오산기지 2005 이시우 2006/05/10 1511

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MILITARY EVENTS
January 2005
Final Decision on Yongsan Dumping “Trial” (Jan 2005) The following is from the Korea Times about a “final” decision on a “toxic dumping” incident. He ordered an employee to dump a gallon of formaldehyde down the drain in 2000 — but what makes this ridiculous was that a Korean company was found to be disposing of toxic waste by the truck loads over a period of years and little was done to the company except a fine. No individuals were prosecuted. This case illustrates the arbitrary nature of Korean justice when it comes to American soldiers. This case was strictly political. The USFK has ALWAYS contended that the USFK has jurisdiction over this case as the “crime” was committed by a USFK employee during USFK duties on USFK property and therefore his punishment fell under the SOFA agreement. He was given a minor disciplinary action in 2001.

USFK Employee Gets Suspended Prison Term for Toxic Dumping
By Lee Jin-woo
Staff Reporter

A local appeals court on Tuesday sentenced Albert McFarland, an American civilian employee of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), to six months imprisonment with the term suspended for two years for instructing his subordinates to dump a toxic substance into the Han River in Seoul in 2000.

The 59-year-old chief of the mortuary at the 8th U.S. Army garrison was convicted of dumping some 227 liters of formaldehyde into the river through a mortuary sewage drain by a Seoul district court in January last year. “Considering conditions of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and other regulations on crimes which occur during peacetime and not in connection to official duty fall under jurisdiction of a Korean court, there should be no doubt over the jurisdiction of this case,” the court said in its ruling.

The court said it had decided to hand down the accused a suspended jail term in consideration of the average sentence given in similar cases.

McFarland uttered the word “regret” after yesterday’s hearing, but is expected to appeal to the top court. McFarland, who was initially accused by Green Korea United, an environmental group in July 2000 for his crime, was indicted by a summary court in March 2001. He was fined 5 million.

But, a Seoul district court judge rejected the penalties by the summary court and ordered him to stand a criminal trial considering the seriousness of the case. The district court handed down a six-month prison term for McFarland in January 2004.

After refusing to appear for trial several times, the USFK civilian employee showed up for an appellate court’s hearing for the first time in December last year.

He was promoted to chief of the mortuary from his previous vice-chief position in June 2001 after he was given a short disciplinary measure under U.S. military regulations, being relieved from his post for 30 days without pay.

February 2005:
USFK Crime Declined in 2004 (Feb 2005 – Sep 2005) Joongang Ilbo reported on 12 Feb 2005 that the “USFK crime rate fell substantially in 2004.” It stated: “The number of crimes committed by U.S. soldiers in Korea dropped significantly last year, according to the National Police Agency. The number of “general offenses,” such as thefts and robberies, committed by U.S. Forces Korea personnel fell from 83 in 2003 to 59 in 2004, the agency said. The number of “special crimes,” including sexual violence, decreased from 98 to 57. Observers attributed the dropoff to reinforced and more frequent patrols by U.S. military police. For several years, military police and local police have jointly patroled the Itaewon area where off-duty soldiers frequently socialize. In addition, soliders have been subject to a midnight curfew, and many bars involved in prostitution have been placed off-limits to U.S. military personnel.” (NOTE: These figures are based on Korean National Police figures for OFF-BASE crimes — not cumulative USFK figures for on-base and off-base crime.)

Interestingly, in March 2005, Yonhap News reported “Crimes Committed by S. Korean Soldiers Drop: Report” It stated that according to the Defense Ministry, a total of 7,777 crimes were committed by South Korean soldiers last year, a decline of 4.1 percent from a year ago. In a report to a parliamentary committee, the ministry said traffic-related crimes took the largest portion with 2,325 cases, followed by 2,120 violent crimes and 1,109 desertions.

On 25 Sep 2005, the Yonhap News reported, “An average 23 criminal incidents take place every day in the South Korean military, with the lion’s share occurring in the Army, data from the Ministry of Defense revealed Sunday. According to the data submitted to Rep. Song Young-sun of the Grand National Party, a total of 37,000 criminal cases have been reported from 2001 to July this year. About 80 percent of them occurred in the Army, followed by the Navy with 13 percent and the Air Force with 7 percent.”

The ROK NGO groups need to ask themselves about the 57 special crimes committed by the USFK troops versus the 2,120 violent crimes by ROK soldiers…but we know the answer already. There is silence…only the accusing finger of the evil USFK soldiers.

On 24 Aug 2005, the Stars and Stripes printed an article that stated that crimes by U.S. troops in S. Korea in 2005 were down 25 percent due to the 4,000 man deployment to Iraq, driving limitations for only senior NCOs and above and dubious “better training” dealing with Korean sensitivities.

The rap sheet: Personal crimes ?Includes murder, assault, robbery, forgery, being absent without leave, disorderly conduct and other violations of orders and regulations 2004 ?1,150 2005 ?713 Drug crimes 2004 ?24 2005 ?24 Suicidal acts 2004 ?24 (including one death) 2005 ?24 (including three deaths) Property crime ?Such as larceny, burglary, shoplifting, and black marketing 2004 ?2,562 2005 ?2,101 Traffic accidents 2004 ?870 2005 ?679 Drunken driving 2004 ?110 2005 ?33 ( Source: USFK )

Provost marshal statistics ?based on offenses, not convictions ?that showed a total of 3,574 crimes between January and June compared with 4,740 for that period in 2004: a 25 percent reduction.

The command implemented the rule in April 2004 in response to a “significant increase of military driving under the influence (DUI),” Oten said. In 2003, 52 of the 77 military drunken driving offenses were committed by E-5s and E-6s. There were 2,725 cars registered to drivers of those ranks on July 1, 2004 but only 1,119 as of July 1 this year.
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ROK Defense White Paper released (Apr 2005) According to the Korea Times the US was committed to dispatch 690,000 troops to Korea in a crisis. This is actually old hat news as the US has made this commitment long ago. According to the article, the Ministry of Defense’s “White Paper” states that in the event of a war on the peninsula, the U.S. would dispatch 690,000 troops, 2,000 aircraft, and 160 naval craft to defend South Korea. The Defense White Paper said the U.S.’ contingency plan included the deployment of 70 percent of its Marine Corps. The remaining forces consisted of 50 percent of the U.S. Air Force and 40 percent of the U.S. Navy.

The planned increase in forces is mainly designed to provide strikes against North Korean field artillery located near the inter-Korean border in the early stage of any war and ensure sea and air superiority with several aircraft carriers. Actually reality says that a carrier group from Yokosuka, Japan with one or two nuclear subs from Guam — with immediate reaction from Kadena and Misawa.

The document said that North Korea has strengthened its missile and artillery forces in an apparent bid to increase striking power with the smallest financial outlay. North Korea increased its field guns by 1,000 to 13,500 over the past four years and has established a missile department in its Defense Ministry. About 70 percent of the 1-million-strong North Korean ground forces are stationed south of the Pyongyang-Wonsan line, which enables Pyongyang to launch a surprise attack without any redeployment. The paper also said that North Korea is believed to have developed one or two nuclear weapons from weapons-grade plutonium extracted before the International Atomic Energy Agency conducted an inspection of nuclear facilities in North Korea in 1992.

The controversial designation of “main enemy” for North Korea was deleted from the Defense White Paper in what appears to be part of Seoul’s efforts to reconcile with Pyongyang. North Korea was described as a “direct military threat” instead. North Korea’s conventional weapons, weapons of mass destruction and its forward deployment of troops were all mentioned as direct military threats to South Korea in the paper. The ministry said it decided to remove main enemy from the official defense document due to the special and dual nature of inter-Korean relations. The paper was published after years of postponement due to a dispute over the term of reference for North Korea. The ministry began labeling North Korea “main enemy” in the paper in 1995, a year after a North Korean official threatened to turn Seoul into “a sea of fire.”

(NOTE: In March 2005, Sen Hyde of the Congressional Foreign Relations Committee stated that without a “main enemy” in Korea, why are we there? This was a pointed attack on the South Korean stance to continue reapproachment with the North while the nuclear issue remains unsettled.)

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Japan Starting the Move to Change the Peace Constitution (Feb 2005-Dec 2005) On Feb 24, 2005, a former Japanese prime minister said Japan should revise its constitution to recognize its individual and collective right to defend itself. In an interview with South Korea’s Yonhap news agency, former Japanese premier Yasuhiro Nakasone said it should be an important responsibility of the government and the state to guarantee national security and defense. He said the proposed constitutional revision means Japan will become an ordinary state. He admitted that the current constitution had contributed to maintaining peace in Japan, but emphasized that defective or anachronistic aspects have been pointed out over the past six decades.

The times have changed. Just as Korea has a “386 generation” so does Japan. Neither personally remembers the poverty and horrors of the WWII, but both view the events historically and react by historical revisionism. The Koreans feel they have been wronged and require repayment for “their” suffering — but the Japanese feel that there has been enough apologies and concessions to Korea. The view point is simply, “Japanese thinking is Japanese — and Korean thinking is Korean. You think what you want, but don’t burden me with your emotional garbage.” The following is an article on 15 Mar 2005 in the Chosun Ilbo:

Japan’s ‘Neocons’ Feel No Debt to Korea
“As there is Korean thinking in Korea, so there is Japanese thinking in Japan. Don’t expect any changes that will transcend the current system.” That was what Nakagawa Shoichi told a delegation of Korean politicians who visited Japan in 2001 to protest against distortions of history in Japanese textbooks.

Four years later, Nakagawa is a core figure in the Japanese Cabinet as minister of economy, trade and industry. His comment is revealing of the mindset of a new generation of Japanese politicians. They believe there should be no more apologies, and Korea should not be shown any exceptional consideration.

The core group of young lawmakers in their 40s and 50s, dubbed “Japan’s neocons”, think in a completely different fashion from the “boei-zoku” – lawmakers with close ties to the Japanese Self Defense Force – and the ethnic nationalists of the past. Core figures of the group include Abe Shinzo, 51, the acting secretary-general of Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and top North Korea hardliner; Ishiba Shigeru, 47, a former minister of state for Defense; Nakagawa Shoichi, 52; and 47-year-old Yamamoto Ichita, who heads the LDP team studying economic sanctions on North Korea.

Since they entered politics, they have moved past factionalism, struck alliances with lawmakers with defense links and formed their own study groups. All are confirmed proponents of changing the Japanese constitution. There are similar groups in the opposition party as well. Maehara Seiji, 48, of the Democratic Party of Japan is so hardline that he once said that if North Korea tested a Taepodong missile, Japan’s Self-Defense Force would shoot it down. The bipartisan “Young Lawmaker’s Group for Establishing Security in the New Century” is the neocons’ Masonic lodge.

Many of the neocons, most of whom inherited their positions, studied abroad. They are fiercely proud of Japan and stress the country’s international role. As members of a postwar generation imagining itself free of responsibility for Japan’s conquests and wartime history, they no longer view the Korea-Japan relationship as in any way special. On the contrary, they want it rebuilt into a “normal relationship”.

Tension and conflicts between Korea and Japan brings out their disposition. A good example are the negotiations for a free trade agreement between the two countries, at a virtual standstill because Japan will not yield on agricultural imports. A Korean Foreign Ministry official said in earlier economic negotiations with Japan, the Koreans only needed to bring up Japan’s past wrongdoings to get the Japanese to concede a point. No longer. Korean negotiators have given up playing the wartime atrocities card, he added.

In a standoff last year over Korea’s decision to print Dokdo Islet stamps, Tokyo sent a statement condemning the stamps through the Universal Postal Union to 190 member nations. In the past, it would have ended at only one protest letter. Nor are Japan’s neocons interested in Korean protests over distortions of history in Japanese textbooks.

Seoul University historian Park Cheol-hee, 42, said Japan’s younger generation of politicians feel no debt over the past. He said previous generations of Japanese politicians showed some degree of special consideration for Korea, but this was simply no longer true.
In March, there is a proposal to change the Constitution to allow the Prime Minister to legally visit the Yosokuni Shrine, a shrine to Japanese War Dead, after a Yokosuka Court ruled that it was unconstitutional for the Prime Minister to visit the shrine under the separation of church and state functions. Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) of Japan New Constitution Foundation Committee plans to ease the law regarding the separation of state and religion. By doing so, religious practices of the nation and local governments that fall into the range of social rituals or customary activities will be acceptable. According to the paper, the LDP intends to secure constitutional support for a prime minister’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, where war criminals are commemorated, by interpreting a politician’s official shrine visits as a tradition. (See Military Affairs: Relocation of USFK — President Roh will NOT allow USFK troops Expanded US Role in NE Asia for expanded discussion of US-Japan relationship.)

The US in turn is testing the waters in Japan with live-fire training exercises at Camp Fuji. This is the location that the US had proposed the relocation of 16,000 Marines from Okinawa — but were stymied after the Japanese invoked Article 9 of the Peace Constitution that stated that troops involved in the US Global Strategy could NOT be stationed on mainland Japan. (NOTE: USFJ faces very important logistical and operational considerations with realignment planning regarding the issue of relocating Marine Corps Air Station Futenma from Okinawa’s crowded Ginowan district. Okinawans long have campaigned for reducing the “footprint” of the U.S. military bases covering a fifth of the island. In 1996, the bilateral Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) adopted a plan to close some bases and consolidate others, reducing land they occupy by 21 percent. Part of that plan included closing Futenma within seven years if an alternate site could be found. After years of political wrangling, a site was chosen in waters off Okinawa’s northeast coast at Henoko, next to Camp Schwab. Currently environmentalists are protesting the new airfield construction. In 2004, up to 16,000 Marines were proposed for movement to Camp Fuji, but quickly scrapped because of Article 9. There are persistent rumors that if Article 9 were changed, the movement of a Marine Expeditionary Unit could take place.)

According to the Stars and Stripes the Marines from Okinawa deployed to Camp Fuji to perform live-fire exercises. Instead of visiting a live-fire training area in northeast Japan, the battery came to Camp Fuji. The firing of the 155mm rounds from the M198 medium towed Howitzer, the Big Gun, was by India Battery of the 3rd Battalion, 12th Marine Regiment, temporarily based on Okinawa (from Camp Lejune, NC) and deployed to Camp Fuji. The battery is part of the Unit Deployment Program that rotates stateside Marine units to Okinawa and the Pacific for six-month intervals. Units usually return home for 18 months after a deployment but due to the war on terror, units’ schedules have been out of whack. The battery returned home from its last deployment for just six months and came back to Okinawa two months ago. Many of the battery Marines were in Camp Fuji less than a year ago. By being overseas, the Marines can see some of the world as well as focus their training.

The visit to Fuji was unexpected, a change of plans necessitated by the scheduling chaos caused when 3rd Marine Division troops went to South Asia for tsunami relief missions. In addition, rotation schedules from stateside are all messed up because of the Iraq conflict with troops shortened times between deployments overseas. This is the new reality in the Global Positioning Strategy where the forces are overstretched.

According to the article, Camp Fuji’s range is one of the few places that allow live fire in Japan. The battery used the smallest charge possible, so the projectiles landed a mere few miles away — but they can go as far as 18 miles with a larger charge. For the training, the Marines lived in the field, despite the chilling winter temperatures. They practice setting up by maneuvering the 16,000-pound guns into place and digging them into the mud and snow. When they’re done firing, the Marines packed up, moved, repositioned and dug the gun in with shovels and sledgehammers. The artillery Marines practiced their jobs, while transportation guys practiced tasks such as digging trucks out of the mud, which after the snows melted, they had plenty of chances to do.

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March 2005
RSOI/FE05 Scaled Back On 2 Mar 2005, the Korea Herald reported that US Marines will not be taking part in the peninsula’s largest annual US-ROK military exercise this spring because of pressing military demands elsewhere, removing a key element from a drill that has long been a target of DPRK ire. The ROK-US Combined Forces will hold an RSOI – Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration exercise and the Foal Eagle drill previously known as Team Spirit – from March 19 to 25, a military source said. The scale of the exercise in terms of the number of participating US troops and logistics material will be considerably smaller apparently because US troops are overstretched with their heavy deployment in Iraq and in relief operations in South Asian countries devastated by the Dec. 26 earthquake-tsunami disasters.

RSOI/FE 05 focuses on a mock battle aimed at evaluating command capabilities to receive US forces from abroad, with troops mobilized for anti-commando operations and computer war games. The US says the exercise is “defense oriented” and designed to improve the ability of allied forces to defend the ROK against external aggression.

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RSOI/FE05 to include Kitty Hawk sailors, Okinawa Marines The Stars and Stripes reported on 8 March that Marines from Okinawa and sailors from Japan will be among the participants in RSOI/FE05 scheduled to kick off March 19 at various locations on the peninsula. According to U.S. and South Korean military officials, the Foal Eagle and Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI) exercises are scheduled to last one week and will involve the USS Kitty Hawk aircraft carrier, Marines on high speed transports and Stryker armored vehicles. The two exercises, combined since 2002, together are the largest annual joint exercise for the two allies.

3d SBCT, 2d ID at Taegu (20 Mar 05)
The 3d Bde SBCT (Stryker Brigade Combat Team), 2d ID from Fort Lewis, Wash., took part in the RSOI/FE05 exercises in Taegu. The 3d SBCT, 2d ID is the envisioned backbone of the mobile force to be stationed in Korea — though the President Roh has drawn a line against the USFK forces being used as a regional force. The 3d SBCT had just completed training and looked as though they would be deployed to Korea when they were shifted to Iraq in Nov 2003. They rotated back to Fort Lewis in Nov 2004 after being replaced by the 1st SBCT, 25th ID in Iraq.

Kitty Hawk arrives in Pusan on 15 March 2005
While the simulated enemy is never named, the exercise scenarios involve an enemy whose characteristics mirror those of North Korea. In a statement released last week announcing the exercise, the Combined Forces Command ?the U.S.-led joint warfighting command with South Korea ?repeated its long-standing statement that the exercises are defensive in nature and intended to improve the ability to defend against an attack. But, North Korea repeated its also long-standing complaints about the exercise, calling it a prelude to an invasion. The RSOI portion of this month’s exercise focuses on rear-area security and how forces coming from outside South Korea would be integrated into the battle. It also covers logistics aspects of South Korean forces.

Anti-War Protestors at Pusan (16 Mar 05)
An article in the Stars and Stripes on 20 Mar stated, “There is no scenario, like a war game. The drills include maneuvering a large group of ships from both nations together in one area of water, protecting commercial ships with port security and escorts and practicing airstrikes over land by Carrier Air Wing 5, part of the strike group. Foal Eagle also allows the two countries’ military leaders to work together. Liaison officers from both countries work aboard each other’s ships and this year a South Korean admiral will command from aboard the Kitty Hawk during the exercise. (SITE NOTE: In peacetime, a ROK admiral commands the ROK forces, while 7th fleet units are controlled from Fleet HQ in Japan. As the JOINT naval forces taking part in the RSOI/FE05 are NOT part of the USFK structure, a ROK naval force leader is the politically correct move. However, in the event of a real outbreak of hostilities, all forces of both the ROK and USFK come under the Combined Forces Command headed by USFK Commander — but whose authority is derived from all supporting nations leaders — including the ROK President.)

USAV Spearhead Cmdr, 1st Flt ROKN

Generals Observing (20 Mar 05)

Opposition Force troops (20 Mar 05)

ROK Tank Movement (20 Mar 05)
The training is a fundamental part of the Forward Deployed Naval Forces, the Navy’s overseas presence, particularly in the region, Turner said. Although the enemy is hypothetical, South Korea technically remains at war with North Korea. And South Korea’s role as a major trading partner with the United States, protecting the seas for security and shipping, is integral. For sailors, the exercise offers a wide variety of training opportunities. “Every ship is going to be involved in some part of the exercise,” Turner said. Participants include the Kitty Hawk, Strike Group 5, Carrier Air Wing 5, six ships from Destroyer Squadron 15 and the USS Cowpens.”

The Choson Ilbo on 23 Mar reported that environmental activists Green Korea United and the Defense Ministry exchanged verbal broadsides over a US nuclear-powered submarine anchored at the naval base in the southern port city of Chinhae. Green Korea United says the sub SSN-688-LA’s mooring at the Chinhae naval base breaches the 1992 Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The Defense Ministry denies this. A USFK spokesman agreed. “It’s true that a nuclear-powered submarine is anchored at a Korean naval base to take part in a military exercise. But no nuclear weapons are loaded on the submarine,” he said. (NOTE: US Nuclear submarines were suspected of having nuclear tipped cruise missiles aboard during the 1994 nuclear standoff with North Korea. Since that time, anytime a nuclear submarine enters Chinhae, the NGO environmental groups have protested the landing on the supposition that the cruise missiles are loaded aboard — while the MND has denied its existence. No other action to prove or disprove the existence of the missiles occurs…only verbal broadsides.)

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Locals Protest against U.S. Firing Range Relocation Plan Yonhap News reported on 7 March 2005 that U.S. moves to establish a new firing range in South Korea are facing opposition from local residents at a proposed site who are concerned about the excessive noise, environmental destruction and potential accidents that may ensue. According to the 2005 fact book produced by the USFK last month, the U.S. intends to shut down its Koon-ni Range in Maehyang-ri, just south of Seoul, and build a new range in Chik-do, 70 kilometers from the southwestern port city of Kunsan.

The US can’t win on this one. The NGO activists have been after the closure of the Kooni Range for years. The ROK claimed it didn’t want to pay any money for upkeep as the US wanted the range and all kinds of silliness was going on. Finally the US said it was closing the range and moving to Chik-do which the Army can use for live-fires of its hell-fire missiles as the Rodriquez Range up near the DMZ is too short. The US has been using the site for years, but not as a primary range.

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USFK Farm Goods to Face Joint Inspections from April (Mar 2005) On 17 Mar Yonhap News stated that South Korean officials and U.S. military personnel will carry out joint quarantine inspections of agricultural products brought into the country for the United States Forces Korea (USFK) starting in April. The U.S. military is currently responsible for quarantine inspections of food imports for consumption by American soldiers stationed here.

The USFK is a very small importer compared to the rest of the economy, but it is significant in its SYMBOLIC role of representing duty-free US imports for US soldiers. Read between the lines as the WTO rules will force open the local markets for rice and other food commodities in 2005. The ROK had a 10 year grace period to shift its farmers to specialty produce or other crops, but latest farm protests indicate that those who did not switch from total reliance on rice will suffer greatly. The country is in a major crisis as the demand for rice is dropping and demand for western style food items increase.

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Decline in vehicle accidents in 2004 In 2004, vehicle and personal injury accidents among 8th Army troops declined by 46 percent from the previous year. Reportable accidents include those that cause a fatality, permanent disability, missed or restricted work or first aid, according to USFK. These statistics don’t include injuries sustained during crimes, pre-existing conditions or self-inflicted wounds, according to USFK.

USFK has added safety measures since the 2002 incident in which a U.S. military vehicle ran over and killed two Korean girls. Some changes include moving oversized, armored vehicles on flatbed trucks, rather than directly on the road. Many of those vehicle movements are now done at night, between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. Four or more vehicles moving together constitute a convoy, which needs a clearance before traveling, according to USFK. According to USFK, 8th Army in 2004 had 25 Army motor vehicle accidents, down from 33 in 2003, a 24 percent drop. On-duty personal injuries fell from 44 in 2003 to 34 in 2004, a 23 percent difference. (NOTE: We wonder what the weighted factor of losing 3,600 troops and vehicles to Iraq had on this drop. However, the driving changes certainly decreased the potential for accidents — but the widening of roads by the ROK in the area also contributed to the safety.)

During the same time, USFK officials limited driving privileges to E-7s and raised the on-base drinking age from 20 to 21. Off-duty accidents also declined, from 26 in 2003 to 17 in 2004, a 35 percent decrease. (NOTE: We wonder what weighted factor of fewer eligible drivers had on this drop. We wonder what the drinking age has to do with driving safety as the 20-21 age group are NOT in the E-7 driving age group.)

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Two GIs facing “special larceny” charges from ROK for alleged thefts from Tongduchon nightclubs (Mar 2005) According to a Stars and Stripes article on 22 Mar 2005, South Korean authorities are prosecuting two U.S. soldiers who allegedly stole or destroyed about $6,000 worth of goods from several Tongduchoen nightclubs on Dec 26, 2004.

What we find strange in this report is the that monies involved are punishable IMMEDIATELY under ROK law — as the amounts constitute “grand theft.” The ROK has exercised jurisdiction over much smaller amounts in the past — i.e., taxi driver theft. Also it is strange that the prosecutor mentioned that several bars were involved. The report calls for a “restitution” order that had not been acted on, but this would have involved US Army involvement under the SOFA.

What we also find strange is that the Town Patrol would have been notified and involved in such an investigation. If the identity of the military individuals were known to the ROK investigators, they were certainly known to the USFK. The failure of military authorities to act would constitute a major “coverup” — if not UCMJ offense for responsible investigative parties. There is something missing in this report — but we don’t know what it is.

According to the article:

Prosecutor Ha Chung-hyen of the Uijongbu District Public Prosecutor’s Office said last week that charges were filed on March 9 against a 2nd Infantry Division private and another U.S. soldier. The charges include “special larceny” of money and goods from clubs operated by the Korean Special Tourist Association, which serves only U.S. customers.

The soldiers are charged with breaking a lock of the door of a bar, stealing $100, breaking into another four bars in Tongduchoen and stealing money and goods worth about $6,000 on Christmas Day and Dec. 26, 2004, according to the prosecutor’s office.

The soldiers allegedly threw 30 bottles of alcohol, two boxes of beer and two sound systems on the floor of one nightclub, causing about $3,500 damage, according to the Yonhap news agency.

The prosecutor’s office ordered the soldiers, who have not been arrested, to return a laptop computer taken in one of the incidents and compensate to the victims. However, two months after the order was issued, restitution still has not been made, the report said.

The prosecutor decided to press charges because “the accused U.S. soldiers haven’t made any minimum efforts to make compensation for the damages,” according to Yonhap.

Ha was quoted as saying the case was prosecuted to emphasize that the South Korean prosecutor has the ability to exercise jurisdiction over such offenses by U.S. soldiers.

U.S. Forces Korea spokesman Lt. Col. Tom Budzyna said he couldn’t confirm any details of the case until South Korean authorities released the names of the accused.

So far there are no formal charges by the U.S. military, he said. Victims of alleged vandalism and theft may file claims against soldiers under Article 139, Uniform Code of Military Justice. Such claims will be fully investigated, and if found true, the soldier’s pay may be directed to the victim until the amount of the loss is paid, Budzyna said.

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13th Air Force HQ leaving Guam for Hawaii 5th AF moved from Yokota to Anderson? Now 13th AF moves to Hickam? And someone needs to explain that there are no plans afoot.

13th AF will move in May move from Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, to Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii, comes in conjunction with the activation of a provisional war-fighting headquarters at Hickam assigned to plan and execute military operations in the Pacific theater, excluding the Korean peninsula, where military operations will fall under another war-fighting headquarters in the works exclusively for that region.

The 13th Air Force staff will form the core of the new war-fighting headquarters, said Maj. Gen. Edward A. Rice Jr., 13th Air Force commander, during Tuesday’s news conference at Andersen. According to an Air Force release, the Hawaii headquarters will provide:

Unity of command of air, space and information operations forces.
Round-the-clock, immediate Air Operations Center capability.
Rapid deployment anywhere in the Pacific.
A focused commitment to regional security and engagement.
Support for combined force leadership in the region.
The war-fighting headquarters is slated to move from provisional status in the fall. The new headquarters will have about 180 authorized positions when it reaches full strength.

The remaining 1,820 positions at Andersen will remain intact under the 36th Air Expeditionary Wing.

Despite the 13th Air Force move, the buildup on Guam that has taken place in recent years will continue, military officials say. “Our plans to use and leverage the strategic capabilities that are resident here are unchanged,” Rice said. Plans for the island include an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance strike task force; a regional training campus at now-unused Northwest Field; fighters, tankers and bombers in rotation; and a combat civil engineering unit. The Air Force plans to spend about $500 million to prepare for the new missions. “Guam will see a sustained commitment, probably unlike they’ve seen in recent history, not just by the Air Force but by the United States military to take advantage of the unique aspects that are offered here,” Rice said.

EPILOGUE: Throughout 2005, Guam gained more and more significance and the headquarters of the 3rd MEB would move to Guam — drawing down the troops in Okinawa. There was talk of stationing a nuclear carrier at Guam — and having a Naval Air Wing at Anderson. The civil government — unlike Korea and Japan — warmly welcome any new forces stationed in Guam. More and more there are hints of expansion of Guam if the plans to restructure the forces in Japan meet roadblocks. This is a continuing story, but will not see light until the Article 9 of the Japanese Peace Constitution is changed giving the JSDF regional defense authorization — and in effect, reducing the US forces commitment in Japan. Then some radical movements may occur.

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ROK to have Wartime Control? (Mar 2005) According to a Korea Herald editorial on 25 Mar 2005, “The atmosphere for South Korea taking over command of operations in wartime from American troops is becoming ripe, despite worries of a security vacuum. Experts say it is inevitable that wartime control will return to Korea because of changes in the defense situation between the two allies. Recently, U.S. officials expressed a positive outlook on the issue, apparently connected with the United States Forces Korea’s ongoing reduction of its troop presence and efforts to become more agile in dealing with regional contingencies. While Seoul has control of its military in peacetime, the Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command, currently headed by a U.S. four-star general, has the wartime command, which was delegated to the U.S. forces during the 1950-53 Korean War. The general also heads the USFK and American-led United Nations Command, which governs the armistice of the Korean War.”

But this is wishful thinking — but there may be some truth in work. In the RSOI/FE05 the exercise naval operations was commanded by a 4 star ROK admiral.

On March 8, President Roh again spoke of his ambition to take over wartime operation within 10 years in his “self-reliant defense” vision — which most consider unrealistic due to the expense involved. However, in poking the US in the eye again, the US — especially US Congress — may be ready to give the ROK what it wants. However, this will be all dependent on the US falling back to Japan and the USFK command authority moving out of the ROK.

In the background we have South Korea taking over some USFK missions and ongoing American troop cuts by 12,500 to 25,000 by year 2008. South Korean troops have been taking over 10 major operations that the USFK was previously in charge of, including Joint Security Area duty, close aviation support and counterfire artillery attacks — but it should be noted that it is not because they want to, but because the USFK is moving off the DMZ. Also they had to beg the USFK to retain the ATACMS launchers and also continue to live under the USFK Patriot Missile batteries.

Some military officials predicted the issue of wartime control will emerge soon as a key topic in the Security Policy Initiative talks on USFK’s strategic flexibility and mutual defense concerns. Rumsfeld said the Korean military is assuming a greater share of the responsibility for providing the deterrent and the defensive capability on the Korean Peninsula, while USFK will focus on sea and air power for support. But also

Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-ung recently said he aims to increase the defense budget to 3.2 percent of the GDP from the current 2.8 percent by 2008. Unfortunately, the 3.2 mark was what the ROK “promised” over five years ago. The government is to deploy 40 F-15K Strike Eagles by August 2008 in a $3.6 billion contract with Chicago-based Boeing — though the contract was much maligned as the better French jet was beaten by the ROK changing the rules on the bid. The ROK plans to suggest a re-bid for the 2 trillion won ($1.3 billion) project to build four Airborne Early Warning and Control systems, commonly known as AWACS, between 2009 and 2011. Unfortunately, it has continued to postpone acting because of lack of funds and looks to lower the bids while increasing technology transfers. Like most of its programs, they are shuffled around (reprioritized). By 2009, it will deploy eight more P-3 patrol aircraft, which are used primarily to detect prowling enemy submarines. Also, the Army has fielded another multiple rocket launching battalion consisting of 29 launchers and 310 extended range ammunition pods, a key asset to counter North Korea’s conventional-rocket attacks. (SEE Military Events: October 2005: President Roh Pushes for War-time Control for continuation.)

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Taxi Fare hike for On-base Cabs in Korea (Mar 2005) Previously Area I and Area II cabs increased their fares in early March. Then taxi fares for on-base cabs in Area III (Osan, Kunsan and Camp Humphries) was to be raised on April 1. The initial charge for taxis will jump from $1.50 to $1.80 and the “per unit” charge – based on a combination of distance and time – will increase from 25 cents to 30 cents.

The price hikes for all Areas was the result of a combination of factors including the rising cost of driving the cabs and retaining drivers, rising fuel prices (also set by AAFES) and the South Korean won’s rising value against the U.S. dollar. In March 2004, gas prices at on-base stations in South Korea were $1.62 per gallon for regular unleaded fuel. This month, the price was set at $1.95 per gallon.

Cab fares off base may be on the rise as well. Seoul city officials are considering raising taxi fares by 19.5 percent. That would increase the starting fare in “general” taxis, normally silver or white cabs, from 1,600 won to 2,000 won (about $1.98).

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A Republic of Korea Air Force A-37 with the 238th Tactical Fighter Squadron, followed by two A-10s from the 25th Fighter Squadron, taxi down the runway at Wonju Air Base. Pilots from the 25th FS along with 10 maintainers and a five-person security forces team from Osan Air Base, Republic of Korea, took part in the Buddy Wing program in late February. (ROKAF Photo) (Feb 2004) (NOTE: The program was made into a monthly schedule because of the benefits to both parties.)

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36th TFS dropping flare ( 36th Fiends Site )

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April 2005:
US and ROK Military Alliance in Trouble (Apr 2005-Dec 2005) Throughout this whole fiasco with the ROK refusing to pay for its “share” of its defense and openly supplying aid to the North, both the ROK Foreign Ministry and Ministry of Defense continued to maintain the relationship was strong. However, the fact is that there is indeed some deep problems as the ROK under Roh Moo-hyun continues to move towards the left and attach itself to the North. The crux of the problem is that the ROK in supporting the North has negated the very reason for the existence of the USFK. The ROK has continued to push for a self-reliant defense with the ROK having authority of its forces in case of a war. (See Roh Starts Third Year: ROK Self-Reliant Defense in BIG TROUBLE for details.) In Oct 2005, Donald Rumsfeld announced that the US would no longer be a “patron” of the ROK military, but rather become a “partner” in the relationship. In other words, the US was NOT going to pay for the massive upgrade programs that the ROK needed to undertake to become “self-reliant,” but would remain a “partner” — under the Mutual Defense Treaty — to “support” the ROK in case of hostilities. With the rising anti-Americanism in Korea, the public opinion in the US is turning against the ROK and now US congressmen are openly questioning the US-ROK alliance. The culmination of the Japan-US security agreement in Oct 2005, the US seems to be headed towards relocating its forces to Japan and Guam — and reducing its forces in Korea. (See Military Events: Revising Japanese Peace Constitution May Spell Big Trouble for ROK (Oct 2005) for details.)

According to Chosun Ilbo on 8 April 2005, a letter sent to the Ministry of Defense (MND) in which Washington officially told Seoul of its plan to eliminate its War Reserve Stocks for Allies-Korea (WRSA-K), ordinance stored on the Korean Peninsula for use in an emergency meaning first weeks of a war. The letter dated May 20, 2004 was signed by then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and addressed to South Korea’s then-Defense Minister Cho Yung-kil following several years of discussion. According to the letter, the Pentagon formally notified the ROK MND that it would end the war reserve stocks program in December 2006. According to the USFK, the letter “provided a two-and- a-half- year notification to allow for adjustments to the loss of the program.” The USFK stress that “the U.S. government never intended for WRSA-K to be a permanent program. With the ROK becoming the 11th largest economy in the world, the program outlived its original purpose and was deemed no longer necessary a few years ago.” When Dong-A Ilbo reported in April about U.S. plans to terminate WRSA, the MND boasted, “If WRSA is abolished, there will be no negative effect on the Korean military’s war fighting capability.” In reality, however, two months later, it asked the U.S. for a new agreement. The answer came back that there would be no new agreement and that the ROK is on its own in replenishing its war readiness materials. The US bluntly told the ROK it must purchase its ammunition without the US support it has had in the past. (See WRSA-K stockpiles to be Dumped??? for details.)

The USFK, US State Department and Department of Defense reiterated the same phrases. In July 2005, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld AGAIN stated that the USFK head position would remain a 4-star General slot and the numbers would not fall below 25,000 after 2008. At least that is what Rumfield told a group of retired Korean generals. However, despite all these reassurances, most pundits recognize that the ROK-US alliance is on extremely shaky ground.

Verbal promises do NOT hold weight when it comes to actions of expediency. Only a signed document can be trusted — but we also know that the ROK in dealing with the Yongsan move has treated the National Assembly approved MOU as toilet paper.

A Presidential summit was held in June 2005 in the face of deteriorating US-ROK relationships between Bush and Roh. Ostensibly it was to show a unified face to get the North Koreans back to the negotiating table on the nuclear issue. However, the more immediate issues were discussed dealing with the ROK refusal to allow the USFK troops to be used in a regional role — which puts the US and ROK on a head-on collision path. Pundits pointed out that “friends” are greeted at the George Bush ranch in Texas, while others are greeted in Washington. After this summit, Roh no longer stirred the pot over the opposition to the US regional role. The fact was whether Roh wanted it or not, it was going to happen. If Roh pushed the button, the US would pull back to Guam and Japan — and the ROK would sink into oblivion.

(SITE NOTE: In Oct 2005, Roh again pushed the “war-time” commander button — wanting control of the Korean forces in time of war, a condition. This is a condition that will NEVER happen as long as the US holds the CFC commander position with a mandate from the UN. The combined command was formed in 1978 to enhance both countries’ combat readiness. Each year, American and South Korean servicemembers train together in two major exercises Ulchi Focus Lens and RSOI (Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration) to prepare in case of war. In 1992 a ROK general as Deputy Commander of the CFC was rejected by North Korea as the CFC representative to head the Panmunjon Armistice panel because the South never signed the Armistice. Shortly thereafter, ROK pulled its forces out of the CFC during peacetime and would only join the CFC during wartime — though it continued to exercise together in Team Spirit (until done away with); Ulchi Focus Lens and Foal Eagle. (SEE Roh Pushes for War-time Control of ROK Forces)

The only way the ROK troops under the CFC could be returned to ROK control in war-time is to abrogate the US-ROK alliance and terminate the CFC — without which there would no longer be any requirement to position troops in Korea. The US would simply promise to support the ROK if it were invaded under the Mutual Defense Treaty — which unlike other treaties has a attachment that any entry of US forces must be approved by the US Congress and if the ROK starts any conflict with its neighbors, the US will not enter the fray.

In the 6-7 Dec 2005 Security Policy Initiative (SPI), Korea proposed to increase its weight in command over combined Korea-U.S. ground forces. It asked for an increase in the proportion of Korean commanders in the Ground Component Command (GCC), which is currently headed by a Korean general but whose command posts are equally held by the both sides. The two countries agreed that Korea should take more responsibility for its own defense, and increasing the country’s weight in the GCC was part of that. The SPI, in a nutshell, agreed to “discuss details” at the Nov 2006 Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) and to set up committees on both sides to “study” the matter as it would be impacted by a multitude of factors — including the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula and the status change of the USFK.

Unfortunately, it appears that the ROK strategy is to gain control of the US hardware AND the ROK forces by placing its commanders in key positions. Currently the CFC has a ROK general as the deputy commander. The ROK spokesman stated that it will ask for an increase in the proportion of Korean commanders in the Ground Component Command (GCC), which is currently headed by a Korean general but whose command posts are equally held by the both sides. What was left unsaid was that the ROK did NOT want to fund the 4CSI computer interfaces that would have made these dual positions unnecessary. In addition, the GCC during peace time is under the ROK control, but during war, it reverts to the CFC structure with the triple-hatted USFK/CFC/UN commander assuming command of all forces — with the battle strategies approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of both the US and ROK. The MND stated that it would ask what will be additionally transferred to Korean forces after 2007, besides the 10 duties now handled by U.S. Forces Korea that are expected to be turned over to South Korean forces next year.

At the same time, the Defense Ministry spokesman dismissed as “groundless” reports in the overseas press that U.S. forces could pull out of Korea within a decade by the British magazine, the Economist in late Nov 2005. This is not the first report of this kind, but it is becoming more and more prevalent in news and analyst reports as the trend in realigning forces show that they are moving to smaller, more flexible units — just as Australia announced. The Economist article stated that the US was looking to reposition some of its forces to “friendly” nations such as Singapore, India or Australia.)
Row over Oplan 5027/5029 In early 2005, the NGO groups again resurfaced the row over the Oplan 5027 (with its many scenarios of the North invading South Korea) and Oplan 5029 (the Collapse of North Korea) — two scenarios where the crux being “taking the fight North.” According to GlobalSecurity.org: OPLAN 5027 , “During Phase 1, US-ROK forces would conduct a vigorous forward defense aimed at protecting Seoul. Their campaign would be dominated by combined-arms ground battles waged with infantry, artillery, and armor. US air and naval forces would conduct close air support, interdiction, and deep strike missions. After Phase 1, US-ROK operations in Phase 2 would probably focus on seizing key terrain, inflicting additional casualties on enemy forces, and rebuffing further attacks. Phase 3, to start when the US ground buildup was complete and ROK forces were replenished, would be a powerful counteroffensive aimed at destroying the DPRK’s military power. The war plan envisions amphibious assaults into North Korea by US Army and Marines at the narrow waist of North Korea. The entire resources of the US Marine Corps would flow there to establish a beachead, with substantial Army resources quickly conducting over-the-shore operations.” (NOTE: Oplan 5026 deals with surgical strikes by F-117 Stealth fighters or B-2 Bombers that would NOT lead to a Theater War — and was tested in the building in Mar 2003. Oplan 5028 (PACOM CONPLAN 5028-96) differs from Oplan 5027 in the forces available.)

Because the Roh administration refused to engage in the Oplan 5027 review process — the Oplan was renamed the “Concept Plan (CONPLAN) 5029″ to be less offensive, though the USFK continues to refer to it as Oplan 5027. But in the end, the ROK government suspended the US-ROK CFC review process by citing that “it could provoke the North.” But the major point is that by repudiating the Oplan 5027, the Roh Administration has repudiated the process that there exists a state of conflict between the North and the South. As such, the premise for the existence of the USFK is invalidated. THE ALLIANCE STARTED TO BECOME VERY SHAKY FROM THIS POINT ON. (See Oplan 5029 Trashed by NSC for further details.)

This hubbub over the Oplans is not new. In 2003, there was a great todo about Oplan 5030 because it called for setting up conditions whereby the North would implode upon itself — either economically or through the power struggle for leadership. Directed by Sec of Defense Rumsfeld in May 2003, the concept was to aid in the collapse of the North by setting up situations that would overtax the weakened military and bring about its collapse — and included disrupting financial networks and strategic disinformation activities. (Source: 21 July 2003 edition of US News and World Report article by Bruce B. Auster and Kevin Whitelaw.) The part that the ROK objected to was the plans to conduct an invasion of the North to set up the South as head of the new government in the North to return stability to the area. The frenzy in the Korean press subsided but has been resurfaced repeatedly since then.

However, international think tanks believe that the ROK is sticking its head in the ground if it believes the inevitable collapse of the North can be contained. In 2004, it was found the South is TOTALLY unprepared for a massive breach of the DMZ as refugees flood south. It was found they have only seven public buildings identified to house those refugees that get across the DMZ and no contingency plans beyond a vague conceptual plan. The Oplan 5030 sets up the scenario for such an occurrence, but the ROK does not want to even talk about it — along with Oplan 5027/5029.

According to a 9 Nov 2005 Donga Ilbo article Professor Barnett stated, “U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick, for the first time as a high official, discussed it with his Chinese counterpart, which I checked myself with intelligence sources in the administration.? However, he said, 밒nstead of detailed discussions, the U.S. approached the concept as if to 몆lant a new seed,뮅 adding, 밯hether or not this issue (post-Kim Jong Il era) will be discussed in depth is not a matter of 멼f?but 몏hen.뮅 Meanwhile, Russia뭩 representative expert on the Korean peninsula, Andrey Lankov of the Australian National University, said in a phone conversation with a reporter on the same day, 밫he incumbent North Korean officials won뭪 be able to sustain more than 20 years,?predicting, 밃round 2025, the North will collapse in the order of a military coup and civilian reforms led by the middle class in North Korea.?Lankov added, 밃s for now, Cheong Wa Dae is thinking of its desired version of gradual reunification, but in reality it does not make sense,?adding, 밒t should prepare for emergencies.?

ROK Military Intel FULLY Reliant on USFK The ROK is totally reliant on USFK intelligence capabilities — but it refuses to foot the bill for its C4I (command, control, communications, computers and Intelligence) computer upgrades to make the USFK and ROK systems compatible. When the ROK refused to pay its share, the USFK simply allowed the situation to remain at the status quo. This created a totally unhealthy relationship where ROK units will rely on US intel without a direct interface.

As such the ROK does NOT want the 501st Intel to move from Yongsan because of its importance to the ROK military. However, after Donald Rumsfeld stated that the Yongsan Garrison was going to close, the retaining of the 501st at Yongsan becomes somewhat murkey.

As far as intelligence, it is widely known that the US does NOT trust the ROK in sharing its intelligence capabilities — just as the ROK refuses to share any intelligence on the North found out through debriefs of North Korean defectors. The intel that is transferred to the ROK is on an “as required” basis — not something that a trusted ally would do. One wonders how much of the information garnered from the daily U2 North Korea over-flights from Osan AB reaches the ROK AF Operations Center (AFOC) for its operations planning. The AFOC operates as a “peacetime” element and is NOT part of the CFC daily operations.

In 2005, the ROK refused to pay for the upgrades to their computer systems to make them compatible with the USFK systems. They wanted the USFK to pick up the tab — which was promptly refused. After months of uneasy wrangling, the matter was simply left as is — with the ROK and USFK systems incompatible. The Global Command and Control System-Korea (GCCS-K) and combined secure videoteleconferencing provide this “go-to-war” C2 capability. However, that being said, it should be noted that Korea has GCCS and GCCS-K operating simultaneously. Information on the GCCS terminal (classified secret ?no foreign nationals) cannot be downloaded onto GCCS-K (classified secret ?ROK/United States). Information on the GCCS system has to be filtered before releasing to ROK military authorities.

USFK is searching for an effective firewall that will permit using one terminal to access GCCS and GCCS-K. But until that time comes, it뭩 common to find workstations with separate GCCS and GCCS-K terminals, distinct circuits stored in safes, and different wiring and peripherals to support the two systems. U.S. forces use jam-resistant, frequency-hopping SINCGARS. The Korean military uses single-channel radios. Consequently, U.S. military forces in Korea have to use SINCGARS in single-channel mode to exchange information with South Korean military counterparts in the field. This increases the potential for North Korea to jam that frequency.

America뭩 Maneuver Control System can only pass analog data to its Korean counterpart. This effectively reduces the command뭩 ability to receive and transmit real-time digital information from/to our Korean counterparts. For example, a forward observer requesting fire support from a Korean artillery battery would have to pass information through U.S. systems. The information would then have to be converted into a format ROK forces could download into their systems to provide artillery support. (Source: C4I Korea)
However, the major question that crops up is how long before the real time intl information from the USFK system can be transferred to the ROK system in time of war. As the ROK is assuming duties such as artillery return fire in case the North delivers a surprise attack, how long before the USFK high-tech systems that plot artillery information can be transferred to the ROK units without the specialized electronics that are on the M109A6 Paladins. The M109A6 Paladin can target INCOMING rounds and track their trajectory back to the source and return fire BEFORE the other side can move their positions. It is thought that this is the reason the Iraqi Elite Republican Guards did not use their artillery against the onrushing American forces in Iraq. The ROK has none of these advanced weapons — but the ROK has been given the return fire artillery mission in 2005. The “patch-fix” is that the USFK M270 MLRS and M109A6 Paladin units remain on the DMZ and would be used to support the ROK artillery return fire mission in time of war. (See ROK to Take Over Artillery Fire as of August 2005 for details.)

USFK Subtle Hints that there may be Major Drawdown in the Near Future There are subtle signs that the US relationship has changed drastically. Starting in Jan 2005, there seemed to be subtle hints that the US was considering pulling out of the CFC — or downgrading its involvement in Korea’s defense. The US removed its last forces stationed directly on the DMZ in 2005. The USFK has signed off on turning over ten tasks to the ROK as it disengaged from the DMZ. The first task was the turning over of the artillery response to any North Korean attack in Sep 2005 over to the ROK. Though the USFK officially signed off on the transfer in Sep 2005, this function can only be performed with the USFK’s ATACMS M270 MLRS and M109A6 Paladins. The USFK M270 MLRS and M109A6 Paladins are the backbone of the ROK response and are now supposedly under ROK command in time of war. The mission transfer was a part of the Mission Transfers Agreement approved by the 25th ROK-U.S. Military Commission Meeting in 2003. But the MLRS and Paladins being under the ROK in time of war is really irrelevant as the ROK has now assumed the tasking and the USFK signed off on it in October 2005 which was the main thing.

The USFK numbers do NOT seem to agree with the Korean articles — and numbers recently released by a Korean politician. According to the listing at Order of Battle: 2nd ID Division Artillery the numbers given in the ROK article do NOT match with USFK numbers. Currently there are 18 155mm M109A6 Paladins in country as the 2nd BN, 17th Field Artillery was sent to Iraq in Aug 2004. There are about 36 M270 MLRS (Multiple Launcher Rocket System). According to GlobalSecurity.org: DIVARTY, 2nd Infantry Division, “In order to execute that mission, DIVARTY employs two 155mm Direct Support Cannon Battalions, one Multiple Launch Rocket System-Army Tactical Missile System (MLRS/ATACMS) battalion, a separate MLRS/ATACMS battery, a target acquisition battery and a headquarters and headquarters battery. These units have a total of more than 2,000 highly trained and focused U.S. and Korean Augmentee to the U.S. Army (KATUSA) soldiers and support thThe remaining units will become part of the 6th Cavalry, which is now at Camp Humphreys. e Warrior Division from six separate camps.” DIVARTY, 2nd Infantry Division (Camp Stanley) – Divisional Artillery, (NOTE: Orbat also lists 1-37 FA, Fort Lewis with 18 M109A6 SPA 155mm: A-38 FA; F-26 FA the location of 3rd BDE, 2d ID, the Stryker Combat Team.)
As the 2d ID reshuffles its units off the DMZ, it was supposed to relocate to Camp Humphreys. However, we have noted that ALL the ROK requests to retain the Apache Longbows on the DMZ have not been realized. Instead the units have been relocated OUT OF KOREA. The 1st Bn, 52nd Avn. Regt. split with 300 soldiers and their twenty-four UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters departing for Fort Wainwright, Alaska. However, at the same time, the unit is leaving 150 soldiers in Korea with the 1st Btn C-12 Hurons to shuttle VIPs (operating as a separate company). The 2nd Btn CH-47 Chinooks to provide medium lift capabilities with eight Chinooks departing stateside in Apr 2005, but eight Chinooks remaining in Korea. The remaining units will become part of the 6th Cavalry, which is now at Camp Humphreys. Aviation battalions serving with the 17th Aviation Brigade restructured as a part of the Army뭩 goal of transforming into 뱔nits of action.? Eventually, the units that remain in South Korea will become part of the 2nd Aviation Brigade. The new unit, called a Multi-Functional Aviation Brigade (MFAB), is being set up Armywide and combines the service’s AH-64D Apaches, UH-60 Black Hawks, and CH-47 cargo helicopters ?into a single unit.

The USFK combined Corps and Division taskings to form a more flexible unit. The ROK has assumed the tasking for return artillery fire along the DMZ and other taskings such as the bridges are being turned over to the ROK as well. Tanks in Korea that were requested by the ROK to remain on the DMZ are being reduced. 2nd Battalion, 72nd Armor was inactivated with the reduction from 3 to 2 Battalions. The number of 8th Army tanks in South Korea dropped from 140 to 55

The bases are consolidating under the Land Partnership Program (LPP) at a rapid rate and seems well on track. The base realignment’s next phase will involve the return of six Western Corridor bases vacated by 2nd ID last year. The U.S. is scheduled to return the facilities to the South Korean government in December 2005 — as is ahead of schedule on most. (See Seven Camps to close in 2005 for camp closures 2004-2006.)

In Dec 2005, 65th Ordnance Company cased its colors at Camp Casey. The 65th Ordnance Company was the most forward-deployed in the 6th Ordnance Battalion and was responsible for managing more than 41,000 tons of ammunition covering 410 square miles at dozens of points along the Demilitarized Zone. The company was given two months notice that it was going to be deactivated — about the same time the ROK took over the return fire mission and the USFK officially stepped out of providing munitions for the under the now extinct WRSA-K system. This is just one example of how things are swiftly moving ahead on the USFK end — but the ROK end remains clouded in mystery whether it can sustain its end of the defense mission.

However, the ROK promises under the LPP programs STILL have not been realized. Such weak excuses as the MND expected to pay for the purchases of land through the sale of the Yongsan Garrison being thwarted by Seoul City and other groups with their own plans for the areas. The bottom line is that the land is being returned by the USFK under the LPP, but the ROK is not holding up its part of the LPP agreement. Strangely, planning for the scheduled move of the 2nd ID south to Camp Humphreys in 2008 has not started as yet according to 2d ID sources — though a Brigadier General position was opened at Camp Humphreys from USFK HQ at Yongsan specifically to smooth the transition of the Yongsan units and 2d ID to the area. In addition, Camp Stanley is no longer owned by the 2d ID, but has changed hands with the 501st which has support units throughout the peninsula. This is because the facility closures have reduced the number of buildings maintained in Area I from 5,000 to 3,000. Starting with a cadre of around 200 personnel, Camp Stanley is expected to grow to 2000 as troops are moved there following camp closures along the DMZ. In other words, the NON-ESSENTIAL fighting elements have moved to the front and the restructured Air Cav units have been moved to Camp Humphreys. Thus the statement that the moves were not started as yet is misleading. However, the land promised by the ROK for the moves to Camp Humphreys is still up in the air, but the USFK is rotating its people into Camp Humphreys to convert units to smaller combined “Units of Action” as part of the Army restructuring.

The 2d ID completed a transformation process in 2005 that included redeploying a brigade of several thousand troops, first to Iraq and then to the United States. Its remaining forces are being consolidated at bases in the South Korean cities of Uijeongbu (Camp Red Cloud) and Dongducheon (Camp Stanley). The number of AH-64 attack helicopters has thinned from 70 to 50, and the number of UH-60s and other transport choppers from 200 to 70. the number of MA-1A Abrams tanks decreased from 140 to 120, and the number of Bradley M2A3 Infantry / M3A3 Cavalry Fighting Vehicles from 180 to 100. Stinger missile teams have been reduced from 36 to 25 — but these Avenger Pedestal-Mounted Stinger vehicle units have been around for twenty years and will be eventually shipped stateside anyway and reconverted into new missile systems under the Air Defense Artillery. Thus far troops are only leaving the ROK from the DMZ with some units being split and combined with those at Camp Humphreys to form “new” tactical units — smaller and supposedly more versatile in meeting contingencies. However, the operative word is they are smaller. Things are still up in the air.

Many taskings that were formerly located in the ROK have been simply deactivated or transferred to the ROK control. For example, the capability of the Quartermaster Corps to provide showers and changes of clothing in the forward areas was deactivated and sent stateside. Another example is the the 7th Korean Service Corps was activated to handle the transport of 2d ID heavy equipment (tanks and tracked vehicles) to the DMZ training areas in Nov 2005. The company took over the responsibility from the 2d ID, 702d Support Battalion at Camp Stanley and Camp Mobile. It will operate 24 heavy equipment transporters (HET), giant 48-wheeled trucks able to move some of the Army’s largest weapons, including Bradley fighting vehicles and Abrams main battle tanks. The HETs move at night to avoid congestion with Korean National Police escorts. The KSC is a paramilitary organization formed in 1950, during the Korean War, when U.S. commanders needed manpower to move supplies. It was nicknamed the “A-Frame Army” during the war because its members, all civilians, used A-frame backpacks to carry ammunition, rations and even wounded servicemembers in and out of isolated places. This is part of the transfer of responsibility for transport to the Republic of Korea who were to construct a railroad from Camp Humphreys to the Rodriquez Firing Range near the DMZ, but which still has not started.

At Yongsan in Nov 2005, the 19-year old 175th Finance Command cased its colors and merged into the 19th Theater Support Command. The mission is the same, but just under a new command structure. Supposedly the 175th is the first financial command to go to a new model that will eventually be used Armywide. Also in Nov 2005 it was announced that by July 2006, Area I and the Camp Red Cloud garrison would merge to form a “Super garrison” encompassing three camps in the Uijeongbu enclave and with control over the Camp Casey “Sub garrison.” There were no plans for job cuts, but the impacts were still not known. Merging Area I and the Red Cloud garrison, which have separate headquarters at Red Cloud, was to provide more efficient services. The Area I super garrison will be organized along the same lines as super garrisons that have existed for many years in areas II, III and IV. Bottom line is that troops are leaving Yongsan (through attrition) under the umbrella of the “Super garrison” concept.

There are a whole lot of things that are going on within the USFK that are not being publicly announced. What we find strange is that at Camp Humphreys, all the new construction is referred to as “old construction” plans — leaving one to draw some strange conclusions. In Nov 2005, the construction of barracks at K-16 (Kimpo) under a “build-to-lease” program was to be used as the model for Camp Humphreys. This would end the commitment of US funding up front. In addition, some trivial signs seem out of place. For example, the 2d ID just sent 11 tons of museum artifacts to Fort Carson for storage. What seemed strange was that a prized trophy cup used as a ceremonial drinking cup had been recently refurbished at a major expense — only to be sent off to storage. This was a tradition — and the Army does not abandon traditions lightly. The museum will remain but be a much stripped down model.

After months of foot-dragging, the ROK STILL has not procured the land…and it is starting to bear all the features of the Yongsan Garrison move that started in 1990 — and ended up with the return to the status quo. The government supposedly started on June 14 to purchase land for the replacement facilities for the closed U.S. bases. It was supposed to finish buying the land in Pyeongtaek by the end of 2005 — but as of 25 Dec 2005, the protestors still remain adamant. (SITE NOTE: In Dec 2005, the Ministry of Defense pleaded for “understanding” from the people of Pyeongtaek over the move to Camp Humphreys and at the same time, the government announced the plan to build an “international city” in Pyeongtaek. It makes it appear very strange that the two would happen simultaneously — especially when the time suspense to procure the land was the end of 2005. Construction has started in portions of Camp Humphreys in the grading and earth removal phases of construction continuing into the winter months. However, the major portions of land outside the perimeter still has not been settled. The government announced on 27 Dec 2005 that 80 percent of the land had been procured, but 20 percent would have to be “condemned” with court approval.)

Excuses from the MND stating that they wanted to use the money from the sale of the Yongsan garrison to fund the move — but can’t because of the conflicting plans by the City of Seoul for the property. In addition, meeting the costs needed for the base relocation must be dealt with as part of the national defense budget. It is separate from plans to make use of the returned land to pay for the move. The costs of moving the U.S. Army bases nationwide need to be handled in connection with the realignment of the U.S. forces on a national level. Throw in the Seoul intransigence in relocating the US Embassy until finally the Embassy stated that it would take a portion of Camp Coiner at Yongsan in lieu of its other property. Then the ROK wanted certain USFK elements to remain in Yongsan, which in turn brought about renegotiations as to how much property would be retained by the USFK. The squabbling is endless.

In Nov 2005, it was announced that cities in northern Gyeonggi province were to demolish the “tank traps” that were to hinder tank attacks by North Korea. The fortifications are overpass-like structures erected in the 1970s over roads connecting cities in the province to Seoul. In the event of an attack, the ROK Army would blow up the structures to block roads to the capital. The local government of the satellite city of Guri, northeast of Seoul, started demolishing the fortifications over the road connecting Seoul to Namyangju city, Gyeonggi province, on Nov. 8, 34 years after their construction. The city government said it will spend 1.3 billion won ($1.2 million) to dismantle the defensive wall by the end of this year and plans to replace it with underground fortifications on the same spot. The city of Uijeongbu also plans to demolish a defensive structure over the road between Seoul and Dongducheon, starting Dec. 26. It is also discussing with the army the removal of five other fortifications. This is the new outlook along the DMZ where the threat of the Northern invasion seems far away. Now the defenses are considered a “significant inconvenience” — and the ROK Army seems to agree.

In addition, major plans are underway to expand the highways in the area to open up the new cities to growth. All of these factors point to the feeling in the area that the threat from North Korea no longer is of importance. Coupled with the pullout of the USFK by 2008, this foreshadows the ROK commitment to its own defense and how it views the threat from the North.

But then the question comes up — why the hell did the narrow roads remain for all the years the USFK was there? Having driven the roads, the narrow tank barriers were major safety hazards on the winding country roads. Now the ROK seems to have faith that the DMZ defenses or A-10 tank killers will prevent a blitzkrieg. Given these new outlook by Koreans of the new openess between the Koreas — even as Kim Jong-il visited his units stressing that one man is capable of killing a hundred through proper training in Dec 2005 — one must wonder why the USFK remains in Korea.

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May 2005
F-117A to deploy to Kunsan (May 2005) The Korea Times in May 2005 reported that the Pentagon was deploying 15 F-117A Nighthawk stealth fighters and 250 airmen from the 49th FW at Holloman AFB, New Mexico to the Korean Peninsula. “The current deployment of the stealths is not related to the current situation surrounding Pyongyang’s nuclear threat,” Kim quoted USFK spokeswoman MaryAnn Cummings as saying. “This is a routine deployment of a U.S. air force unit for training and familiarization.”

The important point is that the F-117s are deployed to Korea to stress that the US is prepared to go to war with North Korea — while at the same moment it is stating at the six-party talks that it will NEVER invade North Korea. It is the modern version of “speak softly and carry a big stick.” The Stars and Stripes on 30 May stated, “The Pentagon once again will deploy stealth fighter-bombers to South Korea for what the Air Force calls part of ongoing steps to present a credible “deterrent posture” in the region.” The article stated the unit would stay for four months or “as long as needed to meet continuing force posture adjustments.”

On 8 Jun, it was announced the F-117As were at Kunsan AGAIN…as is standard. The F-117As have ALWAYS deployed to Kunsan in the past and only landed at Osan for static displays or presentations to local dignitaries. Despite the USFK downplaying the stealth fighter arrival, the only time the F-117As deployed to Korea in the past was during periods of heightened tensions as a show of strength. The first time the F-117As came to Kunsan supposedly for Team Spirit 93 — though Team Spirit had been shelved in 1992 and 1993 — so it was actually it was due to Kim Il Sung’s nuclear brinksmanship. The F-117s supposedly returned in 1996 when tensions mounted after 23 May 96 when a MiG pilot defected and landed at Seoul and then tensions escalated in Apr 96 when the North Korean ships tested South Korean defenses by entering the disputed territorial waters. (NOTE: We only have seen only one blurp in a news report on this deployment.) The next time was in 2003 for RSOI/FE03 after the North cranked up the heat of its nuclear threat and the F-117As stayed for “additional training.” The F-117As arrived on 14 Mar 2003 and left on 5 Jun 2003.(See Military Affairs (2003) for the low-key buildup.) The F117s next came in the summer of 2004 and stayed for several months from Jul-Aug during the pull out of the 2d Bde 2d ID for Iraq. (See Military Affairs: North Korea (2004) .)
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September 2005:
A Nuclear-armed Japan??? (Sep 2005) Asia Times , on 9 Sep 2005 ran an article, The unthinkable: A nuclear-armed Japan, by Frank Barnabie and Shaun Burnie that should send chills up the spine of the ROK — and the USFK. It is something we have suspected very strongly after a quantity of plutonium — enough to build 8 nuclear weapons — was reported missing in 1994 and then — after an investigation by the IAEA — was written as lost as “dust” in the pipes. (Source: The IAEA and the NPT Safeguards Regime: An Impossible Task, Shaun Burnie.) (NOTE: It takes 3-4 kilograms to build one weapon and 8 weapons would be 24 kilograms was missing. I believe the reports said that it was 22 kilograms at the time. But more suspicious is that in Dec 2005 it was reported that 270 kilograms of nuclear material was found missing from the US Los Alamos nuclear storage facility. At the same time the US is said to be seeking to researching the development of new nuclear warheads with $250 million funding — though the nuclear block-buster bomb is still supposedly verbotten. One wonders if the US is secretly assisting Japan to become a nuclear power — covertly transferring technology and nuclear materials to Japan as it eases out of the “nuclear umbrella” concept. Japan’s neighbors will all be nuclear capable in the future — and it appears that South Korea wants to be a nuclear power as well.)

The authors represent the anti-nuke viewpoint and the article first appeared in Japan Focus. Currently Japan has plutonium far in excess of its projected needs and on the verge of rewriting its Peace Constitution to allow a standing army and allow the use of military force outside its borders to protect the vital interests of nation. There is also some current wrangling on whether this would allow “first strike” capabilities — potentially aimed at North Korea, but could be applied anywhere if the Japanese space program reaches the level of ICBMs.

In the 1960s, the Nixon administration considered the option of arming Japan with nuclear weapons. Now there are pressures to revise its constitution with the active encouragement of the US, and Japan’s military is being deployed overseas, and undertaking joint training with the US as never before. The prospects of Japan moving further toward nationalism and militarism are made worse by the possible successor to Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, Shinzo Abe. However, to overcome the citizens aversion to nuclear weapons, a REAL external threat would be needed to implement the nuclear protocol to turn Japan into a nuclear power in the blink of an eye. However, the article states, “If Japan went nuclear, the consequences would of course be terrible for Northeast Asia. Pressure in South Korea to respond would be huge, relations with China could become disastrous, and the global nuclear non-proliferation regime centered around the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) reduced to a historical footnote.”

Though this is pure speculation. With Japan’s known plutonium stockpiles coupled with the technology to build nuclear weapons, the Japanese could be sitting with nuclear weapons already. Remember that Japan would NOT violate the NPT is the weapons were unassembled. Only assembled weapons stockpiles are monitored — but the big disadvantage of disassembled parts is that it would take at least six months to assemble them in the middle of a life-and-death crisis. (NOTE: There have been rumors for years that nuclear components were stored at Japanese naval bases in secret.)

It is not a secret that the Japanese was interested in the “forbidden” technology — and reported to be seeking bargains on the Russian black market after the downfall of the Soviet Union and that nuclear items (such as the nuclear triggering devices and other critical components) were known to be available and untrackable. It is also known that the impoverished Soviet scientists — including those in the nuclear field — were gobbled up by the ROK and Japan to further their research programs. Japan launched its first weather satellite as part of its scientific research program — and then launched into its abortive space program plagued with successive failures. However, the suggestion is plain — it is one step away from an intermediate range ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads would make it an international nuclear threat.

Japan realizes that India and Pakistan got away with their nuclear weapon programs — and then were rewarded with closer economic ties — and that North Korea followed in their footsteps and for ten years has continued to thumb its nose at the world. The only element that is missing is a REAL external threat to Japan to implement such a nuclear protocol. If North Korea continues to refuse to give up its nuclear weapons AND fires another Taepdong II missile over Japan’s air space to prove its resolve, it may tip the balance. The article excerpts are as follows:

The articles stated:

Japan reportedly now has one of the largest stocks of weapons-usable plutonium in the world (45,000 kilograms and growing) as well as access to the most advanced missile technology. This is not by accident but design. Deliberate policy established in the late 1960s by senior politicians was aimed at acquiring the nuclear material required for atomic bombs, and the means to deliver them. [1] Without having to cross the difficult threshold of actual weapons development, Japan has already become a de facto nuclear weapons state. Successive Japanese governments have achieved this status through a nuclear energy policy based upon the production and use of plutonium, and an ambitious if flawed commercial space program. It is this nuclear policy that will soon lead to the commissioning of the world’s most expensive nuclear facility – the Rokkasho-mura reprocessing plant. [2] The big question is whether or not a future Japanese government will take a political decision to develop nuclear weapons. Nuclear proliferation threats on the Korean peninsula and the growth of China’s economic and military power are two important (and real) drivers that are being cited by powerful interests in Japan as justification for considering what should be the unthinkable. (Source: Asia Times; [1] Mainichi Shimbun, in its August 1, 1994 edition, revealed that a top secret Foreign Ministry document called “Our Nation’s Foreign Policy Principles” was produced in 1969. [2] Total costs for the plant are US$21 billion. See, “Nuclear Twilight Zone”, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. May 2001.)

… Unlike South Korea and Taiwan, which had their pursuit of reprocessing and plutonium frustrated by direct US intervention, Japanese nuclear energy policy since the 1960s has been based on the large-scale production and use of plutonium. The original plan to separate plutonium from nuclear reactor spent fuel and then use it to fuel a generation of fast breeder reactors has failed, with only the Monju fast reactor remaining. Instead the plan to use plutonium as fuel is dependent upon successful loading in conventional light water reactors. This plan too has run into major delays due to the reality of unsafe technology, poor operating standards and a determined anti-nuclear movement that has, over recent decades, challenged all major developments. Whereas in 1994, Japanese officials were predicting that plutonium demand (the amount required to fuel nuclear power plants) would be 85,000 to 90,000 kilograms by 2010, today not one gram of plutonium is loaded into commercial nuclear power reactors. Moreover, while the demand side has been a disaster for Japanese government plans, its plutonium supply has run out of control, with total plutonium stocks now at more than 45 metric tons – a fivefold rise from the early 1990s. This could rise to more than 100 tons within the next 15 years. To date, most of this plutonium has accumulated in overseas reprocessing plants in France and the United Kingdom under contracts signed with Japan. However, with plans to start up the US$21 billion Rokkasho plant, Japan will have a reprocessing capacity only equaled by the world’s largest nuclear weapons states.

… In response to political pressure over its plutonium program, the Japanese government declared in the early 1990s that it would not hold more plutonium than was necessary for commercial use. The government’s “no plutonium stockpile” policy and its declared supply and demand figures for plutonium, were meant to reassure the international community, particularly in East Asia, that Japan would only possess sufficient plutonium to meet commercial requirements. However, almost from day one, Japan has possessed well in excess of its requirements, and as the 1990s unfolded the excess stock has increased.

… The most serious problem facing the IAEA safeguards system is that the most sensitive plants insofar as the diversion of weapon-usable materials is concerned – particularly uranium-enrichment facilities and plutonium reprocessing plants – are impossible to safeguard effectively. [3] Consider, for example, large commercial reprocessing plants that separate the unused uranium, plutonium and fission products in spent nuclear power reactor fuel elements, such as the one under construction at Rokkasho-Mura. Safeguarding the plutonium in spent nuclear reactor fuel elements before reprocessing is relatively simple. It is just a matter of counting the number of elements. Once the plutonium is removed from spent reactor fuel elements at Rokkasho-Mura, safeguarding it is quite a different matter. There is no clear distinction between the commercial use of plutonium and its military use. To argue that the further spread of nuclear weapons must be prevented, as Japan does, while, at the same time, operating a civil reprocessing plant is, to say the least, inconsistent. A good nuclear-weapons designer could construct a nuclear weapon from three or four kilograms of the plutonium produced by the Rokkasho-Mura reprocessing plant. To ensure the timely detection of the diversion of such a small amount of plutonium in a plant where so much plutonium is handled requires very precise safeguard techniques, requiring significantly more precision than is currently achievable. Even with the best available and foreseeable safeguards technology it is not possible to get the precision necessary. [4] (Source: Asia Times; [3] Leventhal, P., “IAEA Safeguards Shortcomings: A Critique”, Nuclear Control Institute, Washington, DC., September 12, 1994 ; [4] Miller, M. M., “Are IAEA Safeguards on Plutonium Bulk-Handling Facilities Effective?”, Nuclear Control Institute, Washington, DC., August 1990.)

… Through most of this period the justification has been for obvious reasons, put in the context of national self-defense, but in most cases without explicit threats being named (at least in public). Today the threats are now more explicitly cited. In recent years leading politicians such as Ozawa Ichiro warned that Japan could use its commercial plutonium stockpile for making nuclear weapons. Ozawa, leader of the opposition party Jiyuto (Liberal Party), declared in 2002 that if the military threat posed by China continued to grow, “It would be so easy for us to produce nuclear warheads – we have plutonium at nuclear power plants in Japan, enough to make several thousand such warheads.” [9] The crisis over North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, based around plutonium reprocessing, strengthened the position of those in Japan advocating nuclear weapons development. This was acknowledged by no less than the US ambassador to Japan Thomas Schieffer: “If you had a nuclear North Korea, it just introduces a whole different dynamic … That increases the pressure on both South Korea and Japan to consider going nuclear themselves.” (Tokyo, June 2005). While such a declaration is intended to put pressure on China to act more forcefully with its ally in Pyongyang, it is also highly significant in terms of US policy toward Japan. (Source: Asia Times; [9] Ozawa’s statement was made during a lecture given in the southern City of Fukuoka, though was not supposed to be made public, April 2002, see Greenpeace International press statement, “Ozawa confirms nuclear weapons potential of Japan’s plutonium program as further nuclear transports loom”, April 7th 2002.)

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ROK National Assembly: Reductions in Numbers of USFK Strength??? (Sep 2005) The Chosun Ilbo on 22 Sep 2005, published publicly for the first time, the numbers of strength reductions for the USFK since 1998. In 2002, George Bush told the Korean people we will not stay if we are not wanted. More and more Koreans are now supporting the US removal from Korea — and now they will see that their wish is coming true. But the USFK reason is that the units are being reorganized into smaller consolidated “Unit of Action” that reduce strength but increase capabilities. However, the numbers for the USAF F-16s are highly questionable. In the Stars and Stripes story, it stated that “Lt. Col. Jung Jong-wu with the Ministry of National Defense said there were many inaccuracies in Song’s report. He refused to provide specifics, however, stating that the issue of military strength is confidential.” Likewise, the USFK declined comment.

This is an example of the inaccurate information that comes out of the National Assembly used in their decision-making process.

USFK Fighting Strength Dwindles 23 Percent
The fighting strength of the U.S. Forces Korea has dwindled by 23 percent since 1998, a lawmaker said Thursday. Thus it slashed the number of F-16s, the primary fighter jets deployed in Korea, from 76 to 60, contrary to popular understanding that reductions focused on ground forces. (NOTE: We are not certain how these numbers were arrived at since there still are the two squadrons at Kunsan and one at Osan. Contingency deployments such as the 90th TFS from Elmendorf to Kwangju do NOT count in number counts.)

Song Young-sun, a member of the National Assembly’s Defense Committee, submitted materials that indicate USFK manpower has decreased 8.1 percent, ground forces 18 percent, air power 42.7 percent and ammunition 23.5 percent, over the last seven years, leading to an overall reduction of 23.1 percent. Song’s analysis based on full-strength USFK manpower and equipment data suggests forces strength has fallen from 37,000 to 34,000. (NOTE: The 2d Btn 2d ID left for Iraq with 3,600 troops — never to return — along with their heavy armor and artillery. Significant is that the ROK did NOT mention the 2d ID M270 MLRS and M109A6 Paladin artillery units that it asked to remain on the DMZ because it cannot fulfill its mission of artillery response without them.)

In other air power reductions, the number of AH-64 attack helicopters has thinned from 70 to 50, and the number of UH-60s and other transport choppers from 200 to 70. As for ammunition, ground forces supplies decreased from 550,000 tons to 420,000 tons, naval supplies from 1,800 tons to 200 tons, and air force supplies from 17,000 tons to 15,000 tons. (NOTE: The AH-64 and UH-60s were part of the DMZ drawdown and formation of the multi-tasked helicopter unit at Camp Humphreys.)

Ground equipment also shrank, with the number of M-1 tanks decreasing from 140 to 120, and the number of M-2 and M-3 infantry fighting vehicles from 180 to 100. Stinger missile teams have been reduced from 36 to 25. This is the first time specifics of the reductions have been made public. (NOTE: Part of these reductions was when the 2d Btn 2d ID pulled out with their heavy armor. Stinger missile teams were reduced as the camps were closed along the DMZ and the units reorganized under the “unit of action” concept.)

But the number of Patriot surface-to-air missile systems has increased from 50 to 60, and the number of A-10 ground attack planes from 20 to 25. “USFK reductions could cast doubt on the U.S. will to carry out its security commitment to Korea and diminish its deterrent capacity on the peninsula,” Song said. (NOTE: As the ROK talks of the diminishing USFK presence, it is still trying to buy cheap second-hand PAC-2 missiles from Germany but has NOT fulfilled its part of the bargain of assuming more of its own defense.)

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October 2005:
President Roh Pushes for War-time Control of ROK Forces (Oct 2005) President Roh again emphasized his desire to regain DIRECT wartime control over the ROK military in Oct 2005. In a speech to commemorate Korea’s Armed Forces Day, Mr. Roh said he wanted an end to one aspect of the US-Korean defense arrangements. The mutual defense agreement between the two nations gives the US general who heads the Combined Forces Command control over the ROK’s military in wartime. Mr. Roh has repeatedly said he wants a self-reliant defense for the ROK. President Roh keeps pushing this same button — and irking the USFK to no end. There is no way that the US will ever be under the ROK Command. If Roh keeps pushing this button, the CFC may disappear in his term in office — and the ROK military will be in a world of hurts having to come to grips with the reality that its military is unable to defend its nation without external aid. Once the alliance is shattered, it can never be put back together again.

In Oct 2005, it was reported that the Roh administration will again call for talks with the US to regain control over its troops in wartime. Under a mutual defense pact, the commander of US troops stationed here exercises operational control over the ROK troops in case of an armed conflict. Roh made this an agenda item for his presidency as part of a “self-reliant” defense force.

The Chosun Ilbo on 3 Oct 2005 reported that the US Forces Korea was supposedly mulling additional troop cuts after Seoul announced it will trim its own forces down from 680,000 to 500,000 by the year 2020. This was also in response to the attempts to reduce or remove altogether the troops from Iraq as their one-year tour is over in Dec 2005.

It was rumored that there would be some bombshells in store for the ROK. Sure enough, on 16 Oct 2005, ahead of bilateral defense talks, Sec of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said the U.S. will no longer serve as South Korea’s patron but become a partner in a more supporting role . The Wall Street Journal quoted Rumsfeld as saying that as Korea changes, so does the nature of the relationship between the two countries. He said Washington’s promise to protect South Korea stands, but it will perform in a supportive capacity. Rumsfeld said South Korea was no longer an impoverished, war-ravaged country dependent on support from Western nations but eager to take a more active role in its own defense, including assuming its own independent posture and building up a substantial fighting force. “It’s been 50-plus years since the war ended,” Rumsfeld said. “It is time for the Republic of Korea to assume a larger role and responsibility” for its own defense, he said.

In 20 Oct 2005, the ROK MND and USFK met for the third time on the Security Policy Initiative (SPI). In the past, the outcome was the ROK agreeing to disagree — and then MND refusing to pay their “share” of the cost of the ROK defense. No one announced the results this time. This was then be followed by the Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) on 21 Oct 05 at the Ministerial level.

South Korea’s military reform plan, which focuses on transforming its manpower-based armed forces into a technology-oriented unit that can form part of a “cooperative self-reliant” military capability. Rumsfeld promised his full support for the plan, as part of efforts to build a more solid alliance. However, Rumsfeld was cautious not to get sucked into committing the US to foot the military upgrades as it has historically done — dating back to the 1960s. His previous statement of no longer being the “patron” of the ROK remained firm.

READ BETWEEN THE LINES : The USFK is THE major player in the ROK defense with all the high-tech weaponry. The ROK has promised but failed to deliver on its military upgrades — instead concentrating only on elements that could be shifted to home-grown industries. A “patron” provides FREE armaments to the ROK…a “supporting partner” provides nothing except his forces to “support” his ROK “partner.” The word “partner” implies “equal” in ability and strength. Though the ROK military is a formidable man-power based force, technologically even the MND will admit that it is far-behind the US military. It is not a “partner” yet if the US is going to apply a new definition to the ROK-US alliance. On the other hand, after the restructuring of the JSDF, the Japanese more than fit the new definition of an equal “partner” — both in capabilities and weaponry. On 8 Dec 2005, the Yomiuri Shimbun reported that the Self-Defense Forces’ international cooperative peace operations, which presently are a secondary duty of the SDF, will be upgraded to a primary duty of national defense under the revised Self-Defense Forces Law. This means that the SDF Law will make Japan a “full partner.” (NOTE: Actually, Japan has chosen to be a junior partner of the United States, taking into consideration the diplomatic environment surrounding the Asia-Pacific region and sentiments of neighboring countries. No one can be a “full partner” of a super-power except another super-power — and the US is the only super-power now. There are differences in views on the UN Security Council seat and other measures, but as a whole, the Japanese see that their self-interests lie with the U.S.

It was reported in Dec 2005 that the SDF “support” of US operations had increased three-fold. This is due to the increased inter-operability exercises that have been going on between the US and Japan. However, in Dec 2005 it was also reported that Japan slashed its military and foreign aid spending again in an austere budget for the year 2006 to March 2007 despite attempts to give the country a higher international profile. The defense budget was down 0.9 percent to 4.81 trillion yen (41.6 billion dollars) for a fourth consecutive decline. The reduction in foreign aid could be a reflection of the Japanese “promise” to reduce its aid to the UN and countries that did not support their bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. The “reduction” in the defense budget is not a major concern as most of the expensive upgrade programs for the JSDF are already in place or funded. At the same time the super-expensive Missile Defense System (MDS) is still in joint US-Japan research phases. However, the Japanese at the same time are starting to flex their muscles on the international stage. In Dec 2005, the Ministry of Defense for the first time stated that the China is a “strategic threat” due to its double-digit expenditures on its military without transparency over the past years. This is a marked change from the Japanese stance that announced Taiwan was of “strategic importance” — not identifying the PRC directly — to one which points out the PRC as a potential threat.)

(L) Donald Rumsfeld is greeted by Defense Minister Ahn Kwang-chan. Gen Laporte in rear. (21 Oct 2005) Joongang Ilbo) (R) Rumsfeld courtesy call to President Roh (21 Oct 2005) (Korea Times)

The publicized 13 points of the 37th SCM on 21 Oct 2005 stated that South Korea has recognized the “strategic flexibility” of U.S. troops stationed on ROK soil, but not stated was that the ROK objects to South Korea being used as a base of operations in the event of a regional dispute — most pointedly between China and Taiwan. USFK is undergoing a fundamental change to slash its troops level in South Korea to 25,000 by 2008 from the current 32,500, reposition the remaining forces away from the DMZ and transform them into agile, expeditionary forces armed with modern weapons.

LISTEN CAREFULLY : “As that happens, we’ll see them play a larger and larger role … and the United States will be able to play a somewhat lesser role,” he said. “How that will evolve over time depends on a variety of things,” including the outcome of diplomatic efforts to end North Korea’s nuclear programs. Rumsfeld stated, “The United States of America has invested the lives of a great many Americans in helping the Republic of Korea to be free,” he said. “We are a part of this alliance at the request of the Republic of Korea’s government.” A reminder what George Bush stated in 2002 during the height of the anti-Americanism that America would remain in Korea only as long as the Korean people wanted the US to remain — not a moment longer. The veiled threat is that the US is ready to depart if the ROK says the word.
South Korea’s desire to assume a greater role in defending itself, including the regaining of full operational control of its troops during wartime, was answered as “agreed to appropriately accelerate discussions on command relations and wartime operational control.” When Rumsfeld was asked when the U.S. eventually would return the wartime operational control, he said, “It’ll take place at the moment when the Republic of Korea and the United States of America decide it’s appropriate .” The allies agreed on the need to maintain a U.S. troop presence in South Korea, along with Washington’s continued provision of a nuclear umbrella for South Korea, it said.

READ BETWEEN THE LINES : The ROK came looking for handouts and the US laid down some heavy ground rules. The US will NOT be footing the bill for the ROK defense upgrades. Though Rumsfeld agreed with the upgrade plan, he did NOT commit the US to assisting in the plan. This new definition also plainly states that the US will NOT restock the WRSA-K that has gone defunct leaving the ROK with between 10-30 days of ammunition if war breaks out. The ROK is on its own.
What is worrisome is the future plans to relocate out of Yongsan in the near future. Though Rumsfeld dismissed any further reduction of the number of USFK beyond what has already been announced. NOTHING was said about the consequences of the ROK failing to provide the land for the move in a timely manner — and this silence is disturbing. The ROK still has NOT procured the land — and allowing the protests to continue. Note that Rumsfeld did NOT state that the previous USFK-ROK agreement to delay portions of the current troop cuts to 25,000 by 2008 in stages would not be accelerated. The ROK sensing the chill in the air started preparations. The Joongang Ilbo on 11 Nov reported that it was anticipating a transfer of wartime control of the ROK forces in the future and a changing inter-Korean relationship. The ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff was planning to strengthen its organizational structure by adding a department in charge of military negotiations with the North and also reorganizing the operational headquarters. Some observers predict that such a transfer will take place by 2015, when South Korea will have finished upgrading most of its equipment and increasing its combat capability — but there are subtle hints that once the US-Japan realignment is in place, the transfer could take place immediately — but the realignment in Japan still is far away from being settled.

Rumsfeld denied that the USFK would be downgraded to a three-star position. This is logical. As long as the CFC exists, the position CANNOT be a three-star as the ROK deputy commander could potentially outrank the US position as a 4-star. There is a push to get out of the CFC — which is being used to strangle the USFK and thwart every move to relocate out of Yongsan and off the DMZ. UNTIL the mechanics for moving the CFC position — or UN-mandated position — to Camp Zama, Japan is in place no action will take place. The three-star position will be in Japan with the four-star rank at the newly created combat command (but still paper organization) at Camp Smith, Hawaii.

A post-script note: We loved the headline of the Chosun Ilbo article on the the SCM that read, “Korea, U.S. Prevaricate on Return of Wartime Command.” My dictionary has “prevaricate” meaning “to lie” or “To depart from or evade the truth; to speak with equivocation.” Interesting. On 3 Nov 2005, the Yonhap News reported, “The U.S.-(South) Korea alliance has encountered bumps in the road for many years, even decades, but recently, the divergences have grown more serious,” said Don Oberdorfer, professor of Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, during a speech delivered at a symposium here held by the Seoul Peace Prize Cultural Foundation.” Basically he stated that binding force of the alliance was the belief of a threat from the North. As the Roh government and younger generation drifted left, the belief that the threat from the North was not present meant that there would be no reason to retain US forces in Korea. This is stating the obvious — the US-ROK alliance is getting shakier by the month as the ROK cements itself to the DPRK with economic aid packages.
On 12 Nov 2005, Yonhap News reported that Gen LaPorte said his wartime operational control of both U.S. and Korean forces is the “cornerstone of deterrence” on the peninsula. “Combined Forces Command has wartime operational control over more than 600,000 active-duty military personnel, from both the Republic of Korea and the United States, making it the cornerstone of deterrence on the Korean Peninsula,” LaPorte was quoted as saying by his office during a ceremony marking the 27th anniversary of the joint command. According to the Chosun Ilbo, “By emphasizing the role of the commander as chief of Combined Forces Command rather than of the USFK, the remarks indicate LaPorte뭩 conviction that the system whereby the two countries pool forces with the U.S. commander in overall charge of practical operations is the most effective solution. The commander heads operations at the orders of the Military Committee, which consists of the chairmen of Joint Chiefs of Staff of both Korea and the U.S.” It should be added that the Presidents of both countries approves the war strategies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and therefore, Korea’s President DOES have war-time control — but not the direct control that Roh Moo-hyun wants that would destroy the CFC.

READ BETWEEN THE LINES: On the occasion of the 27th Anniversary of the CFC, Gen LaPorte publicly marked the US viewpoint. This “cornerstone of deterence” is an old catchphrase used for years, but it now takes on new significance in the current situation as the Roh Administration attempts to wrest control of its wartime forces from the US. Now the US position is shifting. If the ROK wishes to destroy the “cornerstone of deterence” as a matter of national pride, it is free to do so. If Korea says that the CFC goes, so does the reason for the US being in Korea. However, once done, there is no going back. George Bush stated in 2002 that the US will not stay in Korea if it is not wanted. If the American troops are removed — with the exception of some token forces — there will be no “tripwire” for the ROK.

In Oct 2005 at the SCM, the ROK was told that the US will be a “supporter” of Korea but no longer will it be its “patron.” The WRSA-K munitions free-ride is officially dead in Dec 2005 and the ROK was told it would have to purchase its restocking at the going rates — no more discounts. The ROK is teetering on the edge formulating fanciful plans but without the resources to fund anything. With the failure of the latest round of nuclear talks with the North in mid-November 2005, the US patience with South Korea’s open support of the North has worn paper thin.

What Gen LaPorte pointedly did NOT mention is that even without the CFC hat, the USFK Commander will still retain the mantle of the Commander of the United Nations Command – Korea (UNC-K) which signed the Armistice. Under that mantle, he commands the world forces that come to the defense of Korea in case of an unprovoked attack by the North — lending legitimacy to all military actions. However, without the CFC and US presence in Korea, there is really no need for the UNC mantle.

Hypothetically, the UN could sign a peace treaty with the Chinese and North Korea without the ROK — or even the US for that matter — thus ending the Korean War. The ROK was not a signator of the Armistice — only the UN (with US General Ridgeway signing as the commander of the UN forces in Korea). The world would no longer need to automatically come to the aid of Korea. The “war” would become a “conflict.” If a “conflict” should break out by the North invading, it could take years to discuss in the UN before any action is taken — if not vetoed by the US or China (or Russia, France and England). The UN discussed the horrors in Ethiopia while millions died; it discussed the horrors of Serbia while genocide took place; etc. etc. How will Korea fare as the UN discusses and discusses what action to take. The ROK will all alone.

It also forgets that the Mutual Defense Treaty of Korea is NOT automatic. It requires the approval of the US Congress — which may not be so willing to come to its aid if the attack comes from the North. Given that the ROK is currently aligning itself with the North — and providing unmonitored food aid that the US continues to warn is being shifted to its DPRK army. The argument would be: “If one dances with the devil and gets burned, one still has to pay the fiddler.” Some may argue that in case of a conflict, the ROK was responsible for its own actions and not worth the risking of further American lives. But realistically, the US will come to its aid, but perhaps NOT with the commitment of land troops, but with massive airstrikes in the form of Bill Clinton’s famed “bloodless war” strategy using cruise missiles.

However, the US will NOT play its card to “put up or shut up” until the realignment with Japan has been completed AND the proposed change to Article 9 of the Peace Constitution is made. These actions are all in the works as Japan attempts to convince and cajole the Governors at first — and if need be, force a change in the law so that the Central Government of Japan can dictate the use of public lands and its environmental impacts — a power now vested in the Governors hands. But this takes time. The Constitutional revision was supposed to have been completed in Nov 2005 and still is undergoing a judicial review. Koizumi stacked his political life on this shift to conservatism and nationalism — and won a landslide victory. Thus the elements are all in place to make things happen — and they are in work. The Washington Post on 22 Nov 2005 reported that the ruling Liberal Democratic Party formally unveiled a revised draft of Japan’s pacifist constitution that would allow the country to possess an official military for the first time since World War II and give the armed forces a more assertive international role.

Sadly, if the US does pull out the same situation would exist as it did in 1949 when the Acheson Line was declared. But on the other hand, the North is built on ONE economy — a war-time economy. What will the North do without a war? One shudders at the thought of a collapse in the north and the south attempting to buttress it up alone. One could play mind-game scenarios, but the impacts would be disastrous if the 11th rated economy in the world collapsed. The scenarios are endless. It will be out there alone believing that the 1.2 million man DPRK army who has single-mindedly trained for over 50 years to destroy the evil South will reconcile itself to being peaceful adversaries. At the same time the North will watch the ROK military dwindle to only 500,000 men by 2010 without the high-tech armaments and intelligence that the USFK provided — and munitions that would last only 10 days in case of conflict — without the protection of an automatic US and UN intervention. The worst nightmare would be if China invades Taiwan — and decides to split the US forces by attacking the South at the same time. As one says, the scenarios are endless.
In the 6-7 Dec 2005 Security Policy Initiative (SPI), Korea proposed to increase its weight in command over combined Korea-U.S. ground forces. The two-day talks were held at the Korea Military Academy in northern Seoul. Ahn Gwang-chan, deputy defense minister for policymaking, led the South Korean delegation, while the U.S. delegation was headed by Deputy Undersecretary of Defense Richard Lawless. The ROK asked for an increase in the proportion of Korean commanders in the Ground Component Command (GCC), which is currently headed by a Korean general but whose command posts are equally held by the both sides. The two countries agreed that Korea should take more responsibility for its own defense, and increasing the country’s weight in the GCC was part of that.

According to the Korea Times, 7 Dec 2005 , the Ministry of Defense stated the ROK and US agreed to “discuss details” next year on Seoul’s bid to “exercise unilateral authority” to control its armed forces during wartime. “Seoul and Washington plan to set up their own task forces responsible for studying the matter and will have the first meeting on the sidelines of the next SPI meeting slated for February in the U.S.,뮃 the MND’s Ahn Gwang-chan. The task force, led by an Army colonel, will be comprised of about 10 members from the presidential National Security Council, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Ministry of Justice. Supposedly the two sides will meet each other every month. The agreement will be affected by various factors, such as the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula and the status change of the USFK. Ahn뭩 delegation asked for an increase about 50 Korean commanders in the Ground Component Command (GCC), which is currently headed by a Korean general but whose command posts are equally held by both sides. Other agenda items on the table were the realignment of U.S. forces in South Korea and the transfer of security missions of the USFK to the South Korean military. The sides agreed to launch a joint panel aimed at analyzing what additional security roles South Korea should take over from the U.S. military. The topic will be brought up at the Nov 2006 Security Consultative Meeting (SCM)

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November 2005:
ROK forces in Iraq to be extended — but reduced??? (Nov 2005 – On-going) Another irritation factor was that though the MND announced that it would propose that the ROK troops be extended in Iraq in Nov 2005, it also wanted to reduce the numbers by 1,000. The mandate expires in December. The problem was that this was not coordinated with the US nor mentioned during the mini-summit between Roh and Bush on the sidelines of the APEC conference in Pusan. It was a premeditated ambush to stab Bush in the back while he was on the defensive over his Iraq exit strategy. U.S Ambassador Alexander Vershbow reportedly delivered a message about Washington뭩 discontent over the troop cut in a meeting with Yoon on Nov. 24. The ministry, however, said working-level consultations have been underway over the issue in recent months. The ROK withdrawals would start in May 2006. An Army brigade in charge of civil affairs and a few supporting units will be pulled out of the unit. Politically, the unit뭩 status as a division-level post under the command of a two-star general will remain unchanged. Supposedly the withdrawals will be phased out based upon political considerations.

Bush and Roh in Kyongju (Nov 2005)

Background: In Feb. 2004, the National Assembly approved the initial deployment of 3,600 forces — but the ROK kept dragging its feet on the actual deployment until finally the US moved out 3,600 personnel of the 2d Bde, 2d ID to Iraq. The point was made. When the first deployment was completed in September last year, 3,655 troops were stationed in Irbil, in the northern Kurdish region of Iraq — but it was a “safe” location that did nothing to free up US troops from other hot spots in Iraq — in a move that greatly upset the US. South Korea is aiming at maintaining a 2,600-strong contingent in Iraq next year. As of now, 3,260 troops are stationed in Irbil — – after South Korea adjusted some missions.

In Nov 2005, the UN asked that the ROK troops guard a UN development team in their area of control because the force scheduled to provide the cover was delayed. At first the ROK bristled saying they should only guard the building where they worked. Finally, they reluctantly agreed to provide 50 soldiers to act as guards for the workers AND buildings. The point is that the ROK does NOT seem willing to take on any mission that would place its troops in danger — or act as potential targets. NO KOREANS HAVE LOST THEIR LIVES while the US forces death toll is well over 2000. The ROK Army — though still a formidable force — has lost a lot of face internationally as its tough fighter image from Vietnam has been tarnished. The Zaytun “Olive branch” unit is an all-volunteer force and we are sure would be willing to face the dangers for which they are trained, but politics are being played with their unit.
According to Chosun Ilbo on 18 Nov, “While passing a bill Friday (18 Nov) to extend the dispatch of forces to the Middle East country, the government and ruling Uri Party decided to reduce Korea’s Zaytun Unit by 1,000 troops.” Immediately after the announcement blew up in the ROK faces as the ROK did NOT advise the US of its plans, the press releases were changed to state the MND was going to — in the FUTURE TENSE — submit the package the following week…though it appeared that it had already been done. By 20 Nov the Roh government was mumbling horse-manure about the info being “leaked” and that the topic was “discussed at several working-level consultations with the U.S.” but it needed to be “fine-tuned” before release. However, at the same time the MND stated that it intended to release the plan on 21 Nov. Regardless, the Roh Cabinet on 21 Nov endorsed a motion to extend the deployment of South Korean troops to Iraq for one more year, downsizing them by one-third and planned to submit it to the National Assembly on 23 Nov. The plan is to cut one-third of the 3,260-strong Zaytun Unit in stages starting next March. (NOTE: We wonder about the “coincidence” over the MND announcement at the same time that the US was “snubbed” on two major procurement programs for the E-X (AWACS) Program and H-X Project (next generation helicopter). We do NOT think this was a coincidence, but a reprecussion of the US announcement that the US was no longer going to be its “patron” — and that the free-ride was over dealing with everything from the WRSA to its new upgrade programs.)

The Korean attitude was the curtailment was unlikely to bring any changes to the Allied Forces stationed in Iraq. This is true as the troops are in a “safe” area. However, the move was NOT discussed on the 17 Nov summit between Bush and Roh and came as a surprise to the Bush staff who thought it was simply media speculation and NOT an official Roh position. Stephen Hadley, the White House national security adviser, told reporters traveling with Bush in South Korea on 18 Nov that Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon told him the troop question would be before the National Assembly next week. “He made clear that the issue of their force levels in Iraq would be a decision made based on the progress that Iraqi security forces are making and taking in training, and taking more responsibility for security in the evolution of the political situation there and the military requirements and the progress towards stability,” Hadley said.

ROK Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon with Japan Foreign Minister Aso Taro

Under attack both domestically and abroad to scale down the Iraq presence due to the continuing insurgency, Bush has said that the 160,000 troops would be reduced to a “baseline” of 138,000 after the December elections. However, solidarity in the coalition was essential where the US (160,000), UK (13,000) and ROK (3,600) are the three largest players. (NOTE: One the ROK starts reducing its troops in May, the third largest contingent will be the Japanese.) At home Congressman John Murtha (D-Penn) called for the immediate withdrawal from Iraq which prompted heated debates in the House of Representatives. Bush used his visit to 18 Nov Osan AB speech to the troops state his position. Bush quoted a top U-S commander in Iraq as saying a pullout deadline would be a “recipe for disaster.” Bush says as long as he’s president, Iraq policy will be driven by what he calls the “sober judgment” of commanders on the ground.

However, Bush is pushing for the Iraq Army to pick up more of the insurgent pacification role and recently former officers in Saddam Hussein’s army were being recruited to lead the new Iraqi ground forces. Around the world, the resolve to assist in Iraq is slipping. The exodus of coalition partners would deal a blow to American efforts to prepare Iraqis to take over the most dangerous peacekeeping tasks and craft an eventual U.S. exit strategy. In Nov 2005, the first announcements were made that there would be a reduction in forces in Iraq — but still contingent on ground-force leaders assessment of the situation.

Bulgaria and Ukraine will begin withdrawing their combined 1,250 troops by mid-December. If Australia, Britain, Italy, Japan, Poland and South Korea reduce or recall their personnel, more than half of the non-American forces in Iraq could be gone by next summer. Japan and South Korea help with reconstruction, but Britain and Australia provide substantial support forces and Italy and Poland train Iraqi troops and police. Japan and Korea extended their missions for one year, but the ROK will withdraw 1,000 of its 3,250 troops starting in May 2006.

According to AP Washington Pentagon officials, however, said the South Korean government had not notified them of any plan to change their troop presence in Iraq. President Bush’s national security adviser said the president had been assured that South Korea would reduce troop levels only when there had been enough progress on the political and security fronts in Iraq. Donga Ilbo on 23 Nov reported, “…spokesman of the U.S. Defense Department for Asia and Pacific Affairs Brian Maka told Yonhap News that the U.S. came to know of Korea뭩 planned cut in troops stationed in Iraq via reports from the Korean press before the Korean government officially announced it, and that the U.S. also collected information on the size of reduction from the reports of the press, by which he suggested that the discussion between Korea and the U.S. didn뭪 occur smoothly.” This is at odds with the report from the MND that it was discussed with the US at the “working-level.”

Most certainly Bush felt his “ally” had just stabbed him in the back — and may look upon this as an underhanded personal affront — especially since he had praised the ROK in front of the APEC dignitaries — and Roh personally in their mini-summit — for the military support in Iraq. The fact that nothing was mentioned in the mini-summit on 17 Nov — where Bush thanked Roh for his country’s troop contribution — made it all the more galling. The fact that the National Assembly had until December to do so, but the Roh government chose to do it instead on 18 Nov in the middle of the APEC conference made this pretty obvious that it was intentional. To Bush it was still a slap in the face on the international stage — as he then visited China and Mongolia. (NOTE: Mongolia is a military supporter of with peace-keeping troops in Afghanistan and Iraq.)

However, officially, the State Department put happy faces on the situation with remarks that the ROK will stay committed to Iraq. Reality says otherwise as Roh told his country tearfully in Apr 2004 how he was “forced” to agree to “protect his country” — and then dragged his feet to NOT deploy the forces. Roh was NEVER a supporter of the Iraq and only when 3,600 men of the 2d Bde 2d ID was yanked out of Korea for Iraq, did the ROK take action but very reluctantly. (NOTE: 3,600 personnel is the exact number that the ROK promised initially.) (Source: Yonhap News.)
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ROK to Allow Chik Do to be used as Range — After being used for two years by USFK (Nov 2005) The ROK continued to play politics by announcing that Chik Island 70 km off Kunsan as alternative air-to-ground weapons gunnery training sites. By “rescheduling” their training times. However, after the USFK ceased using the Kooni Range — because of the pain-in-the-ass ROK assisted suits — the training switched to Pilsung Range in Taebaek, Kangwon Province. Comically, the ROK is reported to be “considering” allowing the USFK to use Pilsung Range — though the USAF units have used the range for over twenty years.

Kooni Range located in Maehyang-ni, Kyonggi Province, was shut down due to complaints from local residents of massive structural damage and environmental pollution. (See Green Korea for details of NGO nuisance suits.) Suits filed in civil court awarded damages to the residents but under the SOFA Agreement, the ROK would pay for the damages — but in turn, the ROK attempted to make the US pay. Under a Seoul-Washington agreement, South Korea promised an alternative training site but has had difficulties securing that, due to strong opposition from residents and anti-American sentiments.

In 2004, the use of Chik-do was opened as the USAF F-16s practiced strafing and bombing. The Army Apache Longbow helicopters started using Chik-do in 2004 to practice live-fire with the Hellfire missiles. The Rodriquez Range near the DMZ is too short (2 km) to practice live-fires of the missile. An electronic scoring system for air-to-ground firing and bombing is scheduled to be installed on Chik Island later next year.
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December 2005:

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Revising Japanese Peace Constitution May Spell Big Trouble for ROK (Dec 2005) Given the overall picture, the US-ROK alliance is on shaky ground — and dependent on the outcome of the rewriting of the Japanese “Peace Constitution” eliminating (or rewriting) Article 9, the ROK may be facing a true disaster. Article 9 of Japan’s 1947 Constitution, imposed by General Mc Arthur reads, “The Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.” The draft proposal says instead that 뱓o ensure peace and the independence of the nation, Japan shall maintain self-defence forces under the supreme command of the Prime Minister? This amounts to saying the opposite. Analysts agree that the new text would essentially change nothing. It would only remove terminological ambiguities calling things by their name.

By 1952 the SDF (Self-Defense Force) was created. The Japan Self-Defence Forces (JSDF) are a conventional military force in everything but name, numbering some 240,000 specialised troops equipped with the latest weaponry at an annual cost of US$ 44 billion. However, to get by the Article 9 prohibition, the navy destroyers and frigates are renamed as coastal defense ships.

Though the Japanese possessed a “blue water navy” again by the 1960s and participated in PAC-RIM exercises in Hawaii, its Army components never ventured outside its borders until the 1980s when Japan joined the UN peace-keeping forces — but it was accepted as a “peace” mission. According to the Srategy Center, Japan’s balanced naval force of about 45 destroyers, 9 frigates and 16-17 submarines are divided into four Escort Flotilla’s designed to protect shipping lanes in concert with shore-based ASW and strike aircraft, and to work in cooperation with U.S. naval forces. Anti-submarine warfare is the main mission for Japanese surface warships though most have a balanced complement of ASW, anti-air and anti- surface weaponry. Most now carry at least one SH-60J ASW helicopter. The JMSDF operates about 80 P-3C ORION ASW aircraft and can call on three squadrons, or about 60 Japanese Air Self Defense Force (JASDF) fighters equipped to carry medium-range anti-ship missiles. Four new B-767 based airborne early warning and control system (AWACS), ten E- 2C HAWKEYE AWACS plus a number on electronic/signals intelligence aircraft can provide persistent surveillance for the fleet. Japan is now building two 13,500ton helicopter-carrying ASW cruisers but would a need larger ship to support either AV-8B HARRIER or F-35B short take-off capable Joint Strike Fighters.

(NOTE: The Japanese have plans for its next generation of amphibious warship that has hangar deck and will be equipped with APAR radar. At the same time, the Admiral Shin carrier the ROK has on its books for 2010 has been downsized to be a such a ship. It is trying to build a light carrier in the disguise of a troop landing ship with a short landing platform capable of handling VTOL Harrier type aircraft “in an emergency.” The ROK has had this ambition for a while. In the mid-1990s, the ROK tried to modify a Russian carrier bought for scrap from Vladivostok, but only international conventions in its sale by Russia prevented it.)
In 2000 the constitutional prohibition was broken during the American war in Afghanistan when the Japanese government made two SDF ships available, equipped with the most sophisticated communication instruments. A contingent of 3,000 Japanese soldiers is currently stationed in Iraq. In 2005, the Japanese announced that Taiwan was in its “sphere of influence” meaning that it would come to the defense of Taiwan if attacked by China. Now with the changes in the Japanese security agreement, a columnist of the Japanese daily Asahi wrote: “From now on, Japan will sustain American military action on a global level. Such a change is equivalent to a revision of the security treaty”. Such a grave decision could not have been taken without popular or parliamentary consultation. Some feel the resentment by right-wing nationalists against China’s rise to power as a Northeast Asia power broker caused Japan, together with USA, is aiming to contain the power and influence of China in the region.

The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) was long dominated by doctrines and forces that stressed coastal defenses. But today its fleet of about 70 submarines, 25 destroyers and 44 frigates, divided into North Sea, East Sea and South Sea Fleets, is developing the doctrines and capabilities needed to dominate the “First Island Chain,” which would extend to Okinawa, and then the “Second Island Chain,” extending that line to Guam. PLAN naval doctrine appears to emphasize Sea Denial strategies with a potential move toward active support for nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). This later mission would most likely require PLA dominance of the Northern Yellow Sea or the area south of Hainan Island, the most likely base areas for SSBNs. The PLAN stresses submarines for anti-ship missions with the current goal of being able to increasingly coordinate long-range missiles strikes by subs, ships and strike aircraft. (Source: Srategy Center)

Notice that both Japan and Korea are in the “first island chain” and denial of the shipping lanes would strangle the commerce and essential food supplies to the nations. Neither nation is self-sufficient and have export driven economies. The greatest advantage of the PLAN is that its anti-ship missiles are of longer range. China is now acquiring Russian and domestic anti-ship missiles that out-range and out-punch both Japanese and U.S. anti-ship missiles. Reportedly, U.S. SSNs no longer carry the sub-launched TOMOHAWK or HARPOON anti-ship missile.[12] China is now marketing its 280km range YJ-62 (C- 602) anti-ship missile[13], which may also form the basis for basis for a longer-range Land Attack Cruise Missile (LACM) family for the PLAN and PLA Air Force (PLAAF). In PLAN service this missile’s range is likely greater than 300km. And while the 40km range YJ-81Q sub-launched anti-ship missile is known, there may also be a sub-launched version of the 120km range YJ-82. Of particular concern are the PLAN’s new Russian Raduga 3M-80E MOSKIT on its SOVREMENNIY destroyers and the Novator 3M-54 CLUB-S supersonic anti-ship missiles that will arm the 8 Project 636M KILO submarines now being delivered to China. Both missiles are capable of high-speed “jinxing” maneuvers which greatly complicate ship defenses. Both Japanese and U.S. naval Close In Weapon Systems (CIWS), centered on the 20mm gatling gun PHALANX system, can deal with subsonic missiles but may not be capable of defeating the PLAN’s newer Russian maneuverable supersonic missiles. (Source: Srategy Center; (12) “Los Angeles Class (SSN),” Jane’s Fighting Ships, Internet Edition, April 14, 2004. [13] Doug Barrie, “Chinese Cruise Missile Portfolio Expands,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, September 19, 2005, p. 43.)

Another developing area of PLA superiority may be in the area of anti-ship ballistic missiles. In 2004 the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) warned “꿂hinese writings state China intends to develop the capability to attack ships, including carrier strike groups, in the waters around Taiwan using conventional theater ballistic missiles (TBMs) as part of a combined-arms campaign.” [Source: Office of Naval Intelligence, Worldwide Maritime Challenges, 2004.]

Another area where the PLAN is developing a superiority is submarines. By 2010 the PLAN could possess a fleet of modern SSKs over twice the size of Japan’s, supplemented by several of its new second generation SSN. Submarines can operate independently to pick- off unsuspecting targets, or in concert with ships and aircraft to attack larger enemy formations. But as it will possess a force of capable nuclear powered submarines, the PLAN will have the future potential of being able to attempt interdiction of all of Japan’s major sea lines of communication to the Persian Gulf and possibly beyond. The JMSDF has a highly professional submarine force that is proficient in anti-submarine as well as anti-surface work. They are also a force that complements the surface fleet; the JSMDF does work on coordinated ship-sub-aircraft operations. But Japan’s submarines are also small and unsuited for wide-ranging patrols. This force is comprised today of about 16 to 17 conventional subs in three classes.(Source: Srategy Center.)

An additional area where the PLAN is building a superiority over Japan’s forces is in the ability to support its naval forces with offensive and defensive airpower. Regarding offensive airpower, Japan has historically relied on the United States, as required by its “pacifist” constitution. This has meant that Japanese combat aircraft have lacked the ability to attack far-away targets. The ROK has the same deficiency. In addition, JASDF fighters are at a disadvantage in air-to-air missiles. While PLAAF and PLANAF Su-30s have had self-guided medium-range Vympel R-77 AAMs since 2002, the JASDF has just started acquiring a similar missile, the self-guided medium range AAM-4. The JASDF is now modifying 100 F-15J fighters to carry the AAM-4, which reportedly began entering service in 2004.[22] But JASDF fighters will lack a helmet-sighted short-range air-to-air missile until the AAM-5 enters service later this decade, a capability that PLA Sukhois have had since 1993. U.S. F-15Cs based at Kadena Airbase on Okinawa may not have the helmet display sighted AIM-9X until replaced by modified F-15Cs now at Langley Air Base in Virginia, that are in turn being replaced by new F/A-22 fighters. (Source: Srategy Center; [22] Steve Davies, “Boeing F-15 Eagle,” International Airpower Review, Winter 2002, p. 65.) The same deficiencies in the JASDF fighters apply to the ROKAF air defense F-5Es and F-15Ks.

One potential PLA advantage that could be developing rapidly is that of aircraft carriers. It is growing more and more likely that the PLA is going to modify the ex-Soviet/Ukrainian aircraft carrier Varyag for some kind of military mission. This carrier has recently emerged from a drydock in Dalian harbor painted in PLA Navy grey and appears to have benefited from significant work on its hull and internal systems. At the 2005 Moscow Airshow officials from two Russian aerospace companies commented that the Chinese were considering the purchase of the Sukhoi Su-33 carrier-based fighter, or the development of a special version of the Chengdu J-10 fighter, for a future carrier.[25] Chinese internet sources also indicate the possibility that China is developing a small AWACS aircraft suitable for an aircraft carrier. PLAN deployment of an aircraft carrier, even on of medium size like the Varyag, would give China a deterrent capability and an actual opportunity to seize naval dominance over Japan in some scenarios. (Source: Srategy Center; [25] Interviews, Moscow Airshow, August 2005.) Both the ROK and Japan are considering the building of a short-takeoff carrier. The Japanese currently have two “airdraft carriers” (sea control style carrier with a jump deck so VSTOL aircraft can take off full loaded) and with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), it would not be too difficult for them to go to sea almost immediately upon purchase and training of their pilots (See GlobalSecurity.org under Japan-Naval Ships for the three types of helicopters and aircraft carriers the Japan have or plan to build.)
After two years of work by the “US-Japan Security Consultative Committee,” a document entitled “Alliance between United States and Japan: transformation and realignment for the future” was signed on 28 Oct in Washington. The finishing touches which may be applied to the document before its entry into force in March 2006 will not change its essence. Pino Cazzaniga of Asia News wrote, “Its novelty lies in the fact members of the Japanese “Defence Agency” (that is, the army) will, from now on, be able to cross the borders of the archipelago to collaborate in global security alongside its US ally.” (NOTE: In viewing the 28 Oct signing in Washington, Donald Rumsfeld was supposed to stop into Japan after its SCM with Korea on Oct 23, but cancelled it because the “finishing touches” had not been concluded. Both the ROK and Japan SCMs were interrelated and consultations involved were foreshadowed with Rumsfelds statement that the US would no longer be a “patron” of the ROK, but a “partner.” This presaged the shift to Japan as its military base for regional power.)

In the 11 Sep 2005 elections, the ruling party led by Prime Minister Koizumi received a resounding victory — ostensibly over the postal reform — but showing a backing of conservative ideas — and a resurgence of Japanese nationalism. A survey by the Mainichi Shimbun in Sept 2005 found that nearly 85 percent of Japan’s new lower house, elected in Koizumi’s landslide victory, have been surveyed as saying they support changing the pacifist 1947 constitution. This amounts to 402 of the 480 lawmakers in the new lower house back reform of the constitution against just 36 legislators or eight percent who were against, with the rest holding mixed views.

(NOTE: If the Japanese Article 9 in the Peace Constitution is revised in Nov 2005 (anticipated date for Japanese Diet action), the mechanics are already in place in Camp Zama, Japan where some “administrative” elements of the I Corps from Washington state quietly set up operations in July 2005. (NOTE: The USFK denies any changes, but if the US disengages from the ROK, the command structure of US forces could easily be out of Korea in less than a heartbeat.

If the Peace Constitution is changed, there may be some massive shakeups in the military structure throughout the region. On 9 Jul 2005, the Asahi Shimbun reported that a Liberal Democratic Party commission approved a set of outlines Thursday that include revising pacifist Article 9 of the Constitution to stipulate Japan’s right to possess a “self-defense military,” lawmakers said. The word “military” has never been officially used to describe the Self-Defense Forces, mainly out of consideration to Japan’s neighbors. The Washington Post on 22 Nov 2005 reported that the ruling Liberal Democratic Party formally unveiled a revised draft of Japan’s pacifist constitution that would allow the country to possess an official military for the first time since World War II and give the armed forces a more assertive international role.)
The Sep 2005 landslide victory for Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi has changed the landscape of Japanese politics. Washington Post on 14 Nov 2005 reported that Shintaro Ishihara, governor of Tokyo, no longer seems the threat he once was. While some still see him as a loose cannon, his politics can no longer be called radical. The Mainichi newspaper recently released results of a poll of 1,058 Japanese showing that 43 percent thought the nation’s actions during World War II were “clearly wrong,” while a majority of respondents either said the war had been unavoidable or were unsure. Meanwhile, revisionist textbooks that critics say whitewash Japan’s wartime role are being adopted by more and more schools, and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party is pushing to alter the pacifist postwar constitution to allow an official military. The Mainichi and other polls indicate a shift to conservatism and a rise in nationalism amongst the population.

The ruling party will seek to push forward with its draft of the new Constitution revisions by Nov 2005. Seiji Maehara, leader of the Democratic Party, said Japan should stipulate its right of self-defense in the US-imposed constitution. In addition, the Japan Times reported on 19 Sep 2005 that Japan and the US agreed to speed up talks on realigning the US military in Japan and to launch a bilateral framework to enhance cooperation on development issues. Both the US and Japan want to accelerate the talks from the standpoint of maintaining deterrent power while reducing the burden on Okinawa and other localities hosting US bases. However, the problem in Okinawa was the relocation of the Marines which has been nixed for mainland Japan and shifted back to the contentious Futema airstrip — now limited to 1,500 feet and NOT co-use — on reclaimed land and a reef. However, even if approved, it was expected to be years away from completion.

On 27 Oct 2005, the US-Japan agreed that Futenma Marine Corps Air Station would move to an existing US base, Camp Schwab, in a less-populated area of the main Okinawa Island. This opens the way to final ratification of the USFJ realignment — though there were still a few other items on the table. The Futenma relocation issue was seen as a stumbling block to other realignment considerations, including proposals to close the Naha Military Port and Camp Kinser, moving their functions to Marine bases in northern Okinawa; reduce the size of Camp Foster; and move the command element of the III Marine Expeditionary Force to Guam, shifting some 6000-7000 Marines and their dependents to that U.S. territory.

Almost unnoticed in the news in Nov 2005 was that the Japanese LDP agreed unanimously to submit a government-sponsored bill to the Diet in early 2006 to upgrade the Defense Agency to a ministry and will make arrangements with the New Komeito party in the ruling coalition to achieve the submission. The status would elevate it to a head of the Ministry to a cabinet-level position and place it on equal footing with its neighbors on defense matters. In truth, the Defense Agency has been operating as a ministry all-along, but the constitution that prohibited a “standing army” also prevented the formation of a ministry to head the military. This is the beginning of Korea’s worst nightmare as the Japanese are outfitted with high-tech armaments, a blue water navy and an army that is superior in equipment to the ROK military — though manpower-wise it is smaller in size.

As of Nov 2005, all of the following items directly impact the USFK mission in Korea — and the Mutual Defense Pact for Korea. The 3rd MEB directly supports the ROK in time of war. The carrier out of Yokosuka exerts a naval presence off North Korea during times of crisis. The move of I Corps to Camp Zama could spell the end of the CFC structure as it is today with the CFC “hat” moving to Japan as its SDF joins the external defense role in protecting itself from North Korean threats with a Missile Defense Shield (MDS) and USFJ Aegis destroyers (part of the Yokosuka carrier group) acting as part of that shield. On 16 Nov 2005 Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and President George W. Bush met to talk about means to expedite bilateral efforts to realign the US military presence in Japan as well as discuss the North Korean nuclear disarmament talks.
Japan agreed to the replacing the conventionally powered USS Kitty Hawk — due for decommissioning — with the nuclear carrier (reported to be the USS George Washington, but not confirmed) in 2009 because it had no choice. In an attempt to pacify anti-nuclear activists, the US Navy stated it would suspend the operation of the atomic reactor of the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier while it docks at Yokosuka. However, moving the air wing to Iwakuni from Atsugi faces stiff opposition from Iwakuni citizens. The Nimitz-class carrier are far more capable than conventional carriers as they offer better war fighting capabilities because they can hold twice as much aviation fuel, have a larger flight deck and more weapons storage and can last twice as long at a location during contingency operations. However, its crew size and dependents on shore will remain about the same so the changes to Yokosuka infrastructure will be insignificant.

As an off-shoot, the possibility of stationing a carrier at Guam is being openly discussed in the PACAF community to station a naval air wing at Anderson AB as an adjunct to a carrier being based there. Anderson stated that there is enough space to accomodate the wing … though there are also plans to locate bombers as a “satellite” base on a rotation basis. Currently nuclear subs are stationed there. There is speculation that the nuclear weapons that were removed from Okinawa and Korea are now prepositioned in Guam.

The moving of Marines on Okinawa to Guam now tentatively set at 7000 Marines. Special Japanese legislation was introduced to allow Japan to spend about $4.27 billion to pay for moving 6,000 to 7,000 Marines, plus their dependents, from Okinawa to Guam and to exercise eminent domain that would allow the national government to build an airport to replace Marine Corps Air Station Futenma on Camp Schwab and the shallow waters of Oura Wan Bay. Under the Status of Forces Agreement and the bilateral security treaty, Japan is obligated to pay for the bulk of the cost of the U.S. bases in the country. However, the existing agreements don’t apply overseas, and some Japanese officials have raised doubts concerning the legality of funding the move under existing laws. U.S. officials stressed that financial assistance from Japan is essential for the move. The US Pacific Command estimated that at least $9 billion is needed to construct facilities in Guam after the 3rd MEF is transferred there.

However, the Okinawa governor against plan to shift airfield from Futenma to Camp Schwab. Under the old plan, the Futenma AS runway would be joint-use. Under the new plan with Camp Schwab, the runway is shorter and NOT joint use causing Okinawa officials say they now oppose the new airport. The government is considering a special law aimed at expediting the relocation process by giving the central government power to approve matters usually left to local governments “such as environmental impact assessments and reclamation work on public waters.” Okinawa Governor Keiichi Inamine. Inamine has expressed his determination to reject the plan to a US military heliport to be built partly on US Marines Camp Schwab land in Nago’s Henoko district, and partly offshore. The local Okinawa Times and the national Asahi Shimbun newspapers conducted the random poll of 915 people on 12 and 13 Nov 2005 indicated that 72 percent of Okinawans rejected the plan and 84 percent felt the relocation out of Futenma should be to Guam or the US.

The moving of a U.S. Army headquarters (I Corps) to Camp Zama near Tokyo had “portions” of I Corps already in place as of July 2004. However, Kanagawa residents are against any full-scale relocation to Zama and small-scale protests have been held.
As the likelihood of changes to the Japanese Peace Constitution — and impacts to Korea by a mass US pullout from the CFC and its impact to the Korean military (i.e. intelligence support) — President Roh was again mouthing warnings of forming “them” against “us” mentality in Sep 2005. In other words, the ROK played a game where it would be able to make alliances with the Chinese and Russia, provide the DPRK with food and power — and still retain the US in Korea just IN CASE the DPRK reneged. On 19 Sep 2005, President Roh said in his keynote address at the 60th plenary session of the UN General Assembly on Wednesday, said the world “must shake off the mindset and vestiges of imperialism that appear to linger in various forms.” He also called for vigilance against a resurgence of “self-centered” major powers. Roh stated that the US must overcome old divisions in its mind between “them” and “us” in Northeast Asia, with one side to be supported and the other kept in check. This was tantamount to shouting, “DOWN WITH U.S. IMPERIALISM!!!” Speaking at a dinner at the Korean Society in New York, Roh said doing so would “help regional peace and security in Asia and the national interests of the United States.”

Presidential foreign policy advisor Chung Woo-sung provided the customary gloss on Roh’s remarks, which he said were an expression of concern about calls for the US to join hands with Japan in confronting the PRC, but long-time observers have heard this before.

In Dec 2005, it was announced that there would be meetings on the realignment of troops in Japan starting in Jan 2006. This is the continuing work by the “US-Japan Security Consultative Committee,” a document entitled “Alliance between United States and Japan: transformation and realignment for the future” was signed on 28 Oct 2005 in Washington. The finishing touches to the document are being worked out before its entry into force in March 2006. “But we will meet frequently before finalizing the realignment report, in order to map out a plan for each item recommended in the interim report released on Oct. 29,” he said. “Among the topics will be flight paths for (Camp) Schwab and (MCAS) Iwakuni.” However, the details will not change its essence — the biggest of which is that the SDF will be authorized to venture outside the national borders in defense of Japan — presaging a regional role. At the same time the USFJ will be reduced in size and forces moved within Japan.

밯e plan to hold a ministerial level meeting in Washington in January,?said Moriyuki Shikata, U.S. Status of Forces Agreement Division director with Japan뭩 Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The January session will be 뱂ust one of many we plan to hold before March,?the deadline for finalizing the plan, he said. 밒ntensified meetings are expected with the U.S. side through March,?he added. 밃t that same time, we need to synchronize coordination with local communities.? This is part of the move to convince community leaders of the moves’ benefits to Japan and the local communities — and if these cannot be worked out, adjustments to the plan made.

A major part of the interim report was a plan to move Marine helicopter operations from Marine Corps Air Station Futenma to a new facility to be built on Camp Schwab, in a more remote area of Okinawa near the village of Henoko. Refueling aircraft would be moved to MCAS Iwakuni. 밫here are concerns among residents at Henoko that aircraft might fly over their homes,?Shikata said. 밐owever, the flight routes have yet to be determined. We need to finalize them so that the government of Japan will be able to explain them to residents.?br>
He said another important part of the plan is the possible move of some F-15 fighter training from Kadena Air Base to mainland air bases. 밯e need to see that from two aspects,?he said: To increase the ability to cooperate between U.S. and Japan Air Self-Defense forces and 뱓o reduce noise by dispersing the training.?br>
For the first meeting in January, Japan will be represented by Kazuyoshi Umemoto, counselor for North American Affairs Bureau of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Chisato Yamauchi, deputy director of Defense Bureau of Self-Defense Agency, Shikata said.

The realignment plan has been a hard sell on Okinawa. Officials here say that while they support the proposed move of some 7,000 Okinawa-based Marines to Guam and mainland Japan, they vehemently oppose the Camp Schwab heliport plan and the possibility of opening Kadena Air Base to joint use with the JASDF.

Meanwhile, U.S. officials have stressed that reducing Marine troop strength – and closing several bases in southern Okinawa – hinge on moving Marine air operations to Camp Schwab. (Source: Stars and Stripes, 30 Dec 2005.)

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Yongsan Garrison Site Proposed for Yongsan Park — AGAIN (Dec 2005) This is an OLD, OLD topic. The only newsworthy aspect of this story is that nothing has been done — after years and years of the same old story. When the Yongsan Garrison was first proposed for being shut down in 1990 — yes, that is fifteen years ago — the Seoul government immediately demanded that the area be turned over to them with the vague plans for a Seoul Park. The MND who did not want the move mumbled and dragged their feet saying they had to find somewhere for the troops to move to first. After all major cities in Korea refused to accept the troops from Yongsan, the situation returned to the status quo.

After the horrific anti-Americanism in Korea in 2002, the situation was again addressed that Yongsan needed to be shut down, but this time more forcefully by the US. Again Seoul City resurfaced its plans but this time, it had drawn up very specific outlines of what was to be done and which areas were to be converted to high-rise apartments and which areas would become business districts. The Seoul City government would garner billions of dollars in immediate revenues from the sales of land — and future tax revenues in the billions as well. The golf courses were immediately transferred to the Seoul City control to appease them, but the Ministry of Defense (MND) still controlled the remainder of the area. The wrangling was that the MND was NOT going to give the remaining Yongsan land to Seoul City. The battle lines were drawn — especially with real estate worth multi-billions of dollars at stake.

Finally in 2003 Donald Rumsfield made his demands for the move from Yongsan firm. The MND FINALLY revealed publicly its stalling strategy to maintain the “tripwire” of US troops along the DMZ. It claimed it didn’t have the money for the 3.2 billion dollar move and would have to sell the Yongsan land first. The Roh administration wanted to “renegotiate” the move cost. It was delay after delay AGAIN. The move from Yongsan to Pyeongtaek was announced in 2003 and as of Dec 2005, the ROK is still trying to buy the land. At the last moment in 2004, the National Assembly FINALLY approved the funding of the move…but there are snakes in the funding package. The USFK says the move might cost 4.9 billion, but the ROK “negotiated” it to funding 3.2 billion — with the rest unfunded. There is construction at Camp Humphreys on already committed land, but this land is still a minor portion. The major chunks of land have not been procured as yet with ongoing protests. As of Dec 2005, the official statement is that the “Korean Defense Ministry is in the process of procuring the land.” The MND has NOT SOLD THE LAND AT YONGSAN. NO LAND SALE — NO MOVE FROM YONGSAN AND THE DMZ. In addition, meeting the costs needed for the base relocation must be dealt with as part of the national defense budget. It’s separate from plans to make use of the returned land to pay for the move. The costs of moving the U.S. Army bases nationwide need to be handled in connection with the realignment of the U.S. forces on a national level.

This transparent strategy may blow up in the left-leaning Roh administration’s face. The move off the DMZ could just as well be to Guam or other points between. It does not have to be to Pyeongtaek. The USFK is keeping very low key on this because of the current changes in Japan’s SDF structures and the changes to Article 9 of the Peace Constitution. The 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force Headquarters elements are leaving Okinawa for Guam. There is talk of stationing a nuclear carrier in Guam with an air wing at Anderson — and pulling the carrier out of Yokohama. There is talk of making Guam the central point for deployments using portions of Anderson for “satellite bases” for bombers and stealth fighters. There are a lot of things that are going on outside of Korea that could end up with the CFC function disappearing shortly and the UNC function moving to Camp Zama under the I Corps that was partially relocated in Jul 2004.

The deadline for action is fast approaching and we wonder what the next move will be. But one thing is certain — USFK Korea WILL BE DOWNSIZING whether under the new “units of action” concept or because of pullout. The radicals in the left-leaning Roh administration may get what they wish for — but not on the terms they want. On 27 Dec 2005, the administration announced that 80 percent of the land for the move to Camp Humphreys had been procured, but the remaining 20 percent would need court approval to be “condemned.”

The article in the Joongang Ilbo on 22 Dec 2005 stated: “The central government has received a master plan for using the land now used by U.S. military forces in central Seoul when it reverts to the Korean government’s control. It calls for most of the land to be converted to parks, but some would be redeveloped for housing or commercial use. The funds raised from that redevelopment would be used to help fund the U.S. Army’s move to new facilities near Pyeongtaek, south of Seoul in Gyeonggi province. The JoongAng Ilbo obtained a copy of the report, which government officials said could serve as a master plan for the conversion. It envisages a park of about 660 acres in what is now the Main Post and South Post areas of the compound. The project would not be completed until 2030, according to the planning document. To raise the estimated 5 trillion won ($4.9 billion) that the Defense Ministry said might be necessary to fund the relocation of U.S. facilities, the report suggested that other parts of the area be sold or turned into housing, cultural and commercial areas. One rather interesting fund-raising suggestion was that occupants of new buildings surrounding the park area be taxed for the view from their windows. The Korea Planners Association and the Korea Institute of Landscape Architecture submitted the report to the Prime Minister’s Office last month, government officials said. The report estimated that the cost of converting the area to parkland, separate from the U.S. relocation costs that Seoul is responsible for, could be as much as 4.6 trillion won. The development plan also recommended that areas near the Sinyongsan subway station, where the U.S. military hospital is now located, be used as cultural facilities. The hospital building could be used as an exhibition hall, it said, and underground facilities redesigned as parking facilities for the park. Public hearings will be held next year on the plan, government officials said. It could be controversial with environmental groups, which want the entire area to be used as a park. The city government has echoed those calls. (SITE NOTE: We are not certain if the US Embassy move to the old Camp Coiner portion of Yongsan is included in this plan or if the ROK is trying to do one more of its underhanded tricks. The US Embassy move is another highly emotional issue of the ROK to renege on its promises. The move proposal is over a decade old — but still no move has happened becuase of the ROK manuevers to stall the process.)