오산기지 배경과 1945-51 이시우 2006/05/09 1954

http://kalaniosullivan.com/OsanAB/OsanSongtan.html

OSAN AIR BASE (K-55):
Japanese Airfield??? In the past there was some discussion about there possibly being a Japanese airstrip from “secondary” and “tertiary” sources. This was probably NOT the case. Most likely the confusion comes from references are made from the notes that during the later part of World War II, the Japanese conscripted 20,000 Korean laborers to build a Naval Logistics Center in the Pyeongtaek area. This was later referred to as being used by the US Army as an airfield near Anjung-ni. This was, in fact, K-6 (Pyongtaek AB) in the Korean War — which later became Camp Humphreys.

There is no indication on any charts that such a Japanese airfield existed in the Songtan area. The maps below are from the December 1948 USAF Pilotage Chart for Kyongsong (380C), scale 1:500,000 with air info current Jan 1951. It shows 2 fields in the vicinity of what is now Osan AB. One is 3 nautical miles SW of P’yongtaek and is labeled P’YONGT’AENG-NI as an emergency field with a 5100 ft. hard surface runway, field elevation of 62 ft. (Map notation: 62 H 51) The other is 2 NM S of Suwon and is labeled SUWON as a military field with a 5200 ft. hard surface runway, field elevation 60 ft. (Map notation: 60 H 52).

1948 USAF Pilotage Chart for Kyongsong (380C) (Click on chart to enlarge)

(Courtesy Hans Peterman)

Beginnings of Osan AB (K-55) The beginnings of Songtan as a city started with the construction of Osan AB (K-55). The development started with the filling in of the rice fields behind Chicol-ni Village to the left as one exited the gate as well as creation of the shanty-town called “Chong-mun eup” (Front Gate town). The expansion then moved up the base of Milwal-dong and around to the Hill 180 Gate (ROKAF Gate). From here the expansion moved up to the ridge line along MSR-1 until by the 1960s, the Songtan-myeon (district) area was redesignated as a town or Songtan-eup.

“The entire area that now encompasses Osan AB included four tiny farming villages near the hillsides, and a large number of rice paddy areas where the runway now lies. The villages clustered at the base of the hillsides were moved to make room for the base. The villages that were removed were: Jeuk Bong-ri, Chang Deung-ri, Shin Ya-ri and Ya-ri.” (Source: History of Osan Air Base, Republic of Korea, Osan Air Base Historical Office, April 1999 and GlobalSecurity.org: Osan AB.)

We can account for seven villages (hamlets) — and have the names for five of them.
(1) Unknown hamlet: The first relocated hamlet (cluster of small mudwattle houses) was on Bomb Dump hill (now called the Beta Area). There were people living on the bomb dump hill on early 1952 photos while the runway was being constructed, but by 1953 this village had been relocated. This would be considered part of Namsan-ni. The bomb dump hill (now called the “Beta site” ammunition storage) was decomposed granite which was used as fill for the runway construction.

(2) Unknown hamlet: The second hamlet was on Hill 170. According to Ed McManus, Col, USA (ret), the 841st EAB was at the base of Hill 170 near the antenna farm. There was a Korean Village on the hillside behind the 841st area on Hill 170. It was near where the fuel tanks where the POL tanks were positioned. On a 8mm film by Robert Evilsizor, Commander, Co. A, 839th EAB, shows Koreans on Hill 170 taking the thatch roofs off of their houses and loading the thatch six-feet high onto three oxen and then heading off to the south on the newly-made taxiway in 1952. This hamlet would be considered part of Namsan-ni on the other side of the hill.

(3) Shinjang-ni: The third village was Shinjang-ni which was located just outside the present Doolittle gate to the north of the dirt road leading to the Gate. (Source: Aug 1951 839th EAB Overview Construction Drawing) Like Namsan-ni, the Shinjang-ni village was actually a group of hamlets and isolated farm houses combined that stretched to the MSR-1 to the east and Seotan-myeon. (Source: Verbal Conversation Kalani O’Sullivan with Mr. Oh Son-soo, 21 July 2005) A photo by Bob Spiwak in 1953 shows Shinjang-ni very close to the End-of-Runway area. Portions of this village would have had to be relocated when the Perimeter Road was constructed. Up to the 1970s, aerial photos of Osan AB indicated a farm village to the right of the Doolittle Gate area — accessed separately from the MSR-1 road.

Photo towards End-of-Runway (1953) (Bob Spiwak) (NOTE: Close-in house belongs to Namsan-ri Village on Hill 170. In the distance to the right is Shinjang-ni and to the left is Shin-Yari and Yari.)

Yari: The fourth village of Yari was on the north side of the runway and removed when the Perimeter road was built. This village along with Shin-Yari were to the north west of the base (towards Seotan-myeon). This Yari and Shin-Yari were shown in old photos taken after the runway was built. However, by 1954, the villages no longer appear in any of the photos. The sand pit was located near the villages.

(5) Shin-Yari: The fifth area was north-west of Yari in Seotan-myeon moved for the runway expansion and building of the Perimeter Road.

(6) Chokbong-ni (Jeuk-Bong-ri): The fourth village was located right above the supply warehouse on the slopes of Hill 180. It appears that the villagers on Hill 180 were allowed to remain in place while the construction of the base was proceeding in 1952. 8mm movies shot by Robert Evilsizor, Commander Co. A, 839th EAB, showed people of Chokbong-ni moving about in a panoramic shot of the runway area. This village would be relocated when they started building housing and infrastructure on the hillside in 1953-1954. The advance element of the 5th Air Force relocated to the general area of the village.

(7) Chang Deung-ri (Enheng Jengui): This village was located in the present golf course area. At the time, a Class IV bomb storage area was built to support a second wing and the base reservoir was built in this area. (NOTE: See Enheng Jengui and Ginko Tree comments)

How Osan AB (K-55) was named In 1951, all the bases in Korea received a K-designator, with “K” meaning Korea. The number gives you an idea of when it originated. K-55 (Osan-ni Air Base) was near the end of the list with K-56 not completed because of the end of the Korean War. For example, K-1 Pusan-West Air Base and K-2 Taegu Air Base reflected how the allied forces had been pushed into the Pusan Perimeter. K-6 was Pyongtaek Air Field (which later became Camp Humphreys), K-8 was Kunsan Air Base, and K-13 was Suwon Air Base. All of these were Japanese airfields prior to being upgraded for use by jet aircraft. However, the new Osan-ni air field was being built from scratch and therefore its number was much higher.

The end of the K-designators became the ROKAF bases K-57 (Kwang’ju Air Base); K-58 (Yecheon Air Base); K-59 (Cheongju Air Base); K-60 (Songmu Air Base); K-75 (Chungwon Air Base); K-76 (Seosan Air Base); K-60 (Songmu Air Base); K-75 (Chungwon Air Base); K-76 (Seosan Air Base). (See Korean War Reference Page for more information of K-bases.)

AIRFIELD LOCATION AND IDENTIFICATION CODES (Jack Barclay)
This map and messages can be found at:
The Korean War Project: K-Bases in Korea.

As to the name selection of “Osan-ni Air Base”, there appears to be no satisfactory answer from both long-time residents and other sources as to how the base got its name. Originally designated “Osan-ni Air Base” (K-55), the base was redesignated as “Osan Air Base” in September 1956. The name “Osan-ni AB” proved to be quite confusing to military personnel and by 1952, it had already slipped to oblivion amongst flying personnel with the base being referred to as “K-55″ or “Osan AB.”

Interestingly, the specifications directive of the 934th Engineering Aviation Group for the construction of the runway in 1951 calls the project the “Osan Air Field runway” — not “Osan-ni” — throughout the document. It appears that the name Osan-ni started disappearing even before the runway was completed. Actually, the name “Osan-ni Air Base” was so confusing by 1952, military personnel were already referring to the base as “Osan Air Base.” It took until 1956 to change all the paperwork. However, even till today, many Americans are confused by Osan City not being in close proximity to the base — and many mistakenly follow the road maps to Osan City before realizing that Osan AB is NOT in that area.

(NOTE: Koreans in the Songtan area do NOT use “Osan” to refer to the base as a matter of pride as “Osan” refers to the next city down the road. Instead the air base (piyanggi) is referred to “K-55″ from the “K” base designator system used in the Korean War. Even the bus from Pyeongtaek to Songtan that follows the old MSR-1 route (Main Supply Route 1) paralleling the Kyongbu railroad. It continues to use the designation of “K-55″ for the Osan AB area. Even today if you go to the Shinjang-1 dong House Office, the area map on the wall shows “K-55″ — NOT “Osan AB.” Most traffic signs refer to “AFOC” (Air Force Operations Command” (AFOC Gate), “K-55″ or “Piyangi” (Air Base in Hangul (Korean). There is only one sign we have seen on Route 1 at the Doolittle Gate (Back Gate) intersection that says “Osan Air Base” and only one sign on Shinjang Road that says “Main Gate.”)
The term “Osan Air Base” was not only confusing to Americans, it was also confusing to Koreans as well. A story related by Mr. Chong Kyu-sok told of how as a ROKAF airman he was ordered to Osan AB in 1958. He boarded a train and got off at Osan-ni. Arriving late at night, he asked where the base was. They pointed to the bright lights in the distance where search lights were lighting the sky. Not realizing the distance, he started walking and soon realized that it was not as near as the lights seemed to indicate. This experience was not only himself, but with most ROKAF personnel ordered to report to Osan-ni Air Base. Instead of getting off the train at the nearby Seojong-ni Train Station (1km down the road), most got off the train at the Osan-ni Train Station (8km away). (Source: Verbal conversation Kalani O’Sullivan and Mr. Chong Kyu-sok, 21 July 2005.)

The base was not named for any of the villages on the site. Supposedly, the first base commander named the base “Osan-ni,” because it was the only village shown in this region on military maps. We do NOT accept this explanation as military maps clearly showed “Seojong-ni” (Sojang) and its train station.

According to the Osan Air Base Historical Office, April 1999, “The base was not named for any of the villages on the site. The first base commander named the base Osan, as it was the only village shown in this region on military maps and because it was easy to pronounce. The word “Osan” means Crow Hill. The four villages that were moved to make room for the base were Jeuk-Bong-Ri, Chang-Deung-ri, Shin-Ya-Ri and Ya-Ri. A large ginkgo tree that was in the Village Square of one of these villages still stands on a hill in the present golf course site.” (Source: Brief History of Osan AB. This version is parroted in many histories of Osan AB.)

The claim that Osan-ni was the “only village shown in this region on military maps” cannot be substantiated as the December 1948 Pilotage Charts (used at the start of the Korean War) has BOTH Osan-ni and Seojong-ni (Sojang-ni) shown on the maps. (Source: World Pilotage Charts provided by Hans Peterman. December 1948 USAF Pilotage Chart for Kyongsong (380C), scale 1:500,000 with air info current Jan 1951.) On the map, the name of Seojong-ni was “Sojang-ni” which was the Japanese name for the town.

As Seojong-ni village was only about two miles from where K-55 was sited, it should have been the logical choice for the name. But somehow the name “Osan-ni AB” was selected and that was that. (Source: Retiree Activities Office (Osan AB))

Another alleged reason was that “Osan” was easy to pronounce. The word “Osan” means Crow Hill. (Source: Retiree Activities Office (Osan AB).) We find this reason hard to justify as “Seojong” is two syllables long as well. Thus this is not a good reason for why “Osan-ni AB” was chosen.
Corrections to Some Misleading Historical References We comment on the Brief History of Osan AB dated April 1999 because it has been quoted and requoted in so many sources that we respect highly. The current Brief Osan AB history at 51st FW History Site has revised most of these areas. The History of Osan Air Base dated April 1999 states: “The ROK government allowed the U.S. Air Force to purchase 1,250 acres in 1952 to expand the base. A fifth Korean village (unnamed) was relocated in 1953 to enlarge the compound area for the location of Headquarters, 5th Air Force, which maintained an advanced headquarters until the arrival of the 314th Air Division in 1954. Elements of the 839th, 841st, and 417th Engineering Battalions took part in constructing the base. The rolling hills were transformed into a base of operation and the runway was completed in less than six months. The runway opened in December 1952, with the advance elements of the 18th Fighter-Bomber Wing arriving for duty late in the month. The 18th FBW provided air operations in support of UN ground forces during the Korean conflict.” (Source: History of Osan Air Base, Republic of Korea, Osan Air Base Historical Office, April 1999; 51st FW History Site; VFW Post 10216; and GlobalSecurity.org: Osan AB.)

The first sentence is misleading. The US did NOT “purchase” the land for Osan AB. Like all the other bases in Korea built during the Korean War, they were granted for use by the UN and US forces INDEFINITELY. However, unlike other countries where it is for a specific term or a 100-year occupancy clause, the ROK has none attached. But the point is that the US did NOT “purchase” Osan — and remains at the pleasure of the ROK.

To some NGO activists this “rent-free” use of the land is unjust and has remained a bone of contention. The City of Pyeongtaek also finds the USAF tenancy at Osan AB extremely irksome as the USAF is answerable only through the Ministry of Defense on land usage — and NOT to any local authority.

However, in the most negative of senses, the US did “buy” the land use. In the early years of the ROK government, the US virtually subsidized the corrupt Syngman Rhee regime whereby the US monetary grants and aid programs propped up the ROK economy. Because of this “control,” the ROK had no Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the US until 1963 — long after the defeated WWII nations of Japan and Germany had SOFAs in place. In effect, from 1953 to 1963, the ROK had no say-so in the administration of the bases nor prosecution of soldiers who committed major crimes.

Regardless of all the flimsy excuses, the free nation of the Republic of Korea had a SOFA AFTER the defeated nations of WWII — and only after Park Chung-hee had come to power. Until the first revision of the SOFA in 1991, the US paid for much of the ROK’s defense bill either through outright grants or FMS (Foreign Military Sales) giveaways. By remaining under the US nuclear umbrella, the ROK “chaebol” system — like the Japanese “kiretsu” system — was able to prosper and the ROK was able to divert its capital to the expansion of its economy rather than expend it on defense.

However, after the Miracle of the Han brought prosperity to Korea, this “ownership” issue of the base has become a contentious item. The radicals claim that the US is here for its own geopolitical purposes so why should Korea pay for US forces — while the ROK government in 2005 flat refused to increase its cost share and came out with a plan to REDUCE its forces by 2020. The movement of the USFK to Pyeongtaek (K-6 Camp Humphreys and K-55 Osan AB) will cost approximately $3.5 billion out of the Korean coffers. The ROK does NOT want to pay this amount and has constantly attempted to “renegotiate.” There are now angry words heard in Congress over Korea’s stance with respect to North Korea. To many Congressmen, the ROK cannot have US troops to defend against North Korean aggression, while providing direct aid and monetary support of the North Korean regime. The US finally started playing hardball in 2003 and stated it was relocating from Yongsan COMPLETELY with the exception of the CFC headquarters — but there are moves afoot in moving elements of I Corps to Camp Zama in Japan that may affect the CFC if the Japanese rewrite Article 9 of the Japanese Peace Constitution.

On 1 Aug 2005, a Japanese news report in the Daily Yomiuri stated that a new US Army command to be set up at Camp Zama in Japan would assume charge in an emergency on the Korean Peninsula. The command, a “UEX” under new acronymic US forces nomenclature, is smaller than the Washington-based Army First Corps command initially considered for the move to the camp in Kanagawa Prefecture, and combines the functions of a division and army corps. The daily said direct command of the UEX would be limited to an emergency on the Korean Peninsula, while the PRC-Taiwan “hot zone” and conflicts in Southeast Asia included in the “arc of instability” would come under the command of the Third Marine Expeditionary Force based in Okinawa. However, in any Korean emergency US Marine units in Okinawa would come under the operational command of the UEX. (NOTE: This Camp Zama move has been in the works for two years and assumes the role of the Combined Forces Command leadership role in the ROK — and more significantly, though unstated, the elimination of the USFK role in CFC at Yongsan.)

Japan’s governing Liberal Democratic Party released its first draft of constitutional revisions in Aug 2005, in which it proposed having armed forces for not only self-defense but also international contributions. New clauses are designed to clear the way for Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defense, or coming to the military aid of an ally.
Though the US and ROK routinely announce the soundness of the US-ROK alliance, most experts agree that the US-ROK relationship is at a crossroads.

After the 1991 SOFA Agreement, the ROK has been hounded to increase (1) its defense spending to 3.2 percent of GDP — as most front-line “flash-point” nations of the world spend up to 6 percent of GDP. (NOTE: The percentage of GDP for defense has actually decreased steadily from 8 percent at the start of Kim Dae-jung administration down to under 2.8 percent of GDP under the Roh Moo-hyun administration.); and (2) increase is “share” of costs for housing US troops in Korea — such as Japan which pays for 75 percent of costs. Construction of new housing for personnel at Camp Humphreys is proceeding but the USFK claims it is NOT for the move but pre-approved construction. New construction at Osan AB is also proceeding in an area WITHIN the base perimeter. Areas at K-6 designated for USFK use has resulted in violent demonstrations in July 2005 with more expected in the future.

The antagonistic viewpoint of the existence of Osan AB is also evidenced in the local area. In the 1990s, the ROK reserved land for the use of the elements that were to be relocated from Yongsan under a MOA signed and ratified in 1990. Unfortunately the ROK dragged its feet as it refused to come up with monies to facilitate the move. In 2000, Pyeongtaek City requested the lands that had lain fallow at Osan AB be transferred to the city. This spurred the transfer of the lands by the ROK Ministry of Defense to the ROKAF and the building of the AFOC (Air Force Operations Command) on its location.

The phrasing to “expand the base” gives the impression that the base was established and then “expanded” in 1952 by 1,250 acres. We believe this is misleading. The 1,250 acre figure given was the original base size in 1952. Though the base has expanded in various directions over the years, in 1952, the base did not grow much until the 1990s when the Yongsan personnel were to be moved to Osan and the ROK reserved land for the US use. This land was not utilized because the ROK refused to allocate funding for the move and the land reverted to ROKAF use. Osan AB currently occupies 1,661 acres plus 88 acres for an Alpha site 2 miles from the base. (Source: Osan AB: Conservation)

The “fifth Korean village (unnamed)” in our opinion is actually one of the original four listed: Chang Deung-ri. However, it went by a different name of Eunheng Jengui on the Ginko tree plaque at the Golf Course (and mistakenly showing incorporation into the base in 1950) leading to confusion. The location of this village is given by John Sullivan, former 51st Wing Historian and presently USAFE Director of History. The key is the Ginko Tree which is a local landmark on the golf course. John wrote in Apr 2005:

“When MOH Recipient and Bayonet Charge hero Millett visited (four times during my tenures in Korea), the discussions were long and painful. Local, and amateur, historians were adamant that the Chinese never reached Osan AB (that far south) and based their discussions on Army Morning Reports. They had me convinced until I saw Millett’s drawings in his Korean War notebook that showed a large ginko tree in the center of the town where he took enemy gunfire. The historian in me took several of us to the Kyonggi-Do Mayor’s Office and then to several “authorities” who all stated that only one ginko tree survived the Korea War and it was in the center of the town of – whatever that village with the long name was – and that led credence to Millett’s claim of the Hill 180 location. That, and his drawings, which matched the Osan AB Hill to a “T” – so I ended the debate.”
Thus we know the Ginko tree talked about above was in the center of ENHENG JENGUI — and since the Ginko tree is on the golf course, we know that Enheng Jengui was located where the present golf-course is. As we know that 5th AF relocated to the golf course area, Enheng Jengui is just another name for one of the villages we had already accounted for in photos displayed on this site.

The “417th Engineering Aviation Battalion” was a BRIGADE — NOT a Battalion — stationed at Taegu (K-2) from 1952-1954. Some elements of the 417th were at Osan AB, but the main unit remained at K-2. A Brigade in the Korean War consisted of two or more battalions According to The U.S. Air Force in Korea (p499), “In May and June 1952, the 417th Engineer Aviation Brigade, the 934th Engineer Aviation Group, and the 366th, 840th, and 841st Engineer Aviation Battalions unloaded in Korea. From its command post at Taegu, the 417th Brigade filled a long-standing need for an agency which could supervise the construction of air facilities in the combat zone. The Fifth Air Force’s director of installations now ordered construction and specified requirements; the 417th Brigade supervised the actual work and administered the aviation engineer troops.” The 934th was tasked for construction of an entirely new jet fighter airfield on the flood plain of the Chinwi-chon River south of Suwon, at the village of Osan-ni.” (NOTE: The 366th EAB built K-9; the 840th and 841st EABs assisted the 839th at K-55 and then in early 1953, the 841st EAB went to Kunsan to complete the north-south runway. The 839th EAB remained at Osan until 1955 when it was slated for deactivation.)

There is a another point that should be made at this time. According to GlobalSecurity.org: Osan AB, “Prior to its use as an air base, Osan’s site housed an army regiment.” Others have often repeated this comment. Though it appears to be accepted fact, we believe the reference to a REGIMENT on the base is erroneous. After the initial onslaught and the stand of Task Force Smith, the area changed hands. After the Inchon Invasion, the 7th Infantry Division pushed south. On 24 Sep 50 on the Inchon/Seoul front, the 7th Infantry Division entered Osan on a drive to link up with Eighth Army forces advancing from the south. However, no camp was established in the area of Osan AB. They were just passing through. Subsequently the Chinese entered the fray and pushed the Allied forces out of Seoul and back to Taejon through Suwon and Osan. On 4 Jan 51, the capital city of Seoul changed hands for the third time within a six month period. UN forces along the western front were forced to withdraw once again; however, the Chinese did not aggressively follow-up and contact with the enemy dropped off. Up to 1951, the Allied forces were simply transiting the Osan-Songtan area. By the end of May 1951, the battle lines were established where today’s Demilitarized Zone exists — northwestward from the Han River Estuary in the west, less than 30 miles from Seoul, to the north of the 38th Parallel on the east coast. The war had definitely entered a new phase. The fighting continued, but there would be no further large-unit ground operations involving dramatic advances and withdrawals up and down the length of the peninsula.

Thus for this alleged Army regiment to be “housed” on the base, it would have to moved into the Osan AB area AFTER the Fourth Chinese Campaign (April 1951) and when the Chinese were pushed back over the Kansas and Wyoming bulge in June 1951. This leaves a window of from Jun 51 (when the Chinese were pushed back to the Wyoming line) to about Nov 51 — when the 839th EAB arrived to construct the base the first base road to haul the heavy equipment needed to start construction. Though actual heavy construction didn’t start until Jun 1952, elements under the 417th EAG were in place. So who were these Army troops???

It was standard procedure to rotate troops to the rear after a period of heavy action on the front lines. Though it is possible that Army troops were relocated to the rear in the local area for rest, normally they would be sent to “established” bases — NOT an undeveloped waste land. It would have been VERY unusual — with Suwon or Pyeongtaek (K-6) available. If there was a unit before 1952, it most certainly was NOT a regiment. An Army regiment in the Korean War consisted of 2000-3000 men. For this amount of men to be “housed” at the base would require a significant amount of space for tents and messing facilities. There is NO indication that there ever was such an occupancy.

When the 839th EAB arrived their first priority was constructing their living area in what would become the base theater/Tumuri Lodge area. (Source: Don Tomajan article on EAB and photo by Robert Evilsizor.) In addition, in 1953 the Graves and Registration were still recovering American bodies from Task Force Smith — which would have been done previously if an Army Regiment had been in the area between 1951-52. (Source: Ron Freedman narrative) The reference to an Army REGIMENT simply does NOT make sense.

We believe that the reference to an Army REGIMENT in fact refers to the 839th Engineering Aviation BATTALION of about 1000 men — Company A, B, C; HQ Company; and Support unit. They were SCARWAF — Special Category Army with Air Force. The SCARWAF units were originally stateside Army reserve units, but when they arrived in Korea they became a strange mix of both Army and USAF heavy construction specialists (though a minority) working together. It was the forerunner of the USAF famous “Red Horse” units (CESHR). Though it is true that the USAF’s 18th FBW officially took over the base in Dec 52, it was really already an Air Force base once the 839th EAB started in to work. We believe that somewhere along the line some facts became confused about the Army SCARWAF presence at Osan AB (K-55). Initially there was an Army colonel in charge of the EAB mission, but he was replaced with USAF Col Robert Millberry as Director of Installations in 1952. This has been a common mistake dealing with the SCARWAF as not many people understood its operations.

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36th TFS Painting (36th Fiends Site)
51st FW
51st Fighter Wing

The 51st Fighter Wing, headquartered at Osan Air Base, Republic of Korea, is the most forward deployed wing in the world, providing combat ready forces for close air support, air strike control, counter air, interdiction, theater airlift, and communications in the defense of the Republic of Korea. The wing executes military operations to beddown, maintain and employ follow-on forces for the combined arms base that includes three major flying tenants and large multiservice fighting units. The wing accomplishes this mission by:

?LI> Conducting exercises to ensure forces maintain the highest degree of readiness to defend Osan AB against air and ground attack;

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Maintaining and administering U.S. operations at Osan and five collocated operating bases — Taegu, Suwon, Kwang Ju, Kimhae and Cheong Ju ?for reception and beddown of follow-on forces; ?
Providing timely and accurate air power in support of military operations directed by higher headquarters.
The overall responsibility for directing the mission falls on the wing commander. The job of achieving mission goals is divided among the wing’s four groups.

The 51st Operations Group leads and manages the 51st FW’s flying operations, tasked with air strike control, interdiction, counterair, close air support, air rescue and operational airlift missions. The group provides supervision for two fighter squadrons, a rescue flight, an airlift flight, two range squadrons and the operations support squadron. The 36th Fighter Squadron performs air interdiction, close air support, and counter-air missions with LANTIRN (low altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared for Night) equipped F-16C/D model fighters. The 25th Fighter Squadron uses A/OA-10 Thunderbolt IIs to conduct day and night flying operations on air strike control, close air support, interdiction and combat search and rescue missions. The 33rd Rescue Squadron hosts HH-60G helicopters, providing combat rescue coverage and medical evacuations in support of 7th Air Force. The 55th Airlift Flight flies two C-12s to perform short-notice airlift of high priority passengers and cargo throughout the Pacific Theater. The 51st Range Squadron in Koon-Ni manages the only controlled, fully scoreable U.S. Air Force air-to-ground weapons gunnery range in Korea, while Detachment 1 of the 51st Range Squadron in Pil Sung provides electronic warfare training for Air Force, Army, Navy/Marines and Republic of Korea aircrews. The 51st Operations Support Squadron is responsible for training, weapons and tactics, intelligence, plans, airfield management, weather observation and air traffic control for the entire 51st Operations Group.

The 51st Mission Support Group provides wartime readiness, survivability and ground base defense for Osan through civil engineer, security forces, air base operability, explosive ordnance disposal, communications, recreation and services, and personnel assets. The 51st MSG develops and enforces policies providing mission support to more than 10,000 people at 122 units.

The 51st Medical Group provides combat medicine at a moments notice. The 51st MDG provides medical and dental care to the wing community and its geographically separated units. Its unique hospital, the first of its kind in the world, contains more than 92,000 square feet and is capable of sustained operation in a chemical environment. Its 30-bed peacetime capacity accommodates 245 patients in its wartime configuration. The 51st Maintenance Group is responsible for a myriad of logistics concerns. The 51st Maintenance Squadron provides intermediate maintenance for 28 LANTIRN F-16s, 21 A/OA-10s, an HH-60 and five MH-53 helicopters, as well as tenant U-2S aircraft. The squadron also maintains 636 pieces of Aerospace Ground Equipment and repair/calibrate 6,537 items of precision measurement equipment.

The 51st FW was activated on Aug. 18, 1948. Though not involved as a wing in World War II operations, the wing was granted “temporary bestowal” of the honors achieved by its predecessor, the 51st Pursuit Group. Following the 1948 activation, the 51st provided air defense of the Ryukyus Islands during the U.S. occupation of Japan and Okinawa.

During the Korean War, the 51st FW moved operations to Kimpo Air Base on Sept. 22, 1950. By Dec. 10, 1950, the bulk of the wing was forced to retreat back to Itazuke AB and Tsuiki AB, Japan. Missions were flown from Japan; planes landed at Taegu AB to refuel, rearm and fly another mission before returning to Japan. The 51st moved to Suwon AB, Republic of Korea, Oct. 1, 1951, but left rear echelon maintenance facilities at Tsuiki AB.

During the Korean War, the wing’s crews flew combat air patrol, air interdiction, bomber escort and reconnaissance missions in support of United Nations ground forces. The world’s first all-jet air combat was fought between 51st pilots in their F-80s and North Korean MiGs. Capt. Joseph M. McConnell Jr., with 16 MiG kills, became the Air Force’s leading ace of the conflict. His aircraft is on display near Doolittle Gate. During the Vietnam Conflict, crews of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing provided air defense of Naha AB, Okinawa, with F-102s. During the 1968 Pueblo crisis, the wing deployed 12 of its 33 aircraft to Suwon AB. On May 31, 1971, the 51st FIW was inactivated, but for only five months; on Nov. 1, 1971, the wing was redesignated the 51st Air Base Wing and activated at Osan.

The 51st FW’s aircrews have flown a variety of aircraft, including the F-80 Shooting Star, F-82 Twin Mustang, F-86 Sabrejet, F-94 Starfire, F-102 Delta Dagger, F-4E Phantom, F-106 Delta Dart, OV-10 Bronco, A-10 and OA-10 Thunderbolt II and several versions of the F-16 Fighting Falcon.

The 51st was redesignated several times over the next two decades: 51st Composite Wing (Tactical), Sept. 31, 1974; 51st Tactical Fighter Wing, June 1, 1982; and 51st Wing, Feb. 7, 1992. A final redesignation of the 51st FW brought it full circle on Oct. 1, 1992, as part of the Air Force-wide plan to preserve the lineage and heritage of its most prestigious units as the force reduced in size. (Current as of April 2003) (Source: Osan AB.)

OSAN GEOGRAPHICALLY SEPARATED UNITS: (Source: Installation Guide.)
Pil-sung Range (51 Electronic Warfare Training Sq DSN 784-6387, FAX 784-6388. Pil-sung Range is located at the foot of Mt Taebeck, one of the highest mountains in Korea. It is 160 miles due east of Osan and takes about 4 1/2 hours travel time by road. It is now manned by U.S. & Korean Civilian Contractors. There is a dining facility, Club, gym facilities, cable TV, video library and one medic. It is VERY remote.

Ko-on-ni Range (51 Range Sq DSN 784-6112/6113) Ko-on-ni Range is approx. 45 minutes by road from Osan Air Base but is still considered quite remote. It is now manned by U.S. & Korean Civilian Contractors. The compound is small (1 1/2 miles in size) but there is a rec center, gym, ball courts, sauna and jacuzzi. Bring home recipes as the dining facility will use them. Ko-on-ni has an official Air Force mascot, a very friendly and much appreciated dog.

Camp Red Cloud (604 ASOC Sq DSN 732-6142 (also Camp Casey 730-2331), 607 Weather DSN 736-1113, 3rd ROK Liaison DSN 732-6703) Camp Red Cloud is an Army post located approx. 15 miles north of Seoul near the city of Uijongbu(we jong boo). A few people are located at nearby Camp Casey and are in contact with Camp Red Cloud personnel daily. A shuttle bus runs between Red Cloud, Casey and Camp Stanley. Out of 1000 personnel assigned to Red Cloud, approx. 200 are Air Force. Most personnel reside on base in dorms or barracks. Personnel may be out in the field once per month or TDY quite often depending on the unit. The basic menities are available (PX, shoppette, clubs, gym, craft center, library) but the commissary is at Camp Casey. No family housing is available and there is no housing office. Any command sponsored personnel find housing in the city of Uijongbu. Even though Red Cloud is located near a city of 180,000 it is still considered a remote due to the nature of the mission.

Taegu/Waegwan/Camp Carroll/Camp Walker/Camp George/Camp Henry(51 TRANS, DSN 765-8225/8263 (located at Waegwan), 51MMS, Det 1 DSN 766-4035/4036 (located at Taegu) 607 Weather DSN 764-4333 and AFELM JCIS DSN 764-4781 (both located at Camp Walker). Air Force personnel are scattered between Camp Carroll (near Waegwan) and Taegu Air Base near the city of Taegu. Camps Walker, George, and Henry are close to Taegu Air Base. The Camp Henry SITES gives information on this area. Taegu is located approx. 160 miles south of Osan Air Base. All “bases” are either US Army, Korean, or a combination of the two. 51TRANS (Waegwan) is a depo rebuilding center and all personnel reside off base. Only 3 USAF are assigned here. There is a small gym, pool, small PX/commissary, mini mall and it is considered very remote. US Army are assigned here also but the number of personnel is unknown at this time.

The 607 MMS is the “caretaker” unit for Taegu Air Base. Approx. 25 people of different AFSC’s are assigned here. All personnel reside in former Air Force Officer dorms which are basically small apartments. There is a small BX/Shoppette, snack bar, gym and other typical amenities available. The commissary is at Camp Walker (8 miles and 30 minutes drive across town). There is no dining facility and all personnel receive BAS. Along with the Korean Air Force (ROKAF), there are 110-120 army personnel stationed here. There is only one command sponsored billet (commander).

607 Weather/AFELM JCIS is located on Camp Walker. Very few and all reside on post in army barracks.

Kimhae International Airport (IAP)/Kimhae Air Base (51MMS, Det 1 OL-A DSN 763-3581 FAX 787-4208, 51COMM Sq DSN 787-4000, FAX 787-4011, Commercial 011-82-51-801-7019, e-mail 51CS-OL-C@emh7.korea.army.mil)

607 MMS is located in the middle of a ROKAF base approx. 10 miles from Camp Hialeah. Camp Hialeah is in the city of Pusan, the second largest city in; Korea. Approx. 9 USAF personnel are assigned here. E-6 and above have the option of sharing base quarters or residing downtown on single rate BAQ . E-5 and below reside in USAF barracks at Camp Hialeah. See the Camp Hialeah SITES for information about base services. 607 MMS maintain wartime readiness materials and the majority of AFSC’s here are CE types. No command sponsored billets available.

607 COMM is located next door to 607 MMS. There are 4 USAF personnel assigned to this unit. The Site Chief (E-7 slot) is a command sponsored billet. Personnel E-5 and below reside at Camp Hialeah, E-6 and above have the option of sharing base quarters or residing downtown on single rate BAQ. See the Camp Hialeah SITES.

There are a few Defense Logistics Assignments to Kimhae. These folks work at the AMC Terminal. Approx. 17 USAF are assigned here. DLA assignments fall under AFOSI at Bolling AFB and the POC is DCMCI in Dayton Ohio at DSN 986-6401. There are also some DCAMO personnel assigned that work on the F4′s, F15′s and F16′s at Kimhae. Their DSN is 763-7008. Wonju (Camp Long) 7th AOG DSN 721-3512/3410. Camp Long (US Army post) is the nearest military installation to Wonju. Approx. 18 personnel are assigned here. Calling DSN is highly encouraged. There is no SITES for Camp Long.

Camp Humphreys (607 Weather DSN 753-7810, 607 CCS DSN 753-6919) SITES is available for Camp Humphreys. All USAF personnel reside at Camp Humphreys in a large USAF dorm. Basic services are available at Humphreys. Contract bus service or local bus is available for transport to Osan/Songtan. Camp Humphreys is 12 miles south of Osan Air Base.

NOTE: The 607th Weather Detachments are scattered all over Korea, many at Army installations.

Kwangju (607MMS, Det 3 DSN 786-6314/7314 FAX786-6666) 15 USAF personnel are assigned to this small site. Personnel reside in former Officer quarters which are basically a small apartment. JTR is 20% for this site. (Mail Address: Unit 2120, APO AP 96262-2120)
Suwon Air Base (607MMS, Det 2 DSN 788-5385 FAX 788-5396) 16 USAF personnel are assigned to Suwon. Suwon is a USAF base but is the opposite of Osan AB in that the ROKAF (Korean Air Force) has all the planes and does all the flying. A large Army Patriot Battalion is located here but is a tenant unit of the Air Force. Senior NCO’s have the option of living off base (in Songtan) and airmen reside in dorms at Osan AB. All commute daily to Suwon (17 miles north of Osan AB). Suwon has a small BX, snackbar, barbershop, laundry services and dining facility (run by the US Army).

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OSAN AB: OTHER UNITS
51st Communications Group At Osan, the 51st Communications Group supports base communications for the 51st Fighter Wing, and command and control communications for 7th Air Force and the Air Component Command. Group personnel gain valuable experience supporting critical warfighting systems for the air operations center under the 7th AF commander in his roles as the Combined Air Component commander and Area Air Defense commander. The 7th AF AOC is an inplace command and control center for all aerospace operations within the Korean theater. Communications support includes providing infrastructure and data systems for disseminating the daily integrated tasking order; radio and data circuits for managing the Common Tactical Picture; Global Command and Control System administration for managing the Common Operational Picture; Defense Red Switch Network maintenance for secure voice capabilities; tactical switch maintenance for secure data and voice connectivity; and secure video teleconferencing systems strategic warplanning for U.S. and Korean leaders.

One of the most important capabilities delivered by the 51st is the sensor-to-shooter information link for command and control of warfighting assets, which results in the Common Tactical Picture. Systems that support the sensor-to-shooter information link include tactical satellite, ultra-high frequency and high frequency radios, and point-to-point tactical data circuits that connect multi-service platforms operating throughout the theater.

The 621st Air Control Squadron manages the Common Tactical Picture and forwards this information to the Common Operational Picture, which is viewed through the Global Command and Control System- Korea. Comm group personnel maintain the voice and data systems by which 621st ACS manages tactical digital information links to create the Common Tactical Picture. TADILs use inputs from radars aboard multiple joint warfighting platforms to provide near real-time information to conduct tactical operations, ensuring the Air Force? ability to fly, fight and win.

A recent accomplishment of the 51st in support of the sensor-to-shooter information link was a high frequency TADIL A link. Due to the increased range provided by HF radio systems, this TADIL A link allows the 7th AF AOC to bring U.S. Navy assets in the waters around the Korean peninsula into the air and ground tactical picture. In addition, this new capability allows AWACS aircraft launching from Kadena AB, Okinawa, to receive the tactical picture long before reaching the theater, preparing them to control air operations and deliver air power more effectively and expeditiously. This accomplishment is a noteworthy success story because an HF TADIL A capability had eluded radio technicians for some time due to the difficulty in using the AN/URC-119(V) HF radio system for data communications. Even after installing the TADIL A modification to the URC-119, radio technicians could not achieve the required signal quality to pass TADIL A data through the URC-119 successfully. Therefore, 621st ACS and 51st CG coordinated to obtain a technical solution for an alternate radio system that would pass data traffic more effectively. In the end, 621st ACS acquired a Sunair 9000-series radio system that 51st CG personnel installed and configured to use an omni-directional antenna. The key advantage of the Sunair 9000-series radio system is the independent side band capability, which is not available with the URC- 119.

This new radio system has proven very successful after extensive testing with several joint players and has delivered a robust extended-range TADIL A link capability for tip-of-the-spear operations in defense of freedom for the Republic of Korea. The 51st Communications Group? personnel continue striving to improve communications systems that support the sensor-toshooter information link to ensure that the 7th AF AOC can synergize and exploit all aerospace weapon systems and deliver timely, accurate and devastating effects.

(Source: AFCA May 2001 by Capt Sean Keene)

303rd Intel Squadron The 303rd IS, popularly known as “Skivvy Nine,” has one of the most challenging and exciting missions in the air intelligence world. The unit was originally formed as a detachment of the 1st Radio Squadron Mobile at Johnson Air Base, Japan, on Nov. 20, 1950. The unit was readied for immediate deployment to Korea in response to the invasion of the South Korea by North Korean forces. Following several redesignations during the Korean War, the unit was finally designated as a detachment of the 15th RSM and moved to Osan in April 1953. In Nov. 1954, however, it again became Det. 1 of the 1st RSM. In May 1955, when the 15th was redesignated the 6922nd, the detachment at Osan became Det. 1 of the 6922nd.

In Oct. 1958 it became the 6929th RSM and was assigned to the 6902nd Special Communications Group. In Dec. 1958 it was transferred back to the 6922nd. In July 1963 it became the 6929th Security Squadron and in April 1970 it was designated Det. 1, Pacific Security Region. In May 1970 it gained squadron status as the 6903rd Security Squadron. The unit was designated a Group in 1981 and remained as such until 1993 when it was designated the 303rd IS, under the 692nd Intelligence Group, the 67th Intelligence Wing, and the Air Intelligence Agency.

Over the years, many people have contributed to Skivvy Nine’s “can-do” reputation. In 1951 the unit won its first Air Force Outstanding Unit Award and the Korean Streamer Award. Since then the unit has garnered more than 10 AFOUAs. In 1974 the 6903rd SS was presented the Freedom Through Vigilance award as security service’s top unit. In 1979 the unit won the coveted Travis Trophy, an annual award presented to the most outstanding U.S. Cryptologic Agency of the Defense Department, and received honorable mention for the same award in 1994. The unit was the Air Force nominee for the Travis Trophy again in 1996. The 303rd IS won the Large Unit Air Force Outstanding Maintenance award in 1982. In 1994 and 1996, Skivvy Nine won the U.S. Air Force Top Ground-Based Cryptologic Unit award. (Source: USAFSS Units: Note #6)

Air Force Operations Command (ROKAF) Osan Air Base is also home to the Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF) Operations Command (AFOC). The ROKAF occupies an additional significant area within Osan AB, and recently expanded into land that had originally been purchased to accommodate the relocation of forces from Yongsan Army Garrison. When that move was cancelled, the ROKAF acquired the land. The new AFOC headquarters is located in the expansion area. (Source: RAO: Osan History.)

The Air Force Operations Command was formerly the “Combat Air Command,” that was headquartered at Osan. It has nine flight wings and one training wing. It controls aircraft that included twenty-two Sqs of ground attack fighters/interceptors, twenty-three counterinsurgency aircraft in one Sq, twenty reconnaissance aircraft in one Sq, and fifteen search-and-rescue helicopters in one Sq. All of these aircraft were produced in the United States, with the exception of sixty-eight Northrop F-5E/Fs that were coproduced with Korean Air. As of 1990 the 294 Northrop F-5s and 36 General Dynamics F16C /Ds were the primary ground attack aircraft. Approximately 130 McDonnell Douglas F-4s were deployed as of 1990 for air defense but were equally useful in ground attack. All three types of aircraft were capable of being used in either role, depending on their armament. (Source: GlobalSecurity.org.) The ROKAF will be adding the F-15K shortly to its inventory and has received the first in Sep 2005.

AOC (2002) (Jack Terwiel)

AOC (2002) (Jack Terwiel)
The major problem with the CFC is that the US has all the intelligence — which at times it is reluctant to share with its ROK counterparts in peacetime.

“When I was a director of TACC (Theatre of Air Control Center) at OSAN Air Base, which was operated by both the ROK Air Force Operation Command and the US 7th Air Force Command, one of my primary responsibilities along with my US counter partner included 24-hour observation and reaction against all enemy activities displayed on LSD (Large Scale Display).

Most concerned limitation of mine in that position was that I could not access some of important intelligence, and I felt this type of limitation could cause adverse effect on our decisive reaction to enemy’s possible provocation. On occasional strategic information was very hard to obtain.” (Source: “The Strategic Intelligence & the Air Superiority for the National Security of Korea,” Myong-Sang CHOE Ph.D., August 30 2001.)
In the AOC (Air Operations Center) in Osan, the Air Force refers to the “ITO” (Integrated Tasking Order) as the “ITS” (“integrated tasking suggestion”). It is a list of assets with missions assigned against the best targets intelligence collectors can produce that meet the CINC’s guidance. The 3rd Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD) operations branch links the intelligence, the attack asset and the CINC’s guidance together for timely attack. The 3rd BCD at Osan is the only combined BCD in the Army (ROK-US under the CFC). (Source: GlobalSecurity.org: 3rd Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD) – Korea and Global Security.org: BCD Mission)

Korean Air Simulation Center The establishment of the Korean Air Simulation Center at Osan Air Base, Republic of Korea made air and space power modeling and simulation a permanent fixture on the Korean peninsula. It serves as a valuable resource to the Korean Combined Forces Command, the US Air Force and Defense Department. The KASC uses modeling and simulation technology to enable an array of computer and software tools to create graphically represented, synthetic environments for training and mission planning that challenge decision makers while testing strategy, plans and doctrine.

The KASC specifically focuses on air and space power modeling and simulation and is one of two centers outside the United States. In the past, the modeling and simulation tools that were used during Ulchi Focus Lens had to be flown in from the United States, set up, and tested — an expensive, several-week ordeal. Following the exercise, the reverse would occur. Now that the sophisticated modeling and simulation tools are in place year-round, the time and resources available for training have increased dramatically.

The center’s powerful modeling and simulation tools provide benefits to the combined forces commander, air component commander, and down through the squadron level. The models allow for practicing the execution of air and space tasking orders for missions, whether strike, reconnaissance, inter-theater airlift, logistics, unmanned aerial vehicles or maintenance. The models and simulations allow the same people who are doing their jobs in wartime to walk through the decision making process — in exactly the same manner they would if hostilities were to occur. (Source: GlobalSecurity.org: Osan.)

ROKAF Air Defense Artillery Command In 1990, the ROK Army transferred the operations of the Hawk and Nike-Zeus missiles to the ROKAF — transferred to them from the departing US Air Defense forces — and formed the ROKAF Air Defense Artillery Command (ADAC). In Jul 1991 the ROK Army ADA infantries formally transferred the ADA responsibility to the ROKAF. (Source: ROKAF.)

There is little information at this time except that there are three brigades under the ROKAF ADAC (with the 2d ADA Brigade identified and two unspecified). Each brigade consists of one Nike-Zeus and two Hawk units under each brigade. (Source: GlobalSecurity.org)

The Nike-Zeus units are 1960s vintage weaponry that should have been replaced many years ago. Tests of their reliability in recent years have shown that they are patently worthless. Supposedly the ROK is attempting to procure used PAC-2 Patriot missiles from Germany to support its air defense — but the ROK keeps trying to buy cheap and renegotiate the price. The ROK’s seriousness in procuring the PAC-2 is in question as long as the US supports Korea’s defense with PAC-3 Patriots at Kunsan, Kwangju and Osan-Suwon.

At Osan, the ROKAF also maintains the Vulcan 20mm cannons at the end of the runway.

3rd Space Surveillance Squadron Detachment 1 (Osan, Korea) RF Surveillance Site at Osan 3rd Space Surveillance Squadron: The 2nd Command and Control Squadron (2CACS), housed at Schriever AFB, is the command and control node for the passive radio frequency (RF) sensors, which includes the 3rd Space Surveillance Squadron Detachment 1 (Osan, Korea). The Osan site is used for the tracking of low altitude space objects.

The Osan Passive Radio Frequency (RF) space surveillance site tracks satellites using RF signal emmisions to compute angle of arrival observations. This site provides coverage of near-earth satellites utilizing the Low Altitude Space Surveillance (LASS) system. (Source: Space Command: Osan.)
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303rd IS We are confused as to the many units that are shown simultaneously operating at Osan. At this time, we believe that these overlapping units may actually be the same units with the 136th CSS becoming the 32d CSS in 1953.

(1). 32 CSS Pacific division (Comsec/Transec) 1953 to 1955 became the 6932nd RSM (Radio Security Mobile) Det 1 Moriyama Japan 1953 to 1954/55 (also referred to as Flt A). (It became the 6932nd RSM.)

Det 1 Moriyama Japan 1953 to 1954/55 (also referred to as Flt A)
Det 1 Obu Japan 1954/55 to ?? (became Det 3,6922nd RGM)
Det 3 APO 235 Okinawa
Det ? Ewah college Seoul Korea 1951 to 1953 (note #10)
Det ? K-55 Osan-ri KOR 1953 to ??
Flt A Moriyama Japan
Flt C APO 235 Okinawa
Flt E Hickam AFB Hawaii

Note #10 The origins of the unit were TDY groups from the Japanese Unit. There were two deployments both were handled as TDY missions from Nagoya. The first mission was in late 1950. It was located at Seoul and it was quickly withdrawn during the Chinese offensive in the latter part of that year. They got out with the clothes on their backs. The unit lost its equipment and all members of the team lost their personal belongings. The second mission began in the later part of 1951 and it was located in the Ewha College area of Seoul. The unit moved to K-55 (Osan-ri) in 1955. (Source: USAFSS Units: Note 10) (SITE NOTE: The first unit we feel is the unit Det that fell back to Osan-ni before Suwon was captured and provided the only telecommunications link to Japan in June 1950.)
(2). 15th RSM, Ashiya, JPN (July 1951 to 8 May 1955) many detachments operating in Korea. (It would later be redesignated as the 6922 RSM.)
Det 1 Ewah college Seoul Korea ?? to January 6 1952.
Det 1 Osan AB KOR 1953 to 8 May 1955
Det 1 Suwan KOR 6 Jan 1952 to ??
Det 2 Cho-do KOR Sep 1952 to 1953
Det 3 Paengnyong-do KOR 1953 to ??
Det 151 Osan AB KOR April 1953 to Nov 1954

(3). They also show a Det B Wakkanai JPN (1953 to 1954) with Det 1 Osan AB KOR (Nov 1954 to May 1955).

After the Korean War, there was a mix of units at Osan — but these may again be the same unit with redesignations.
Det 1 of 6922nd RGM Osan AB KOR (? 1953 to ???)
6929 RGM Osan AB KOR (Oct 1958 to July 1963).
6929 S.S. Osan AB KOR (July 1963 to April 1970).
Det 1 Osan AB K-55 KOR (at least 1967 to 1970) of the 6922 S.W. Clark AFB PI (1 July 1965 to July 1974).
Det 1 Osan AB KOR (1968 to 1970) under the 6988 S.S. Yokota AB, JPN (Mar 1962 to 1972).
6903 S.S. Osan AB KOR (May 1970 to 1 Aug 1979).
6903 E.S.G. Osan AB KOR (1 Aug 1979 to 1 Oct 1993).
303rd Intel Sqdn Osan AB KOR (1 Oct 1993 to present).

The 303rd IS, popularly known as “Skivvy Nine,” has one of the most challenging and exciting missions in the air intelligence world. The unit was originally formed as a detachment of the 1st Radio Squadron Mobile at Johnson Air Base, Japan, on Nov. 20, 1950. The unit was readied for immediate deployment to Korea in response to the invasion of the South Korea by North Korean forces. Following several redesignations during the Korean War, the unit was finally designated as a detachment of the 15th RSM and moved to Osan in April 1953. In Nov. 1954, however, it again became Det. 1 of the 1st RSM. In May 1955, when the 15th was redesignated the 6922nd, the detachment at Osan became Det. 1 of the 6922nd.

In Oct. 1958 it became the 6929th RSM and was assigned to the 6902nd Special Communications Group. In Dec. 1958 it was transferred back to the 6922nd. In July 1963 it became the 6929th Security Squadron and in April 1970 it was designated Det. 1, Pacific Security Region. In May 1970 it gained squadron status as the 6903rd Security Squadron. The unit was designated a Group in 1981 and remained as such until 1993 when it was designated the 303rd IS, under the 692nd Intelligence Group, the 67th Intelligence Wing, and the Air Intelligence Agency.

Over the years, many people have contributed to Skivvy Nine’s “can-do” reputation. In 1951 the unit won its first Air Force Outstanding Unit Award and the Korean Streamer Award. Since then the unit has garnered more than 10 AFOUAs. In 1974 the 6903rd SS was presented the Freedom Through Vigilance award as security service’s top unit. In 1979 the unit won the coveted Travis Trophy, an annual award presented to the most outstanding U.S. Cryptologic Agency of the Defense Department, and received honorable mention for the same award in 1994. The unit was the Air Force nominee for the Travis Trophy again in 1996. The 303rd IS won the Large Unit Air Force Outstanding Maintenance award in 1982. In 1994 and 1996, Skivvy Nine won the U.S. Air Force Top Ground-Based Cryptologic Unit award. (Source: USAFSS Units: Note #6)
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5th Tactical Air Control Group (5TACG) …Operations:: From Nov 1951 to mid Oct 1955, supported 5th Air Force and other Far East Air Forces agencies in Korea by installing, operating and maintaining radio, telephone, and teletype communications networks linking Air Force and other military installations in Korea with bases in Japan. Operated communications centers serving 5th Air Force’s headquarters at Seoul and Taegu until Jan 1954 and at Osan-Ni thereafter. In addition, from Nov 1954 to Feb 1955, supported a Republic of Korea Air Force Technical Training school. From Jan to Apr 1955, occasionally sent men and equipment as far away as Formosa to support mobility exercises.

…Moved to Japan in Oct 1955. While continuing to survey, install, operate, and maintain radio, telephone, and teletype communications in support of 5th Air Force and Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) operations, the group became more mobile to provide communications support anywhere in the area of Far East (later, Pacific) Air Forces when natural disasters such as floods or typhoons destroyed or damaged fixed facilities. Moved to Okinawa in 1957 with no change in basic operations. Came under 13th Air Force control in Sep 1958, about the same time the group deployed men and equipment to Formosa to augment 13th Air Force communications links there during the crisis over Quemoy Island..

…The group acquired a tactical air control function in April 1959 with assignment of the 605th Tactical Control Squadron. It lost its communications construction squadron at the same time, but retained both radio relay and mobile communications squadrons.

…Moved to Clark AB, Philippines, in Oct 1959, continuing communications and tactical control support for 13th, 5th, and Pacific Air Forces operations. Also trained indigenous personnel in communications and tactical control operational techniques. In Oct 1961, the group lost all squadrons although another mobile communications group was briefly attached for control until January 1962. The 5th Tactical Control Group maintained and “operating” radar section within it headquarters, however, and retained it tactical control capability. Detachments of the group, located in Southeast Asia, provided training of indigenous Air Force personnel in operation communications equipment for tactical control for the next several years.

…Two tactical control squadrons joined the group in April 1964, and July 1964, a tactical control maintenance squadron was assigned. The group continued to provide tactical control support and mobile capability to support PACAF and 13th and 5th Air Force operations.

…Two direct air support squadrons joined the group in 1968. The group continued to provide emergency mobile communications and electronics facilities to replace or augment fixed PACAF installations. From late 1970 to late 1971, the group also maintained permanent detachments in Thailand and Korea, and several months in 1971, the 22nd Tactical Air Support Squadron (light), equipped with 0-2 Aircraft, was part of the group.

…The group began phasing down in September 1971, when its Thailand detachment was closed and the 22nd TASS transferred.. From then until its inactivation at the end of 1971, the group controlled a single tactical control squadron (the 605th) and it detachment in Korea.

…Redesignated as the 5th Tactical Air Control Group, the group activated at Osan AB, Korea, on 8 Jan 1980 as a component of the 51st Composite Wing (Tactical). To perform its mission the group comprised a direct air support squadron, a tactical air control squadron, a tactical air control center squadron, and a separate detachment.

…During the 1980′s the group supported the Korean Tactical Air Control System by maintaining ground radar sites with air and ground support provided by forward air controllers, air support operations centers, tactical air control parties, and communications personnel and equipment. Served the 314th Air Division for June 1982 to September 1986, when it was assigned directly to 7th Air Force. Participated in numerous PACAF training exercises in Korea and the western Pacific, working with other branches of the U.S. Armed Forces and units of other nations. Its 19th Tactical Air Support Squadron converted in 1983 form OV-10A to OV-37B aircraft, but returned to OV-10′s in 1985. In August 1989, the group moved form Osan AB to Suwon AB, South Korea, but it returned to Osan in October 1990 when it was assigned to the 51st Tactical Fighter Wing.

US Occupation: Military Government
With the war’s end the expatriate Koreans in Japan rushed home – more than a million to southern Korea and an estimated 350,000 to northern Korea – to find a disrupted economy, a swollen and underemployed population, and a volatile political environment. Fleeing the Russian armies sent to occupy Korea above the 38th Parallel, more than another million Koreans fled Manchuria and northern Korea.

Into this mess, elements emerged that sought to fill the “power vacuum” left by the Japanese departure. The two major groups was the “Evangelical-Reformers” (capitalists) of the far right and the Communists on the far left. The evangelicals-capitalists were ready to make peace with the former colonial master for the sake of immediate economic advantage and limited social reform. The evangelicals-capitalists believed that Korean well-being and independence required some accommodation with Japan and reconciliation. The Communists, on the other hand, rejected detente with Japan or leniency for Koreans who had played any role (however marginal) in the Japanese colonial system. They stressed the purity of the farmers and workers and national self-sufficiency, even if such economics froze the Koreans in relative poverty. Their source of external inspiration was not an economic power, but a fountainhead of ideology with the Soviet Union (or a Communist China). In Korea, the battlelines were drawn — one could serve Christ or Marx, but not both.(Source: “Understanding Is Better Than Remembering: The Korean War, 1945-1954″, Allan Millett, 1995.)

In looking at their leaders another factor that made compromise impossible in forming a government for national unity was “simply generational and historical, complicated by the relative importance of the individual leaders who had led the failed March First Movement. Of the thirty-three men who signed the Declaration of Independence of March First, all were leaders of religious groups. Not one was a Communist, even in the philosophical sense. Korean socialists thus found it easy to condemn the first generation of nationalists as failed old men, handicapped by Confucianism, traditional education, false western values, and a fear of military action. The Communists were the “new” as well as true Koreans, men of youthful vigor and action. A superficial comparison of some of the elite leaders of 1945 shows their contrasting ages:

Evangelical-Reformers
Cho Man-sik (63)
Kim Ku (69)
Syngman Rhee (70)
Yo Un-yong (60)
Philip Jaisohn (79)
Yun Ch’i-ho (80)
Yi Pom-sok (45)
Kim Kyu-sik (64)
Cho Pyong-ok (51)

Communists
Kim Il-sung (33)
Pak. Hon-yong (45)
Kim II (32)
O Chin-u (36)
Chae Yong-gun (45)
Kim Tu-bong (56)
Ch’oe Ch’ang-ik (49)
Kim Ch’aek (42)
Ho Ka-I (41)

The key strategy for the Korean political elite was to move from “oppositionists” to the independent control of the governments of half of Korea. To put it more simplisticly, it is better to have half a pie than continue to dispute over the whole pie and have nothing. Remember that the evangelical-reformists had formed governments in exile outside of country in China and the US. None of these leaders were present when the reins of power were being relinquished from the Japanese to the Korean people. The only ones with any organization in Korea was the Communists who had formed Youth Groups and other grass roots organizations to fight the Japanese. During the initial phases of the Japanese turning over power in the South, the Communists and Socialists stepped in — outside of the US Military Government — and set up local and regional committees to transition power to the Korean People’s Republic. Acting under the power of these committees, groups emerged as quasi-police that ended up as judge, jury and executioner if anyone disagreed with their demands. They flourished with the new freedoms after the liberation — especially in the Cholla provinces. They established their political organizations and publications — with the goal of unifying under the leadership of North Korea. When the US Military Governor-General, Major General Hodge took over there was a distinct lack of sympathy for the south Korean left-revolutionaries — and the committees were swiftly disbanded. In South Korea the American military government tried to dampen popular protest (e.g. the autumn harvest uprisings of 1946) through progressive “good government” and “Koreanization” of the ministries it inherited from the interim Korean People’s Republic, which it did not recognize as legitimate. However. by October 1946, General Hodge had lost patience with the Communists who caused serious problems in South Korea and ordered the arrests of key Communist leaders of the South Korean Workers’ Party. Widespread Communist-inspired strikes and riots in southern cities ensued. Riots in Taegu and Chonju and other cities in South Cholla Province were particularly serious as more than 2,000 Communists were arrested. Some 1,500 were prosecuted, 500 were convicted, and 16 sentenced to death. Key Communists fled to North Korea. (Source: American Military Government in Korea, E. Grant Meade, p70 and A History of the Korean People by Andrew C. Hahn)

Rhee tried to maintain a personal aloofness from the messy business of Korean politics; he preferred the course of personal influence upon the military government rather than create or join a political party. His principal rival, Kim Ku, did the dirty work of eliminating the opposition of every political coloration. Assassins linked to Kim Ku’s Korean Independence Party killed two successive heads of the Korean Democratic Party and then Yo Un-hyong himself in 1947. (An Army lieutenant murdered Kim Ku in 1949, and the assumption is that he did so with the encouragement of someone in the Rhee government.) Although the Korean Constabulary remained under effective American military direction, the Korean National Police, assisted by the paramilitary youth associations directed by Yi Pom-sok, another rightist-revolutionary, hounded the South Korean Workers Party (the Communists) into underground opposition. American administrators became simply advisors in August, 1947, and left the government altogether in 1948 with the declaration of the Republic of Korea. (Source: “Understanding Is Better Than Remembering: The Korean War, 1945-1954″, Allan Millett, 1995.)

The situation in Korea was chaotic as the Japanese had occupied virtually every administrative position both in the government and in industry and their departure left government and the economy at a standstill. The US Army Military Government in Korea was left to fill this gap and, as soon as military government detachments arrived, they were thrown into the breach. US military personnel began work in all of the bureaus of the central government in Seoul as well as in provincial and local governments — though in the provinces, many of these military civil advisors simply used it as an opportunity to “set up house” with local kisaengs (prostitutes). However, there were setbacks as Communists attempted to gain control of the democratic process — at times through subversive means and at other through terrorism, as well as inserting Committee spies in the Military Government administration. One group the Chiandei in Chollanam-do — or “white shirts” from their uniform of unbleached white shirts — inserted itself as the local police and used its quasi-legal position as being from the Committee to set up the Republic. It used strong arm tactics that ranged from extortion to outright murder of Japanese police officers who disagreed with them. Its back was broken when a provincial secret police said there was a plot to assassinate the governor, vice-governor, chief of police and commander of the 20th’s MPs. (Source: American Military Government in Korea, E. Grant Meade, p70) As a result, there was a Seoul directive to disband any group whose activies were inconsistent with the Military Government and placed political parties, organizations, and societies under control of the Military Government.

The Japanese police was asked to stay on because there was no choice as a Korean police force had to be trained before turning the reins over to them. At the same time, there were committees to form what would become the “Constabulary” — the forerunner to the ROK army.

Under the Japanese government-general, the Korean legal system was thoroughly centralized. The national Bureau of Justice not only supervised all courts and penal institutions direct from Seoul, but passed upon admissions to the Bar Association. In fact, 86 percent of the lawyers and judges were Japanese and when they left the peninsula it was difficult to find replacements. The laws applied in Korea were basically the laws of Japan, and of singular importance was the philosphy underlying their applications. In criminal cases the presumption of guilt was carried to the extreme of not bringing the accused to trial until the police had obtained a confession. The Americans first sought to abolish the Japanese practice of summary police punishment without trial, but the Americans could not instill into the minds of the Korean lawyers the Anglo-Sanon conception of due process of law nor the rights of the individual before the courts. Unfortunately, the heavy-handedness of the Military Government in “railroading” those who challenged their authority made a traversty of justice that they sought to instill. Though the convictions were overturned, the image in the minds of the Koreans against the Military Government would last forever. (SITE NOTE: The system in Korea is based upon the rights and protection of society, while the American system is based the rights of the individual. In Korean the accused is assumed guilty until proven innocent. In America, the accused is innocent until proven guilty. The Americans were foolish to attempt to change a thousand-year old system overnight. Even today the Korean legal system is based upon the rights of society and the presumption of guilt.)

The Ministry of Justice destroyed records prior to the American arrival to cover any misdeeds during the colonial period. When the Anmericans arrived in Korea, they found the admini9stration of legal matters to be in a state of disintegration unmatched by any of the other governmental activities. The behavior of the officials of the Bureau of Justice was particularly notorious. Land titles were missing, prison records had been almost totally destroyed, and even fingerprint files had been burned. Millions of yen had been embezzled or illegally disoposed of by Bureau personnel. The director and many of his subordinates were therefore imprisoned. (Source: American Military Government in Korea, E. Grant Meade, p130)

After the Japanese governor-general relinquished government to the Koreans, finding capable Koreans for the most important jobs proved not too difficult to find, although the volatile political situation often hampered a satisfactory choice. More difficulty was experienced in recruiting for the rank and file. In some instances retention of those employed by the Japanese was made acceptable to the people, although individuals occasionally had to be assigned ot other departments or localities. In certain activities, such as public safety, where the Japanese rule had been particularly odious, recruitment had to begin almost from scratch. However, so long as able men could be found to occupty the responsible positions there was little difficulty in selecting their subordinates. The main problem lay in their training, as the majority were inexperienced in government service. (Source: American Military Government in Korea, E. Grant Meade, p84)

To prevent an upheaval in government, the US Military government decreed that the Japanese law continue in force except where specifically modified by the American Military Government ordinances. The Military Government set about to make rules but without any idea of the cultural impacts to the established system. It first negated all transactions on Japanese-owned property which in effect reversed all previous sales that had taken place between departing Japanese to Koreans. It set a MAXIMUM tenant rental fee which in effect set a higher rent limit than was seen under the Japanese. However, one of the most unwise pieced of economic legislation ever decreed by the American in Korea was when it “removed all Japanese controls from the production, collection, and marketing of rice, and declared that henceforth all transactions in rice would be mae in a free market. This was the height of stupidity. There was hardly an American who did not firmly believe that the Koreans needed instruction in the conduct of a democratic government, yet these believers disregarded the fact that these same Koreans lacked the knowledge and experience to operate within an uncontrolled, capitalistic economy.” (Source: American Military Government in Korea, E. Grant Meade, pp64-65)

In 1946, Seoul-shi changed its name to “Seoul Tutk-byul shi” as its official name. (Source: Songtan.org: Songtan History: Hangul Translation)

850,000 Japanese were repatriated to Japan by Oct 1946, but the size of the influx of Koreans being repatriated was something the Military Government was unprepared for. Registration figures showed that 1,787,679 repatriates from foreign countries and from North Korea had registered as entering the American Zone by October 2, 1946 — about a million from the North and a half-million from Japan. These additions to the population in a distorted economy and severe unemployment created many problems.

The Forestry Section was interested in flood control, particulary from the standpoint of soil erosion, a serious problem because of the forest depredation which followed the surrender. The Japanese had done an excellent job of reforestation in South Korea, much of which had been almost treeless at the turn of the century, and had severely restrid the Koreans in their timber cutting. After surrender, however, there was no way of enforcingthe restrictions and the people denuded considerable areas. The Military Government concentrated on preserving the large Japanese-owned forests by having them adequately guarded. In line with this effort, it reorganized the sixteen Japanese nurseries, rehabilitated the provincial Forestry Experimental Station, and through the Materials Control Corporation secured seed and other items necessary to begin a provincial reforestation program by the spring of 1946. Within two years the experimental forest of Suwon was the most successful venture of its kind in American territory. (Source: American Military Government in Korea, E. Grant Meade, p198)

At the time, the Han River was navigable by small craft for 170 miles from its mouth. In the area treeless hills were a characteristic feature of the countryside, though in the west central part of the peninsula there were considerable forests. Game was plentiful everywhere such as pheasant, duck, teal, quail, and a score of other fauna. For the most part Korean towns and villages are mere clusters of huts with narrow dirty streets and open sewers. 71 percent of all Koreans still lived in crowded villages adjacent to their fields, though urbanization had featured Korea’s population increase especially in the Seoul area. Almost three quarters of the population engaged in agricultural pursuits, and in normal years the land produced ample foodstuffs to support the entire population. (Source: American Military Government in Korea, E. Grant Meade, p14 -19)

In A History of the Korean People by Andrew C. Hahn, South Korea is described as being “in economic chaos after the collapse of Japanese rule and partition of the country. Before the division of Korea, the south had been primarily an agricultural region, producing 63 percent of the nation’s food grains, and containing most of the country’s light industry and about 24 percent of heavy industry.”
Almost all electric power had been generated by the hydroelectric plants on the Yalu and other rivers (with only 0.5 percent in the south) and the entire supply of chemical fertilizer came from the Japanese-established plant at Hungnam on the northeast coast. When the northern supply of chemical fertilizer stopped, farm production in south declined sharply, creating a serious food shortage. Because of the lack of power, many industrial plants were shut down.)

Basically, the country’s money was worthless as the Japanese issued bank notes in enormous amounts before the end of their colonial rule…and the trend continued after they were gone. The “yen” was the monetary unit in 1946 as Korea transitioned to the “won”.

Many factories in the south were closed due to the shortage of skilled workers, technicians, electric power, and raw materials, making the economic situation worse. Moreover, the influx of some 1.5 million refugees from China, Manchuria, Japan, and North Korea in 1945-1946 caused additional problems. The rapid population growth increased the housing shortage as well as shortages of essential commodities, resulting in many social problems. As a sense of frustration overwhelmed the people, moral and ethical standards declined.

In 1946, an eyewitness reported: the “situation is getting worse. There is rampant inflation. Consumer goods and coal are virtually nonexistent. Food distribution is inequitable. … Transportation equipment is breaking down. Unemployment is rising to dangerous proportions. … Hunger is rapidly spreading and will probably result in starvation in many areas by midsummer.”

According to the Pyeongtaek History (Pyeongtaek Si Sa), in 1945 there were many problems dealing with the removal of the Japanese police force. These police units were led by Japanese officers and NCOs with Koreans in the lower ranks. Only those Koreans who assumed Japanese nationality were allowed to be promoted up the ranks. This form of management structure cause great upheaval when Korea received its independence in 1945 and the Japanese were slated to be repatriated. According to the Pyeongtaek History (Pyeongtaek Si Sa), the Suwon police were assigned the duty of taking care of Pyeongtaek. The US Military government (Occupation Forces) asked the Japanese police leadership to remain in place until Koreans could be trained to take over the positions. Though this riled many Koreans, it was the only solution until Koreans could be trained take over.

In A History of the Korean People by Andrew C. Hahn, South Korea is described as being “in economic chaos after the collapse of Japanese rule and partition of the country. Before the division of Korea, the south had been primarily an agricultural region, producing 63 percent of the nation’s food grains, and containing most of the country’s light industry and about 24 percent of heavy industry.”

Almost all electric power had been generated by the hydroelectric plants on the Yalu and other rivers (with only 0.5 percent in the south) and the entire supply of chemical fertilizer came from the Japanese-established plant at Hungnam on the northeast coast. When the northern supply of chemical fertilizer stopped, farm production in south declined sharply, creating a serious food shortage. Because of the lack of power, many industrial plants were shut down.)

Basically, the country’s money was worthless as the Japanese issued bank notes in enormous amounts before the end of their colonial rule…and the trend continued after they were gone. The “yen” was the monetary unit in 1946 as Korea transitioned to the “won”.

Many factories in the south were closed due to the shortage of skilled workers, technicians, electric power, and raw materials, making the economic situation worse. Moreover, the influx of some 1.5 million refugees from China, Manchuria, Japan, and North Korea in 1945-1946 caused additional problems. The rapid population growth increased the housing shortage as well as shortages of essential commodities, resulting in many social problems. As a sense of frustration overwhelmed the people, moral and ethical standards declined.

In 1946, an eyewitness reported: the “situation is getting worse. There is rampant inflation. Consumer goods and coal are virtually nonexistent. Food distribution is inequitable. … Transportation equipment is breaking down. Unemployment is rising to dangerous proportions. … Hunger is rapidly spreading and will probably result in starvation in many areas by midsummer.”

A History of the Korean People by Andrew C. Hahn: In 1946, one such group that resented the Americans was the Communists and Socialists. They flourished with the new freedoms after the liberation — especially in the Cholla provinces. They established their political organizations and publications — with the goal of unifying under the leadership of North Korea.

However. by October 1946, General Hodge had lost patience with the Communists who caused serious problems in South Korea and ordered the arrests of key Communist leaders of the South Korean Workers’ Party. Widespread Communist-inspired strikes and riots in souther cities ensued. Riots in Taegu and Chonju and other cities in South Cholla Province were particularly serious as more than 2,000 Communists were arrested. Some 1,500 were prosecuted, 500 were convicted, and 16 sentenced to death. Key Communists fled to North Korea.

The surviving rebels, however, established guerrilla bases in the Chiri, Odae and Taebaek mountains, aided by two smaller mutinies in the Taegubased 6th Regiment in November and December, 1948. Further assistance came in the form of refugee southern Koreans who infiltrated back to the south as partisans. By mid-1949 Rhee faced a significant rural partisan force in five of his eight provinces. Although both the Communists and the government forces widely misreported losses, incidents with casualties ran around an average of 1,000 a month between October, 1948 and October 1949, then jumped during the Winter Suppression Campaign, 1949-1950. The partisan war took on additional dimension when in May, 1949 regular units of the North Korean border constabulary clashed with infantry regiments of the South Korean army, as the Constabulary had been redesignated in December, 1948. For a year units up to regimental size staged operations on both sides of the border, focused principally on the Ongjin peninsula, the hills north of Kaesong, and the mountains that surrounded Chunch’on, the provincial capital of Kangwon-do, the gateway to the guerrilla bases in the Taebaek mountains. (Source: “Understanding Is Better Than Remembering: The Korean War, 1945-1954″, Allan Millett, 1995.)

Two separate states — the Republic of Korea in the south and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the north — were formally proclaimed in 1948. With the U.N.-held elections of May 1948 (and the inauguration of the Republic of Korea on 15 August 1948), the Communist troubles flared anew. The strong-arm methods of razing villages on a vast scale after an uprising in Cheju Do in April 1948, gave the regime a fascist stamp. (Source: The Republic of Korea, W.E. Reeve, 1963, p32) The Communists who opposed the UN sponsored elections in South Korea instigated a rebellion on Cheju Island. The Cheju Rebellion from April 1948 to the spring of 1949, resulted in the deaths of at least 30,000 people.

SITE NOTE: To this day, some Koreans still fault Major General Hodge, the first US Military Governor, for the brutality and manner in which the rebellion was put down. Though General Hodge was not directly involved in the actions, evidence does point to his offices selecting key Korean officers to carry out the brutal campaigns. The main focus appears to be that Military Government wanted the rebellion put down — by any means — to prevent a drawn out conflict that would have prevented the Americans from withdrawing from Korea. “Kimsoft” on the net builds an eloquent case of the US Military Government’s fingers in the stew. In recent years, the April 3rd Cheju Uprising has been resurfaced by activists. The focus is that international laws prohibit “scorched earth” tactics as a war crime. According to Kim Ik-Ruhl, the Cheju police commander Kim Jung-Ho and the US Military Government police commissioner Cho Byong-Ok were guilty of conducting inhuman and barbaric scorched earth campaigns against their own people. The unstated allegation is that this was done with the knowledge and encouragement of Washington and the US Military Government.

After an anti-election protest on March 1, 1948, the police arrested 2500 young people. One of those arrested was later fished out of a river, tortured to death. According to an account by Gen Kim Ik-Ruhl, on 3 April 1948, the rebels simultaneously attacked all Cheju police stations. They occupied all stations – except the Cheju City station – and the police suffered major damages and lost much weapons and ammo. The rebel strength was estimated to range from a few hundreds to a few thousands. No one knew who the rebels were or what they wanted. The violence was aimed at the Police and the Northwest Youth Group which had been terrorizing the civilians. The Northwest Youth group was formed was formed as a para-military forrce which would provide a reserve in case of need. However, after the initial take over of the police stations, the violence turned extreme with public executions. The Americans and the police had no plan for counter-attacks. During this time, the US trusted the police with US carbines and ammunition, but the constabulary were issued Japanese Model 99 rifles WITHOUT ammunition.

There was a meeting over the April 3rd Cheju Uprising on 5 May 1948. The participants were: the US Military Governor Maj. Gen. Dean, US Military Government Civil Affairs Minister Ahn Jae Hong, Army (Constabulary) Commander Brig. Gen. Song Ho Chang, US Military Government Police Commissioner Cho Byong Ok, Cheju commandant Lt. Col. Mansfield, Cheju Governor Yu Hae Jin, the 9th Regiment commander Lt. Col. Kim Ik Ruhl, Cheju Police Inspector Choe Chun, and Gen. Dean’s interpreter Mr. Kim (a Christian minister).

The Cheju Police Inspector Choe Chun spoke on behalf of the police and stated that the Cheju Uprising was planned and organized by the Communist International and that the only way to put it down was a massive joint military-police campaign.

Lt. Col. Kim Ik-Ruhl (36), 9th Regiment commander, presented the army plan — stating that less than 300 rebels were armed and other rebels were “mere hanger-ons.”
He stated that Communists, anarchists, smugglers and other criminal elements had taken advantage of the islanders’ xenophobia and instigated the Cheju uprising. (SITE NOTE: At the time, the Cheju people were unfriendly to outsiders and treated the Constabulary officers and soldiers in the same way they treated the Japanese or the Americans as more than 80 percent of the troops were from Chollabuk-do or Kyongsang-do. After the liberation, the government sent members of the Northwest Youth Group to resettle in Cheju — they at first were welcomed, but later when they started to commit heinous crimes against the people under the protection of the police, the Cheju people came to hate them as well.)
The direct cause of the rebellion was the conflict between the police and the smugglers. (SITE NOTE: Under both the Japanese occupation and US military government, Cheju ports were in effect free trade ports that crawled with would-be smugglers of Japanese products and merchants looking for deals. The police and the Northwest Youth members hijacked contraband shipments from the locals and secretly sold them to the mainland merchants.)
He claimed the weak link in the operation was the police’s lawlessness, which is mainly responsible for driving the people to the rebel side. For this reason, the entire police on Cheju should be placed under his command for unified operations. The scorched earth tactics of the police and the failed police policies caused rebel strength to increase by several folds from a few hundred to several thousands.

At that point, Dr. Cho Byong-Ok (54) — speaking in English for the sake of General Dean as most of the Koreans at the meeting could not understand English — falsely accused Lt. Col. Kim of being a Communist and saying his dead father was actually a high-ranking cadre in North Korea. He further stated the photographic evidence of the atrocities assembled by AMERICAN Cheju commandant Lt. Col. Mansfield was fabricated. Lt. Col. Kim was condemned by Dr. Cho’s words and the impression was that General Dean had believed him. At this point, Lt. Col. Kim attacked Dr. Cho and attempted to strangle him unless he retracted his words. Brig. Gen. Song, Commander of the ROK Constabulary (Army) under the US Military Government, simply called for the two to stop fighting — but did not break up the chaos. Finally General Dean had US MPs separate the two.

Ahn Jae-hong, Minister of Civil Affairs, attempted to mediate, but ended up sobbing and pounding his chair. “Oh, This is so terrible! Regimental commander, please get hold of yourself. All this is because our nation was liberated not on our own strength but on others. For this, we have to suffer through these insults. Commander, please restrain yourself!”

(SITE NOTE: The impression made by Ahn Jae-hong is that if the Americans had not liberated Korea, there would not be the chaos pitting Korean against Korean in the name of ideologies — Democracy versus Communism. The experience of Korea stands in sharp contrast with other Asian nations, not because the Koreans did not seek liberation, but because they received it at such low cost. Nationalism throughout Asia had been forged and tempered by the fires of fighting the European imperialists, then the Japanese, and even themselves between 1937 and 1945, but in Korea the sheer weight of Japanese oppression and economic co-option had eliminated all but symbolic resistance. There is no Mahatma Gandhi, Aung Sen, Chin Peng, Ho Chi Minh, Mao Zedong, or Ramon Magsaysay in Korean history, so Korean claimants for power had to invent themselves as great national heroes – or allow foreign patrons to perform this service. Perhaps if more Koreans had fought and died between 1937 and 1945, fewer Koreans would have died in 1948-1953. Of course, thousands of Koreans died in World War II, but they did so as part of the Japanese armed forces or as victims of American bombing of the Japanese home islands. Dying as a participant in the Japanese war effort, however unwilling, is not the same as sacrificing one’s life and liberty in the cause of national independence. Only a handful of Korean politicians could stake a real claim to being resistance leaders. If there is any lesson in post-colonial politics, it is that power grows out of a gun grasped by a partisan leader who remains in his homeland and fights, as the shades of Jorno Kenyatta, Josip Broz, Menachim Begin, George Grivas, and Houari Boumedienne can testify. (Source: “Understanding Is Better Than Remembering: The Korean War, 1945-1954″, Allan Millett, 1995.) See Ahn Jae-hong of Songtan writeup as a “patriot” in the 1930s.)
Lt. Col. Kim was replaced as regimental commander by Lt. Col. Park Gin-Gyon. According to Kim, there was a sinister motive in the Park appointment as he was secretly directed by Gen. Dean to start the scorched earth policy advocated by Mr. Cho — while Lt. Col. Kim and Col. Mansfield were against such a policy. Washington told Gen. Dean to settle up the Cheju issue promptly and he urgently needed a Korean yes-man to command the 9th Regiment. Dean found his man in the person of Lt. Col. Park Jin Gyon.

Park told his troops that the Cheju rebellion was stopping Korea from becoming independent and therefore, it must be put down even if it meant killing all 300,000 residents of Cheju — independence was more important than Cheju. As the new commander of the 9th Regiment, he started scorched earth campaigns and his tactics were repeats of the Japanese tactics in China and Manchuria, whereby innocent civilians were killed. Park’s scorched earth tactics yielded no significant gains against the rebels. The army suffered heavy casualties and villagers joined the rebel ranks.

One month after Park started his tactics, Gen. Dean came to Cheju, promoted Park to a full colonel and invited local dignitaries to a celebration party. Col. Park got drunk and retired to his room. The colonel’s orderly shot and killed him with an M1 rifle and then committed suicide. The group of three who plotted his assassination were from the Kyonggi-do area and most interestingly were Christians. They claimed they were nationalists and killed Park who was a traitor in killing the people he was sworn to protect. They were executed by firing squad and Capt. Hauseman, the officer claimed to be the “father of the ROK Army” fired rounds into the lifeless bodies after execution which created a furor in the Korean press. (Source: Gen. Kim Ik Ruhl: The Truth about Cheju 4.3: Chapter 20..)

In response, the ROK military, paramilitary police and youth gangs — under US command — unleashed one of the most vicious episodes in the Korean counter-revolution. By April 1949, 20,000 homes in Cheju had been destroyed, while about 100,000 people (one-third of the population) had been forcibly removed to coastal areas under ROK control. By the end, about 12% of the Cheju people had been massacred. The US embassy happily reported: “The all-out guerilla extermination campaign came to a virtual end in April with order restored and most rebels and sympathisers killed, captured, or converted”. (Source: Green Left.)

The beginnings of the present-day Korean army started as an American-trained gendarmerie. In 1948 the American aid program was stepped up and arms and equipment for an army of 50,000 was provided. In December 1948, the Constabulary was redesignated as the ROK Army. The South Korean police then numbered 30,000 and were almost as well armed as the army, and it was believed that various para-military forces such as the Youth Corps would provide a reserve in case of need. These para-military forces aligned themselves with the police forces as they were the ones in power. Publicly the US wanting to be rid of the Korean problem was making statements boasting of the ROK Constabulary competence. Senator H.A. Smith in 1949 when he reported privately to the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee that he believed the South Korean army “thoroughly capable of taking care of Southern Korea in any possible conflict with the North.” In truth, the Constabulary was as a whole more of a rag-tag bunch ill-trained to meet the needs for defense of the nation. Though each unit supposedly had U.S. advisors, the complaint was that many units never saw them except for brief visits. Most of the lower rank members were from the poverty-ridden northern regions of South Korea and simply were members interested in having a square meal. On the other hand, the officers were made up of the young elite who were educated and aggressive officers — many with Japanese military experience. Though the records state that the US provided the constabulary with arms, in truth many regiments were equipped only with Japanese Model 99 rifles and armament confiscated at the end of the war — and most importantly, NOT provided any ammunition for the weapons. On the other hand, the police was provided with not only Japanese weapons and ammunition, but also American carbines and ammunition. In other words, the US Military Government did NOT trust the Constabulary fearing an armed rebellion — as had happened in Yosu in 1948 and Taegu in 1949 — and therefore, did not properly arm the troops — except in the Seoul garrison area. Another reason was that the KMAG felt that ammunition rationing and the advisors’ influence would keep the Korean army on the defensive — instead of attacking North Korea. Under the US Military Government a standard policy was developed of moving the highest-ranking commanders around at regular intervals to remove any potential threats to the Government. (NOTE: This policy was followed after the Korean War by Syngman Rhee’s government for the same reasons.) The head of the Constabulary was a Brigadier General with headquarters in Seoul.

Rhee’s warlike rhetoric, echoed by some of his favored generals, disturbed the State Department enough that it blocked KMAG’s request in 1949-1950 for light tanks and improved medium artillery for the Korean army. Part of the Truman administration’s reluctance to arm the Korean army for more than counter-guerrilla operations came from the suspicion that Rhee would siphon off Mutual Defense Assistance Act (1949) aid for personal and political aims and turn the army into a bulwark of political repression. The fear had some foundation, but was also naive since the Korean National Police and its para-military youth auxiliaries already had enough resources for this “mission.” To insure the quest for traitors in the army, Rhee created the Army Investigative Command (which evolved into the Korean Counterintelligence Corps) and placed it under the command of Brigadier General Kim Chang-yong, a former sergeant-investigator in the Manchurian army and notorious among his colleagues for his unrelenting search for Communist subversives, broadly defined.

As Brigadier General William L. Roberts, USA, chief of KMAG, argued, the arms he requested had little to do with policing the civilian population and a great deal to do with stopping an invasion. Roberts and his advisors felt confident that ammunition rationing and their own influence would keep the Korean army on the defensive. Even when the Truman administration approved increased aid to the Korean army (no tanks, though), it could not obtain Congressional approval until it tied Korean aid (which it wanted) to military assistance to the Chinese Nationalist army on Taiwan (which it did not want). The result was that the Korean army received $10 million in badly-needed assistance in March 1950, but too late to help. (Source: “Understanding Is Better Than Remembering: The Korean War, 1945-1954″, Allan Millett, 1995.)

First Republic

The US Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) operated all of the machinery of government until Koreans could be trained for bureaucraftic duty, political parties organized, and a dulty elected Korean government was able to assume control. While this was taking place in the South, a Soviet-trained cadre of Korean Communists formed a separate government , spurning all calls by the United Nations for free, UN-supervised elections throughout the peninsula.

As long as it survived, the Rhee regime could and did exploit the guerrilla war to its political advantage. In November, 1948, the National Assembly passed a draconian National Security Law that outlawed the Communist party and gave the security forces detention and judicial powers that made Western lawyers quake, but would have surprised no Asian. Although the National Security Law gave a veneer of legalism to the anti-left vendetta – for such it was, reciprocity for the horrors visited upon the Korean National Police and its families – the Rhee government did not ignore the rightist challengers. Earlier in the year (August, 1948), the Assembly had passed the National Traitor Law, which gave the government power to arrest, to deny public office, and to confiscate property from any Korean who had served the Japanese colonial government in a leadership position (broadly defined) and whose loyalty now seemed suspect. The Korean National Police, for example, tried to use this law to purge the Korean army of its senior officers, the majority of whom had been junior officers in the Japanese and Manchukuo armies. Both laws and the general internal regulations of the KNP and Korean army allowed both organizations to purge their own ranks of suspected rebels. The Korean army rid itself of more than 4,000 officers and men, jailing about a thousand and executing around 200. The U.S. Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG), about 500 officers and men, formed a strong bond with the army’s surviving senior officers to protect the army from Rhee and the police while it recruited itself up to 100,000 and worked on its training and equipment problems. (Source: “Understanding Is Better Than Remembering: The Korean War, 1945-1954″, Allan Millett, 1995.)

Syngman Rhee inaugurated as First Republic President on 24 Jul 1948. (Pyeongtaek City) (Source: Pyeongtaek History (CD), Pyeongtaek Si Sa)

First Republic celebration at National Assembly (1 Aug 1948) (Pyeongtaek City) (Source: Pyeongtaek History (CD), Pyeongtaek Si Sa)

Barred entry to the North, the UN Commission on Korea had no choice but to oversee elections only in the South. These were held on 10 May 1948, and sent 200 representatives to the National Assembly. The Assembly adopted the constitution of the Republic of Korea on 12 July without debate — simply because of the deadline involved — and, three days later, elected Syngman Rhee as its first president. On 14 August 1948, three years after liberation from Japanese rule, the government of the Republic of Korea was formally inaugurated and the USAMGIK terminated.

Syngman Rhee (Yi Syng-Man) was born in Kaesong, Korea, on 26th April, 1875. He took an interest in politics and in 1897 he was imprisoned by the Yi Dynasty for taking part in a protest against the monarchy. Though historians agree that he was a despot, Syngman Rhee’s positive image is still portrayed in America — especially amongst his supporters in Hawaii where he went into exile. The consensus of most historians is that he was a despot who ruled with a harsh iron-fist in the name of anti-Communism, but in actuality his rule was based simply on his remaining in power.

“Rhee is a sinister and dangerous man, an anachronism who had strayed into this age to use the clich?s and machinery of democracy for unscrupulous and undemocratic ends.” – Mark Gayn, the Chicago Sun

“The Korean leadership is provided by that numerically small class which virtually monopolizes the native wealth and education of the country… Since this class could not have acquired and maintained its favored position under Japanese rule without a certain minimum of collaboration, it has experienced difficulty in finding acceptable candidates for political office and has been forced to support imported expatiate politicians such as Syngman Rhee and Kim Ku. These, while they have no pro-Japanese taint, are essentially demagogue bent on autocratic rule.” — March 10, 1948, US CIA

“Rhee will be killed in a few weeks, when the Korean people find out the truth.” — Gen. MacArthur.
Supported by the US when Kim Ku opted not to run for the Presidency, the US sought a person they could control. Unfortunately, it turned out that Syngman Rhee turned out to be the “loose cannon” during the Korean War — and created problems that still plague Korea even today. Many of the darkest tragedies occurred in the name of “anti-Communism” but it was a loose term that encompassed anyone who was a threat to Rhee’s position or who opposed his authority. Over the years his regime was seen as authoritarian, corrupt and inefficient. He was re-elected in 1956 and 1960 by large majorities. However, few believed the elections had been fair and gave rise to widespread anti-government demonstrations that were put down with such brutality that it toppled his regime.

Who Was Rhee Syngman?
Lee Wha Rang, February 22, 2000

Dr. Rhee Syngman ruled South Korea from 1948 until his downfall in 1960. His fanatic anti-communism made him a darling of the United States. In spite of his professed faith in Christianity, he had more Koreans killed than any other tyrants in the Korean history.

He is accused of being the man behind the Cheju April 3rd Massacre, the Daejun Massacre, the Suwon Massacre, the blowing up the Hangang Bridge, assassination of Kim Ku and Yo Woon Young and countless other killings of Koreans. However, much of the Korean accusations of responsibility for incidents over fifty years ago cannot be substantiated as most of the first hand witnesses are dead and there are confusing historical reports after the Korean War that placed the blame for many of the killings on the Communists.

Although Dr. Rhee dominated Korea for over ten years, little information is available on him on the Internet and what little cyber-information available is mostly false or inaccurate. For example, one source claims that Rhee presided over a ‘government in exile in Hawaii’. Another source claims Rhee was from the royal family line. Most history books praise him as the ‘tiger of Korea’, democratically elected founder of Korea, most revered by all Koreans even today, and so on.

Nothing can be further from truth.

All the legends aside, Rhee was born on March 26, 1875 (many of the ‘official’ documents list 1876, but Rhee listed 1875 as the year of his birth on his application to Princeton), a son of an impoverished yangban, Rhee Kyong Sun. Rhee organized fellow students to oppose the corrupt Yi government and spent six years in jail for his “treason”. While in prison, he became a Christian.

In 1904, the Yi government sent Rhee (because of his English and American connection) to the US in order to implement the US-Korea Friendship Treaty signed in 1885. The Yi officials were unaware of the secret agreement the US had made with Japan, whereby Japan would take over Korea and Manchuria, and the US would take the Philippines.

In November 1905, Rhee Syngman met Teddy Roosevelt in Washington and pleaded in vain for American support for Korean independence. Foreign nations (including the US) withdrew diplomatic missions from Seoul.

Rhee obtained a Bachelor of Art at George Washington University in 1907 and a Master’s Degree at Harvard in 1909. In September 1908, he enrolled at Princeton University and obtained a Ph.D. on June 14, 1910 at the age of 33.

Rhee was penniless and the Princeton University waived the fees and the Princeton Theological Seminary gave him free room and board (Rhee’s mailing address was: 111 Hodge Hall, Princeton, NJ) on Rhee’s promise that he would return to Korea to spread the Gospel.

In a neat handwritten letter to the Princeton officials dated September 23, 1908, Rhee pleads for special considerations for his ‘extreme poverty’ and his promised return to Korea by 1910. He wants a Ph.D. in two years and the Princeton granted his wish in a letter dated October 2, 1908. Rhee lived at 202 N 36th St., New York, NY at the time.

Curiously, Princeton had contacted Harvard to verify Rhee’s alleged Master’s degree. It turned out that even though Rhee had completed his master degree requirements, he had not been awarded the degree yet. Princeton decided to ignore Rhee’s ‘misunderstanding’ and the whole matter was dropped. (Rhee’s ‘official’ biography states that Rhee was awarded a Master’s degree from Harvard in 1908, but the degree was awarded in 1909, one year after Rhee was admitted to Princeton).

Rhee was not a good student. His grade cards show: Economics (D), Government (B) and 3 History courses (B, B, C). He took 7 classes at Princeton barely passing them. In fact, the first reading of his thesis – “Neutrality As Influenced by the United States” – was unfavorable. In an April 14, 1910 letter, Prof. Edward Elliott, Dean of College, informed Rhee that “The majority of those who have examined it are unwilling to recommend its acceptance..”.

On May 24, 1910, Rhee’s thesis was accepted finally “on condition that the last part be put into as good condition as the first..” Rhee was finally granted his Ph.D. – the first Korean to be so honored – on June 3, 1910. However, Rhee could not raise enough money to bind and publish his thesis as required by Princeton and Rhee was given one year to comply with this rule. In mid-1910, Rhee Syngman returned to Korea as a teacher at Seoul YMCA and as a Christian missionary (Methodist). He lived at YMCA, Seoul, Korea. In a letter dated January 31, 1911, Rhee tells Princeton that he does not have the $80 needed for his thesis. He wrote “I have to ask for some more help either from the University or from the unknown friend who helped me so much already.” The ‘unknown friend’ probably refers to the Methodist Church of America.

In 1912, Rhee Syngman gave up his evangelic work in Korea and emigrated to Hawaii as headmaster of a Methodist school, The Korean Christian Institute, Honolulu, Hawaii. There, Rhee founded and edited the Korean Pacific Magazine in 1913.

On April 8, 1919, the Korean Provisional Government (KPG) was established in the French Concession of Shanghai. Rhee Syngman (in absentia) was elected president, Yi Tong Whi defense minister (later, premier) and Kim Kyu Sik foreign minister. The KPG had its own parliament, press, and a military school in Shanghai. The original founders of KPG represented a broad spectrum of the Korean political ideologies united in the common cause of Korean independence.

On Sept. 23, 1919, Gen. Yi Tong Whi took over the premiership of the Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai. Gen. Yi filled high positions in the KGP with his fellow members of the Korean People’s Socialist Party. Yi’s effort to regroup KPG into a united front failed, however. The exiles split into two primary groups: Yi’s group who favored military actions with Soviet backing and Rhee Syngman’s group which favored diplomatic channels working closely with America.

On Dec. 8, 1920, Rhee Syngman arrived in Shanghai. Rhee was elected president of the KPG in 1919, in absentia, but this was the first time Rhee set foot in the KPG office.

On Jan. 26, 1921, Shanghai, the Korean Provisional Government split openly. When Rhee’s faction learned about Lenin’s gold rubles, an open hostility toward Gen. Yi erupted. Rhee Syngman accused Kim Rip of embezzling funds to finance his sex habits. Kim Rip was assassinated and Gen. Yi parted company with the KPG.

Unfortunately for the KGP, Rhee was more interested in fermenting dissension in the ranks than in forming a united front against Japan. Rhee was finally expelled by Kim Ku from the KPG in 1925 for embezzelements (in 1960, he was expelled again, being accused of taking $20 million from his Seoul government among other misdeed). Kim Ku became the president.

Rhee returned to Hawaii in disgrace. From 1925 to 1945, Rhee attempted to pass himself off as the sole representative of Korea even though the Korean Provisional Government disowned him in 1925. The US State Dept. officials wrote him off as an old man out of touch and representing no one but himself in Korea.

In America, Rhee’s financial problems worsened and he turned to the Soviets for help. On his train tip to Moscow, Rhee met a young Austrian woman, Francisca Donner. Rhee was refused entry to the Soviet Union. Bitterly disappointed, he returned to Hawaii but kept in touch with Miss. Donner.

He married Francisca Donner on October 8, 1934 in New York City. He supported his family on contributions from other Koreans in US. In 1943, the Korean National Association in the US accused Rhee of taking money earmarked for independence activities for his personal use. According to a Princeton document, Rhee and his wife lived at 1766 Hobart Street, NW, Washington, DC. in 1940.

Rhee listed his profession as: “Washington Representative” of the Provisional Government of Korea in Exile, Chungking, China. In a 1948 document, Rhee lists his position as: “Chairman, Korean Commission”, located at 4700 16th Street, NW, Washington, DC.

On October 12, 1945, Gen. MacArthur ordered Col. Preston Goodfellow, former Deputy Director of the OSS (Office of Strategic Services), to fetch Syngman Rhee from America. Rhee owed this fortune to Chiang Kai Sek. MacArthur was looking for a Korean leader he could count on and asked Chiang Kai Sek for a recommendation. Chiang came out with two names: Kim Ku and Rhee Syngman.

MacArthur ordered Gen. Hodge (in charge of Korea) to treat Rhee with respect and do whatever in Hodge’s power to anoint Rhee as the chosen puppet to control the ‘Korean mobs’.

Rhee had been trying to return home since Aug. 15, 1945, but the US State Dept. would not issue him a passport for his travel. Sometime in the 1940′s, Rhee was enrolled into the OSS by Col. Preston Goodfellow. The OSS wanted ‘Col. Rhee’ to organize an espionage network inside Korea.

However, “Col. Rhee” had no contact in Korea and could not find a single Korean in Korea for this job. Nevertheless, Rhee gave out generous “concessions” in post-war Korea to a number of his supporters including Goodfellow in return for their support for his authority Korea.

In 1948, Rhee was ‘democratically elected President of the First Republic of Korea.”. Rhee was removed from power by the Korean people in 1960.

On April 28, 1960, a DC-4 belonging to the Civil Air Transport (CAT was operated by the US CIA) spirited Rhee out of Korea barely one step ahead of a lynch mob. Kim Yong Kap, Rhee’s Deputy Minister of Finance, revealed that Rhee took $20 million of the government fund. Rhee, his wife and an adopted son lived at 2033 Makiki St., Honolulu, Hawaii. Rhee died on July 19, 1965 at the age of 90 of a stroke. His 65-year old wife Francisca and adopted son Rhee In Soo were at his bedside. A US Air Force plane carried his body to Seoul for a family funeral. Park Jung Hee, who had plotted to topple Rhee, planned a state funeral but decided against it in face of mounting opposition. Rhee’s body was interned at Dougjak-dong National Cemetery near Seoul.

Francisca Rhee returned to her native country and lived out her tragic life with a relative, Miss B Donner, at Laurenzgasse 4/6, 1050 Vienna, Austria. (Source: Kimsoft: Who Was Syngman Rhee?, Lee Wha Rang, 20 Feb 2000.)
Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge and President Rhee signed an agreement on 24 August 1948, whereby the ROK government would gradually assume command of the nations’s security forces and the US Army Forces in Korea began their withdrawal. (Source: The US Military Experience in Korea 1871-1982, pp 6-8, Command Historian’s Office, USFK/EUSA)

An event occurred in October 1948 that got much more attention, indeed international coverage: a rebellion at the southeastern port city of Yosu that soon spread to other counties in S. Cholla and S. Kyongsang, and that for a time seemed to threaten the foundations of the fledgling Republic. The proximate cause of the uprising was the refusal on October 19 of elements of the 14th and 6th Regiments of the ROK Constabulary (Army) to embark for a counterinsurgency mission on Cheju. Led by Communists, the mutineers killed the local police, and seized the city of Suchon, twenty miles to the north. About 2000 insurgent soldiers won control of the city and sent a detachment to take neighbouring Sunchon. By October 20, the rebel elements controlled a number of nearby towns. In Yosu, the people paraded with red flags and shouted slogans. At a mass meeting on October 20, the Communist people’s committee was made the governing body. People’s courts were established to try police officers, landlords, regime officials and other active supporters of the Rhee dictatorship. The rebels established people’s committees and tribunals which tried some 500 officials, soldiers and others, some of whom were executed.

The Communist-led mutiny became a full-scale revolt that spread into other areas leading to the deaths of 1,200 civilians and South Korean troops, 1,500 rebels and their supporters and much property damage. The rebellion was crushed with terrible severity by loyal troops under the direct orders of Syngman Rhee — and would be a forewarning of his actions to suppress Communists in the Korean War. Several young Korean colonels: Chung Il-gwon, Chae Pyong-duk, and Kim Paek-il — along with their American advisors quelled the uprising. Gen. William Roberts, the KMAG commander, ordered Americans to stay out of direct combat, but even that injunction was ignored from time to time. American advisors were with all ROK Army units, but the most important ones were a Colonel Harley E. Fuller, named chief advisor for the suppression, Captain James Hausman from KMAG G-3, and Captain John P. Reed from G-2 (Army intelligence).

Gen Roberts met with Gen Song Ho-sang and urged him “to strike hard everywhere … and allow no obstacles to stop him.” Roberts’ “Letter of instruction” to Song read, Your mission is to meet the rebel attack with an overwhelmingly superior force and to crush it…. Because of their political and strategic importance, it is essential that Sunchon and Yosu be recaptured at an early date. The liberation of these cities from the rebel forces will be moral and political victories of great propaganda value.

American C-47 transports ferried Korean troops, weapons, and other materiel; KMAG spotter planes surveilled the area throughout the period of the rebellion; American intelligence organizations worked intimately with Army and KNP counterparts. The loyal Constabulary first contained the main elements in Yeosu and then policed up the Sunchon area. Seeing the futility of their situation, the trapped rebels in Yosu surrendered.

The UN Commission on Korea for 1949 stated that 23,000 persons were arrested and over 80 percent of them were found guilty. R.C. Allen stated that ten months after the rebellion Koreans were still being executed for alleged complicity in it.

In April 1949, the remnants of the rebels fled into the Chiri mountains and were joined by North Korean guerillas. They established three bases (in the Chiri mountains, Odae mountains, and Andong area). In October 1949, some 3,000 guerillas and several hundred local supporters launched a winter offensive against such large towns as Andong, Chinju, and Pohang. Though they failed to occupy the towns, the stage was set for the Korean War.

The ROK Marines was organized in 1949 after the ROK Army communist rebellion in Yosu in October 1948.

In 1949, Inchon, Suwon and Kaesong were upgraded to “shi” (city).

Prelude to the Korean War

Roh had discouraged the elections scheduled for May, 1950, pleading the guerrilla threat to the voters. With maximum pressure from the State Department and the United Nations Commission on Korea and minimal partisan interference, the National Assembly elections (monitored by UNOK observers, however superficially) produced a stunning setback for Rhee and every other organized faction. Independents captured 126 of the 208 seats while “ruling party” candidates won only fifty-five, rightist oppositionists twenty-four, and the left (now virtually outlawed) three seats. With his domestic powerbase still in danger, Rhee courted foreign friends and was in turn cultivated in the name of a new anti-Communist alliance that would include South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and, Japan. Rhee cultivated his friendship with General Douglas MacArthur and welcomed John Foster Dulles on a visit to Seoul. He corresponded feverishly with any American he thought could muster support in Congress or set-up “off line” military assistance and counter- subversive aid. As the monsoon season of 1950 approached, Rhee saw nothing ahead but a season of discontent, but he did not expect war. (Source: “Understanding Is Better Than Remembering: The Korean War, 1945-1954″, Allan Millett, 1995.)

A History of the Korean People by Andrew C. Hahn: The outcome of the American occupation of South Korea was quite dissimilar from that of the American occupation of Japan. Having no clear-cut policy or plans for Korea, the American occupation left behind no particular imprints, or notable accomplishments. When the Americans ended their occupation, South Korea was unstable, socially chaotic, and an economically bankrupt country. The truth was that the majority of the Americans in Korea lost interest in helping the Koreans and simply wished to go home. To most American GI’s, Korea was simply “a piece of worthless real estate,” and they totally lacked concern for the Korean people’s future.

The Soviets, on the other hand, achieved much more in North Korea, although they too had no policy or plans for Korea in the early stage of their occupation. In contrast to the Americans in the south, the Soviets promoted cordiality with North Korean leaders. established coherent political structure, and fostered a well-equipped military force capable of launching an aggressive war to unify the divided country.

The inherent weakness of South Korea, particularly its military weakness, coupled with certain steps taken by the U.S. government, contributed to North Korea’s launching of the war. In the first place, the U.S., because of President Truman’s demilitarization program, withdrew U.S. troops from South Korea in 1949 without adequatelhy preparing South Korean troops to defend their national territory. The U.S. regarded South Korea strategically less important than Greece, Italy, and Iran in dealing with Soviet expansionism.

Secondly, President Truman did not believe that the Soviet Union would permit a North Korean invasion for military conquest of the entire peninsula. He believed that the Soviets would continue their efforts through infiltration and underground activities.

Above all, the U.S. government — specifically Secretary of State, Dean Acheson — wanted to make Korea a testing ground for the policy of containment of the United States, and therefore misled the North Koreans to believe that the U.S. had abandoned South Korea. Some dispute this idea of Dean Acheson’s intent. However, the fact remains that Dean Acheson, knowingly or unwittingly, stated that the American defense perimeter stretched from the Aleutians to the Ryukus (Japan) — leaving South Korea unprotected — and followed this by the announcement that Congress had cut off aid to South Korea. This sent a clear message to Kim Il-Sung in North Korea that it was an opportune time to attack and he began his preparations for war.

At least six warnings of a possible invasion was sent to Washington between October 1949 and June 1950 from General MacArthur or General Hodge, but were either ignored or they were only given cursory attention. Then on a Sunday morning on 25 June 1950, North Korea attacked.

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1950:
Invasion The origin of the conflict between the two Koreas is to be found in the artificial division of Korea after World War II and in the failure to reach an agreement on the method to be used for returning independence to Korea by the occupying powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. The main aim in temporarily dividing Korea militarily along the 38th parallel was to coordinate the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and Korea. However, because of the emerging Cold War between the two major powers, two contrasting political systems were established in the occupation zones, with each side refusing to recognize the other and claiming sole jurisdiction and legitimacy for the whole of Korea.

The desire to unify the country was equally strong in both parts of the country. After the complete withdrawal of the US and Soviet troops from Korea in 1949, the South wanted to “restore the lost land” and the North wanted to “liberate the southern half of the Republic”. The North, economically and militarily much stronger than the South, decided to solve the problem of non-recognition and of the division by military means. Kim Il-sung went to Moscow in April to convince Stalin, and in May 1950 to China to obtain the approval of Mao. In Moscow he could secure Stalin’s support in return for political as well as some material gains for Korea.(Note: 216 secret Soviet documents which Russian president Boris Yeltsin presented to South Korean president Kim Young-sam on June 1994 reveal that Kim Il-sung could not start a war without Soviet approval. Stalin was interested in getting 25,000 tons of lead per year. See Cold War International History Project Bulletin, No 5, Spring 1995, pp. 1-9.) At the beginning, Stalin was cautious and against the adventure, but was convinced by Kim Il-sung that the war could be won quickly without US intervention.

The desire to unify the country was equally strong in both parts of the country. After the complete withdrawal of the US and Soviet troops from Korea in 1949, the South wanted to “restore the lost land” and the North wanted to “liberate the southern half of the Republic”. The North, economically and militarily much stronger than the South, decided to solve the problem of non-recognition and of the division by military means. Kim Il-sung went to Moscow in April to convince Stalin, and in May 1950 to China to obtain the approval of Mao. In Moscow he could secure Stalin’s support in return for political as well as some material gains for Korea.(1) At the beginning, Stalin was cautious and against the adventure, but was convinced by Kim Il-sung that the war could be won quickly without US intervention. (Source: Asia Times)

Scattered but heavy rains fell along the 38th Parallel in the pre-dawn darkness of Sunday, 25 June 1950. Farther south, at Seoul, the day dawned overcast but with only light occasional showers. The summer monsoon season had just begun. Rain-heavy rain-might be expected to sweep over the variously tinted green of the rice paddies and the barren gray-brown mountain slopes of South Korea during the coming weeks.

Along the dark, rain-soaked Parallel, North Korean artillery and mortars broke the early morning stillness. It was about 0400. The precise moment of opening enemy fire varied perhaps as much as an hour at different points across the width of the peninsula, but everywhere it signaled a co-ordinated attack from coast to coast. The sequence of attack seemed to progress from west to east, with the earliest attack striking the Ongjin Peninsula at approximately 0400.

The tactical situation for the ROK Army above Seoul was poor as evening fell on the second day, 26 June. Its 1st Division at Korangp’o-ri was flanked by the enemy 1st Division immediately to the east and the 4th and 3d Divisions at Uijongbu. Its 7th Division and elements of the 2d, 5th, and Capital Divisions were fighting un-co-ordinated delaying actions in the vicinity of Uijongbu.

During the evening the Korean Government decided to move from Seoul to Taejon. Members of the South Korean National Assembly, however, after debate decided to remain in Seoul. … The generally calm atmosphere that had pervaded the Seoul area during the first two days of the invasion disappeared on the third. The failure of the much discussed counterattack of the ROK 7th and 2d Divisions and the continued advance of the North Korean columns upon Seoul became known to the populace of the city during 27 June, and refugees began crowding the roads. During this and the preceding day North Korean planes dropped leaflets on the city calling for surrender. Also, Marshal Choe Yong Gun, field commander of the North Korean invaders, broadcast by radio an appeal for surrender. The populace generally expected the city to fall during the night. By evening confusion took hold in Seoul. … Before midnight, 27 June, the defenses of Seoul had all but fallen.

North Korean Tank heading south (1950). (Pyeongtaek City) (Source: Pyeongtaek History (CD), Pyeongtaek Si Sa)
Seoul fell on the fourth day of the invasion. At the end of June, after six days, everything north of the Han River had been lost. On the morning of 29 June, General Yu Jai Hyung with about 1,200 men of the ROK 7th Division and four machine guns, all that was left of his division, defended the bridge sites from the south bank of the river. In the next day or two remnants of four South Korean divisions assembled on the south bank or were still infiltrating across the river. Colonel Paik brought the ROK 1st Division, now down to about 5,000 men, across the Han on 29 June in the vicinity of Kimpo Airfield, twelve air miles northwest of Seoul. He had to leave his artillery behind but his men brought out their small arms and most of their crew-served weapons.

Of 98,000 men in the ROK Army on 25 June the Army headquarters could account for only 22,000 south of the Han at the end of the month. When information came in a few days later about the 6th and 8th Divisions and more stragglers assembled south of the river, this figure increased to 54,000. But even this left 44,000 completely gone in the first week of war-killed, captured, or missing. Of all the divisions engaged in the initial fighting, only the 6th and 8th escaped with their organization, weapons, equipment, and transport relatively intact. Except for them, the ROK Army came out of the initial disaster with little more than about 30 percent of its individual weapons.

(Source: South of the Naktong, North to the Yalu, Chapter III)

Truman Enters Korean War On 29 June President Truman approved a new directive greatly broadening the authority of the Far East commander in meeting the Korean crisis. It is to be noted that this directive of 29 June did not authorize General MacArthur to use U.S. ground combat troops in the Han River area-only at the southern tip of the peninsula to assure the retention of a port. At midmorning on 30 June President Truman held a meeting with State and Defense Department officials and approved two orders: (1) to send two divisions to Korea from Japan; and (2) to establish a naval blockade of North Korea. The legislative leaders and UN were notified of the action and the US was in the Korean War.

In the two or three days following the North Korean crossing of the Parallel, air units moved hurriedly from bases in Japan distant from Korea to those nearest the peninsula. Most of the fighter and fighter-bomber squadrons moved to Itazuke and Ashiya Air Bases, which had the most favorable positions with respect to the Korean battle area. Bombers also moved closer to the combat zone; twenty B-29′s of the 19th Bombardment Group, Twentieth Air Force, had moved from Guam to Kadena Airfield on Okinawa by 29 June.

The air action which began on 26 June continued during the following days. One flight of U.S. planes bombed targets in Seoul on the 28th. Enemy planes destroyed two more American planes at Suwon Airfield during the day. Land-based planes of the Far East Air Forces began to strike hard at the North Koreans by the end of June. On the 28th, the Fifth Air Force flew 172 combat sorties in support of the ROK Army and comparable support continued in ensuing days. General Stratemeyer acted quickly to augment the number of his combat planes by taking approximately 50 F-51′s out of storage. On 30 June he informed Washington that he needed 164 F-80C’s, 21 F-82′s, 23 B-29′s, 21 C-54′s, and 64 F-51′s. The Air Force informed him that it could not send the F-80′s, but would substitute 150 F-51′s in excellent condition. The F-51 had a greater range than the F-80, used less fuel, and could operate more easily from the rough Korean airfields.

President Henry S Truman responded quickly by sending troops from Japan to Korea and mobilized the UN to undertake its first-ever international military action. Unfortunately for the North, the Soviet Union was not present at the UN Security Council at that time in protest against the non-recognition of communist China by the UN, so it was unable to veto the action against the North. On the same day, the UN Security Council condemned the invasion as a breach of peace and an act of aggression and called for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal to the 38th parallel. With the refusal of North Korea to withdraw from the South, Truman decided to intervene in Korea, and on June 27, 1950 the Security Council called for members to help South Korea.

On 30 Jun Gen Church fell back to Suwon and was ordered to hold on to the Suwon strip for two days until reinforcements could be flown in, but while away at Osan-ni (which had a telephone relay switch to contact Japan), panic set in a Suwon communications were destroyed. Upon his return, Gen Church was furious, but the situation dictated withdrawal to Taejon — reaching there on 1 July. (NOTE: The USAF Security Service records shows 1st RSM of Johnson AB, JPN with a “Det C Osan AB” in 1950 — which had not been built yet. This might have been the unit that was in Osan-ni. USAFSS Units states under 32 CSS Pacific division (Comsec/Transec) 1953 to 1955: “Note #10 The origins of the unit were TDY groups from the Japanese Unit. There were two deployments both were handled as TDY missions from Nagoya. The first mission was in late 1950. It was located at Seoul and it was quickly withdrawn during the Chinese offensive in the latter part of that year. They got out with the clothes on their backs. The unit lost its equipment and all members of the team lost their personal belongings. The second mission began in the later part of 1951 and it was located in the Ewha College area of Seoul. The unit moved to K-55 (Osan-ri) in 1955.”)

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Massacres at Chonju, Suwon, and Taejon (Jun-Jul 1950) At the outbreak of war in 1950, one of the first acts of the Rhee regime was to order the execution of political prisoners, whose deaths were in due course attributed to atrocities by the incoming northern forces. In Seoul, there was only time to execute ‘about a hundred communists’ (according to an Australian diplomatic source), but in Pusan an estimated 50,000 were killed, and Gregory Henderson, then a United States Embassy official in Seoul, estimated that throughout the country, ‘probably over 100 000′ people were killed without any trial or legal warrant at this time. (Source: Korea Since 1850, Stewart Lone and Gavan McCormack, 1993)

In 2003 Korean TV news reported on the massacres that occurred throughout the country were committed by the Korean National Police. The pieces featured relatives who were searching for the remains of their relatives. In 2003, one news expose depicted graphically on Korean TV the excavation of bones of piles of skulls and bones in a mass grave not far from the Chonju prison.

According to Massacres: Asia, “When the Korean War broke out, Col. Nichols (an American spy master) was the last American to leave Seoul. On his flight south, he participated in the massacres of 1,800 civilians at Suwon: “I stood by helplessly, witnessing the entire affair. Two big bull-dozers worked constantly. One made the ditch-type grave. Trucks loaded with the condemned (“Communists”) arrived. Their hands were already tied behind them. They were hastily pushed into a line along the edge of the newly opened grave. They were quickly shot in the head and pushed into the grave…. The worst part about this whole affair was that I learned later that not all the people killed were communists..” There is photographic evidence of the presence of US military personnel (as observers) at the site.

The official United States Army report issued at the end of the war gave a total figure of civilian victims of atrocities of 7,334 (which it will be noted is a small fraction of those executed by Rhee in the first moments of the war alone). Of that 7,334, the deaths of unnumbered civilians, variously estimated from 5,000 to 7,500 (sic), were attributed to a single incident, known as the ‘Taejon Massacre’. As for Taejon, a massacre undoubtedly occurred, but what precisely happened, when and who was responsible remain to be settled. When first revealed, it was blamed on the Communists, but there is doubt.

Two Australian officers – Major Peach and Wing Commander Rankin – were in the Taejon area at the precise time when the massacre occurred. Major Peach reported on July 9 that he saw trucks loaded with prisoners on the way the killing field. Father Cadars, a French priest, witnessed the Daejon massacre: ‘..just before the Americans retreated from the town, South Korean police had brought into a forest clearing near his church 1700 men, loaded layer upon layer into trucks. These prisoners were ordered out and ordered to dig long trenches.” (Source: Korea Since 1850, Stewart Lone and Gavan McCormack, 1993)

The first published references to the massacre appeared in an article in the English communist) paper, the Daily Worker, dated 9 August 1950. Its correspondent, Alan Winnington, accompanying the (Northern) Korean People’s Army on their march southwards, reported having inspected mass graves at a village called ‘Rangwul’ near Taejon, which is about 160 kilometres south of Seoul. He concluded from inspection of the graves, photographic evidence and discussions with villagers in the vicinity, that approximately 7000 prisoners from the gaols of Taejon and nearby had been summarily executed at that spot between 6 and 21 July (when the area was captured by the KPA), and buried in mass graves dug by locally press-ganged peasants. Because of the political ramifications in the midst of a war, the allegations made by Winnington were never followed up nor even mentioned in the US Army report at the end of the war. He also asserted that from June 29 to July 3, 1950 more than 1,800 people were killed in Inchon, where a branch of Sodaemun Prison, Seoul, was situated, and at least 1,200 in Suwon. This suggested the possibility of mass killings of inmates of prisons situated in areas north of Taejon.

The Daejon Massacre was covered by No Ka-Won in an article (Taejon hyong-mu-so sa-chon san-baek myong hak-sal sa-kon (The massacre of 4300 men from the Taejon prison), Mal Magazine, February 1992, pp. 122-31). Mr. No interviewed some of the South Korean police who did the killing at Daejon as well as scores of other eyewitnesses. (Source: The Coverup Goes On: ‘Dead Koreans Talk No Tale?’, Lee Wha-Rang)

North Koreans Cross the Han (28 Jun-4 Jul 1950)
South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu
North Koreans Cross the Han After securing Yongdungp’o on 3 July, the N.K. 4th Division prepared to continue the attack south. The next morning, at 0600, it departed on the Suwon road with the 5th Regiment in the lead. Just before noon on 4 July, eleven enemy tanks with accompanying infantry were in Anyang-ni, halfway between Yongdungp’o and Suwon. The road from Suwon through Osan toward P’yongt’aek was almost solid with ROK Army vehicles and men moving south the afternoon and evening of 4 July. The 5th Regiment of the ROK 2d Division attempted to delay the enemy column between Anyang-ni and Suwon, but fourteen T34 tanks penetrated its positions, completely disorganized the regiment, and inflicted on it heavy casualties. The Australian and U.S. Air Forces, striving to slow the North Korean advance, did not always hit enemy targets. On that day, 4 July, friendly planes strafed ROK troops several times in the vicinity of Osan. The ROK Army headquarters left Suwon during the day. At midnight the N.K. 4th Division occupied the town.

(Source: South of the Naktong, North to the Yalu, Chapter V)

US-ROK Front 13 Jul 50
South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu
Task Force SmithAs requested by General Dean, the 3d Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. David H. Smith, went to Ansong, twelve miles east of P’yongt’aek to cover the highway there. Colonel Lovless set up his regimental headquarters that day, 5 July, at Songhwan-ni, six miles south of P’yongt’aek, on the main highway and rail line. General Dean placed great importance on holding the P’yongt’aek-Ansong line. On the west, an estuary of the Yellow Sea came up almost to P’yongt’aek and offered the best barrier south of Seoul to an enemy that might try to pass around the west (or left) flank of a force defending the main highway and rail line. See South of the Naktong, North to the Yalu, Chapter VI (pp60-75) for accounts of the Task Force Smith’s entry into the fray and battles at Osan.

According to the VFW Post 10216: Osan AB:

Osan is situated near the site of two significant battles that occurred early in the Korean War. The first ground combat action between American and north Korean forces was fought just a few miles north of Osan Air Base. To halt the advancing North Korean army, which had seized Seoul and was pushing south, Maj. Gen. William F. Dean, commander of the 24th Infantry Division, sent two under-strength infantry companies and a headquarters element from Japan to Pyongtaek July 2, 1950. There they were joined by elements of an artillery battalion. Under the command of Lt. Col. Charles Bradford Smith, this force of 540 men, now called “Task Force Smith” moved into position at Juk Mi Pass, just south of Suwon Air Base, where they faced more than 5,000 north Korean soldiers and 34 Soviet built T-34 tanks. Smith’s mission was to halt the enemy drive south and allow Gen. Dean time to regroup United Nations forces and establish a defensive perimeter.

On July 5, 1950, “Task Force Smith” engaged the enemy near Chukini-Ryong. The battle raged for seven hours as the task force held firm against an entire communist division. Outnumbered, outgunned, and out of ammunition, the survivors managed to fight their way clear and reach Pyongtaek where they joined elements of the 34th Infantry Regiment. Delaying actions continued just north of Chonan, until the weary soldiers pulled back to Taejon where General Dean had established his headquarters. The delaying actions fought by Task Force Smith and the 34th Infantry enabled the 24th Infantry Division to land in Korea and establish and hold the “Pusan Perimeter” along the Naktong River.

Topping a hill a few miles north of Osan on the road to Suwon stand two monuments. On the West Side of the highway a stone pillar constructed by Companies B and C of the 3rd Engineering Battalion, 24th Infantry Division pays tribute to the first American soldier who gave his life in the valley. The larger memorial on the East Side of the road was erected by the Republic of Korea to honor the gallant men of Task Force Smith who had fought so bravely. The Kyongi-Do Governor and VFW annually pay tribute to the members of Task Force Smith in a solemn ceremony at the monument.

On July 5, 1950, “Task Force Smith” was hit by enemy fire between the Towns of Osan and Suwon. For seven hours, the task force held firm against an entire communist division. With ammunition depleted, the survivors managed to fight their way clear and reach Pyongtaek. There, joining an element of the 34th Infantry Regiment, they soon had to give up this position, almost without a fight. Just north of Chonan, the task force fought another delaying action, but soon was pulled back to Taejon where General Dean had established his headquarters. “Task Force Smith” fought for 16 days, culminating its delaying action by holding the north Korean army outside of Taejon. That enabled the 24th Infantry Division to land at Pusan and hold the Pusan perimeter until the famous Inchon landing September 15, 1950. (Source: GlobalSecurity.org: Osan AB)

The following are the actions on 5 July. There were tales of dud ammunition, bazooka rounds fired point blank bouncing off the T-34 tanks, and the rice paddy muck causing the soldiers to shed their helmets and anything that slowed them down as they retreated from the North Korean onslaught. On 5 July, enemy attacks continued along the Suwon-Singal-Kumyangjang line. Enemy 1st, 2d and 5th Divisions pressed toward Osan and Pyongt’aek while US troops retreated.
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1st Lt. Philip Day, Jr. Task Force Smith
In the early gray dawn of July 5, Sgt. Loren Chambers yelled, “Hey, look over there, Lieutenant. Can you believe?!” Looking down the road toward Suwon, I made out a column of tanks. Seems like there were eight o f them. I couldn’t believe my eyes. “What are those?” I asked. Chambers answered. “Those are T34 tanks, sir, and I don’t think they’re going to be friendly toward us.” The company commander was called. Everybody got real excited about them. The day was beginning in earnest.

Really in earnest, Dashner said, “Let’s get some artillery on them.” Behund us the 105-mm howitzers (of the 58th Field Artillery Battalion) fired several rounds but without effect. The tanks kept coming. Behind the first goup came anouther, then another. They passed through B Company, which was spread out on either side of the road. Lt. Ollie Connor had a bazooka in a ditch beside the road. He hit several tanks, but they continued to roll through our position. At any one time seems like ther’d be four tanks behind us curling up the hill, five going through B Comapany and two comining down the road toward me. Several of them swiveled their turrets and began shooting. I was with a 75-mm recoilless-rifle team. “Let’s see,” I shouted, “if we can get one of those tanks.” We picked up the gun and moved it to where we could get a clean shot. I don’t know if we were poorly trained, weren’t thinking, or if it slipped our minds, but we set up the gun on the forward slope of the hill. when we fired, the recoilless blast blew a hole in the hill which instantly covered us in mud and dirt. The effect wasn’t nearly as bad on us as it was on the gun. It jammed and wouldn’t fire until we’d cleaned the whole damn thing.

When we were ready again, we moved the gun to a better position and began banging away. I swearr we had some hits, but the tanks never slowed down. One we hit in the tracks and ti slewed sidways off the road. More of the tanks began shooting at tus. I saw their exlosions walking up the hill. I don’t know what happend to the other tow guys with me, but one blast knocked me and the gun over backward. I began bleeding from my ears. I wasn’t unconscious, just stunned by the concussion.

In a little less than two hours, thirty North Korean tanks rolled through the position we were supposd to block as if we hadn’t been there. That was our first two hours in combat. (Source: The Korean War, Pusan to Chosin, An Oral History, Donald Knox, pp19-22)
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1st Lt. William Wyrick, Task Force Smith

My assistant platoon sergeant, Loren Chambers, called back on the soud-powered telephone for some 50-mm moar fire on the enemy tanks. The answer was, “They won’t reach that far.”
“Well, how about the 81-mm mortars?”
“They didn’t come over with us.”
“Howabout the 4.3s (mortars?”
“The 4.2s can’t fire.”
“How about the artilery?’;
“No comunications.”
“What about the Air Force?”
“They don’t know where we are.”
“Call the Navy.”
“They can’t reach this far.”
‘Well, then, send me a camera. I want to take a picture of this.”

About an hour after the tanks went through our position, a long convoy of trucks, bumper to bumper and as far as I could see, rolled down the road from the direction the tanks had come. They were paced with North Koran troops. (Source: The Korean War, Pusan to Chosin, An Oral History, Donald Knox, pp19-22)
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1st Lt. Charles Payne, 1st Battalion/34th Infantry
Hitting the T34 head-on mearly produed a bounce-off. We soon ran out of ammo and had one man killedin action (Pvt. Kenneth Shaddrick). I pulled everyone back while our 4.2 mortar engaged their tanks. I saw one tread on fire and we bade their infantry cramble. There were many more North Korean trucks on the road immediately ot out north. Having run out of ammo, the bazooka teams and the 4.2s dropped back. (NOTE: Pvt Shaddrick was killed in action when he was raked across the chest by machine gun fire south of the village of Osan near the railroad tracks — near present day Osan AB.) (Source: The Korean War, Pusan to Chosin, An Oral History, Donald Knox, pp19-22)
Topping a hill a few miles north of Osan on the road to Suwon stands a m/onument, constructed by Companies B and C of the 3rd Engineering Battalion, 24th Infantry Division, in honor of the men who gave their lives in the valley. The inscription on the plaque, in both English and Hongul, reads: “In commemoration of this site, 5 July 1950, 408 men of Task Force Smith, 21st Infantry Regiment and Battery, 57th Field Artillery Battalion, 24th Infantry Division, fought the initial action between United States and Communist Troops.”

(Source: GlobalSecurity.org: Osan AB)

Task Force Smith at Osan-ni (5 Jul 1950)
South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu
Once south of P’yongt’aek, the Korean peninsula broadens out westward forty-five miles and a road net spreads south and west there permitting the outflanking of the Seoul-Taegu highway positions. East of Ansong, mountains come down close to that town, affording some protection there to a right (east) flank anchored on it. P’yongt’aek and Ansong were key points on the two principal highways running south between the Yellow Sea and the west central mountains. If enemy troops succeeded in penetrating south of P’yongt’aek, delaying and blocking action against them would become infinitely more difficult in the western part of Korea. [2] General Dean was expecting too much, however, to anticipate that one battalion in the poor state of training that characterized the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, and without artillery, tank, or antitank weapon support, could hold the P’yongt’aek position more than momentarily against the vastly superior enemy force that was known to be advancing on it. See South of the Naktong, North to the Yalu, Chapter VII (pp79-100) for accounts of the Delaying Actions from Pyongtaek to Chonan.

Task Force Smith at Osan-ni (5 Jul 1950)
South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu
One incident from South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, Chapter 7 tells on one incident very close to the present day Osan AB. Assuming the incident was “one mile from the edge of Seojong-ni,” it would place the encounter with the enemy tank somewhere near the railroad tracks near the present-day Shinjang Shopping Mall.

Lt. Charles E. Payne with some infantrymen started north. Approaching the village of Seojong they discovered tank tracks in the muddy road where an enemy tank had turned around. Payne stopped the trucks and dismounted his men. A South Korean soldier on horseback, wearing foliage camouflage on his helmet, rode up to them and yelled, “Tanks, tanks, go back!” Payne eventually located the enemy tank on the railroad track about a mile ahead at the edge of Seojong-ni, five miles south of Osan. In an exchange of fire about 1600 between his bazooka teams and the tank at long range, enemy machine gun fire killed Pvt. Kenneth Shadrick. The bazooka teams withdrew, bringing Shadrick’s body with them. The group returned to P’yongt’aek and reported the futile effort to Barth and Ayres. [3] (34th Inf WD, 5 Jul 50; Barth MS, pp. 2-3; Higgins, War in Korea, pp. 58-65; New York Times, July 6, 1950, p. 3; Time Magazine, July 17, 1950, p. 12. Miss Higgins erroneously publicized Shadrick as being the first American infantryman killed in the Korean War.) See South of the Naktong, North to the Yalu, Chapter VII (pp79-100) for accounts of the Delaying Actions from Pyongtaek to Chonan.

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SNIP OF HISTORY DETAILS:
There are a lot of historical details we are going to snip out here as we are only dealing with Songtan and the immediate vicinity. For the details of the Pusan Perimeter, Invasion of Inchon and subsequent move North, go to South of the Naktong, North to the Yalu, Table of Contents.

As the war swept over the area, the state of the infrastructure fell into disrepair. After the Inchon Invasion and Pusan Breakout, the railway system was found to be in a state of disrepair. Water pumps and electrical systems were destroyed. Communications was crippled. Prior to the invasion, Osan-ni had a telephone relay switch for international calls that was also destroyed.

Infrastructure and Train System at Start of Korean War Because of the long distances and the very poor roads, everyone moving in Korea wanted to go by rail. Pusan Base Section ruled that rail movement was possible only for vehicles over two and one half tons that were going farther than Taegu. Everything lighter, or going shorter distances, had to be driven. The following is from PART II Transportation Corps, 5. Problems in Railroad Operations (pp63-67) — from Combat Support in Korea, John G. Westover (P/O Center of Military History Online Collection. It stated,

Railroad activities in the Korean conflict have been vital to the movement of troops, equipment, and supplies. The military railway personnel have been faced constantly with problems of reconstruction, operation, maintenance, destruction, and then, again, reconstruction of the rail lines, bridges, stations, and communications facilities. All these have had to be handled along with the forward and rearward movement of supply trains as the tactical situation changed.

During the first several months, as the United Nations troops were withdrawing to the Naktong perimeter, there were few technical problems. This was a period in which traffic control and the train movements were the major considerations. When the September drive began, however, the railroads had to contend with destroyed water pumps, bridges, stations and tracks, and communications.

The locomotives of the Korean National Railroads were all steam operated and required large amounts of water. Pumps were in poor condition originally, but in the recaptured territory they were broken or had no power. The first pumps obtained from the Corps of Engineers had a capacity of only 1C6 gallons per minute. Later, 480-gallon pumps were installed and found satisfactory. To provide electricity for shops, roundhouses and pumping stations, 100-kilowatt generators were installed.

Communications were also a problem. From Sindong to Seoul, communications lines were 75 per cent destroyed; from Seoul to Kaesong, 100 per cent; from Kaesong to Pyongyang, 25 per cent. U.S. signal troops and supplies were not available for repair of the lines. Until December 1950 only Korean communications men could be used, and their work was unsatisfactory.

There was no copper wire for railroad communications lines, and field wire was used in emergency circuits. These circuits would function only for a day or two. Then a second expedient was attempted?SCR-399 radios placed at each main station between Taegu and Seoul. This, too, was unsatisfactory.

By late November the telephone line between Sindong and Seoul had been pieced together and was working after a fashion. Early in December a good line was established from Kaesong to Pyongyang, but it was mid-December before the line between Seoul and Kaesong was functioning properly. The circuits between Pyongyang and Sinanju never operated.

The greatest help to the railway communications system was the Mukden cable circuits, provided by Eighth Army in late November and early December. Circuits to Pusan, Taegu, Taejon, Chonan, and Pyongyang were assigned directly to the 3d TMRS switchboard.

During the withdrawal of November-January there was no difliculty with communications. In addition to the Mukden cable circuits, the 3d TMRS now had good wayside communications from Pyongyang to Seoul.

As the troops moved north after the breakout from the Pusan perimeter, the 3d TMRS and KNR personnel repaired tracks and bridges. Such repairs made heavy demands on the engineers for timbers and tools. If the engineers had these, the 3d TMRS got them.

U.S. engineers repaired the Naktong River bridge at Waegwan, the Han River shoo-fly bridge (expedient railroad structure) at Seoul, the Imjin River shoo-fly bridge, and the high-level bridge at Hanpo-ri. Except for these, Korean bridge and track gangs repaired the rail lines during the advance. They opened the lines rapidly by using sandbags, timber trestling, and rail stringers as expedients. The Korean gangs could repair as much in three or four days as the U.S. engineers in ten. However, it was somewhat diflicult to get the lightly clad Korean gangs to work during cold weather.

During the fall of 1950 the KNR had money to make repairs. However, the scale of reconstruction was so vast that in December the money ran out. It was then necessary for the United States to pay all labor, new construction, and repair charges.

By late November continuous operation as far North as the Taedong station was made possible by the completion of the bridge at Hanpo-ri over the Yesong River. On 1 December 1950 the railroad was in operation as far north as Sinanju, but there was no railroad bridge crossing the Taedong River at Pyongyang. Both bridges across the Taedong had been blown and it was necessary to unload the cars at the Taedong station, load the supplies on trucks which crossed a ponton bridge, and then reload trains going north. At the time of the Chinese Communist offensive, thc Korean railroads were carrying four thousand tons daily into Taedong.

When the general withdrawal started, the technical services hurriedly evacuated large quantities of critical materiel. However, certain supplies remained in the north and others were moved northward to meet requirements. Empty cars were sent into Taedong for south-bound loading.

Successive railheads were set up at points where the division could draw POL, rations, and ammunition. As one railhead was closed, another was opened farther south. This went on for several weeks, all the way south through Chonan.

The locomotives and rolling stock north of the unbridged Taedong River were destroyed because they could not be evacuated. South of Pyongyang, every effort was made to save as much as possible. Rail yards were stripped. Inoperative locomotives were destroyed. Bridges, switches, control towers, and other equipment were dynamited.

A typical closing of the rail line was the operation at Yongdungpo. On 4 January, 23 trains (462 cars) moved south-bound between 0001 and 2030 hours. One of the last trains contained machinery and equipment from the KNR shops and yards. The movement control personnel rode the last train, while the engineer and transportation representatives who demolished the yards withdrew by jeep. By 0200, 5 January, Yongdungpo was cleared, and trains were moving south on both tracks of the main line.

Similar operations took place at Ascom City and Inchon. Heavy traffic moved out by rail over the main line, but much was moved by rail to Inchon and placed on ships. Rail yards at these two cities were blown on the night of 4 January; the railroaders, including the KNR employees, were moved to Pusan by water. Only the last two switch engines working at the docks were destroyed.

During the withdrawal, thousands of Korean refugees streamed south. Railroad yards became so crowded that the refugees had to be driven away before the trains could be made up. This was particularly true at Seoul and Yongdungpo. All south-bound trains carried refugees 뾞s long as one more could hang on.

Screening points for the north-bound cars were set up along the main line. Items not needed, or intended for units that had moved, were cut out. But even with this system, the consignee unit was often gone when a car arrived at its destination. If possible, a re-routing or reconsignment was made.

The urgency of the tactical situation brought much disorganized loading. Some cars were not marked, others were marked inadequately, and on some the marks were obliterated. The railroads moved all cars. Screening was carried out along the line, but it allowed many unmarked cars to be brought all the way to the Pusan area.

Early in January, 20 to 30 trains were coming into Pusan area daily. The rail lines could not handle this volume. About 50 per cent of the cars arriving were unmarked. Screening teams, which opened the cars, often found items for three or four different services loaded into one car. It took months to clear the Pusan yards of the retrograde tonnage.

The men of the Korean National Railroads showed great loyalty and courage during the withdrawal. In several instances train and engine crews moved their trains from a city as the infantry withdrew. At Seojong-ni the infantry had taken up positions south of the town while the KNR crews were still making up the last train.
The Security Council decided on July 7,1950 to establish a Unified Command for the UN Forces in Korea and mandated a joint military action to repel the troops from the North and to restore the status quo in Korea. General Douglas MacArthur was designated by the US government as the supreme commander of the UN forces in Korea, and South Korean president Rhee Syng-man put the South Korean military under his command. The forces committed were: The US forces, those of South Korea and combat contingents from Australia, Belgium, Luxembourg, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Great Britain, Greece, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and Turkey, with medical units from Denmark, India, and Sweden. These forces were placed under a unified UN command headed by the US commander in chief in the Far East, General Douglas MacArthur.
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Invasion of Inchon and Push North
But for all the subterfuge, it is now known that China’s Mao Tse-Tung had warned North Korea’s Kim Il-Sung that MacArthur would probably land at Inchon on September 15…but Kim Il-Sung disregarded this warning.

On September 15, 1950 the US 1st Marine Division, ROK marines and army troops led the “surprise” attack at Inchon. Despite this lack of secrecy, the landing met with little resistance and was resounding success with few casualties. As word of this spread to the North Korean forces, their forces completely shattered. On September 18, the U.N. broke out of the Pusan Perimeter. By September 23 the NKPA (Inmun Gun) was everywhere in full retreat. US, ROK, and UN forces launched counterattacks against the North Korean forces from the Pusan Perimeter in order to link with the UN forces at Seoul and Inchon.

American advance after Pusan Breakout and Inchon Invasion. American troops crossing the Pyongtaek Bridge Sep 1950. (Pyeongtaek City) (Source: Pyeongtaek History (CD), Pyeongtaek Si Sa)
Following a street-by-street fight in Seoul, the US X Corps captured the ruined ROK capital of Seoul on 26 September. Late that same night a fast-=racing 1st Cavalry Division battalion linked up with elements of the 7th Infantry Division near Osan-ni, the same village at which American troops had first met the North Koreans in combat. (Source: USAF in Korea, Robert F. Futrell, p167)

Victory in South Korea came quickly once the North Korean People’s Army, already reduced to a dearth of logistics by aerial blockade, was outmaneuvered on the ground. On 29 September General MacArthur and President Rhee flew to Seoul for a victory parade which marked the Republic of Korea government’s return to its capital city. South of the United Nations lines remnants of six Red divisions coninued to resist the US IX Corps, a new organization comprising the US 2d and 25th Infantry Divisions and attached units which had become operational for the mopping-up campaign on 23 September. Althohough somme bypassed North Koreans, continued to fight, General MacArthur informed the United Nations that “the backbone of the North Korean Army has been broken.” (Source: USAF in Korea, Robert F. Futrell, p167)

The UN military action in Korea, taken by the US Eighth Army under General MacArthur, was able to accomplish its mission by October 7, 1950 by restoring the status quo in Korea. The war could have ended here.

However, sensing an opportunity not only to stop but also to roll back communist expansion and to unify the country by force, General MacArthur and president Rhee Syng-man decided to march forward to the North. Truman approved orders for UN forces to cross the 38th parallel and to push the enemy above the Yalu River, although communist China had warned repeatedly against such an action. By October 25, some advance units had reached the Yalu river and victory was close, but they were confronted with an unexpected enemy, the Chinese “volunteers”. The Chinese began to move into North Korea in massive numbers and together with North Korean troops started an offensive. They pushed back UN forces to below the 38th parallel, and recaptured Seoul in January 1951. The conflict had developed into a limited international war involving the United States and 19 other nations on one side and China and North Korea on the other.

The UN forces including three ROK divisions pursued the fleeing North Korean forces. But unknown to the UN forces, the Chinese 40th, 39th and 42d armies under Commander-in-Chief Peng had marched under the cover of darkness into North Korea on 19 October. They were getting into position for their initial assault. In all there were four armies, three artillery divisions and one antiaircraft regiment. This was the first contingent of thirty-nine divisions that Chairman Mao promised to send to North Korea. The goal of the Chinese in Korea was to assist North Korea in the “reasonable settlement of its problem by wiping out the U.S. troops and then seek a peaceful settlement.” They went undetected by American fliers and MacArthur was convinced there was no threat of Chinese intervention. This is what he told President Truman in his meeting with him on October 15 at Wake Island.

Three Chinese Armies — the equivalent of nine U.S. divisions — moved into position slowly by night. On October 21 Pyongyang fell to UN forces. On the October 21 the orders were given for the Chinese troops to destroy the ROK 6th, 7th and 8th Divisions that were advancing north. By October 25, two of the armies were in position to attack. The plan was to lure the enemy UN and ROK troops into mountain areas, then encircle them and wipe them out.

MacArthur still in ignorant of the Chinese presence in North Korea, issued a statement in Tokyo that “the war is definitely coming to an end shortly.” But contact had been made by ROK 1st Division near Unsan and captured a Chinese prisoner who revealed that vast numbers of Chinese had crossed the Yalu and were heading south. This was radioed to headquarters. In addition, a spy group headed by Navy Lieutenant Eugene Clark ranged far to the north and had picked up conclusive evidence of thousands of Chinese heading south. However, MacArthur still refused to take the Chinese seriously despite the intelligence.

The race to the Yalu continued despite the warnings. On October 24 The Eight Army crossed the strategic Chungchon River and one division, the ROK 6th Division had reached the Yalu River on the Manchurian border. MacArthur rejoiced and authorized the use of “any and all ground forces to secure all of North Korea.”

The Chinese Spring the Trap On October 26, the X Corps landed at Wonsan on the east coast.

On November 2 Peng sprang the trap to wipe out the U.S. 2nd Division. By November 5 MacArthur, without consulting Washington (but later approved by Truman), gave the orders to bomb the Korean end of the Yalu River bridges. He now realized that the Chinese intervention was serious, for the Chinese had driven Eighth Army back across the Chungchon River. Suddenly the Chinese disengaged as Walker had succeeded in withdrawing the bulk of his troops safely across the Chungchon River. But Mao was satisfied with the First Chinese Campaign. The Chinese had annihilated 15,000 of the ROK & UN forces and foiled MacArthur’s plan to occupy all of Korea by Thanksgiving. But then suddenly the Chinese withdrew back across the Yalu on November 7. By suddenly withdrawing, Mao guessed that MacArthur, assuming he had beaten the Chinese, would push his troops farther north.

MacArthur fell for the trap. Between November 10-24, X Corps advanced toward the Yalu River in the east, while the Eight Army closed in on the west. On November 24, MacArthur issued orders for a “final offensive” to launch an all-out attack to secure all of North Korea. Following MacArthur’s orders, UN forces continued forward being drawn into the area. MacArthur felt the mountainous backbone of North Korea made it impossible for the Chinese to use the area for military operations. He knew little of his new enemy. The Chinese simply waited to spring the trap, then on November 25 the slaughter began. Three Volunteer armies suddenly attacked the western front of Eighth Army along the Ch’ongch’on River. The ROK II Corps was in disarray after both its divisions collapsed. The road to retreat was jammed.

At the Chosin Reservoir, the Marines and the 7th Division were unaware of the debacle going on in the western flank and prepared for their attack. Little did the Marines know that eight Chinese Volunteer divisions had been lying in wait for them on the west side of the Chosin Reservoir. On the east side of the Chosin Reservoir, the Chinese 80th Division approached the 7th ID without being observed. On November 27 the Chinese struck the 1st Marine and 7th ID at Changjin Reservoir in the east. The rest is history. The debacle, the misery, the heroism, the fighting and the frozen retreat.

Mysteriously, General Almond of X Corps remained oblivious to the true situation and wanted to continue the attack. General Walton Walker of the Eighth Army did not share this view and ordered a general withdrawal of the Eighth Army — in order to save his men. By November 28 MacArthur woke up to reality and authorized Walker to fall back to Pyongyang and there to go on the defensive, while X Corps was to withdraw to the Hungnam-Wonsan area. He cabled the Pentagon: “We face an entirely new war.” Mao’s troops on both the eastern and western fronts had caused a sensational turn of events smashing MacArthur’s dreams of taking all of Korea — with his forces in full retreat.

The Communist Chinese intervention with 260,000 “volunteers” on November 27, 1950 failed to push far enough south to put Kunsan in jeopardy. The construction continued on the base. On December 22, General Walker was killed in a jeep accident and replaced by General Matt Ridgeway. On December 24, X Corps sails from Hungnam. North Korea is evacuated.

As the military situation developed unfavorably for the Allied forces, General MacArthur asked Truman to authorize the use of nuclear weapons against China and North Korea. Fortunately, although some US military leaders favored the nuclear option, Truman decided not to use the weapons for a number of reasons.(NOTE: General MacArthur was strongly in favor of using nuclear weapons on Korea and on China. For the political and military considerations of employment of nuclear weapons during the Korean War, see D Calingaert, “Nuclear Weapons and the Korean War”, Journal of Strategic Studies, June 1988, pp. 177-207.) Later in 1951, he discharged General MacArthur over this issue and redefined American policy by abandoning his objective of military reunification of Korea. His aim was now a return to the status quo, even as the Chinese and North Koreans were advancing southward. Truman was unwilling to engage in an all-out war which could have led to a world war involving the Soviet Union.

As the war reached a new phase with massive intervention of Chinese “volunteers”, the UN General Assembly formally proposed a ceasefire in December 1950. Following some preparatory talks, representatives of the UN and communist commands began formal truce negotiations in July 1951 at Kaesong, North Korea. (Source: Asia Times, The Korean peninsula’s imperfect past, Mark B M Suh.)

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1951:
Third Chinese Campaign (January 1951) On December 31, 230,000 Chinese volunteers and 70,000 North Koreans launched the Third Chinese Campaign as a surprise attack. This flow of battle centered around the 38th Parallel and Seoul. Though the Chinese and North Koreans recaptured Seoul on January 4, 1951, the UN forces retook Seoul on March 18, 1951.

As the third phase of the Korean War뾲he CCF (Communist Chinese Forces) Intervention?drew to a close on 24 January 1951, the United Nations Command (UNC) had come to the end of a series of tactical withdrawals. Starting in mid-December 1950, Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway’s Eighth Army had fallen back from the 38th Parallel, first to the South Korean capital of Seoul, then to a line below Osan and Wonju. Meanwhile, Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond’s X Corps had evacuated by sea on the east coast to Pusan, where it became part of the Eighth Army. All the territorial gains in North Korea of the earlier phases of the war had been lost. But General Ridgway was convinced the enemy lacked the logistical system to maintain offensive operations for any extended period, and he was preparing to begin a counteroffensive. This fourth phase of the war would largely shape the outcome of the conflict.

After two task forces had encountered little or no Chinese opposition in probes to the north, on 25 January General Ridgway launched Operation THUNDERBOLT, a larger but still cautious reconnaissance in force supported by air power. Resistance stiffened at the end of the month, but it gave way in the west by 9 February. The next day UN forces secured Inch’on and Kimpo airfield, and the U.S. I Corps neared the Han River. Meanwhile, on the central front, as the operation expanded, the X Corps met increasing opposition, and the Chinese struck back on the night of 11?2 February, driving back Republic of Korea (ROK) forces north of Hoengsong. But when four Chinese regiments attacked the crossroads town of Chip’yong-ni on the 13th, the U.S. 23d Infantry and the French Battalion conducted a successful defense for three days until the enemy withdrew. Ridgway regarded this valiant effort as symbolic of the renewed fighting spirit of his command.

Osan is remembered as the location for the first U.S. Army company-strength bayonet charge since World War I, which occurred on February 7, 1951. That charge was part of a larger plan to clear the Republic of Korea of all communist troops south of Seoul. Army Capt. Lewis L. Millet led his soldiers against communist Chinese forces on Hill 180, which dominates present day Osan Air Base. For his heroic actions, Captain Millet received the Medal of Honor. According to the VFW Post 10216: Osan AB site:

After the Chinese counter-attacked they swept down pushing the bloodied allied troops back across the border and taking Seoul. On December 31, 230,000 Chinese volunteers and 70,000 North Koreans launched the Third Chinese Campaign as a surprise attack. This flow of battle centered around the 38th Parallel and Seoul during the Third Chinese Campaign (January 1951) and Fourth Chinese Campaign (April 1951). On February 1, the U.N. voted to end the Korean conflict by “peaceful means.” Though the Chinese and North Koreans recaptured Seoul on January 4, 1951, the UN forces retook Seoul on March 18, 1951. In the midst of this action was the “The Battle of Bayonet Hill”
The Battle of “Bayonet Hill”, 7 February 1951
Hill 180, as it was called during the Korean War, lay between the exhausted Chinese Communist and North Korean forces and General Matthew Ridgeway뭩 revitalized 8th U.S. Army in late January, 1951. After being driven back steadily during the last months of 1950 by Chinese hordes, U.S. troops regrouped and were ready to probe the overextended, under-supplied Chinese and North Koreans. Ridgeway sent the 27th Infantry “Wolfhounds” north toward Osan as the vanguard for an all-out U.N. assault called Operation Thunderbolt. Easy Company, part of the Wolfhounds contingent, was commanded by a tough, World War II-hardened officer–Captain Lewis Millett. Company E boarded tanks and started forward.

Capt Lewis Millet (7 Feb 1951)

On February 5, 1951, it was moving through a frozen rice paddy west of the road running south out of Osan. Suddenly, the crackle of enemy machine-gun fire broke the morning air. The first platoon found itself pinned down. Chinese were emplaced on two hills straddling the road. Their fire picked up. The bullets whistled through the air, slapping into the ice.

“Second platoon!” Millett hollered. “Fix bayonets–move to the left of the first.” Then Millett was off, shouting, “C뭢on with me!” He bounded to the base of the hill. There he waited for his platoons to form up. “We뭠l get 멷m with the bayonet! Let뭩 go!” he yelled when they were ready. Up the hill the two platoons went, all the GIs yelling at the top of their voices. Above them, Millett appeared on the skyline, rifle in one hand, waving his men upward with the other. Even as he did so, Chinese soldiers scurried from their foxholes, skittering down the reverse slope helter-skelter.

By the time the two platoons joined Millett on the crest only a few enemy stragglers remained. They were quickly dispatched. To the rear, the rest of Millett뭩 battalion observed the audacious charge. The colonel quickly came forward to shake Millett뭩 hand and congratulate him for his courage. That night the colonel began the paperwork that would bring Millett the Distinguished Service Cross. Little did he know that Millett뭩 charge was but a rehearsal for what would come just forty-eight hours later.

At midday on February 7, Company E had the point for the battalion. Near the smoke-blackened village of Soam-ni, just west and north of Osan, they approached a ridge line. On military maps, it was designated Hill 180. To the men of Company E and the annals of U.S. military history it would forever be “Bayonet Hill.”

Accompanied by two of his platoons astride tanks, Millett approached Hill 180, fully expecting to bypass it completely. Then one of his men noticed movement among the thick foliage near the top of the hill. It was crawling with Chinese. And Company E sat almost directly under their guns. Once apprised of the situation, Millett quickly ordered the tanks off the road. He got his two platoons deployed along a paddy dike.

By now the Chinese had opened fire. A number of Millett뭩 men fell, cut down by vicious machine-gun fire. Leaping aboard the nearest tank, Millett grabbed its .50-caliber machine gun. He sent a stream of tracers flying toward the enemy position. “Keep it going there,” he told the gunner. Then he jumped off the tank and moved on. He knew from here on it was all a matter of timing. He had to get an attack under way quickly. He didn뭪 want these Chinese to get away like the others had two days earlier.

Millett called to one of his platoon leaders to get ready to move out. Seconds later, enfilading fire from a previously quiet Chinese machine gun tore into the first platoon. Casualties mounted. Then the .50-caliber machine gun supporting first platoon went silent–jammed with a ruptured cartridge. Millett swore under his breath. His attack was crumbling even before it started. He scrambled from his position and raced across the bullet-swept ground to the first platoon. Spotting the platoon sergeant as he barreled into position, Millett just hollered at the men, “Get ready to move out! We뭨e going up the hill. Fix bayonets! Charge! Everyone goes with me!” He raised his rifle and took out across the open fields.

Bounding from the small rises and hurdling the ditches, Millett kept his feet across the ice-covered ground. Behind him the platoon sergeant and a dozen men ran after Millett. Those who hadn뭪 followed were cut down minutes later as enemy machine-gun fire from Hill 180 zeroed in on them. When he reached the base of the hill, Millett flung himself down under a rocky outcropping while he waited for the others to catch up. After they did Millet motioned upward. “Let뭩 go!” he said. Dashing from rock to rock. Millett made the first of three small knobs that comprised Hill 180. The center and far knob rose some twenty meters higher. Millett spotted a Chinese machine gun to his left. He ordered a BAR to fire on it. Another soldier spotted eight Chinese squatting in a hole just ten yards from Millett. The captain ran to it, firing his carbine and throwing grenades. The enemy died.

Millett now radioed for his third platoon to come forward. After he had them in position Millett told them, “Attack straight up the hill!” With their bayonet-tipped rifles carried at high port, screaming Chinese phrases as they ran, Millett and his assembled men raced toward the two higher knobs. Lunging into the first line of enemy foxholes, the GIs ripped into the Chinese, bayonets first. The terror-filled shrieks of the bayoneted enemy rose above the din of battle. Millett was so far in front of his men he had to dodge grenades thrown by both sides. Ignoring the thundering explosions, he charged headlong at an anti-tank gun firing point-blank at him. A few well-tossed grenades took care of that weapon.

A cluster of grenades flew down from a Chinese position farther uphill. Millett danced and dodged around, avoiding the detonations of eight grenades. A ninth got him, sending hot steel shards into his back and legs. He could feel the blood coursing down his skin, drenching his fatigues beneath his parka. Unmindful of the intense pain, Millett continued his charge. He urged his men forward. “Let뭩 go!,” he screamed. “Use grenades and cold steel! Kill 멷m with the bayonet!” At the crest of the highest knob he jumped into one arm of a V-shaped slit trench. With a savage thrust of his bayonet he impaled one enemy soldier. He had to fire a round to dislodge his weapon. A second enemy soldier rushed at Millett. The emboldened captain met him like a frenzied tiger, jamming his sharp steel blade into the man뭩 throat, ripping it wide open. A third Chinese, in the far arm of the V, raised his rifle. Before he could fire Millett was on him, slamming his blood-stained bayonet into the enemy soldier뭩 chest. While Millett dispatched the soldier, the rest of his men rushed past. Millett leaped after them.

Together they went on, screaming and yelling, firing from the hip, ripping and stabbing enemy flesh with their bayonets, throwing grenades into bunkers and foxholes until they had completely eliminated the enemy from the hill.

When it was all over Millett stopped atop the saw-toothed ridge and pumped his bloody rifle up and down, signaling to those below he had conquered Bayonet Hill. After the battle forty-seven enemy dead were counted on the forward slope of the hill; thirty had died as a result of bayonet wounds. On the reverse slope lay another fifty enemy, dead of either bayonet or gunshot wounds. Witnesses estimated another hundred Chinese escaped.

Evacuated due to the seriousness of his wounds, Millett spent several months in the hospital recuperating. His Medal of Honor was presented to him at the White House on July 5, 1951.

(L) Col. Millet at Bayonet Hill 50th Anniversary (R) Col. Millet honored at VFW Post 10216 (Hill 180 Post) (2000) (VFW Post 10216: Osan AB)

Bayonet Hill 50th Anniversary (2000) (51st FW History Office)

Plaque on Hill 180 (1998) (VFW Post 10216: Osan AB)

EPILOGUE: John C. Sullivan, USAFE Director of History, wrote in Apr 2005:

That said, the entire debate over Hill 180 raged for years. When MOH Recipient and Bayonet Charge hero Millett visited (four times during my tenures in Korea), the discussions were long and painful. Local, and amateur, historians were adamant that the Chinese never reach Osan AB (that far south) and based their discussions on Army Morning Reports. They had me convinced until I saw Millett’s drawings in his Korean War notebook that showed a large ginko tree in the center of the town where he took enemy gunfire. The historian in me took several of us to the Kyonggi-Do Mayor’s Office and then to several “authorities” who all stated that only one ginko tree survived the Korea War and it was in the center of the town of – whatever that village with the long name was – and that led credence to Millett’s claim of the Hill 180 location. That, and his drawings, which matched the Osan AB Hill to a “T” – so I ended the debate. The Army folks finally admitted (in person, but not in writing) that the unit’s AM reports showed Millett’s unit was north of where Osan was, but they agreed that enemy forces could have been on patrol down MSR 1 as far as Pyongtaek. Who knows. Millett said when he filed his report he listed the encounter “somewhere west of MSR 1 near Suwon.” Sounds OK by me. He didn’t encounter the entire Chinese army.

So, if you check the dates of Millett’s bayonet charge, you will reach the conclusion that there was no base at present day Osan until later – not even any digging or preparation.

Ginko Tree on Golf Course (2003)

Landmark Marker of Ginko Tree (2003) (NOTE: Marker tells of a rich man without children planting the tree and then having children. He celebrated event at this tree annually and the tree was known as “Enheng Jengui” (Mana from the Ginko Tree). The village was called “Enheng Jengui” after the tree and became part of the base in 1950.) (SOURCE: Osan AB History Web Page)

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Chinese Advance Stalls (Jan 51) As almost half a million Chinese Communist and North Korean troops launched a new ground offensive, Fifth Air Force embarked on a campaign of air raids on enemy troop columns on 1 Jan. On 3 Jan, massive numbers of Chinese troops crossed the frozen Han River east and west of Seoul. Eighth Army began evacuating the South Korean capital. The ROK government began moving to Pusan. In one of the largest FEAF Bomber Command air raids, more than sixty B-29s dropped 650 tons of incendiary bombs on Pyongyang. UN forces burned nearly 500,000 gallons of fuel and 23,000 gallons of napalm at Kimpo in preparation for abandoning the base to the advancing enemy. Far East Air Forces flew 958 combat sorties, a one-day record. On 4 January, for the third time in six months, Seoul changed hands as CCF troops moved in. The last USAF aircraft left Kimpo Airfield. On 14 January, Chinese Communist forces reached their furthest extent of advance into South Korea with the capture of Wonju. The following is from AFHRA: Jan 1951.

Early in January, the powerful new offensive by Chinese Communist and North Korean forces drove UN forces out of Seoul and nearby Kimpo and Suwon Airfields. The UN and communist ground forces fought a see-saw battle for the crossroads city of Wonju in north central South Korea. By mid-January, the enemy offensive had stalled on a line between Pyontaek on the west coast and Samchok on the east coast, partly because the UN Command retained air superiority over the front. By the end of the month, UN forces had launched a counter-offensive, forcing the enemy northward toward Seoul.

With the loss of Kimpo and Suwon Airfields, the U.S. Air Force moved most jet fighters to bases in Japan. From there, USAF F-86s did not have the range to reach the front easily, much less the MiG-infested skies of northwestern Korea. After almost two weeks out of combat, the Fifth Air Force returned some Sabres to Korea to test their capabilities in new missions of armed reconnaissance and close air support. These flew air to ground missions from Taegu, where F-80s and F-84s also continued to operate. communist jet fighters remained at their Yalu River bases and for the first nineteen days of January only occasionally challenged U.S. aircraft over North Korea. Lacking the range and air-to-ground weapons, enemy jets did not provide any air support for communist ground troops. Despite severe winter weather that sometimes curtailed sorties during January, Fifth Air Force conducted extremely destructive close air support missions for UN forces, killing or wounding an estimated 18,750 enemy troops. C-47s embarked on new roles-dropping flares in support of B-26 and F-82 night raids and serving as communications platforms to connect the Tactical Air Control Center, TACPs, and T-6 Mosquito airplanes.

FEAF Bomber Command raided enemy marshalling yards, airfields, and supply centers, dropping more than 6700 tons of bombs on over 720 sorties. Superfortress crews occasionally struck bridges with radio-guided bombs but largely avoided northwestern Korea, where they might have encountered scores of MiG-15s. In an air campaign intended to burn and destroy key North Korean cities, Bomber Command B-29s raided Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, with huge formations dropping incendiary bombs on the city. Targets of other major incendiary raids in North Korea included Hamhung, Kaesong, and Komusan. By the end of the month, FEAF Bomber Command, with a total force of about one hundred B-29s, was launching about twenty-four Superfortresses daily, rotating missions among the 19th, 98th, and 307th Bombardment Groups. The command also initiated B-29 night harassment attacks against North Korean cities during January.

Deprived of bases in the Seoul area, FEAF Combat Cargo Command could not easily respond to increased UN demands for airlift caused by rapid unit withdrawals and blocking of surface supply lines by heavy snow. Near the front lines, Eighth Army engineers bulldozed airstrips at Wonju and Chungju for the cargo landings, but Wonju fell into enemy hands, and frozen mud caused C-46 accidents at Chungju. The C-119s, which were too large to land at these airstrips, dropped supplies to UN forces in north central South Korea. Depending primarily on C-47 and C-119 airplanes, Combat Cargo Command delivered more than 14,000 tons of equipment and supplies; it also evacuated 10,000 combat casualties in South Korea during the first three weeks of January. Search and rescue units flew 452 missions, evacuating 112 critically wounded patients and rescuing sixteen soldiers from behind enemy lines. The Fifth Air Force’s Boat Section conducted forty-two missions.
On 15 January when no enemy troops appeared on the “Dog” line, General Ridgway sent a regimental combat tem northward to feel out the enemy’s strength. This task force “Wolfhound” probed to Osan before it exchanged shots with a fleeting detachment of hostile troops, and on the following day “Wolfhound” got almost to Suwon before it was finally halted by enemy emplacements. The tactical aircrewmen who supported “Wolfhound” returned from missions with strange reports: they claimed to have inflicted heavy casualties upon bodies of enemy troops moving northward out of Suwon. Evidently the Reds had overreached their grasp and were withdrawing rrom extended positions to regroup, respupply and rearm. (Source: USAF in Korea, Robert F. Futrell, pp281-282)

17 Jan 51 Eighth Army reentered Suwon. This was the most favorable entry in Eighth Army’s journal since the Chinese intervention in the war in late November 1950. (Source: Chronology data)

UN Forces Retake Seoul (February-March 1951) 10 Feb 51– Eighth Army units retook Inchon and Kimpo airfield. UN patrols entered Seoul. (Source: Chronology data)

In the west the U.S. I and IX Corps gradually seized the area up to the Han River, except for one enemy foothold between Seoul and Yangp’yong. By February 18th combat patrols confirmed that Chinese and North Korean troops along the entire central front were withdrawing. General Ridgway then began a general advance (Operation KILLER) by the IX and X Corps to pursue the enemy. By the end of the month the Chinese foothold below the Han River had collapsed. With the approval of General Douglas MacArthur, the UNC commander, Ridgway continued his attack north by launching Operation RIPPER on 7 March. The objective was a line designated Idaho just south of the 38th Parallel. On the night of 14?5 March, UN patrols moved into a deserted Seoul. By the end of the month Ridgway’s troops had reached the Idaho line.

One group that made the advance was the 65th Engineer Combat Battalion. When the unit fell back in January 1951, they had blown the bridge at Osan-ni where the Chinwi River crossed the Main Supply Route 1 (MSR-1) just north of the present Osan AB (K-55). When they were “bugging out” from Seoul with the Chinese on their heels in Jan 1951, they thought they were leaving Korea so they did a thorough job in their demolition. Now upon returning in Feb 1951, they had to figure out how to reconstruct the bridge.

3. Causeway at Osan
Lt. Sam D. Starobin, S2, 65th Engineer Combat Battalion

During the withdrawal of November 1950-January 1951, the 25th Infantry Division withdrew across the Han River at Seoul and continued south on the main road as far as Chonan. At Osan we crossed the Chinwi River and there the 65th Engineer Combat Battalion blew the bridge. We believed we were withdrawing from Korea and we did thorough work on our demolitions.

The bridge at Osan was a 28-foot, two-lane, four-span, concrete structure. The abutments were fifteen feet high. The bridge was demolished by blowing alternate piers and the south abutment. This left a saw-toothed appearance.

Four weeks after we had destroyed this bridge we were back to it and were faced with the problem of crossing the Chinwi River. Osan was built up to the bank of the river, which prevented us from building a bypass alongside the bridge. We had to go east of the town with a detour, then ford the river upstream.

Our new bypass was not satisfactory. It lengthened the route by more than a mile and the river bed gave us a great deal of trouble. The spongy clay was frozen several inches deep, but the constant movement of our heavy vehicles over it soon broke this crust and the vehicles bogged down. We had to move the bypass several times.

Sketch of Bridge (Before/After)
We did not feel justified in expending materials or labor to make this bypass permanent and we feared high water would make it useless. We didn’t have 280 feet of bridging, and a shorter bridge would have to cross the spongy river bed. The battalion S3 (Major Joseph Pessa), the CO of Company A (Capt. Richard F. McAdoo) and I held a conference at the bridge site. We concluded it would be more practical to build a new bridge than to repair the damaged one. But we also found that the deck of the old concrete bridge was adequate for a causeway.

Company A placed four hundred pounds of TNT kicker charge to blow piers 1 and 3, and the north abutment. The explosions were simultaneous.

After the site cleared we could see that our calculations were accurate and that the bridge had dropped as planned. The concrete deck of the old bridge now formed a causeway over the banks and stream some four feet above the ground. There was plenty of room underneath for the river to flow at low stage.

Within six hours of our conference traffic was rolling across the newcauseway. There was no limit on tonnage on this structure, but it was limited to one-lane traffic.

During the heavy spring rains several other bridges along the route were washed out. I know that this one was functioning perfectly as late as April. The river might have gone over it later, but it could never be washed away.

We used this system of stream crossing several times later. It always worked. (SITE NOTE: They were correct that at low stage, it was passable, but at high water, the bridge was covered with water and impassable. This bridge remained in use until the 1980s when it was replaced when the expanded highway was built.) (Source: PART I Corps of Engineers, 3. Causeway at Osan (pp14-16) — from Combat Support in Korea, John G. Westover (P/O Center of Military History Online Collection
Fourth Chinese Campaign (April 1951) The question now was whether to cross the 38th Parallel again. On 20 March the Joint Chiefs of Staff had notified General MacArthur that President Harry S. Truman was preparing to announce a willingness to negotiate an end to the conflict with the North Koreans and the Chinese, an announcement that would be issued before any advance above the 38th Parallel. MacArthur preempted that announcement by issuing his own offer to end hostilities, but one that included a threat to cross the parallel. President Truman never released his statement, concluding, however unhappily, that perhaps MacArthur’s ultimatum would pressure the enemy to the negotiating table. He also left the decision on crossing the 38th Parallel to tactical considerations. Consequently, when Ridgway received intelligence about enemy preparations for an expected spring offensive, he began a new attack, with MacArthur’s approval, in early April. The objective was a line designated Kansas about ten miles above the 38th Parallel. By the 9th the U.S. I and IX Corps, and the ROK I Corps on the east coast, had reached that line, and the U.S. X Corps and the ROK III Corps were nearing it. The I and IX Corps then continued their attack beyond Kansas. At the same time, on 11 April, President Truman relieved MacArthur after the UNC commander said he would welcome the use of Nationalist Chinese forces since there could be “no substitute for victory” in Korea. Ridgway replaced MacArthur, and on 14 April Lt. Gen. James A. Van Fleet assumed command of the Eighth Army.

Eight days later four Chinese army groups and two North Korean corps began the enemy’s spring offensive, attacking most heavily in the west, with a major focus on recapturing Seoul. Withdrawing in stages to previously prepared defenses several miles north of Seoul, General Van Fleet finally stopped the advance. On 15 May the enemy attacked again. Van Fleet had expected another advance on Seoul, but the brunt of the assault was in the east-central area. By repositioning units and using unrelenting artillery fire, he stopped the attack on 20 May after the enemy had penetrated thirty miles. To prevent the Chinese and North Koreans from regrouping, Van Fleet immediately sent the Eighth Army forward. Meeting light resistance, the Eighth Army was just short of the Kansas line by 31 May. The next day Van Fleet sent part of his force farther north, to a line designated Wyoming in the west-central area known as the Iron Triangle. By mid-June the Eighth Army was in control of both the Kansas line and the Wyoming bulge.

Given this strong defensive position, Van Fleet was ordered to hold and fortify it while Washington waited for the Chinese and North Koreans to offer to negotiate an armistice. The enemy in turn used this lull to regroup and to build defenses opposite the Eighth Army. The days settled down to patrols and small clashes. On 23 June, Jacob Malik, the Soviet Union’s delegate to the United Nations, called for talks on a cease-fire and armistice. When the People’s Republic of China endorsed Malik’s statement, President Truman authorized General Ridgway to arrange the talks. After a series of radio messages, the first armistice conference was scheduled for 10 July in the town of Kaesong. The time of large-scale fighting was over.

Armistice Talks (July 1951) Armistice talks began at Kaesong on 10 July 1951. North and South Korea were willing to fight on, but after twelve months of large-scale but indecisive conflict, their Cold War supporters뾲he People뭩 Republic of China and the Soviet Union on one side, the United States and its UN allies on the other뾥ad concluded it was not in their respective interests to continue. The chief negotiator for the UN was American Vice Adm. C. Turner Joy; his counterpart was Lt. Gen. Nam Il, the chief of staff of the North Korean People뭩 Army. At the first session it was agreed that military operations could continue until an armistice agreement was actually signed. The front lines remained relatively quiet, though, as the opposing sides adopted a cautious watch-and-wait stance. (Source: Center of Military History: Korean War)

Refugee Problems Refugee problems were a primary concern. Not only were millions of North Koreans fleeing south, but the populace in general was fleeing the North Korean onslaught. In Pusan, there was a huge refugee problem as makeshift camps were set up.

After the outbreak of hostilities, the war effort and relief work submerged all other considerations. The military forces were concerned with the prevention of conditions among the civilian population which might lead to disease, starvation, and unrest. In addition to military assistance from many member states of the United Nations, aid for civilian relief purposes was also made available. The United Nations Civil Assistance Command (UNCACK), later redesignated as the Korean Civil Assistance Comand (KCAK). Thus from the start the United States, which was acting as the Unified Command under the resolutions of the United nations, played the leading role in adminstering economic as well as military assictance.

UNCACK and KCAK, with headquarters in Pusan, had teams in all the important provincial centers, extended one by one as the Communists were pushed northwards, until they covered the whole of the Republic’s territory. In cooperation with the local Korean officials, they were remarkably successful in preventing widespread starvation or the serious epidemic diseases normally typical of refugee conditions. Thousands of tons of foodstuffs and huge quantities of clothing were distributed to the evacuees; millions of persons were vacinated and injected with anti-cholera and anti-typhus vaccine; refugee camps were set up and housing provided. (Source: The Republic of Korea, W.E. Reeve, 1963, pp108-109)

War Time Economy It is impossible to escape the conclusion that certain policies and actions of the authorities, both Korean and those of the United Nations Command, went to aggravate the problems faced by the Korean War economy. One of the major contributory causes of the hyper-inflation, for instance, was the method of financing the local expenditure incurred by the United Nations forces.

In July 1950 an agreement was signed requiring the South Korean Government should provide Korean currency to the Commanding General of the U.N. forces. Nothing was said in this agreement about repayment, and a quarrel over the won conversion rate had the result that until August 1952, foreign exchange was NOT made available to the Korean Government in repayment except fo one installment in 1951, coverng some 63 billion won. By that time, the vast sum of 739 billion won had been advanced — a sum over eleven times the total note issue at the beginning of the war. In other words, the UN was borrowing money, but not repaying it back — and this was compounded by Rhee wanting the money to be repaid to be more than the going-rate.

It was not until just before the end of hostilities that the disagreement arising from Rhee’s insistence on over-valuing the won was, for the time being, resolved with the repayment of $86 million then made in full and final settlement of the outstanding advances, and arrangements made that all future drawings of local currency by the UN forces should be promptly repaid. These payments for local expenditures of UN forces together with US offshore purchases contined to represent Korea’s largest source of foreign currency earnings, far exceeding the value of visible exports well into the 1970s.

On the Korean side, attempts were made to curb the inflationary tide under extremely difficult conditions, for instance, by slashing many intems of non-defense budget expenditure. But some other actions contributed to inflation, such as the bank loands granted to cover deficits of vested government enterprises. In the three years of the Korean War, the money supply increased about 17 times, retail prices 22 times, and wholesale prices 18 times. Barter transactions were increasingly resorted to and in the general disarray of economic life and organizational machinery there grew a degree of corruption much greater than was traditional in Korea. (Source: The Republic of Korea, W.E. Reeve, 1963, pp109-110)

Songtan Area Background

Seojong-ni Background

Osan AB (K-55) Background

American Off-base Bar Culture

Roads Surrounding K-55

Songtan History:

Songtan Background Data

Songtan History: 1952-1979

Songtan History: 1980-Present

Osan AB and the Songtan Area: Chronological History

Local Area History from Prehistoric times up to 1945

Osan AB and the Songtan Area: 1945-1951

Osan AB and the Songtan Area: 1952

Osan AB and the Songtan Area: 1953-1954

Osan AB and the Songtan Area: 1955-1959

Osan AB and the Songtan Area: 1960-1964

Osan AB and the Songtan Area: 1965-1969

Osan AB and the Songtan Area: 1970-1974

Osan AB and the Songtan Area: 1975-1979

Osan AB and the Songtan Area: 1980-1984

Osan AB and the Songtan Area: 1985-1989

Osan AB and the Songtan Area: 1990-1994

Osan AB and the Songtan Area: 1995-1999

Osan AB and the Songtan Area: 2000-2004

Osan AB and the Songtan Area: 2005

Korea-wide Events: 2005

Osan AB and the Songtan Area: 2006

Pyeongtaek Area and Korea Military Events: 2006

Korea-wide Events: 2006

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Acknowledgement: Special thanks to Jack Terwiel, Capt, USAF (Ret) of the Osan Retired Activities Office for photos of base (past and present) — Dan Klopten, Robert Furrer, Robert Evilsizor, Ron Freedman, Harry Tezlaf and Ken Shallenbarger. Special thanks to Jackie Turner, 7th AF Historian, and John Okonski, 51st FW Historian, for their assistance with photos and guidance on the history of Osan AB. Thanks to Curly Knepp, Maj, USAF (Ret) for his photos and direction in uncovering the history of the area. Thanks to Don Tomajan for his comments, photos and assistance on the EAB history in 1952-1954. Thanks to Bob Spiwak for his narratives and photos of life at Osan AB in 1953.

Special thanks to Mr. Oh Sun-soo, Victoria Hotel, for his information on the early development of Songtan. Special thanks to Mr. Jim Price, AIG Insurance, for his sharing of his experiences during his long residence in Songtan. Special thanks to Mr. Yi Kyong Chu, Kasey Lee’s Tailors, for his help and guidance in assembling this history. Special thanks to Mr. Son Kwang-chil, Hanyang Kalbi, and Mr. Yi N.K, Korea Hotel, for providing information of the early days of the Milwal-dong area. Thanks to Mr. Kim Sang-do, Electronic Repair Shop, and Mr. Jeong Tae-ho, Young Chon Hotel, for their help in providing information of the early days of the Young Chon Alley area. Thanks to Mr. Kwon Oh-hoon, Dong Sung Realty, for his help on the local area history. Special thanks to Mr. Kim Jae-won, Asia Hotel for his help in providing a wealth of information on the local area.

Special thanks to Ms. Jin Dal-lae and other staff members of the Jisan-dong Ward Office for taking the time to research and provide historical materials on Songtan and Pyongtaek City. Thanks to the Shinjang 1-dong Ward Office for taking time to provide information on the roads in the area. Thanks to the Seojong-dong Ward Office staff and Chief of the ward Office, Choi Yun-su, for their help in providing maps to unravel the confusing boundary issues. Much of the information on Pyongtaek City and the Songtan area was extracted from the Pyeongtaek City History, Pyeongtaek Si Sa.

Thanks to the Songbuk Elementary School for permission to use their photos from their private collection. Thanks to staff of the Songshin Elementary, Taegwang Middle School and Taegwang High School staff for their help in their histories. Special thanks to the Mr. Kim Jong-youp, Vice-Principal of the Hyomyung Middle School and Ms. Choi Jeong-min for their assistance with the history of Hyomyung Middle School and High School. Special thanks to the Mr. Park Hyun-jong, Vice Principal of the Seojong Elementary School, and the staff including Ms. Choi Yun-young, Mr. Kim Hyong-ill and Ms. Pae Eun-hui, for their assistance in assembling the history of Seojong Elementary School.
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View of Osan AB (USAF Photo)

THIS IS A WORK IN-PROGRESS AND FACTS ARE BEING ADDED/DELETED DURING THIS PROCESS. THIS IS NOT A COMPLETED HISTORY.

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Songtan History
The community surrounding Osan Air Base is itself rich in history and tradition. Evidence of rice growing in the area dates back to around 800 B.C. Because of the areas abundance of water the flat plains became the prized area for rice crops. The first organized group in the area was the Samhan (Three Han Federation). One of the strongest of the Mahan group rose to prominence over the others as the Paekje and controlled the area. The Korguro swept down and pushed the Paekje down to Puyo and took over the area during the Three Kingdom Period. Later the Shilla pushed out the Koguryo and united the peninsula under the Unifed Shilla Period. Then the Koryo dynasty was founded setting up their capital in Kaesong and forced the capitulation of the Shilla and Paekje. Finally the Chosun Dynasty in 1392 set up their capital in Seoul. Taxes in the form of rice tribute was sent to Seoul from the area. There are also stories related that charcoal was also sent as tribute as only charcoal could be burned inside the Seoul city walls in the Chosun Dynasty. (See Brief Korean History of the Local Area.)

This history attempts to follow the development of the community and its symbiotic relationship with the base from the 1950s through the 1980s. After the 1980s, the impacts of the Miracle of the Han reached the area. The economic impact of Osan AB on the local community was lessened. In the 1990s, the Shinjang Mall area was designated as Special Tourism Zone recognizing the impact of Osan AB more as a source of income from tourism rather than a major employer in the area. In the 1990s, the development of an agricultural-urban city base of Pyeongtaek City was established with the surrounding areas being developed with national, regional and local industrial parks — and Songtan was incorporated into Pyongtaek City. By the 2000s, the impacts of Osan AB on the local economy was still important, but no longer the major source of employment as businesses and factories moved into the area.

Songtan History Supposedly, there stood a village called “Che Yok Dong” on the site of the present Shinjang area. A king of the Shilla Dynasty (57 BC – AD 935) bestowed the name on the village, which means tax and labor exempt. It was not an empty gesture, the royalty was so impressed with the village leaders’ honesty, fairness, and loyalty to their subjects and Korea that the inhabitants were exempted from paying taxes or working for the state. (Source: 51st FW Historian site) According to the 51st FW site, “Chicol-ni”, the name of the village outside the Main Gate in the 1950s, was a derivative of the “Che Yok Gaol.” (NOTE: In the Songtan.org: Songtan History, Chicol-ni (Chicol Village) is NOT mentioned as one of the original towns near Osan’s Main Gate. The towns mentioned are Taehyeon-dong (near Songbuk Farmer’s Market); Kunjang-maul (near the end of the runway); Namsan-teo (Namsan Village); and Milwal-maul/Shinjang-dong/Pokchang-maul (after the Korean War). We do not dispute the existence of Chicol Village, but it appears to have been only a minor village in the Chosun period located at the edge of Namsan-teo, Jaeyok-dong, Tanhyeon-myeon, Jinwi-hyeon.)

However, we are skeptical of this story. Long-time residents claim they have never heard of the story. (Source: Verbal Conversation Kalani O’Sullivan and Mr. Chae Won-ho and Mr. Oh Sun-soo in July 2005.) In addition, in the Pyeongtaek History, Pyeongtaek Si Sa, we find no reference to this village story. However, we do find a reference under Shinjang-dong that up to 1960, the administrative area was known as “Jae Yok-dong” as an administrative unit for multiple small hamlets in the area. (Source: Pyeongtaek History, Pyeongtaek Si Sa.) (SITE NOTE: There are different English spellings of “Jae Yok” on road signs in Shinjang-1 dong: “Jae eok Gil” (road) or “Jeyeok Gil” (road).)

There is a story about Jaeyok Village that tells a story that during the Chosun period in Kung Jungjong’s reign (1506?544), Jaeyok was founded near Namsan-tau in 1522 (16th year of Jungjong’s reign). King Jungjong established political reform, rectifying the wrongs of the previous administration. Jungjong also practiced Hyangyak, a method of self-government in the districts, which still applies to modern Korean governance today. During the Gimyo Purge of the Scholars in 1519, Chae Jang-soon, a member of a group of scholars pushing for innovative social changes, was forced to commit suicide because of false accusations brought against his group by conservative elements in the court. He was buried in Namsan-teo. 35 years later in 1559 during King Sonjo’s reign, Chae Jang-soon was exhonerated of the charges and posthumously promoted to Minister. Yi Yul-gok (1536-1584) came to Namsan-teo and told to the residents to protect the Namsan-teo area to honor Chae Jang-soon. As a result the area was named, Jaeyok in honor of Mr. Chae. Associated with this was the exemption from tribute. (Source: Songtan.org: Songtan History: Hangul Translation).) (NOTE: We have not been able to locate the grave of Chae Jang-soon nor does any of the local population we have talked to know of its location.) (NOTE: Yul-Gok is the pseudonym of the great philosopher Yi I (1536-1584 AD), nicknamed “the Confucius of Korea.” See TKDTutor: Yi Yul-gok for details on his life. Yi Yul-gok is depicted on the Korean 5,000 won note with Ojukheon, his memorial shrine in his birthplace in Gangneung, Gangwon-do, on the reverse.)
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Origin of the Name “Songtan”
The Chinese characters for “Songtan” means song = “pine” and tan = “charcoal.” At the same time, the area to the north-west is known as “Seotan” meaning “West Pine.” At this time, we do not know the specific origins of “Songtan.” The most reasonable is the explanation was provided by Oh Sun-soo and Yi Kyong Chu (Kasey Lee)

Song (pine) In the Japanese colonial period, the Japanese reforestation center was in Suwon and its efforts to reforest Korea was considered a major success. According to American Military Government in Korea by E. Grant Meade, prior to the Japanese colonial period, the Koreans in the latter part of the Chosun dynasty had denuded their forests. Under the Japanese the Korean forests were again replanted as part of the Japanese Public Works system. The Public Works was a highly centralized activity under the Japanese regime with the heads of the local branches looking to the Province for orders as they were not under the direction of the district magistrate.

One of the Japanese Public Works successes was the forestry station in the Suwon area. Unlike other Public Works areas that were dominated by the Japanese, the forestry projects personnel were mostly Korean. Thus in one sense, the forestry was one area that Koreans were dominant and probably an area of pride for those involved in the reforestation projects. During the Japanese colonial period the reforestation project in Suwon used the hills of the surrounding areas as nurserys for seedlings or as tree farms to harvest the pine cones for seeds.

Though the low-lying areas were almost devoid of trees, the tops of the hills were covered with the hardy pitch pine (Pinus Rigida). The Pitch Pine was the pine of choice for reforestation because of its ability to withstand drought conditions. Because of the lack of ground cover needed to trap the water in a water shed, the rainfall simply ran off the hills causing repeated flooding in the flood plain area. However, the saplings root systems of the stunted three-four foot saplings aiding in the prevention of massive erosion.

The pitch pine prefers sun and moist well drained soil but will tolerate a wide range of soils including poor, dry soil. Important to reforestation of coastal areas was that the pine is salt tolerant. It is found on typically poor, dry, sandy soil that is often too sterile for most other trees, and usually found in the company of gray birch, and scrub oak. Growth is extremely variable; short and poorly formed on poor sites, but can be a straight, medium sized tree reachin 80 feet tall on better sites. Seed cone maturity is in 2 years — a relatively short time for maturity.

However, as World War II dragged on, any Japanese advances in reforestation were wiped out as the wood resources went to the war effort.

After the WWII, the desparate need for heating fuel caused the Koreans to denude the hills to survive the harsh Korean winters. A common photo in the Occupation and post-Korean War years, was the farmer with an A-frame (chige) on his back filled with twigs and materials for firewood. Trees were a rarity in the densely populated areas of Korean cities and towns. In 1949, one of the first laws of the First Republic was the outlawing of cutting down any tree.

After the Korean War due to their rapid growth and potential to halt erosion on the denuded slopes of Korea, pitch pine and acacia were planted across Korea. (Source: Osan AB: Conservation.) After the Korean war, a law was promulgated that prevented the cutting down of any tree over 15 feet in height. The Military Government during the Occupation years reestablished the reforestation programs of the Japanese — and like the Japanese Public Works program — it was a success as well.

Photos in 1971 of a hilltop in Jinwi overlooking the Chinwi River at north end of base indicate that the reforestation with the pitch pine had taken place throughout the area. The trees appeared to be about three-feet tall. The irregular spacing of the saplings in the photo indicate that the trees were propagating naturally instead of through a reforestation effort — with spaces gaps in the original plantings due plant demise. As the plants reach maturity in two years, the plantings on the Jinwi hills were planted much earlier. Around Seojong-ni there are patches of scrub pine (pitch pine) on the hills surround the city. However, these are only found on the hill tops — not at the base of the hills which were cleared for the rice fields. (NOTE: This same hill in 2005 is now covered with a variety of trees and other vegetation. The lower portions have a thick growth of a mixture of trees (cottonwood, acacia and other species) with a mass of tangled vines between the trees.)

(L) Pine Reforestation (R) Pine in foreground of view of Chinwi River overflowing

During the Korean War, the Koreans would gather up all the pine needles and twigs from the trees, but they did not cut the trees. Not only was cutting of trees illegal, it was simply common-sense. The dried twigs from the trees were perpetual, but if you cut the tree down you had warmth only for a day. Bob Furrer noted that around his Taejon site, the villagers would gather the twigs under the trees, but would not cut the branches or tree itself.

Study of Pinus Rigida in the 1980s shows the study of the pine tree at plantations in 5 Kyonggi-do areas (Yongin, Songtan, Anseong, Yeoju, and Yangdong). Thus even today the Songtan is considered as a prime pine tree reforestation area for growing seedlings.

NOTE: The pitch pine and acacia are the two dominant forest types in the Songtan area with chestnuts also found in the area. Acacia trees (acacia albida) are found in arid or semi-arid areas of the hillsides to prevent erosion from the recurrent flooding of the area, but was also planted along the roadsides especially near bridges to prevent the shoulders from eroding. Along the highways in the local area, one can see acacias along the roadside and in the less populated areas of the hills surrounding Songtan. The acacia was normally planted on the semi-arid slopes.

However, the fast-growing cottonwoods were introduced along the roadsides next to rice paddies in the late 1950s. Cottonwoods typically grow on the edges of rivers and streams and can grow to 100 feet in height. In the 1960s, the fast-growing Norfolk pine imported from Australia was used to control the erosion on the mountainsides. Also the fast growing weeping willows were imported for use along reservoirs as it was aesthetically pleasing, but also good for preventing soil erosion on the banks.

In 1975, the national reforestation program was granted to the Chonju Paper Co. — now Hansol Paper Co. Ltd. — and the lush green forests one sees in Korea are due to this effort. When driving down to the Cholla areas, many foreigners note that the lush forests covering the mountains look somewhat strange but they can’t pinpoint what it is. The strangeness is because the trees are evenly spaced and the growth seems unnatural. However, the reforestation has been a success.
Tan (charcoal) The explanation of the meaning of the charcoal comes from the name of the rise as one enters Songtan. The name for the area was “Sutgokae.” The word “Sut-Ko-Gae” in Hangul (Korean) where sut = “charcoal” and kogae = “hill or rise.” This can be retranslated into the Chinese ideograms to mean “Tan Hyeon” where Tan = “charcoal” and “Hyeon” = “hill.”

In the Chosun Dynasty, the Seotan and Songtan area were engaged in charcoal production. The Tanhyeon-dong area (Charcoal Hill) near the present Songbuk Farmers’ Market area, was a rest stop along the main road from Seoul. In 1756 census, Tanhyeon-myeon, Jinwi-hyeon showed 603 people engaged in the making of charcoal. There were large stands of pine trees in the area at the time. This area provided charcoal to Seoul as only charcoal could be burned within the city walls. (Source: Songtan.org: Songtan History: Hangul Translation)

According to Songtan.org, “Ssutkogae” comes from the Japanese colonial period when there were about 300 farm families selling charcoal for a living in the Seotan and Songtan area. According to this source, “ssutkogae” means “the top of the hill which makes charcoal” or “charcoal rise.” (Source: Songtan.org: Songtan History: Hangul Translation)

According to Oh Sun-soo, the name was first applied to the rise where Route 1 from Osan City now goes straight ahead over a rise and stretched to the Jinsan Park area (Jwa-dong area). Later it was applied to specifically to an area along the ridge line in Jwa-dong where black clubs sprouted. (Source: Verbal conversation Kalani O’Sullivan and Chong Kyu-sok, 21 Jul 2005.) However, according to Songtan.org, “Ssutkogae” became “Sukgokage” by the end of the Korean War due to common usage. (Source: Songtan.org: Songtan History: Hangul Translation)

According to Yi Kyong Chu (Kasey Lee), there were supposedly many kilns used to remove the water from wood and create the deep black charcoal in the Jisan-dong area. This area started where the present Route 1 from Osan City goes up over a rise. Prior to 1985, this rise then went down into a crescent shaped area of rice fields and swampy land. The kilns were supposedly located on the interior slopes to the west and extended from where the present Express Bus Terminal is to the ridgetop overlooking the Shinjang area. The slope stretched horizontally from the ridgeline in Songbuk-dong where it starts to rise to the Jisan Park area. (Source: Verbal conversation Kalani O’Sullivan and Yi Kyong-chu, owner of Kasey Lee Tailors, 25 Jul 2005.) According to Mr. Kwon Oh-hoon the area near Jangmi Apartment Road was also known to contain charcoal kilns using the acacia and pine trees in the area leading to the area being known as Sutkogae (Charcoal rise). According to Mr. Kwon, the Jisan Park Hill (Songtan Park) contained a village called Sutkonjang-ni (Charcoal factory village) or Sutma in the 1950s-1960s. Supposedly the charcoal kilns were near the Jisan Elementary School area on the portion of the park close to the Jangmi Apartment Road. (Source: Verbal Conversation Kalani O’Sullivan with Mr. Kwon Oh-hoon, owner of Dongsung Realty, on 23 Aug 2005.)

Supposedly the area of Jeomchon Village was filled with pottery kilns. This village was located on the slope that leads up towards the present Songtan City Hall Branch Office. According to the Songtan.org: Songtan History, a Mr. Hwang Kum-seok came to the town in 1920 to make and sell pottery. Soon many people came to the area and made all variety of pottery from Kimchi Pots to bowls. (Source: Songtan.org: Songtan History: Hangul Translation) (NOTE: It was also during this time period that the term “Ssutkogae” (Charcoal Rise) came into use.)

Kim Jae-won remembers walking past the Jeomchon area on his way to Songbuk Elementary School and seeing many kilns in the area. He suspected that these had been converted to pottery manufacturing after the use of charcoal was replaced by charcoal briquettes — cylindrical charcoal with holes in the center made of pulverized charcoal in the late 1960s. (Source: Verbal Conversation with Mr. Kim Jae-won, owner of Asia Hotel, on 26 Sep 2005.) In the late 1970s, Songtan housing expanded into this area and the kilns shut down and people forced to relocate.

The existence of kilns in the local area would be corroborated by the existence of bathhouses that operated in the Chong-mun up (Front Gate Town) using this charcoal to provide hot water for the “steam houses” (saunas). In 1953, a bathhouse was started by Jeong Tae Ho near the communal well in Chicol Village. (NOTE: This was the origin of the Young Chon Hotel.) Soon other bathhouses sprang up as the population swelled.

NOTE: Some mispronunciations of “Sutgokae” (charcoal hill) created some misinformation to be spread.
Supposedly prior to the area being commonly called “Chicoville” (Chicol Village) by the Americans, it was referred to as “Sugogi” (meaning “cow meat” from the American bastardized pronunciation of “Sutgoge”). (Source: Verbal conversation with Jim Price, Jun 2005.)

Some Koreans mispronounced “Sut” as a strong sound and it came out as “suk.” “Suk” stands for a medicinal plant (related to the dandelion family) used in rice cake coloring (green) and meat sauces. As “kogae” means “a rise,” the name was interpreted to mean a small rise covered with the “sut” plant. (Source: Verbal conversation Kalani O’Sullivan and Chong Kyu-sok, 21 Jul 2005, and Yi Kyong-chu, 25 Jul 2005.) Some Korean people interviewed knew that this name applied to the rise area as one enters Songtan, but thought it meant that the rise at one time was covered with the herb “suk.” None of these people made the linkage between both “sut” and “tan” both meaning charcoal.

The Shinjang-dong House Office had just been established in 1962 in its present location at the top of the hill in the Mokcheon area. In 1963, Songtan-myeon (district) was to be upgraded to an eup (town). According to Oh Sun-soo, former owner of the GQ Tailor and owner of the Victoria Hotel, when the area was to be upgraded to a “town” (eup), meetings were held amongst the area leaders and there was much discussion on finding a suitable name for the new town. The name “Sutkogae” was considered. However, because the Chinese ideographs could be mispronounced as “Ssutkogae” which metaphorically means sex between a man and woman, “Sutkogae” was rejected. None of the other names seemed appropriate as they were relatively small villages and not representative of the town. As there was no consensus on a name, “Songtan” was accepted as the name of the town. (Source: Verbal conversation with Mr. Oh Sun-soo, 21 July 2005.)

However, this is refuted as the names of Korean towns were ALWAYS based on the Chinese ideographs meaning “Tanhyeon” (Charcoal Rise) or “Songtan” (Pine Charcoal) would have been more appropriate as a town’s name choice. (Source: Verbal Conversation with Kim Jae-won, owner of Asia Hotel, on 26 Sep 2005.)

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Old Villages of Songtan
The following are short descriptions of the old villages in the Songtan area dating back to the Chosun dynasty in some cases. Sources of information are from varied sources. The translations from Songtan.org: Songtan History. We apologize that the translations from the Songtan History are not full translations as some of it deals with items that were not relevant to our history. We also take full responsibility for any unwitting inaccuracies injected into the translations to English.

Songtan (2002) (Pyeongtaek Si Sa)

K-55 (Osan Air Base)

Chokbong Village — (NO LONGER EXISTS) Near present Osan AB BX. Village relocated when base constructed in 1952. (Source: 931st EAG, Overview Drawing, Aug 51.) Jeuk Bong-ri (Source: History of Osan Air Base, Republic of Korea, Osan Air Base Historical Office, April 1999 and GlobalSecurity.org: Osan AB.)
Yari Village — (NO LONGER EXISTS) On the north side of base near sand pit during construction. Yari relocated when the base perimeter road constructed in 1953. (Source: 931st EAG, Overview Drawing, Aug 51.) (Source: History of Osan Air Base, Republic of Korea, Osan Air Base Historical Office, April 1999 and GlobalSecurity.org: Osan AB.)
Shin-Yari Village — (NO LONGER EXISTS) On the north side of base near sand pit during construction. Yari relocated when the base perimeter road constructed in 1953. (Source: 931st EAG, Overview Drawing, Aug 51.) (Source: History of Osan Air Base, Republic of Korea, Osan Air Base Historical Office, April 1999 and GlobalSecurity.org: Osan AB.)
Chang Deung-ri Village — (NO LONGER EXISTS) This village relocated to make way for the 5th AF construction and construction of facilities for a second wing that never arrived. (Source: 931st EAG, Overview Drawing, Aug 51.) The Ginko Tree on the Golf Course names a village of Eunhaeng-junge which may be the same as this village. (Source: History of Osan Air Base, Republic of Korea, Osan Air Base Historical Office, April 1999 and GlobalSecurity.org: Osan AB.)

Songtan (2002) (Pyeongtaek Si Sa)

Shinjang 1-dong

Kujang-teo Village — (Near the Doolittle Gate) During the Chosun dynasty, it was the marketplace for the Jinwi area. “Ku-jang” means “Old-market.” (Source: Songtan History.) Currently a small village between the EOR and overrun area and the Doolittle Gate Road. (NOTE: On the Aug 51 931st EAB Overview Drawing, this is annotated as “Shinjang-ni” (New-Market Village).)
Shinjang Village — Called “Tongsang Ji Goal” Village and was a food market BEFORE the Korean War. AFTER the Korean War, it became Shinjang. (Source: Songtan History.) (See Kujang-teo, Shinjang 1-dong) (NOTE: This appears to be talking of the Jungang Open Market in the Shinjang Mall area that appeared in about 1954 as small food stalls and grew into covered alleyways in the 1960s.)
Jaeyeok Village — Founded in 1522 in the 16th year of King Jungjong’s reign. Jaeyok was founded near Namsan-tau in 1522 (16th year of Jungjong’s reign). During the Gimyo Purge of the Scholars in 1519, Chae Jang-soon, a member of a group of scholars pushing for innovative social changes, was forced to commit suicide because of false accusations brought against his group by conservative elements in the court. He was buried in Namsan-teo. 35 years later in 1559 during King Sonjo’s reign, Chae Jang-soon was exhonerated of the charges and posthumously promoted to Minister. Yi Yul-gok (1536-1584) came to Namsan-teo and told to the residents to protect the Namsan-teo area to honor Chae Jang-soon. As a result the area was named, Jaeyok in honor of Mr. Chae. Associated with this was the exemption from tribute. (Source: Songtan History.)
Namsan-teo Village — (Near Bravo Gate) Unknown where name originated. Speculation that “Wonsan” changed to “Namsan.” (Source: Songtan History.) (NOTE: See Jaeyok Village for note.)
Mokcheon Village — (Near Kyongbu Railway) Village is estimated to be 500 years old. The large Jinwi River was to the east. In the past it was noted to have a large forest and there was a wood bridge across the Jinwi River. During flood periods, wood float down the river and retrieved in the town. (Source: Songtan History.)

Shinjang 2-dong

Milwal Village — (Near Main Gate) Four roads converge in the area. In the past, the area supposedly had large stands of pine trees that were noted for its beauty in viewing the moon. “Milwal” means “Honeymoon” which would describe the feeling of viewing the moon from this area. (Source: Songtan History.) At the onset of the Korean War, during the Battle of Hill 180 the area described as devoid of trees. During the Korean War, many North Korean refugees from the Hwanghae-do settled in this area making it a mass of tightly packed houses.

Road from Milwal Road down to Prince Hotel in Shinjang 2-dong

Songweol Village — Southern part of Shinjang 2-dong. In the past, the area supposedly had large stands of pine trees that were noted for its beauty in viewing the moon. (Source: Songtan History.)

Songbuk-dong

Tanhyeon Village — In the Chosun Dynasty, the Seotan and Songtan area were engaged in charcoal production. The Tanhyeon-dong area (Charcoal Hill) near the present Songbuk Farmers’ Market area, was a rest stop along the main road from Seoul. In 1756 census, Tanhyeon-myeon, Jinwi-hyeon showed 603 people engaged in the making of charcoal. There were large stands of pine trees in the area at the time. This area provided charcoal to Seoul as only charcoal could be burned within the city walls. In Chinese ideographs, “Tanhyeon” means “Charcoal hill.” In Hangul, this equates to “Sutkogae” (Charcoal rise). (Source: Songtan History.) This area was just above the old intersection of MSR-1 to the Shinjang Mall Road — now the Mokcheon Pedestrian Underpass road. It extended from the MSR-1 in the Farmers’ Market area up to Mite Keonji Village. (NOTE: The Songbuk Farmers’ Market originated AFTER the K-55 base was built. Prior to this the 1950s, the Kujang Village (Old Market Village) at the end of the Osan AB runway was the food market place for the Jinwi area.)

Songbuk School Road heading towards Rte 304

Keonji Village — (Near Songbuk Elementary School) Built 450 years ago next to the Jisan Cheon (Stream). Near Keonji Village, there was a Yangdal Village. To the northeast of this village there was a swampy lake called, “Buk Ahweol” which abounded in fish. Dried fish was a specialty of the village. (Source: Songtan History.) There were two villages: Are Keonji-ni (Upper Keonji) and Mite Keonji-ni (Lower Keonji). (Source: Verbal Conversation with Mr. Oh Sun-soo, owner of the Victoria Hotel, on 24 Aug 2005.) Access to the village was by a dirt road that followed the Jisan Stream. This village disappeared with the construction of the apartment buildings near Songbuk Elementary School, but still shown on a Songtan area map north of Route 304 across from Songbuk Elementary School. The area called Dokguk-dong.
Magok Village — Before its name was Banghyori and located in Jinwi-hyeon. After the Korean War, it became Makgok, Panghae-dong. It was located on the backside of a mountain with a road called “Songhyun.” “Songje” was below the mountain. Soldiers tents were in an area called “Makgok Camp.” (Source: Songtan History.)

Magok Village (Pyeongtaek Times)

Jungri Village — Inside Magok Village in Panghae-dong. (Source: Songtan History.)

Panghae-dong (Pyeongtaek Times)

Panghae-dong Village — Panghyo-ri 400-500 years ago changed to Panghae-dong. Most of the people are from Kwangju branch of the Lee family. Guess that came to area in Chosun dynasty 400 years ago. (Source: Songtan History.)
Dongmak Village — Chosun period, three roads converged at this village. It was a rest stop with taverns and houses. It was first in Jinwi-hyeon, Masan-myeon. Later it was in Tahhyeon-myeon and then Songtan-myeon. (Source: Songtan History.) Located in the Burak Mountain hills. Location of Dongmak Reservoir.
Shinheung Village — Across the Mountain from Ojwa-dong and split away from Ojwa-dong to create a new village. (Source: Songtan History.)
Ojwa-dong Village — In the middle of the Chosun dynasty (Yi jo), Mr. Chae Ja-ban, a teacher, made the town. There were a long of birds (bongang) that would eat seeds from the udong tree. The area was called “Dongshil-bong.” This area has a memorial to Chae Ja-Ban (susgongun sadang) and a 5.6m gingko tree. (Source: Songtan History.) (NOTE: On boundary of Jinwi-myeon. See Chae Yu-Lim Shrine (Landmark) in Ojwa-gaol (hamlet) in Ojwa-dong Village)
Oligok Village — 300-400 years ago a Mr. Oh came and made the town. The area was called “Oh lu gok” and then was changed to “Oh li gok.” Townspeople state that because there were a lot of ducks in the stream it was called “Uri gaol.” Uncertain, but there may have been a bridge across the stream. (Source: Songtan History.) (NOTE: On the boundary of Jinwi-myeon.) (NOTE: Oligok is north of Route 304 (Songbuk School Road) on the other side of the mountain and south of road into Jinwi.)
Jijang Village — (Near Songtan Middle School) In the Koryo period in 1300 A.D. it was named Burak-man. The Jijangsa Temple is behind the Songtan Middle School up on a hill. The town was below the temple. In the Imjin War (Japanese Invasion), the temple was destroyed. Currently there is a small temple marker to mark the spot. (Source: Songtan History.) (NOTE: Hoam-sa Temple and Seongbul-sa Temple are located in the area. We cannot locate the temple marker at this time.)
Ugok Village — (In Burak Mountain) Village looks like a cow laying down. Thus it it is called “U” (cow) gok (lie down). In the Koryo period a Mr. So from Chinsan government came to the town. Villagers stated he was a bad man and the town at the time was called, “So goal” town. (Source: Songtan History.) (NOTE: Ugok reached by following Chaeyokshiseol Trail into the Burak Mountains. Along Route 304 up the Jisan Valley.)

Jisan-dong

Songcheon Village — Gogi-eup inside of Jisan-ni, Panhyun-dong. In 1970, the name changed to Songcheon. (Source: Songtan History.)
Jwadong Village — (Near Terminal Ridge Road) Called by two names: Jwaeul and Jaweol. Also called Jaeul. Mr. Chae-shi from Kangnung is purported to have made the town. (Source: Songtan History.) Aerial photos show it existed along the MSR-1 in 1952. In 1970s area commonly known as “Sutkogae.”

Jisan-dong, Sutkogae in Jwadong area

Jijang Village — (Near Jwadong Village and extends to Jeonchom Village area) Aerial photos show it existed along the MSR-1 in 1952.

Ichung-dong

Wonyichung Village (I-chung) — It was said the Chunshin was good for the King Yi chung. According to the Songtan History, Oh Dal-jae, teacher, was born here in 1609 and Jo Gwang-jo was born here in 1482. The town was made 600 years ago, but destroyed by construction of the road. Only 10 people remained in 2002. (Source: Songtan History.)
Shinli Village — Across from Ichung Village (Wonichung Village). A new town. (Source: Songtan History.) (NOTE: There is also an area in Jinwi known as “Shinli” in the vicinity of Songtan Samik Apartments in Songbuk-dong)
Dongryung Village — Monument to Oh Dal-jae and Cho Gwang-jo located here. A 1759 Map shows area as Songjanghyan. There was a military army camp at Dongryung and it was listed as a strategic location. However, this army camp has disappeared. (Source: Songtan History.)
Chilkwae Village — During the Chonsun dynasty, Mr. Han Si’s family founded the town. Magok town is across the mountain. (SEE Magok Village, Songbuk-dong) There were a lot of thieves (hinchi kogae) in the Burak Mountains. The town had a well and 7 nuti trees. Shamanist believed the trees were 7 powerful people protecting the well. The trees no longer exist, only the well. (Source: Songtan History.)

Seojong-dong

Pokchang Village — During Korean War, North Korean refugees from Hwanghaedo moved to the area. (Source: Songtan History.) Other areas of North Korean refugees settlements were Milwal-dong, Jeokbong-ni, Sageori and Shinchang-dong.

Jeokbong-ni (Pyeongtaek Times)

Sageori Village — Meeting of four roads. During Korean War, North Korean refugees from Hwanghaedo moved to the area. (Source: Songtan History.)
Jeomchon Village — In 1920 Hwang Kum-seok came to the area to make pottery to sell. Soon may people came to the area to make pottery as well. In 1970 Songtan was expanding and houses were built in the area and the people left. The grave of Cheong Hon-top in the area. (Source: Songtan History.) Kim Jae-won remembers walking to Songbuk Elementary School and passing large numbers of kilns in the area. (Source: Verbal Conversation with Kim Jae-won, owner of the Asia Hotel, on 26 Sep 2005.)

Seojong Tourism Road to City Hall from the Jeomchon area.

Seojong Village — “Seojong” means “West Well.” Supposedly there was a well where the water tasted superior. (Source: Songtan History.) There were three wells in the area of “Seodungmul” (Seodunmul) just above Seojong Elementary School. There are no wells now as the water table has dropped as Jangang-dong has drawn away the water. (Source: Pyeongtaek Times: Seojong-dong) The original village cluster was located just above the Seojong Elementary School. There appeared to be three circular clusters just above the Seojong Elementary School indicating the existence of three wells. This area is now called “Seodumul.” (Source: Map of Seojong-ni area from Songbuk House Office.)
Shinseo Village — East of Seojong-ni. Built during the Chosun dynasty and called “Shinseo.” (Source: Songtan History.)
Shinseon Village — Near Seojong-ni. After the Korean War, many people moved into this area. (Source: Songtan History.) “Wongok” is in this area next to the Seojong Business district.
Mogak Village — During the Chosun period, it was noted to have a large land on the plain. It was noted for making raincoats made of straw. (Source: Songtan History.)

Jungang-dong

Galbyeong Village — (Near Seojong-ni) There used to be a bridge in the area that no longer exists. Supposedly the area had a lot of reeds that were used to make sandals. (Source: Songtan History.) Northeast of Seojong-ni Train Station to the east of the tracks. Galbyeong Road starts at Galbyeong Village.

Galpyeong

Jangang Village — Formerly within Seojong-ri when it was under Songtan-myeon. (Source: Songtan History.) (Near the Jangdang local industrial area.)
Wonjangdang Village (Jangdang) — The mountain looks like a deer (jang) in this area. The town was at the base of the mountain in the Chosun dynasty. (Source: Songtan History.)
Kwangcheon Village — Split out from Wonjangdang. There was a large stream there which boats would navigate. (Source: Songtan History.)
Kwangkwi Village — Split out from Kwangja Village in 1960 as a farming area. There is a spring in the area. (Source: Songtan History.) South of Seojong-ni Train Station.
Panseong Village — In 1910, a Mr. Cho came to the the town (Cheongno Town) and made a water wheel. 4-5 generations of the Cho family have lived there. The name was changed to Pyeongseong. (Source: Songtan History.)
Jangan Village — In the Chosun dynasty there was the Samnam Road and Hwinchi (small) Road. During the later part of the Koryo dynasty, a Mr. Cha (teacher) lived here. There was a food market here. In this village there is the Unam Cha Won-bu grave; Hwinchi Gogae Yi Yong-Son stele. (Source: Songtan History.) (Near the Jangdang local industrial area.)

Songtan-dong

Naeri Village — “Middle Village” in Middle of Doil-ri. Grave of Admiral Won Kyun located here. (Source: Songtan History.) Near the Deok-am Mountain. (See Korean History for details of Won Kyun grave.) North of Korean National College of Rehabilitation and Welfare.
Hari Village — Below Doil-ri Village. Place of 99 hills. Grave of Admiral Won Kyun located in the area. (Source: Songtan History.) Near the Deok-am Mountain. (See Korean History for details of Won Kyun grave.)
Sangri Village — In the village about 800 years ago there was a furnace for the production of iron. There was an upper town with pears and other fruit trees. In the 1759 census, there was 90 people clustered around a river fording point. At the time the village was called “Sachal-ri.” The tree at the fording point still exists. (Source: Songtan History.) Located on the southeast of Songtan-dong near Route 333. It is located north of Naeri. Below Bonghwang-sa Temple in Buraksan Mountain.

Old Songtan Villages that are in areas that were split away to Pyeongtaek-shi to facilitate administrative control of industrial zones:

Jajae-dong: To the south of Ichung-dong, the boundary is Jajae-dong, Pyeongtaek-shi.

Kajae-dong: To the south of Songtan-dong, the boundary is Kajae-dong, Pyeongtaek-shi. “Kajae-ul” was made up of Sangkajae, Hakajae and Kamnamu. “Kajae” comes from the shape of the mountain that looks like a small lobster. (Source: Pyeongtaek Times: Kajaeul)

Sangkajae Village — Lots of birds and “kajae” (crawfish). Grave site of Independence fighter: Yi Sung-ik. “Sangkajae” means “upper Kajae.” (Source: Songtan History.)
Hakajae Village (Kajae) — Hakajae is at the lower end of the Sangkajae. (Source: Songtan History.) (“Hakajae” means “lower Kajae.” South of the Route 1-Hyomyung School Road intersection within the Songtan Industrial Area.)
Kamnamu: (NO LONGER EXISTS) Kamnamu was a small village below Hakajae. The name comes from the many “kam” (persimmon) trees in the area. However, since the people moved away, there is few of the trees left. (Source: Pyeongtaek Times: Kajaeul)

Doil-dong:

Wondoil Village (Doil) — In the Chosun dynasty, it was called Yau, Pangmyeon, Yauchaneul. (Source: Songtan History.)

Mokgok-dong: Pyeongtaek-Songtan Local Industrial Complex — Abuts Jangdang Local Industrial complex) To south of Songtan-dong, the boundary is Mokgok-dong, Pyeongtaek.

Songtan Industrial area (Mokgok-dong)

Chilweon-dong: (part of Chilgoe Local Industrial area)

Chilweon Village — In the 1759 census, there were 120 people. Chilweon is Suchon and Sincheon together. It is now called Wonchilweon. It was at the meeting of three roads and became a rest stop with a lot of business. Thus there were a lot of makoli houses. The town was first called Gaolwon meaning “curative spa.” (Source: Songtan History.) To the east of Route 304.
Shincheon Village — Halfway between Suchon and Chilweon. A new town. Wondoil town created called “Chilweon Changalili.” Domicheon stream runs beside it. During the Chosun Dynasty it was called “Yaujaul. Many people lived along Kamju Road. (Source: Songtan History.) Below Wondoil. To the east of Route 304.
Suchon Village — Split off from Chilweon. Later located across from Tongbuk. The water from Suchon was noted as drinking water for its purity. Local custom has sacrifices of a black pig in Mudang ceremonies to ensure the purity of the water. (Source: Songtan History.) Below Shincheon. To the east of Route 304.

In Research as to location of village:

Seokjeong Village — “Seokjeong” means “stone well.” Supposedly there was a stone well where the water tasted superior. This was one well of three wells that the water tasted superior in the Chosun dynasty period. The stone well remains. (Source: Songtan History.) Indications are that this village no longer exists. At this time, think in Seojong-ni in the Seodumul area.

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1950s
Growth of Chicol Village (Chicoville) and Chong-mun eup (Front Gate Town) (1950s) The impression of the local culture on the American soldiers was not positive. Ron Freedman, a 2nd Lt. with the 398th AAA AW Bn at K55. He stated, “And of course the stench from the use of night soil was overpowering. The place was so backwards it was unbelievable. No roads, no electricity, no water, and the main road through Osan-ni was just dirt. The villagers paid their taxes by keeping the road somewhat repaired.”

According to Jim Price, the shanty town just outside the base was called “Sugogi” by Americans before it was called “Chicoville, but he didn’t know the reason. (Source: Verbal conversation with Jim Price, Jun 2005.) However, by 1953 the area was called “Chicol-ni” (Village) or “Chicoville” by the Americans taken from the name of the village directly outside the Main Gate. “Sugogi” means “cow meat” but it was actually the bastardization of “Sutkogae.” According to Oh Sun-soo, the word “Sut-Ko-Gae” in Hangul (Korean) means “charcoal hill or rise.” According to Mr. Oh, the name was first applied to the rise where Route 1 from Osan City now goes straight ahead over a rise — but later was applied to an area along the ridge line near the base in Jwa-dong. Later it would be applied to the area in Jwa-dong across the railroad tracks from K-55 where black bars and brothels sprang up. (Source: Verbal conversation Kalani O’Sullivan with Oh Sun-soo in 21 July 2005.)

Chicol-ni was the area directly to the left of the Main Gate as one exited K-55. In 1957, the first large building on the left was the Hansong Korean Dance Hall. Behind this were farm houses and fields. It extended down until the Namsan Village area with the mudwattle houses up to the perimeter of the base along the hillsides. The lower areas in the basin before the rise to MSR-1 were rice fields.

The area to the right of the Main Gate (the new shanty town) was referred to as Chong-mun eup (Front Gate Town) by the Korean people. In Confucian thinking, the farmer held a higher status level than the tradesman — and therefore, the farmers tended to disassociate themselves from the “camptown” (kijich’on) trade. Under the Confucian model, the businessman is the lowest in social strata.

Local Families (Jan 1952) (Robert Evilsizor)

Local Families: Papasan Entering house with A-frame (1952) (Robert Evilsizor)

Local Families: Buddhist Temple next to Choga-chip (NOTE: Believe at Hill 170 Namsan Village.) (Jan 1952) (Robert Evilsizor)

However, after 1955, the common name of the shanty town was “Chicoville” (Chicol Village or Chicol-ni). There was also reference to Chicol-ni as “C-rats Village” (C-rations). Some people jokingly referred to it as “Mudville” because the roads were all dirt and when it rained, it became a sea of mud.

For the purposes of this history, we will call the entire “front gate town” (Chong-mun eup) area as “Chicol Village.”

Village Well (1954) (Dan Klopten)

Communal well in Chicol Village in 1956 (1956) (Jeong Tae-ho)

This area is located on the left side of the Shinjang Mall looking east.

Eventually the entire rice field area in the Jaeyok-dong area was reclaimed for use as housing by the mid-1960s. Notice the difference between the 1954 photo and the 1956 photo. In the first the shanty-town houses are set back from the well and separated by the rice field. In the second in 1956, the shanty houses are now encroaching on the well indicating that the population of Chicol Village was growing. Notice also the position of the pig stys and rice fields that use human waster for fertilizer in relation to the artesian well. A bathhouse was constructed near this well in 1953 and became the beginnings of the Young Chon Hotel. (Source: Verbal conversation with Jeong Tae-ho, owner of Young Chon Hotel, 20 Jul 2005)

NOTE: The Young Chon Hotel is now built on the site of the well. According to Cho Hoon, the well itself is now enclosed and located in the basement area of the Stereo Club, but Sun Shei-Chyi stated it was still a source of water for the Young Chon Hotel. (Source: Verbal conversation with Cho Hoon, Cho Pharmacy owner, 23 Jul 2005 and Sun Shei-Chyi, Tai Ho Lou restaurant owner, 24 Aug 2005.) According to Pak Chong-su, owner of the Park’s Doll and Toy Shop, and Kim Se-hwon, owner of the Rose Hotel, there were two springs. The first was the Yongchon spring and the second was located across the Jeyok Road in the rice fields near the perimeter of the base. (Source: Verbal conversation with Pak Chong-su, on 19 Nov 2005, and Kim Se-hwon on 20 Jan 2005.)
The buildings of “Chicoville” were a clap-trap variety thrown together with any scrap of timber or refuse that could be found. Photos show the roads as all dirt and the roofs of the houses appear to be tar paper tacked down with strips of wood. The shanty-town spread from the main gate back to the rail line and around the base of the small hill with MSR-1 on the other side. There was little construction up the hill as yet. The shanty town residents did include prostitutes, but the majority were simply people trying to find work to survive. Those were still desparately poor times.

There was work for doing the most menial of tasks using A-frames to haul dirt to breaking rocks with sledge hammers. It wasn’t much — but it was work that provided money for food. The lucky ones found semi-permanent work in the mess tents or supply, but the majority lined up to be selected for menial “coolie” labor tasks on a daily basis. The elite were those who could speak a little English and were invaluable as translators.

Making Forms for Concrete 30 inch Drainage Pipes while Temperature at 20 degree F (1952) (Robert Evilsizor)

Concrete 30 inch Drainage Pipes while Temperature at 20 degree F (1952) (Robert Evilsizor)

Making Crushed Rock (Jan 1952) (Robert Evilsizor)

Drainage Ditch Construction (1952) (Robert Evilsizor)

Story of Pak Chan-yang Pak Chan-yang was 15 years old in early 1953. It had been six months since he’d fled North Korea living as a refugee in Kunsan when he came to Songtan seeking work. (SITE NOTE: We believe that this would have to be in 1951 when the US forces were retreating from North Korea after the Chinese joined the fray. Because Seoul was falling, the refugees were relocated south to Kunsan. The Chinese stopped their advance in the Seoul area and the North Korean refugees remained in the Kunsan area. Other North Korean refugees from the Hwanghae-do area just above Kyonggi-do streamed south through Seoul and stopped at Taejon. When the advance stopped and news of work at Osan AB, these refugees migrated north again to the Songtan area, settling in the Milwal-dong area (Shinchang-dong and Jokbong-ni).)

Pak Chan-Yang (2001) (Airmen Magazine)

“Then he heard the Americans were hiring people at Osan. He knew he had to go there. “It was the only way I could help myself and my family,” he said. “I had to go.” So with the few won [Korean money] that his father had given him in his pocket, he left. The money didn’t last the trip, but he made it to Osan. What he saw amazed him. The base was still under construction. And jets took off with a roar from its concrete runway. The landscape around the base was bare. There were no rice paddies or trees. No town or homes. “I had never seen anything like it before,” he said. “But there was so much going on.” Out of money and hungry, he joined the other people outside the base gate looking for work. He spoke no English and had no job skills. But he was determined. During the next three months, he lived day to day. If he got a meal a day, he was lucky. Many days he went hungry. He built a shack from cardboard boxes discarded from the base. But each time it rained he had to rebuild it. “And it rained a lot,” he said. Pak doesn’t like to dwell on that time. All he’ll say is that it was a hard time. He got his break in January 1954 ?a job helping build the base dining facility. He had an income. Could eat regularly and send his family money. When the dining facility opened, he stayed to work in the kitchen. Soon he developed a taste for roast beef and hamburgers. He’s been at Osan ever since, longer than any other worker.” (Source: Air Force Magazine, Oct 2001, Honcho Park)

C-Ration Village Outside the Gate (1954) (Robert Furrer)

We believe the photo above was taken from just outside the Main Gate to the left from a depression immediately to the right of the Main Gate. The Shinjang Mall Road from the Main Gate slowly curved to the left and then right at an incline straight up the hill. The hill to the left is where the Hanil Church would be built. The Shinjang Mall Road was just to the right of it — going up the hill to the base of the ridge at a diagonal.

It crossed the railspur at the top of the hill at a diagonal to get around the base of the hill and then veered left and down the other side to cross the Kyongbu line at the Mokcheon crossing at a diagonal. It then continued straight to intersect the MSR-1 at an angle.

Though hard to see the Kyongbu Railway is running from left to right about halfway up the hill in the photo. It comes from Osan-ni and enters the picture from behind the hill to the left.

In 1954, there were only a few houses on the hill. However, by 1957 the houses had covered the hills. To the far right edge, one can see a road that is going up over the hill. We believe this is a service road for the railspur junction of the Kyongbu Railway from the area of Terminal Ridge Road. (NOTE: This would be the area where the Shinjang Road Overpass would be built.) Directly to the right of the Shinjang Mall Road under the small sign board is the entrance to a small undeveloped path that would its way to the Songwang area.

Chicol-ni and Chongmun-eup Population Explosion In the photo below, the Shinjang Mall Road — though then only a dirt road — goes straight ahead to the MSR-1. Mr Oh Sun-soo, owner of the Victoria Hotel, used to own a home on the corner directly outside the Main Gate to the right. There was a small road (path) to Songwang area that jogged behind his house then diagonally from the Main Gate towards the upper left-hand corner of the picture.

(NOTE: This is now the alleyway behind the 7-11 across from the Main Gate. The path went down the alley to the road to the overpass. It led past where the Asia Hotel is now into the alley that is to the rear of the hotel. This led to the street with the Prince Hotel. The original path continued down the road for about a block and then went up to a path along the side of the hill — now a small side road (Milwal-Songwol) following the path’s old route. It continued down past the rice fields to the Songwang area (Shinjang 2-dong).

Main Gate Aerial View (1957)

The Milwal Road started at the Main Gate and then jogged around a house and then diagonally at a 45 degree angle to the base of the hill. It then proceeded up the hill and veered to the right to the Hill 180 Gate (Shinchang-dong and Jokbong-ni area). Mr. Son Kwang-chil, owner of Hanyang Kalbi, had his family home on Milwal Road in Milwal-dong — directly to the right of the Main Gate — five houses down from the top of the photo on the right. According to Mr. Oh, all the area to the left of the gate was known as Chicol Village. (NOTE: In 1978, the road would be widened and straightened to lead straight to the Main Gate.)

All the area to the right was known as “Chong-mun eup” or Front Gate Town. To the left on the Chicol Village side, the first large building was the Hansong Dance Hall which later became a billards parlor. A hotel would be built along the area and then the Osan Hotel would be built there in 1983. (NOTE: The Namsan Village Road was built in 1993 and the Osan Hotel moved to its present location at the base of the Milwal Road.)

In the Chicol Village area to the left as one exited the Main Gate, the large Haesong Dance Hall (and later pool hall) that was the first large building outside the gate. It was replaced by a hotel in the 1960s. (NOTE: The Namsan Village Road would not be built until 1993.) In the low lying areas, the rice fields were slowly being reclaimed, but the communal well was still in use. This was the Jae Yok-dong area.

Kyongbu Railway Crossing (1959) (Ed Stirling)

NOTE: Notice that the rail is slowly dropping off on a gradual decline towards Osan-ni. (SITE NOTE: Over the years, the rails have been leveled as seen by the cuts made between the line of the original hill to the current railbed in the Shinjang area is between ten to fifteen feet.)

The train passes over the base of the ridge at the Mokcheon Crossing and then drops off as it passes this point. At the right edge one can see the signal for the Mokcheon Crossing — location of the Mokcheon Pedestrian Underpass today. A little further down, one can see pedestrians crossing the track on the pedestrian short cut to the Songbuk Farmers’ Market. This is the location of the Mokcheon Underpass today. Further on is the point the initial road crossed to get to the back gate. (NOTE: The Pyeongtaek City records show the road was built in 1980-1983, but photographic evidence shows the road was in existence in 1953.) After the Korean War, this road appears to have been used primarily for the Shinjang-ni village area.

Railway Crossings In the Songtan area in 1959, there appeared to be three railway crossings — two unmarked and one with railway crossing bars and lights.
Back Gate Crossing The first unmarked crossing appears to be where the first dirt road was cut from MSR-1 to the back gate, but then used to get to the Shinjang-ni village area. (This is now the overpass road to the Back Gate (Doolittle) in Shinjang 1-dong.) The village in the distance is Mokcheon-ni Village between the crossing and “Chong-mun Eup” (Front Gate Town) Mokcheon Crossing.

Mokcheon Area Crossing The second crossing was from the Mokcheon area which had developed into the residential area. It was directly across the tracks to the Songbuk Farmers’ Market entrance. This remained an unmarked crossing. This was not a formal road, but simply a foot path developed by people taking a shortcut to the Farmers’ Market. In the 1960s, it developed into a lane on the Songbuk-dong side as businesses and houses crowded in on the tracks. When the Shinjang Road Overpass was built in 1978 the Kyongbu tracks were sealed off with a high wall. Later in the 1980s, the Mokcheon Underpass was built at this point — along with a road that ran up to the Shinjang 1-dong House Office and Jungang Church.

Shinjang Mall Road Crossing The third was the continuation of the Shinjang Mall road to the Mokcheon crossing. The road proceeded to the marked crossing with a bar and lights. Later in the late 1960s, this became a manned crossing. After the Shinjang Road Overpass was built in 1978, this crossing was blocked. This is the present location of the Mokcheon pedestrian underpass.

Roads Around Osan AB (K-55) in 1950s The first road was the Shinjang Mall Road that ran directly from the Main Gate across the rail spur and then the Kyongbu railroad tracks to the MSR-1. This was the original road built by the Co A 839th EAB. This road was built up about 15 feet above the existing rice fields — level with the Kyongbu Railway. (This would later become the Shinjang-mall and Mokcheon pedestrian crossing area.)

In the 1950s, the Shinjang Mall Road was the only major road to the MSR-1. The Shinjang Road was not developed until the 1970s when Park Chung-hee acquiesced to a request from the Osan AB Commander that a new road needed to be built to the MSR-1 because of the congestion along the original route. Originally this was a small road (path) in the 1950s that curved to to the right at a 45 degree angle at the Main Gate and then turned left to go over the railroad tracks to MSR-1 over the ridgeline. It was not used for vehicular traffic in 1950s.

The Milwal Road connected the Milwal-dong area to the Main Gate. It did NOT connect to the MSR-1until the Shinjang Road Overpass was constructed in 1978. In the 1950s, it was simply a dirt path that jogged around a house at the main gate and then traveled in a 45 degree angle until it reached the base of the hill. It then went up the hill and veered right. The small dirt path followed the perimeter along the west side of the base until it reached the Hill 180 Gate.

Because the shanties in Chicolville were so susceptible to fires, a one-engine fire station was placed at the top of the hill with a watch tower in 1958. (In the 1970s, in conjunction with the building of a new road to the MSR-1, the Milwal Road was widened and straightened to go from the top of the hill straight to the Main Gate. (SEE Roads surrounding K-55: MSR-1 Access Roads.)

Shinjang Mall Road According to Oh Sun-soo, the original businesses started in the Songwang area (near the Songshin Elementary School) and spread outward to the road and into the Jungang Market area. (Source: Verbal conversation Kalani O’Sullivan and Oh Sun-soo, 21 Jul 2005.) This seems reasonable as there was a used lumber yard in the early 1950s where people got lumber to build their shops while the rest of the Chicoville was made up of shanties. The lumber was scrap from pallets or crates as wood was at a premium during those times. According to Kwon Oh-hoon the major garbage dump was in Ojwa-dong (Ojwa-gaol) behind Are Konji-ni, but this was the garbage dump — not a salvage yard or business. (Source: Verbal conversation Kalani O’Sullivan and Kwon Oh-hoon, 24 Aug 2005.)

By the late 1950s, the buildings along the Shinjang Mall Road were starting to look more substantial as small shops and businesses started up. In the late 1950s, most of the shops appeared to be variety stores, beauty shops and drug shops. The Shinjang Mall Road remained a two-lane packed dirt road. Just before the railroad tracks there was a slight rise. In the Songbuk-dong area, the road terminated in a “Y” intersection that served as the entrance to the base. The first businesses started up at this intersection. The “Y” intersection of MSR-1 was within one block of the Songbuk Farmers’ Market, Jaeil Theater and the Intercity Bus Terminal.

Shinjang Mall Road head toward Hill. (1959) (Ed Stirling) (NOTE: The road veers right at hill and continues up incline to rail spur.)

Looking down Shinjang Mall Road in the picture above, the hill straight ahead where the Hanil Church would be built. In the photo above, there is a drug shop (with clinic) on the right and a beauty shop and another drug shop on the left. Notice the mover with a load on his back carried on an A-frame (Chige) on right of the road — with a truck on the left. The road is a two-lane dirt road that veers right and then continues up an incline to the rail spur.

Shinjang Mall Road just before the Railspur. (1959) (Ed Stirling)

The picture above is taken on Shinjang Mall Road just as one nears the railspur to the “freight gate.” Lights (or perhaps Buddhist paper lanterns) strung across the road indicate the crossing. To the left near the tracks are furniture movers. To the left, is a policeman riding his bicycle. (NOTE: Notice the large building to the left along the tracks on the Shinjang-side. Compare this to the 1965 photo by Harry Tezlaf and 1966 photo by Thomas Utts of the same location where the same large building still exists.)

MSR-1 MSR-1 from Osan-ni (8km to the north) ran straight through the town until it came to a fork. In 1952 when the base was first built, the MSR-1 (Tanhyeon Street) that ran straight ahead and up the ridgeline past the Songbuk farmers’ market on the left. At the top of the ridge, it would turn right at the Terminal Ridge Road and go west down the ridge and across the railroad crossing at the base of the hill. It would continue straight and turn right to the Main Gate of Osan AB (K-55). The Terminal Ridge Road also ran east down the ridge and joined MSR-1 near the present Express Bus Terminal at a T-intersection.

MSR-1 Looking towards Osan-ni in the Jinwi-myeon area (1954) (Don Klopten)

The Jisan dong area at the time was rice paddies and swamp. If you didn’t turn left at the ridgeline turnoff, the road (Jwadong Road) ran straight ahead down the ridgeline past the Jwadong Ridge Road. It following the Kyongbu rail road tracks until the road (Jijangdong Road) leveled off near the Seojong-ni area and ran next to the train tracks. It ran straight ahead past the Seojong Train Station and then continued on to the Pyeongtaek Train Station. This was the MSR-1 used between 1952-1953. (NOTE: This is the route that the Pyeongtaek City buses take to “K-55″ from Pyeongtaek station. Remember that the Koreans of Songtan do not use the term “Osan AB”.)

Intersection of MSR-1 Bypass Road and Road to Main Gate (Terminal Ridge Road) (1954) (Robert Furrer)

MSR-1 Bypass By late 1952, the growth was spreading out rapidly up the sides to the ridge across the railroad tracks and along the MSR-1 creating congestion in the area. A new route was cut by 8th Army Engineers (unit unknown) that ran to the left at the fork near the dirt path leading to the Ojwa-dong area and Are Konji-ni. MSR-1 Bypass was to allow through traffic to bypass the congestion created by the construction of Osan AB.

Now listed as “National Route 1,” the MSR-1 Bypass continued up past the Songbuk Farmers’ Market to the right (Songbuk Market Road) and continued straight down the road (Bukbu Jungang Street) until it got to Sejeong ni at which point it turned right toward the Sejeong Train Station. Before the train station, it turned left and rejoined the original MSR-1 (Seojong Market Road) as Homyeon School Road. It continued on straight to the Pyeongtaek Train Station. Photos in 1959 show the MSR-1 Bypass was a dirt road large enough for two lanes of truck convoys in both directions. The photos also show the area of Jisan-dong next to the Express Bus Terminal as being rice fields between the MSR-1 and the hills (Burak Mountains) — where the present Route 1 to Pyeongtaek runs. There was a circular area that was a geological sump area of rice paddies and swamps. The road between the fork and Seojong-ni was relatively flat.

The Jisan-dong area had not been developed as yet and the area was all rice paddies up to the base of the Burak Mountain area to the east and to where the Are Konji-ni (Lower Konji Village) was located in the northeast. Oh Sun-soo, owner of the Victoria Hotel, stated that his family home was originally from Are Konji-ni. Mite Konji-ni (Upper Konji Village) was located near the present location of the Songbuk Elementary School on the left as one followed the Jisan Cheon (Stream) up the valley. (Source: Verbal conversation Kalani O’Sullivan with Oh Sun-soo, 21 Jul 2005.)

In the 1954 picture above there is a faint line in the middle of the rice field and what appears to be flood gates. This is the path that connected the Are Konji-ni (Lower Konji Village) to the farms along the base of the Jisan Hill. According to According to Kwon Oh-hoon the major salvage yard/garbage dump was in Ojwa-dong (Ojwa-gaol) behind Are Konji-ni. (Source: Verbal conversation Kalani O’Sullivan and Kwon Oh-hoon, 24 Aug 2005.) The areas between the intersection to Are Konji-ni to the left are rice fields.

After Songbuk Elementary was opened in 1955, the children from the Shinjang area would walk around the base of the Jisan Hill and then follow the path around the base of the Buraksan Mountain until Songbuk Elementary. (Source: Verbal conversation Kalani O’Sullivan and Kwon Oh-hoon, 24 Aug 2005.)

By the late 1950s, the Songtan “downtown” areas were crowded near the Songbuk Farmers Market and the town expanded to the east. By the early 1960s, the rice field areas between Are Konji-ni to the intersection from the path to the MSR-1 Bypass Road had been filled in and housing & businesses filled the area.

Milwal Road The Milwal-dong area was where most of the North Korean refugees — mostly from the Hwanghae-do area — attracted to Osan AB by the promise of work clustered in this area for mutual protection and support. Originally Milwal Road was simply a dirt path from the Main Gate led up the hill to Milwal-dong. The road came out of the gate, twisted like a snake going around a building and then went at a 45 degree angle until it straightened out at the base and went up the incline.

At the top of the hill, the Milwal Road veered right and became the Shinchang Road. This road followed the perimeter until it connected to the Hill 180 gate. There was only one road at the time and many alleyways off of the road that followed the topography in a mass of dead-end alleyways. The houses were built right up to the fence line of the base and was a mix of older mudwattle (choga chip) farmer houses with vegetable plots and the low mudbrick and stucco homes with transite roofs.

Housing sprouted outside the Hill 180 Gate area mainly supporting the populace that worked on the base. As was mentioned before a “camptown” of Makum-ni was to the right as one exited the Hill 180 gate at the bottom of the rise, but after the Korean War ended, it slowly returned to a farming village. (Source: Narrative of Lt. Ron Freedman about life on Hill 170.)

After Makum-ni, the dirt road continued straight ahead following the perimeter of the base until it came to the village of Kumgak-ri to the west of the base. In Nov 1953, a school was established here that became a “branch” school of Seotan Elementary School and later would become the Kumgak-ri Elementary. (NOTE: This school filled the need for the large numbers of North Korean refugee children who had moved into the Milwal, Jokbong, Shinchang-dong and Sagori areas on the south side of Osan AB. This school was closed in 2000 due to falling rural population size.)

At Kumgak-ri, the road (path) turned right. In this area the villages of Shin-Yari and Yari were relocated and the 839th EAB operated a Sand Pit. This area were primarily rice fields with scattered mudwattle homes. The road continued straight ahead to the Chinwi River. This was the west end of the runway. At this point, the perimeter road from the base on the north side joined with the road (path) from Kumgak-ri and continued over a long bridge spanning the Chinwi River to Seotan-myeon. This area was susceptible to flooding when the Chinwi River overflowed its banks. The base had built a levee and a drainage channel between the Chinwi River and the base to minimize the impacts of flooding.

Life in Chicol Village and Milwal-dong In the late 1950s, the conditions in the village of “Chicoville” (Chicol-ri or Chicol Village) improved. The buildings were looking a little more sturdy than in the Korean War era. The “strip” from the Main Gate to the rail spur now contained the “entertainment” district. The bars were now box-like structures resembling warehouses with open-air windows. Yaugwans (inns) had sprouted all along this area.

Many of the new shops were now made of wood. A scrap lumber business salvaged wood from pallets crates — any of wood that could be used for construction was in the Songwang area — though the major salvage yard was up behind Are Konji-ni in Ojwa-dong (Ojwa-gaol). Concrete was scarce commodity as Korea continued to rebuild its infrastructure from the devastation of the Korean War. It would be another decade before enough cement plants and plywood factories were constructed to meet the demands for construction materials. Most new construction used mudbricks covered with stucco.

Hideaway Club (1958) (Don Klopten)

Commerce was returning to the area in the form of small grocery stores (each one saying they had cold beer). Also seen were the tailor shops and shoe repair shops. The pharmacies (Yak) that dispensed medicines (including venereal disease treatment) also sprouted up as doctors in Korea were at a premium so the government authorized the drug shops to take over parts of the medical trade in prescribing western drugs. Of course, the drug shops were off-limits to GIs. (NOTE: In Korea, there are two types of medical doctors. Western Medicine and Oriental Medicine. The pharmacy only dealt western medicines and were restricted from any sales of oriental medicines. Because the lack of doctors, the government authorized the pharmacies to prescribe medicines for the treatment of common ailments. Fifty years later, this system is still in use.)

The Jungang Open Market started up as a small operation in the side streets to the left of the Shinjang Mall Road in the general area it is today. Stands were set up in the open air along the sides of the alleyways peddling various condiments, fruits, vegetables or inexpensive goods. By the late 1950s, small open-air shops for retail goods (cheap clothes, etc.) appeared — the predecessor of the Shinjang Shopping Mall. (NOTE: The Shinjang Road did not exist at the time, but there was a small undeveloped dirt road that led from the Main Gate diagonally to this general area near to the Jungang Open Market area and then a path curved down to the Milwal-dong area until the Songwang Church. By the late 1950s, shanties had spread down the slopes of Hill 180 near the present Capital Hotel to the railroad tracks and filled the area south up to the rice fields.)

According to Oh Sun-soo, the businesses started in the Songwang area (Shinjang 2-dong) near the railroad tracks and spread outward. (Source: Verbal conversation Kalani O’Sullivan and Oh Sun-soo, 21 Jul 2005.) NOTE: Songshin School had not been built yet as the area was still rice fields up to near the Sogwang (Onnori) Church stood on a slight rise.

This area would have been the area just to the south of the Jungang Open Market Shopping Mall area with small shops near the railway tracks. That the first businesses would spring up here seems reasonable as the population was here — not up on MSR-1. Photos of the area outside the gate in 1954, showed very little in the way of houses. However, by 1957 the houses had spread up the sides of the hills.

The used lumber yard used for the construction of many buildings in the 1960s was in this area. In this area the hardware shops also sprang up. (NOTE: The refuse of the base was hauled away under contract — and every piece of wood that could be recycled (such as wood pallets or crates) were salvaged. According to Kwon Oh-hoon the major salvage yard/garbage dump was in Ojwa-dong (Ojwa-gaol) behind Are Konji-ni. (Source: Verbal conversation Kalani O’Sullivan and Kwon Oh-hoon, 24 Aug 2005.) Even up to the 1970s, the dunnage (wood blocks to block munitions on railway flatcars) would be “traded” to Koreans along the tracks for bottles of soju or beer. Though technically such actions were “blackmarketing,” the act to the GIs was simply saving them from having to haul all the dunnage away after they off-loaded the munitions.)

NOTE: The area up to where the present day Shinjang-2 House Office is located was land, but the area beyond was all rice fields. In the mid-1960s, the rice fields were reclaimed and the Songshin Elementary School was built in 1965 on the highground. Next door in tents was the Songwang Middle School. It was replaced in 1973 by the Taegwang Middle-High School built adjacent to the Songshin School after the land was reclaimed. It would not be until the mid-1970s that the rice fields further south would be reclaimed and Pokchang Elementary School would be built.

Main Gate Looking out at Shinjang Mall area (1959) (Ed Stirling) (NOTE: The Songwang Church can be seen in the distance in what is now the Shinjang 2-dong area.)

The 1959 photo of the Main Gate plainly shows a church visible above the shanties outside the gate. The Shinjang Mall Road was to the left so the church was near the road leading to the MSR-1 up the ridgeline. The only church in this area was the Songwang Church. The Songwang Church has recently changed its name to the Onnori Church and is located directly across the street from the Shinjang 2-dong House Office.

NOTE: The oldest church in the area is the Jaeil Church up on a hill in the Milwal-dong area on the southwest side of the base. It was first started as the Jwadong Presbyterian Church in 1958 and changed to the Jaeil Church in 1961. The other major churches in the area are Songtan Catholic Church (1965); Jungang Church (1967); and Hanil Church (1967). These three churches are located on the hill along Mokcheon Road near the railway and have been prominent landmarks for the Shinjang area.

2005: Onnuri Church (Formerly the Songwang Church) (Aug 2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan) (NOTE: One can see the traces of the old lettering for the Songwang Church above the door)

Expansion of Businesses along MSR-1 A path was being used to cross the railroad tracks from the Chicol Village (Chicoville) (Jae Yok-dong area) to get to the Songbuk farmers’ market area. This never was a recognized crossing, but as you could see the trains approaching over 8km away in both directions, there was never much concern of an accident. A lane sprang up on the Songbuk side of the tracks to this crossing. (NOTE: This later became the Mokcheon Underpass road.)

The Shinjang Mall Road to the MSR-1 was through a marked crossing with bars and signal lights. (NOTE: This later became the Mokcheon pedestrian underpass — found directly at the end of the Shinjang Shopping Mall Road next to the Kyongbu Railway fence.)

By the late 1950s, the Songbuk Farmers’ Market had expanded to feed the growing Korean population in the area. It was situated in the main part of town in the Songbuk area alongside the MSR-1. Like the Osan-ni Farmers’ Market 8km away, its opening indicated the local economy was coming back to life. However, at first the offerings would have been simple condiments and produce at first. By the late 1950s, semi-permanent stalls started to appear offering clothing or other essentials.

Around the farmers’ market, small businesses sprang up turning the area into the business center. Buildings started to line the MSR-1 that ran past the farmers’ market. The center of the town now shifted to the business district that had grown with small shops lining the MSR-1. Housing was still critical and one 1959 photo showed a “house rental agency” business along the MSR-1 on the road looking towards Osan-ni along the road just after one left the main part of town.

The base provided the major portion of the area’s income as the largest employer of Koreans as waitresses, housegirls/boys, support staff, road construction crews, skilled and unskilled laborers. Foreign exchange was also earned from the bar trade and open prostitution off-base in Chicol Village. The houses immediately surrounding the Main Gate area were small mudbrick and stucco structures that were primarily one-room houses with outdoor “water closets” (toilets) and outdoor cooking facilities. The heating was with the hondol system (water heater) using charcoal so these small confined quarters were dangerous in winter due to the potential of carbon monoxide poisoning.

In the late 1950s, a police box was added at the intersection of Shinjang Mall Road to the MSR-1. It is where the current Songtan police station is now located. Policemen rode bicycles at first, but later white motorcycles and jeeps became the mode of transportation.

The one engine fire house established in the 1958 was located up on right at the top of the Milwal-dong hill with a fire watch tower. In the “Chicoville” fires were constantly breaking out due to flimsy materials used to construct the shanties and the danger of it spreading rapidly in the closely packed housing was always a concern. (NOTE: In the 1970s, the fire station was combined with the Pyeongtaek Station, but in the late 1970s, Songtan again had its own fire station.)

In 1959 photos of the area a mud brick “factory” in the area is shown. These mudbricks were the major building material from the Korean War through the late 1970s as concrete was still considered an expensive alternative due to limited cement production facilities in South Korea. In the Shinjang 2-dong area near the railroad tracks, there was a lumberyard that specialized in used lumber from pallets or any source — mostly the refuse from the base hauled off under contract. These bits and pieces ended up in the manufacture of houses in the area. According to Kwon Oh-hoon the major salvage yard/garbage dump was in Ojwa-dong (Ojwa-gaol) behind Are Konji-ni. (Source: Verbal conversation Kalani O’Sullivan and Kwon Oh-hoon, 24 Aug 2005.)

Education Starting in 1949, it elementary education was made compulsory. The main intent was to get the children to once again read “hangul” as their native language. In the 1930s, the Japanese banned the use of hangul in the public schools in an attempt to assimilate Korea. On 3 Mar 1938 the teaching of Korean in middle school was abolished.

The Seojong Elementary traces its roots to the Seop Konlip Hakyo that was established on 3 Jun 1922 and became a four-year school on 16 Oct 1922. It later became a 6-year elementary school in 1924 and graduated its first class in 1926. However, according to the Pyeongtaek Si Sa (History), it was founded in 1945 as a “branch” school and became a recognized Elementary School in 1949 with 8 classrooms. (SEE Seojong Background for Seojong Elementary school photos and history.) Officially, there was only the Seojong-ni Elementary School in 1952 when the base was first built.

In Seotan-myeon, the Seotan Elementary School was established in 1930. The Seotan Elementary School is in the same location at present. There was also a private school in Seotan-myeon at either Madu-ri or Suweolan-ri in the 1950s-1960s.

The Kumgak-ri Elementary School in Godeok-myeon was on the west side of base. It became a “branch” school of Seotan Elementary School in Nov 1953. This school was established to fill the need for the education of the large numbers of North Korean refugee children that had moved into Milwal-ni, Jokbong-ni, Shinchang-dong and Sagori on the south side of Osan AB. In 2000, the Kumgak Elementary School closed because of lack of students — reflecting the current crisis of declining rural populations — and the student body combined with Pokchong School in Seojong-dong.

There was Sandae Elementary in Jinwi-myeon was established in the 1930s. This later became the Jinwi Elementary School.

However, we know that other private and religious operated in the area. The Hyomyeon School in Seojeong-ni started in the 1953 as a private Catholic school and should qualify as one of the oldest in the area. The classes started when Father Dominicu, the Korean priest, began classes in the rectory for a small number of children in 1952.

In 1953, the 18th FBW contributed money and materials to build a 8-room country school about two miles from the base. The official dedication date of the St. Theresa’s Middle School on 21 Apr 1953 is used as the official beginning of the Hyomyung Middle School.

In June 2005, we ran across an HQ Far East Air Force (FEAF) news release that mentioned a school being built by the 18th FBW. The HQ FEAF, 5th Air Force news release on 22 Jan 1954 read in part: “The airmen of the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing provided materials and finances for a new eight-room country school house near Osan for 280 Korean grammar school children. While Korean builders speeded the construction of the new building, men of the 18th Wing utilized their off-duty time in the base hobby shop making 90 double desks and 140 double seats needed for the students.”

We began our search for the school at the time in the immediate area — with no luck. However, while conducting an interview on the Seojong-ni area schools at Hyomyung Middle School, we were shown the 2003 50th Anniversary edition yearbook of the Hyomyung Schools and a small article by Father Dominicus — the Catholic priest of St. Theresa’s Church in Seojong-ni between 1952-1960 — documented the building of the school by the 18th FBW of K-55 (Osan AB) donations.

Chaplain (Maj) Rinkowski and St. Theresa’s Middle School (1952) (Hyomyung 50th Anniversary Book (2003))
The Hyomyung Middle School 50th Anniversary Edition (2003) shed light on this school. The postcard in the photo reads: “This school was built by Catholic Airmen, Army Personnel, SCARWAF Personnel of K-55 through their generous contributions at Masses during the past six months. Bishop Paul M. Rho, Bishop of Seoul, (blocked out) the $6,000 (blocked out) 6 January 1954.” According to Mr. Kim Jong-youp, Vice-Principal of Hyomyung Middle School, the structure was built in what is now the parking lot of the Seojong Catholic Church.

It appears that $6,000 — a significant amount of money at that time — was donated towards the construction of the school done under contract, The key man in getting this going was Chaplain (Major) Rinkowski of the Wing Chaplain of the 18th FBW and Father Dominicu (Korean priest) of the St. Theresa’s Church in Seojong-ni. However, this project was not well-publicized and may have been a strictly Catholic airmen initiative as many veterans of that period did not know of this school.

The Seojong Church (St. Theresa’s Catholic Church) was founded on its present location in 1937. Prior to this structure, Father Dominicu (1918-1977) was teaching a small number of students in the rectory in 1952. Father Dominicu served at the church from 1952-1960.

Father Dominicu teaching in Rectory (1952) (Hyomyung 50th Anniversary Book (2003))
The building was erected in 1953 and called “St. Theresa Middle School” — and is the predecessor of the present Hyomyung Middle School. (NOTE: It appears that the date of the official opening of the structure by Bishop Paul M. Rho is used as the founding date of the Hyomyung Middle School, though the school was established at a much later date about a half-mile down the road. The Hyomung Middle School was founded on 21 May 1953 — and followed by the Hyomyung High School on 21 May 1956.)

There were also other “church” schools in the area. The most visible was the Salvation Army was active in the Chicol Village area. Its main work was with the orphans through the Gusegun (Salvation Army) church set up in the area. (NOTE: The during this time period there were 20 orphanages in Suwon and three in Pyeongtaek to handle the overflow crowds of children. The Pyeongtaek orphanages handled the orphans that showed up at K-55. Currently there is the Ae Hyang Orphanage in Seojong-dong run by Mr. Lee Min Ho.)

Smaller church schools also operated in the area. The Kwangmyeong Gongmin Hakkyo (church school) was established in 1953. (NOTE: We haven’t established the location, but Taegwang Middle School authorities state it was in the same area as the Taegwang Middle School today — probably near the high ground near the Songwang Church (Onnori Church) in Shinjang 2-dong as the remainder was still rice fields. Most likely it was set up in tents donated by the American military as building materials were scarce.)

On 11 Nov 1955, the Songtan Godung Gomin Hakkyo (church school) started six classes. This became the Songwang hagwon on 6 Jan 1962 and then merged with the Songwang Middle School on 17 Mar 1962. At the time, this was set up in military tents alongside the Songshin Elementary School which was established on 1 Jan 1963. On 12 Mar 1968, the Taegwang hagwon changed to the Taegwang Middle School and supplanted the Songwang Middle School with permanent structures next to the Songshin Elementary School.)
Mystery School Bob Spiwak sent a photo taken in 1953 that he at first thought was an orphanage, but then realized it was school kids. We at first thought it was Seojong-ni Elementary, but the signboard reading “Seotan branch school” didn’t match. Mr. Oh Sun-soo stated that the construction appeared to be Japanese meaning it was built PRIOR TO the end of WWII. In comparing the structure to the old Seojong Elementary photos from the 1940s, we agree that it is of the same type of construction — but it is NOT the Seojong-ni Elementary School. Seotan Elementary’s principal stated that the photo was NOT of his school in Seotan that dates back to the 1930s. Then we noticed the correlation of Kumgak-ri Elementary on the southwest side of Hill 180 being attached to Seotan Elementary in Nov 1953 — and thought it was the school built by the 18th FW in 1953 with donations. Again we were wrong as this turned out to be the predecessor of the Hyomyung Middle School in Seojong-ni and the new school was NOT of Japanese style construction. In addition, Bob Spiwak stated that the school was within easy walking distance of Hill 170 on the north end of base — while Kumgakri is located about three miles away on the south side of the base. As of Sep 2005, we are still uncertain as to where this school was.

School unknown, but near Hill 170 (1953) (Bob Spiwak) (NOTE: See Compulsory Elementary School Education in the Songtan area for details.)

Bob Spiwak’s photo is of significance as there were few photos of these types of structures and infrastructure at the time. At that time, photos were for portraits or official photos and very few candid shots of the schools exist. What is marvelous about the photo is that though the kids had patches on their clothes — all the clothes appeared washed and pressed. This reflects the attitudes and respect towards the educational process on the part of parents and children — a tradition continued till today. There was no middle school or high school in the area and for many of these kids — this was the end of their education. The intent of these schools was to teach the Koreans to once again read “hangul” (Korean) — after years of Japanese colonial rule which banned the use of Hangul in schools in 1937 — and it succeeded as the Korean populace currently has a 98 percent literacy rate. Because of the times, this would be the last education for many of these children as poverty prevented many from continuing on.
In 1952, Robert Evilsizor with the 839th EAB, took some 8mm movies of a long procession of kids walking to school. As there was only the Seojong Elementary School in the area at the time, these kids must have been on the way to school. They were guided by the teacher and some women who might have been parents or teachers. Though the government had passed a law making education compulsory it did not fund the schools adequately. Thus most of the schools were supported by “donations” from the Parent-Teacher Associations. In fact, those children whose families could not afford to “donate,” did not attend school. Because of the severe poverty, many times families could not even afford the cost of paper and pencils. In the film, most of the children did not have uniforms, but some of the older one did. Some of the girls wore white blouses with black trim on the collar and black skirts. Some of boys wore the traditional black coat and pants. What was evident was the happiness to attend school that was evident in the faces of the children as they marched along. (NOTE: This VCR tape was provided to the Seojong Elementary School to be used in their education programs of the 1950s periods history with the permission of Robert Evilsizor.)

Though elementary education was “compulsory,” the truth was the government had neither the resources nor the teachers to implement such a program. At that time, if you were a high school graduate, you were qualified to be an elementary school teacher. “Government-endorsed” schools were set up in a system where the government would provide the buildings (many times tents donated by the American military) or unheated-buildings and approximately 25 percent of the funding. The parents would “donate” the difference.

In this void many missionary and church schools moved in to fill the void to help the poor people be educated. The missionary schools have a long history in Korea dating back to the late 1800s starting in Pyeongyang and spreading to the other major cities and treaty ports. At that time, the yangban upper classes were educated, but the poor were left uneducated. The same appears to be true in the Songtan area in the 1950s. The “haves” (no matter how meager) went to the government schools, while the poor went to the “church” schools. The emphasis was simply on learning to read and write Hangul (Korean), but the education starved Koreans flocked to these schools which operated sometimes in shifts to handle both children and adults.

(L) Songbuk Elementary School (1955) (R) 50th Anniversary Ceremony (1 April 2005) (Songbuk Elementary School)

In 1955, the Songbuk Elementary School was opened to handle the growing student population with three one-story wooden structures with tile roofs. Its construction followed the pattern of a large playground below and the school elevated along the side of a hill or mountain. The buildings had a long hallway at the front and classrooms connected to these rooms. In 1956, the Hyomyeon Middle School was built in the area. (NOTE: See Compulsory Elementary School Education in the Songtan area for details of educational system in 1950-1960s. Photos of Songbuk Elementary from 1955 to the present are included in the combined chronological history of Osan AB & Songtan. )

1960s
Early 1960s In the early 1960s, housing was at a premium and soon more houses were spreading up the side of the hills towards the “town center” in Songbuk dong. The houses were still a mix of mudwattle houses (choga chip) and mudbrick and stucco houses. However, the shanty town look of the area was slowly disappearing — though the buildings were still not the sturdiest construction — as more of the buildings were constructed of wood.

On the Chicol Village side the rice fields were slowly disappearing as the houses encroached on the fields and the rice fields were reclaimed. After the first water mains were laid, the communal well near where the Young Chon Hotel is today was capped.

Benjo ditch between houses (Circa 1960) (51st FW Archives)

(L) Chicol Village area with houses encroaching on rice fields. The rice fields is supposed to be where the Young Chon Hotel would later be built. (Circa 1960) (51st FW Archives) (R) Another view of the houses encroaching of rice fields. Notice the mix of mudwattle homes and more modern mudbrick and stucco houses. The one home with a tile roof stands out while others are with transite (corrugated concrete/asbestoes) or corrugated iron roofs. Notice that most have outdoor cooking areas. (Circa 1960) (51st FW Archives)

The houses now spread up the hill to the Milwal-dong area and right towards the Hill 180 gate in the Shinchang-dong and Jokbong-ni area. In this area, the houses were tightly packed with small alleyways.

In the Chicol Village area to the left as one exited the Main Gate, the large Haesong Dance Hall (and later pool hall) that was the first large building outside the gate was replaced by a hotel. In the low lying areas of the Jae-Yok-dong area (Shinjang 1-dong), the rice fields were slowly being reclaimed and houses built upon the old rice fields. This was the Jae Yok-dong area. The communal well was covered over as bars started to line the Shinjang Mall road.

The Namsan Village area next to Hill 170 had returned to being an agricultural area. However, it appears that there was no real perimeter as paths were well-worn from the top of the hill down to the base of the hill. The areas past Namsan Village were all rice fields.

To the right as one exited the Main Gate, the “Front Gate Town” (Chongmun eup) now was crowded with buildings fronting on the three main roads (1) Shinjang to Mokcheon Road (straight ahead); (2) Shinjang to MSR-1 on the Ridgeline (to the right at a diagonal, but still only a dirt path until mid 1970s.) and (3) Milwal-dong Road (to the right, but still going behind houses). By the 1960s, the area adjacent to the road leading to the Hill 180 Gate was crammed with houses of those employed on the base or in the service industry (bars, restaurants, beauty shops, general merchandise stores, tailor shops, and small inns). According to Oh Sun-soo, he started the GQ Tailor Shop in 1962. (NOTE: The GQ Tailor Shop is now under new ownership in 2005.)

Though the brothels in the area were a major industry, historically, this is not an especially welcome topic for Koreans. Though the Koreans differentiated between the Chicol Village and Chongmun-eup (Front Gate Town), the Americans called the entire area “Chicoville,” including the areas in Songbuk-dong.

In June 1962, by joint action, the Ministries of Justice, Interior, and Social Welfare and related agencies established 104 “special districts” of prostitution. In this way, the American “camptowns” could be classified as “special tourism zones” which were off-limits to Koreans. At the same time, the red-light districts were off-limits to the Americans. At the time, the major source of foreign currency exchange for Korea came from the American soldiers spending their paychecks downtown. During this time, the prostitutes of Korea were praised by the Park Chung-hee regime for their actions to bring in much needed foreign exchange. It was a sad commentary of the stark poverty and desparate conditions that existed in Korea at that time. (See “1964: Songtan Becomes Special Tourism Zone” for details)

On 15 June 1962, the Shinjang Branch Office was established by Pyeongtaek-gun Ordinance No. 25. While it was in effect recognizing the camptown (kijich’on) aspects of off-base Songtan, it was also recognition of the growing population in the area — consisting of people who worked on the base. The “town” was spreading out from the center of the Chongmun-eup (Front Gate Town) shanty-town area. New construction of low-lying houses for GIs living off-base in the Mokcheon Village area near the railroad tracks.

At the same time the civilian populace was expanding outward into the Malwal-dong area around the base of Hill 180. The Jaeil Church (formerly Pokchong Presbyterian Church) was founded in 1958 and a new church built in 1961 in this area on the hill south of Hill 180.

The businesses lining the MSR-1 were slowly becoming two story structures — with stores downstairs and living quarters upstairs. Where MSR-1 was on the ridgeline, the storefronts would be at street level, but the living areas either to the rear of the store or below the store. These buildings were anchored to the slope with timbers driven into the ground. The buildings were also starting to become more substantial in appearance. By the mid-1960s, the area rated a Police Box on the ridge line along MSR-1. At first the police men rode bicycles, but later the policemen were equipped with motorcycles. (NOTE: The current Songtan Police Box in Songbuk-dong is near the same location as the original police box.)

(L) Pony Cart in front of Han Song Tailor Shop located three shops down towards the Main Gate from the Stereo Club. (Circa 1960) (NOTE: Shops are on an incline. Mr Hwang Song-gi, employee of the Asia Hotel, stated he worked at the shop for a year. Mr. Son Kwang-chil, owner of Hanyang Kalbi, stated his father was head of the “union” of these “delivery” men who were North Korean refugees. His father had seven ponies used in his business.) ; (R) Used Lumber Yard in Shinjang area (Circa 1960) (NOTE: Lumber of any sort was a precious commodity. Many of the new stores were being built with the scrap lumber. According to Kwon Oh-hoon the major salvage yard/garbage dump was in Ojwa-dong (Ojwa-gaol) behind Are Konji-ni. (Source: Verbal conversation Kalani O’Sullivan and Kwon Oh-hoon, 24 Aug 2005.)) )

Shinjang Mall Road near where the Stereo Club is today. Seoul Barbershop, Shoe Repair Shop and Mijin Custom Shoe Shop (NOTE: Mr. Sun Shing-Chyi, Tae Ho Lou Restaurant owner, identified this as being in the Mall area near the Stereo Club. Mr. Lee Kwang, Barbershop owner, also stated it was in the Mall area. Residence above Shoe Shop made of recycled wood and corrugated iron roof. Stovepipe next to Barbershop sign. Electric pole in rear of barbershop indicates more buildings in rear.) (Circa 1960) (51st FW Archives)
MSR-1 leading towards Osan-ni (NOTE: Jinwi-myeon hills in distance as road curves and goes down incline towards Farmers’ Market. Electric poles to rear of buildings indicate that other buildings were behind the stores on left. Use of stones to construct stores on right indicates availability of concrete.) (Circa 1960) (51st FW Archives)

Drugshop and Tai Kuk Bakery. (NOTE: Mr. Sun Shing-Chyi and his wife identified this drug shop and bakery being near the intersection of the Shinjang Mall Road and the MSR-1. However, the Drug shop construction indicates it is built on an incline with the drugshop at streetlevel with the living quarters to the rear. Most likely this was on Shinjang Mall Road probably near the Main Gate.) (Circa 1960) (51st FW Archives)
Shinjang Mall Road. (NOTE: Though the road at first appeared too wide to be Shinjang Mall Road, local residents confirmed it was a two lane road. This appears to be the curve near the Main Gate that before the straight length. The hill where Hanil Church is now can be seen in the distance.) (Circa 1960) (51st FW Archives)

In the Chicol Village area to the left as one exited the Main Gate, the large Haesong Dance Hall (and later pool hall) was replaced by a hotel. In the low lying areas, the rice fields were slowly being reclaimed and houses built upon the old rice fields. The first water mains were built in the area and the communal well was covered over as bars and shops started to line the Shinjang Mall road. The Stereo Club was built over the well and the first Young Chon Hotel was constructed.

Down near Aragon Alley, Mr. Yi Eun-hak started the Chon Kwang Dang Jewelry Shop in 1962. Right next door, Mr. Cho Hoon started the Cho Pharmacy in 1965. Just outside the Main Gate to the right as one exited, Mr. Oh Sun-soo opened th GQ Tailor Shop in 1962.

By the early 1960s, many of the business structures were made from recycled wood (i.e., scrap lumber and pallets from the base) — as wood was a precious commodity at the time. (NOTE: There were plywood plants in operation throughout the country, but the supply could not keep up with the demand. The same was true of concrete as the country struggled to rebuild its infrastructure.)

Political Environment and Impact to Osan AB The increasingly authoritarian rule of President Syngman Rhee, along with government corruption and injustice, added to the discontent of the people. The elections of Mar 1960, in which Rhee won a fourth term, were marked by widespread violence, police brutality, and accusations by Rhee’s opponents of government fraud. A student protest march in Apr 1960, in which 125 students were shot down by the police, triggered a wave of uprisings across the country. Because the US had supported Rhee, there were protests at the front gate of the “Yankee Go Home” variety.

“The election had been held in March and Rhee was re-elected as a dictator, but a lot of the Koreans didn’t buy it and rioting broke out all over the country including at Chicol Village. Mobs of people gathered outside the gate and shouted anti-American slogans, “Yankee go home” and that sort of thing, and the ROK Army and police would wade into the crowd and beat hell out of them. We went down to the main gate to watch a couple of times. It was weird to see some of the people we knew in the crowd.” (Source: Ed Stirling’s narratives (1960) from Retired Activities Office)
Songtan-myeon becomes Songtan-eup On 1 January 1963, Songtan-myeon (district) was raised to the status of Songtan-eup (town), Pyeongtaek-gun by Law No. 1117 (promulgated on 21 November 1962). The name “Chicoville” (Chicol-ri or Chicol Village) persisted until 1963 and then was replaced with the term “Songtan.” (See above for how Songtan got its name for the discussions on the name choice of Songtan.) Songtan-eup (town) actually encompassed Jae Yok-dong (later Shinjang-dong), Songbuk-dong, and Jisan-dong. At this time, the Seojong-ni area was not associated with the Songtan area.

According to Mr. Oh Sun-soo there was some discussion amongst the local leaders to select a proper name choice for the new “town.” The name “Ssutgoke” — referring to the hills that one meets as one enters the Songtan area — meaning Pine Charcoal in Chinese ideographs was considered. However, there was also the mispronunciation that meant a “sex act.” Thus the name was shelved and Songtan accepted. Supposedly there were charcoal kilns along this hill.

In 1962, Shinjang-dong replaced Jae Yok-dong. (NOTE: The street Jeyok Gil (Road) behind the Songtan Mall Road still remains as a reminder of Jae Yok-dong.) Also at this time, the Americans stopped referring to the area as “Chicoville” (Chicol Village). The Americans started calling the area “Songtan.”

This change of Songtan to an “eup” (town) coincided with the ROK governments move to set up 140 “special entertainment districts” (red-light districts) and set up a system of “camptowns” (kijich’on) to gain much needed foreign currency from the military. At that time, the ROK government relied heavily on US grants and aid to survive. After this, the name “Chico-ville” (Chicol Village) disappears and the name “Songtan” — to American GIs at least — became synonymous with the area directly outside the main gate of Osan AB.

Mid-1960s The Songtan area continued to grow as more people came to the area seeking employment. With this growing population the service industry began to grow rapidly with restaurants, clothing shops, food stalls, tailor shops, shoe repair shops, barbershops, and the multitude of businesses needed to support a growing community. The Korean populace continued to refer to the Air Base (piyangi) as “K-55″ — and NEVER referred to it as Osan AB. The inter-city buses to Pyeongtaek followed the route of the MSR-1 past the bus terminal and referred to the airbase as “K-55″ on their placards.
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Harry Tezlaf at Turtle (near where Commissary in 2005) (1965) (Harry Tezlaf)
Pond near Turtle Monument (where Commissary is in 2005) (1965) (Harry Tezlaf)

(NOTE: On 28 Aug 2000, Brig Gen David Clary, 51st Wing Commander, transferred the Yi Taeyun Stele to the Vice-mayor of Pyeongtaek City, Yi Pil-woon. Afterwards, City Workers moved the Stele to a 14th Century Confucian School at Daeseongjeon Jinwi Hanggyo, Bongnam-ri, Chinwi-myeon, Pyeongtaek City along with other monuments. (Source: MIG Flyer, 1 Sep 2000) The stele was in honor of the Kwangju Governor Lee Taeyu in 1661. There is some uncertainty about the origin of this stele. An improbable tale is that it was erected in the area in 1661 and was present when the base was constructed. A more likely tale stated that it was relocated from Palgongsan near Taegu during installation of a communications site. (Source: Osan AB: Conservation.) It was turned over to the Pyeongtaek City government in Aug 2000 — though humorously the Osan AB claimed at the time that there were no formal records of this stele being in the USAF possession until 1989.

In Aug 2005, Kalani O’Sullivan visited the Daeseongjeon Jinwi Hanggyo site. The Lee Taeyu stele was sitting amongst other markers to the right of the entrance in what appears to be a storage area for monuments that no one is certain what to do with. The buildings and grounds are well-taken care of, but the site itself is not a very memorable landmark.)

(L) Daeseongjeon Jinwi Hanggyo (R) Yi Taeyun Stele with other Monuments (2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan)

(L) Yi Taeyun Stele Turtle base (R) Yi Taeyun Stele Top of Marker (2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan)

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Shinjang Mall Road near Railspur (Oct 1966) (Thomas Utts)

To the left is a Glass (window) Shop and a barber shop. To the right is an OB bar followed by a barber shop and Yanghwadang Optical & Gold Shop. At the right edge of photo is the Hanyang Drug Shop and next to it is the Namsan Drug shop.

Outside gate walking up Shinjang Mall Road (Oct 1966) (Thomas Utts)

Just ahead is the rail spur. The double telephone pole to the right was removed in 2003. This is the location of Jungangsijan(7) Road. To the right is the Shin Jin Barber Shop and a Restaurant. This was the location of the Olive Clothes Shop owned by Kang Sung-yoon in 2005.

To the left was the Daeho Inn and Daehung Inn. There was also the Samsong Dong watch Shop. The Oscar Beauty Shop was also on the left. It remained in operation at the same location until 2002.

Currently the Dong Sung Realty Office is situated in the building. The owner Mr. Kwon Oh-hoon has operated in the Songtan area since 1985, but moved to the location in 2003. The office is typical of the 1960s construction with concrete wall and corrugated transite (asbestos/concrete) roof. Living quarters were located above the store, but is now blocked off. The Mall side has a false front but behind it one can see the corrugated iron roofing added later. Over the years, the road has been built up so that one must step down to enter the office.

2005: (L) Dong Sung Realty (R) Mr. Kwon Oh-hoon, owner of Dong Sung Realty.

Another business dating back to the 1960s is the Tai Ho Lu Chinese Restaurant that is located behind the Dong Sung Realty next to the Parking Garage. In the 1966 photo, it is directly behind the large building to the left (Jaeil Store) next to the rail spur. The current owners are Sun Shing-Shyi and his son Sun Teh-Wei. The restaurant was established by the Sun Shing-Shyi’s brother in 1963. The original roof is of transite, but it has been covered by another roof that is tar-shingled. The concrete exterior was upgraded with ceramic tiles in 1983. If you open the back door of the restaurant, the rail spur is directly outside. The restaurant is well-known to the local populace and its having survived for over 40 years in the same location is the best testimonial as to the quality of its food. Large servings at a modest price — not fancy, but tasty and filling. The restaurant is both an in-house and delivery restaurant.

2005: (L) Tai Ho Lu Restaurant near Railspur; (R) Sun Teh-Wei and mother

The sign for the Daehung Yaugwan (Inn) is seen in the 1966 photo to the left. It was established about 1963. The Daehung Inn relocated to the Shinjang Road near the Main Gate in 1970 and is still operated by the same owner, Mr. Hong Yang-san.

Daehung Hotel Lobby (2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan)

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Main Gate Osan AB (1965) (Harry Tezlaf)
Shinjang Mall Road leading to MSR-1 (1965) (Harry Tezlaf)

Shinjang Mall Road outside Main Gate (1965) (Harry Tezlaf)
Beginnings of Jungang Open Market. A decade after the Korean War, commerce is starting to grow with the appearance of small shops and open stalls. (1965) (Harry Tezlaf)

First sewers and water mains in Songtan (1965) (Harry Tezlaf)
Movie billboard along road advertising the movies at the Seojong Theater on Milwal Road. (1965) (Harry Tezlaf) (NOTE: The Songtan Catholic Church — built in 1965 — is seen to the right on the skyline. This picture is taken along the Shinjang Road leading to MSR-1 before the Mokdong Road and Railroad tracks.)

Police box at Intersection of MSR-1 and road to Main Gate (NOTE: This is now the location of the Songtan Police Station. To the right was the Jaeil Movie Theater and Intercity Bus Stop.) (Mar 1967) (Harry Tezlaf)

Police box at Intersection of MSR-1 and road to Main Gate (Mar 1967) (Harry Tezlaf)

Store selling Beer & Soju (1965) (Harry Tezlaf) (NOTE: The cases of empty soju bottles outside the store.)
Shinjang Mall Road intersection with Railspur (1965) (Harry Tezlaf) (NOTE: The railroad spur is just ahead. To the left is the signal and behind it is a bar for traffic with a truck crossing the tracks. To the right is signs for women’s tailor dress shops (yong chang) and stationary shop (Moon Banggu). Notice the large building to the left of the picture at the railroad crossing and compare it to the 1966 photo by Thomas Utts and 1959 photo by Ed Stirling of the same location.)

MSR-1 looking towards Osan-ni (1965) (Harry Tezlaf) (NOTE: At the base of the ridgeline before leveling off and veering left to Osan-ni. Note the shops end at base of ridgeline.)

Road leading to MSR-1 at Railroad Tracks (1965) (Harry Tezlaf) (NOTE: Position of Jwa-dong Ridgeline indicates that this is the Shinjang Mall Road crossing. The Mokcheon pedestrian underpass is in this location today.)

Typical Songtan house in winter. Houses built with mudbrick and stucco with transite (concrete/asbestoes) roofing. Chimney for hondol heating system with charcoal. Notice the TV antennas indicating the inhabitants are American military. (1965) (Harry Tezlaf)

Songtan tile rooftops and construction (1965) (Harry Tezlaf) (NOTE: These houses are the newer houses built with cinder blocks and having ceramic tile roofs. The houses had a small cinderblock wall built around them for “privacy.” The use of concrete cinderblocks on the walls and in construction indicates that concrete was now available as an inexpensive building material. The method for mixing concrete was to dig a hole in the ground and mix the cement with sand and aggregate (small stones). The sifting screen is for aggregate. Uncertain of location in Chicol Village area.)

Rice fields (1965) (Harry Tezlaf)

NOTE: This photo taken from the Milwal-dong (Songwang area) near the present day overpass on the Shinjang 2-dong side possibly near the Songwang Church. The picture is taken from the Shinjang 2-dong side near the railroad tracks somewhere around where the Songtan Hotel is now. Behind the photographer are the houses that are just to the right of the Shinjang Road. At that time, the area between the west side of Hill 180 and the railroad tracks was still mostly ricefields.

The large building 2/3 of the way from the right is the Seojong (later Jungang) Movie Theater at the top of Milwal Road — where the Capital Hotel is presently located. The hills to the right are the base perimeter. The next hill to the left of the Seojong (later Jungang) Theater has a fuzzy image of the Jaeil Church that had just expanded in 1961. To the left of the Seojong (later Jungang) Theater are the houses spreading out from the west side of Hill 180 towards Seojong-ni. The ricefields will be reclaimed later to form the area used for the Songshin Elementary School and Taegwang Middle-High School. In the 1970s, the remainder of the fields will be reclaimed and the Pokchang Elementary School built at the left edge of the picture. The expansion towards Seojong-ni will end about where the houses on the left are.

(Source: The photos of Harry Tezlaf at Osan Retired Activities Office.)

Changes in Korean Society During the mid-1960s, South Korea’s economy grew so rapidly that the United States decided to phase out its aid program to Seoul. The success of Park Chung-hee’s five-year economic plans in copying the Japanese “kiretsu” (favored-company) success formula with the establishment of “chaebols” (favored family-operated business) — coupled with protectionism to allow the domestic markets to grow — was a success. However, the key factor was the Korean people’s willingness as a group to sacrifice for the good of the nation. But despite these manifestations of success, Korea was still a desparately poor place to live.

During the 1960′s, South Korea made great economic progress. Seoul, the showpiece of this success, became known as the “Miracle on the Han River.” Through its five year plans, the government set out to make Korea into a modern industrial nation. New industry sprang up around Seoul, causing the population to soar to 10.6 million. Rapid growth forced the government to develop plans to ease crowding in Seoul.

It chose an area south of the Han River, where relatively few people lived, to build new housing. The Express Bus Terminal was built in this area during this period. At this time, the Yongsan area on the other side of the river was still considered to be on the outskirts of Seoul.

Soon huge, high-rise apartments pierced the skyline in other outlying areas. Rice growing fields south of the city disappeared to be filled by apartment complexes. The city absorbed these new residential areas into its orbit. Yongsan and Yongdong-po which had been on the outskirts of Seoul, now became a crowded center.

Korea as a whole was experiencing a change in life-style. The new housing was unlike traditional Korean homes, which were wide, one-story structures with rows of rooms linked by courtyards and porches. Instead, residents of modern Seoul lived in vast apartment complexes surrounded by playgrounds, department stores, and sports facilities. The old-style homes disappeared from the city landscape. (Source: Korean Society.)

However, despite these successes in Seoul, the progress in the rural areas would not be seen for another decade. The area remained a poor rural area with a “one-horse” economy — Osan AB. There is a misconception on the part of the Americans who lived and worked in the area that the population was mostly bar-related and service industry workers. This is not true though there were significant numbers of prostitutes (said to number 2,500) and many bar-related workers in the area. The majority of the population of about 80,000 were base workers — but many more were employed as “contract workers” doing the menial tasks under contract such as cutting the grass or repairing facilities. The remainder of the population in the area was engaged in subsistence farming — but many families were engaged in both base employment and maintaining their farms.

Late 1960s By the late 1960s, the houses were starting to move up the slopes into the Mokcheon area near the tracks. In this area, new residences were being built exclusively for the GI personnel. It was apparent from photos that GIs were the residents as TV antennas sprouted from the rooftops. (NOTE: At this time, the black-and-white government Korean TV station ran only 10 hours a day, shutting down at 10p.m. To compensate, the Armed Forces Radio and Television Station (AFRTS-Osan) cranked up its power transmissions slightly so that it would spill over the immediate area. Korea never complained and the Americans living off-base were happy.

In the Milwal-dong area, at the top of the hill — where the Capital Hotel is today — stood the large Jungang Movie Theater. Just below it was the one engine firestation with a fire watch tower. (NOTE: In the early days of Songtan, the close proximity of the houses, plus the increasing use of lumber, coupled with the use of charcoal as the primary heating medium, made the threat of fire that could spread quickly a very real danger.)

The houses were now tightly packed and starting to spread down the slopes from the same dirt road (path) leading to Hill 180. According to Kasey Lee, that many of the new residents to the area were North Korean refugees — mostly from the Hwanghae-do Province — who were seeking work and tended to cluster together in the Milwal-dong area (Shinchang-dong and Jokbong-ni). (Source: Verbal conversation Kalani O’Sullivna with Kasey Lee, 25 Jul 2005.)

Jaeil Church (1968) (Bill Bayless)

(NOTE: The Songtan Jaeil Church was first started as the Ywadong Presbyterian Church on 5 Dec 1958. On 21 Mar 1961, the cornerstone was laid for a 40 pyeong church. On 1 Apr 1961, the Songtan Jaeil Church was officially founded. By 1973, the church had grown in size to 324 pyeong and in 1998 it reached its present 328 pyeong size. The church added a daycare school in 1981 and a Christian Missionary School in 1990. On 28 April 2000 it added the Jaeil Kindergarten. It is still at its present location on a hill top on the west side of Hill 180 in the Milwal-dong area.

Hill 180 Gate Road (Shinchang-dong and Jokbong-ni area) (1968) (Bill Bayless)

NOTE: Taken from the hilltop where the Jaeil Church is presently located. The top of the hill to left is the base perimeter. The wide path (road) running along the left is the Hill 180 Gate Road (Shinchang-dong and Jokbong-ni area). The dirt path running left to right now is the entrance to the Jaeil Church on the hill. Following the path back towards the Main Gate, the Seojong Movie Theater is at the top of Milwal Road. To the top right in the distance, the white building is the Songtan Catholic Church. The Kyongbu Railroad tracks are behind the hill of the church and the faint line from the Church area towards Osan-ni is the railway. The hills in the distance are the mountains in the Jinwi area. To the right the rice field area would be reclaimed and become the Pokchang Elementary School.

Notice the roofs of the houses below. To the bottom left, the roof of what appears to be corrugated iron is held down with sandbags alongside a mudwattle house (choga chip) with thatched roof. The roof on the bottom right is the same as the shanties built in Chicoville (Chong-mun eup (Front Gate Town)) in the 1950s. The roof is tar paper tacked down with strips. If you look at the houses in the area, you can see that it is a mix of the choga-chip houses with the mudbrick ones.

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2005

(L) Jaeil Church (Aug 2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan) (R) View from Jaeil Church to Milwal-Road. Capital Hotel now where Sejong Theater was. (Aug 2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan)

View from Jaeil Church. Pokchang Elementary School where rice fields once were. (Aug 2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan)

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Looking up the road to MSR-1 (1968) (Bill Bayless) (NOTE: Location uncertain but we believe the Shinjang Mall Road. The road was is actually on a gradual rising incline as it neared the Mokcheon Crossing. Notice the upper stories of the stores being used for housing. Believe this taken along the Shinjang Mall Road just before the rail par intersection to left which cuts the Shinjang Mall Road diagonally. In 1968 the railway spur was still periodically used so the houses are further back from the tracks. When the spur fell into disuse, the intersecting point became nothing more than a small alley along the discontinued rail spur. Right after the spur, there are houses on a hill. This hill was removed during the rail expansion of the 1980s. This area is now the railway fence area. In the center is the Jisan Hill and in the background right are the Burak Mountains. (SPECULATION) Notice the sign “KROVA” which could be a local radio station.)
Village in snow with Offbase Train Tracks (1968) (Bill Bayless) (NOTE: West of Hill 180. Burak Mountain is in the center. Railroad tracks are in the center running from left to right. MSR-1 is the faint line seen at the base of Burak Mountain where the MSR-1 levels off as it heads towards Seojong-ni. Open areas near the tracks are rice fields covered with snow.)

Milwal Road with Seojong Theater at top (1968) (Bill Bayless) (NOTE: Jungang Movie Theater at top of hill. Intracity bus stop next to theater. One engine fire station and fire watch tower to right of Milwal Road.)
Milwal Road showing dirt road (1968) (Bill Bayless)

Looking down on graves on west side of Hill 180 perimeter (1968) (Bill Bayless)
Outside the Perimeter fence on east side of Hill 180 looking towards Chicol Village (1968) (Bill Bayless)

Older area buildings with stalls and shops (1968) (Bill Bayless) (NOTE: Location unknown but photo seems to indicate an incline. Possibly the Jungang Open Market area.)
Alleyway of Village (1968) (Bill Bayless) (NOTE: Location unknown. Possibly the Jungang Open Market.)

Woodburning stove to stay warm (1968) (Bill Bayless)
Namsan Village: Farmer houses on hillside (1968) (Bill Bayless) (NOTE: See Namsan Village Road for comparison photos.)

Farmer houses east of Chicol Village (1968) (Bill Bayless)
Detail of mudwattle house roofline (1968) (Bill Bayless)

Village east of Main Gate (1968) (Bill Bayless)
Namsan Village: Farmer house (choga chip) (1968) (Bill Bayless)

Child (1968) (Bill Bayless)
Child (1968) (Bill Bayless)

Child (1968) (Bill Bayless)
Child (1968) (Bill Bayless)

Tiered hillside for farming: Unknown location (1968) (Bill Bayless)

GI Photographers walking downtown (Circa 1960s) (NOTE: The uniforms of the girls indicate they are from the Hyomyung Middle School in Seojong-ni. The uniforms of the GIs without nametags indicates they are prior to the mid-60s Vietnam War period as nametags were mandatory.) (51st FW Archives)
To fulfill the needs of the growing population, the Songshin Elementary School was built in the Shinjang-dong area in 1963 and the Taegwang Middle School was built in 1964. Later in 1969 the Taegwang High School was built next door as the first high school in the area. In placing education in perspective, to graduate from middle school in the 1960s was an real accomplishment as many children simply had to go to work to help their families survive. Only elementary school education was compulsory — and a high school graduate qualified to be a teacher in elementary schools. The system was much different from what is seen today.

On 1 Feb 1968 the Seoul-Pusan Express Highway (Kyongbu Expressway) commenced. President Park Chung-hee on 29 Sep 1969 opened the Osan-Chon leg of the 270-mile Seoul-Pusan Expressway. This highway, which would form the backbone of a nationwide mass transit network and improve military supply lines, was scheduled to be completed by mid-1970.

NOTE: One of the first projects of the Park regime was the building of the Seoul-Pusan highway (Kyongbu Expressway). On 1 Feb 1968 the Seoul-Pusan Express Highway construction commenced. This highway connected the two largest cities of South Korea but at the time of its construction it served more of a symbolic purpose than a transportation need based upon benefits versus costs. (Source: Watkins: Park Chung Hee.) President Park Chung-hee on 29 Sep 1969 opened the Osan-Chon leg of the 270-mile Seoul-Pusan Expressway. For the Songtan area this meant that there was a quicker way to get to Seoul with the opening of the Osan Toll Gate was erected.

The Seoul-Pusan highway opened up on 30 Jun 1970. The $1.4 billion project for the 267-mile highway was a solely ROK project that took three years to build. The highway included four military aircraft landing zones to be used in military emergencies. (NOTE: One of these landing strips is between Osan and Suwon — outside Suwon AB. Up until the late 1980s, the USFK and ROK would annually practice landings and takeoffs on the highways.) (Source: Eighth United States Army Chronology 1 Jan 1970-30 Jun 1970 and 1 July 1970-31 December 1970)

The Seoul-Pusan highway project is condemned by many cultural experts as a project that ran hell-bent upon completion without any thought of the possible cultural relics that would paved over. But on the other side of the coin, it is praised as the key to the industrialization of Korea in the 1970s. The World Bank advised against the construction of the road as there was no overwhelming need for the project and costs would outweigh the benefits. But Park pressed forward with the project as a means to stimulate economic activity. The project was a success as it launched the construction industry in Korea and served as the backbone of transportation infrastruction for further economic development throughout Korea.
The ROK annouced a devaluation of its currency as the open market exchange rate jumps from 290 to 305 won to one US dollar.

Miracle of the Han During the 1960′s, South Korea made great economic progress. Seoul, the showpiece of this success, became known as the “Miracle on the Han River.” Through its five year plans, the government set out to make Korea into a modern industrial nation. New industry sprang up around Seoul, causing the population to soar to 10.6 million. Rapid growth forced the government to develop plans to ease crowding in Seoul. It chose an area south of the Han River, where relatively few people lived, to build new housing. Soon huge, high-rise apartments pierced the skyline in other outlying areas. Rice growing fields south of the city disappeared to be filled by apartment complexes. The city absorbed these new residential areas into its orbit.

The new housing was unlike traditional Korean homes, which were wide, one-story structures with rows of rooms linked by courtyards and porches. Instead, residents of modern Seoul lived in vast apartment complexes surrounded by playgrounds, department stores, and sports facilities. The old-style homes disappeared from the city landscape. (Source: Korean Society.)

Unfortunately, the “Miracle of the Han” would take a few more years to extend outside of Seoul. Many people in the Cholla Provinces felt neglected by the prosperity of Seoul while their economies remained at the subsistence levels — and soon became a hot bed of discontent. The term “regionalism” was coined to reflect the feelings of the Cholla provinces towards the “TK” connections — Taegu-Kyongsan — where Park Chung-hee and his confidants came from. (NOTE: As a spin-off of the construction boom in Seoul, the construction companies started to obtain contracts overseas in the early 1970s, especially in the Middle-east, based on Korean labor being inexpensive. This in turn aided the country in bringing in much needed foreign exchange. Korea was exporting its labor force internationally in construction projects throughout the under-developed nations of the world, especially in the Middle East. Especially prominent was the use of Korean construction labor in Saudi Arabia as that nation constructed its cities to settle its nomadic Bedouin tribes into cities. The international construction projects were an important source of foreign exchange sent home to Korea.)

1970s
Early 1970s By the 1970s, some of the benefits of the Miracle of the Han started to trickle down to Songtan. In the Songtan area, there was a growth spurt starting in the early 1970s. Another reason was that the massive apartment construction boom in Seoul continued, but the construction industry had grown to the point that it was now expanding out. Seoul was designated as a “teukbyeolsi” or special city: and divided into wards (“Gu”). High-rise apartments had risen everywhere and the areas were soon getting crowded with people and factories. The government started expansion programs to the south of Seoul. Other national programs were aimed at the development of the 6 metropolitan cities (“gwangyeoksi”) of Busan, Daegu, Incheon, Gwangju, Daejeon, and Ulsan. (Source: Wikipedia: Subdivisions of South Korea.)

In addition, the expansion of the cement production plants had made concrete an inexpensive construction material. The clap-trap buildings were torn down and concrete structures erected. In the Shinjang-dong area low ceilinged two-three story buildings with cement floors and supports and fire-brick walls covered with stucco or ceramic tiles. Cinderblock construction was now the norm and concrete was in plentiful supply for construction. For residential areas, cinderblock one story-houses with tile roofs enclosed by a low wall went up. For two-story buildings, the method was of using rebar tied with wire and forms. Concrete was poured one story at a time. The floor/roof was held up with expandable supports until the concrete cured.

Along MSR-1, the low wooden buildings were replaced by two-story buildings fronting the road. Buildings started to look more “modern” with glass store windows and upgraded store fronts. For most shops, though, the lower floors were open shops for air circulation. However, much of this was simply cosmetic improvements as false fronts were erected over old buildings. In the mid-1970s a popular upgrade was to apply ceramic tiles to the building concrete store fronts. The popular building material became cinderblock — especially in the homes in the Mokcheon area that were constructed during this time. Cinderblock walls sprang up everywhere.

After the completion of the Seoul-Pusan Express Highway (Kyongbu Expressway) in 1970, the now well-seasoned highway construction crews were turned loose on paving the other major arteries in the nation — starting outside of Seoul and moving south. One of the first highways to benefit was Route 1 — the original MSR-1. (NOTE: The MSR-1 had been paved from Osan AB to Seoul in the mid-1960s, but it was still dirt road from there to Pyeongtaek and beyond.) Traffic lights, new street lights, crosswalks and center lines painted on the macadam highway gave Songtan a modern appearance. (NOTE: The farmers tearing up the street macadam for winter fuel was no longer a problem as inexpensive charcoal briquettes became the norm for heating of homes. However, there were persistent tales of this happening in the back gate area of Osan AB well into the mid-1970s.)

Prior to the 1970s, the MSR-1 and Shinjang Mall road was paved but the sidewalks remained dirt. The first sign of improvements was the paving and widening of the streets along with the installation of sidewalks. New street lights appeared along the streets of Songtan and along the MSR-1 areas. This was a result of the spin off of the building of the Seoul-Pusan Express Highway (Kyongbu Expressway) that was completed in 1970. Though critics stated that the cost outweighed the benefits of the highway because there was no transportation demand for such a highway, it did spur the creation of the construction industry.

Though the side roads remained dirt roads, the area started to appear as a modern town — at least along the main thoroughfares. Later in the mid-1970s the benefits of the massive nationwide program to upgrade the MSR-1 reached Songtan and the streets were paved with macadam. (NOTE The old problem of farmers digging up the macadam for winter fuel had been eliminated with the introduction of cheap charcoal briquettes.)

Songtan had been raised to the status of an “eup” (town) in January 1963 with a population of 20,000. However, it was fast approaching a population of a “shi” (city) with a required population of 50,000. (NOTE: A significant portion of the population was involved in the bar trade and service industries clustered with 1km of the base. Many of these individuals were transients in the sense that they were registered in other areas of the country and therefore, were not counted in the census for the Songtan area. At this time, the Seojong area was Seojong-myeon and not included in Songtan. Songtan would be raised to a “shi” (city) on 1 July 1981 and Seojong-myeon was joined with Songtan.)

During this same time period, the government undertook a nationwide program to attract tourists as a means of bringing in much needed foreign exchange. Massive programs were started to upgrade the facilities in Kyongju (National Museum, Sokram Grotto, Pulgaksa Temple); Pusan (Hyundae Beach area); Sorak Mountain area and Cheju Island facilities.

The secondary areas were the GI bar town areas of Tokduchon, Uijongbu, Itaewon, Kunsan and Songtan. These had been identified as “special tourism zones” in 1962 — a polite name for “camptowns.” However, in the 1970s a significant amount of foreign exchange was brought in through these establishments and therefore, these areas benefitted. (NOTE: Remember that in the 1970s, Korea was still a poor country. In addition, another source was the “payoff” from the US in granting military aid and grants to Korea to upgrade its military in exchange for the use of ROK forces in Vietnam.)

Pyeongtaek Lake In December 1973, a 2km-long embankment was constructed from the coast shared by Ggwan-ri, Hyeondeok-myeon, Pyeongtaekho-si Gyeonggi-do province and Mowon-ri, Inju-myeon, Asan-si, Chungcheongnam-do province, creating a huge 24 sq km lake. Ever since, this lake has been crowded with anglers from across the country all year round. Pyeongtaekho is a tidal lake, which is quite different from inland lakes because the water flows back and forth with the high and low tides. The lake is famous for its crucian carp and other species of carp. (Source: Pyeongtaek City site)

Pyeongtaek Lake
Flooding in Songtan The Shinjang Mall Road was first built by the Co. A, 839th EAB as a two-lane packed dirt road. The level of the central street was raised to about 15 feet above the rice field levels below. This can be seen best near the Young Chon Hotel road. There is about a ten foot drop from the storefronts along the mall to the Young Chon Hotel level. Then from the Young Chon Hotel to the level at Jeyok Road, it drops another 5 feet near to the level of the original rice fields.

As a result of the elevated construction of the Shinjang Mall Road, there were slopes on both sides. At first the shops in the 1960s were built at street level and their living quarters directly below the shop on the slope. With the advent of cheap concrete appearing as a building material as new cement factories were built, the construction along the road changed to concrete slab walls with a new innovation for the area — the addition of basements for bars or shops on the hillsides of the Songtan Bar row. On the east side of the Shinjang Mall Road, the sides of the slopes were dug out in line with the street and a concrete retaining wall constructed. Then the two-story building was erected with the shop at street level and the small apartment below. Later most of these apartments were converted to small bars. On the west side of the road, the slope was more gentle and on this side, true basements were erected as more and more two-three story structures went up. (NOTE: In Seoul, basements had been the standard in construction and doubled as air raid shelters. However, in Songtan, it was not the norm as the water table posed a problem. As a result only those buildings on “high ground” (sides of slopes adjacent to the major roads) had basements. Thus the area for basements stretched from where the Songtan Tourist Hotel and Prince Hotel are on the west side of the road to where the Young Chon and Korean Hotel are on the east side. Outside of these areas was where the reclaimed rice fields were.)

However, simply being up on the hillside did not prevent flooding of these basements as the water from the street level flowed down the alleyways into the basements. On 19 Aug 1972 the Songtan area was hit by torrential rains caused by nearing typhoons which resulted in heavy flooding. Evacuation plans were nearly put into effect for Osan AB. The low-lying areas of Mokcheon and the Shinjang 1-dong were severely impacted. The Jisan Stream emptied into the Mokcheon area and then went under the Back Gate Road (Doolittle Gate) to join the Osan Stream before joining the Chinwi River on the north of the base. When the Chinwi backed up, so did the Jisan Stream and flooding occurred in the entire Shinjang-area.

Because the Mokcheon area was the low ground, the runoff followed the Mokcheon roads into the low areas. Flooding undermined the foundations of the cinderblock walls that were erected in the mid-1970s as the water turned to streams flowing through the alleyways. In the Namsan Village area, those houses on the hillside did not suffer from flooding, but those at the foot of Hill 170 did have problems. If one goes to Namsan Village, the older homes along the street have cinderblock walls that sit at various angles showing the impacts of the various flooding in the area.

The Pyongtaek area is a flood-plain area and noted for massive flooding every ten years. Whenever it flooded, the road between Songtan and Osan-ni was blocked. The bridge which had been destroyed in the Korean War (1951) and rebuilt at a much lower level by the Army Combat Engineers had not been replaced. (See “1951″) Thus whenever it flooded, the bridge was covered with water and traffic ceased. Photos of the mid-1970s show that the flooding at times also inundated the railroad tracks as well.

River Overflowing Bridge (Note: This is the Chinwi River north of the base that is flooding) (1971) (Harry Tezlaf)
Flooding (1971) (Harry Tezlaf)

Flooding in JinWi Myeon(1971) (Harry Tezlaf) (NOTE: This is looking down MSR-1 towards Osan AB. MSR-1 jogs to the right at the base of the hill in the distance.)
Flooding in JinWi myeon (1971) (Harry Tezlaf) (NOTE: This is looking towards Osan-ni down MSR-1 in the long straight-away after what is now the Songtan Fire Department to the left.)

Flooding of Railroad tracks (covered by water) (1971) (Harry Tezlaf) (NOTE: The railroad tracks follow the telephone poles.)
Flooding (1971) (Harry Tezlaf)

Flooding near Osan AB (Unknown location) (Circa 1970s) (51st Archives)

Separate Development in Seojong-ni In the Seojong-ni area, new two-story buildings around the Seojong-ni train station went up and the growth spread into the bypass road area near the open market. Even up to the 1970s, the development of both areas were not interrelated — expect perhaps in spill-over base contracts for construction. Basically Seojong-ni became the center of servicing the commercial needs of the farmers in the area, while Songtan’s economy was almost totally dependant upon Osan AB. Small businesses were relocating from Seoul to the Seojong-ni area because of the cheaper labor and land costs — and the infrastructure had improved significantly with the paved roads and opening of the Osan Toll Gate to Seoul on the Kyongbu Expressway in 1969.

The separate development of the two communities continued with no real interface. Small-scale manufacturing and industrial activity was centering in Seojong-ni, while Songtan remained primarily a one-horse economy attached to the base. The area between Songtan and Seojong-ni remained sparcely populated.

Songtan would be raised to a “shi” (city) on 1 July 1981 and Seojong-myeon was joined with Songtan. The new center of the the city was to be the Ichung-dong area. “Ichung” means “two loyalties” and symbolizes the melding of the two areas of Songtan and Seojong-ni.

Education Songshin Elementary School is located down the road from the Main Gate about a 1/2 mile at the end of the restaurant and shop area of Shinjang 2-dong. The area for all of these schools were reclaimed rice fields. Songshin was founded around 1960 and Taegwang Middle School was founded in 1964. Taegwang High School established around 1969. Photos in 1968 show that portions of this area still was rice paddies. In addition, both sides of the railroad tracks further down towards Seojong-ni were still rice fields. (SITE NOTE: Dates need to be verified.) The Songshin Elementary School is entered from the Shinjang 2-dong Shopping area side, while the Taegwang Middle School is entered from the Taegwang School Road side.

With the increase in population, new schools were built in the area. At this time, the development of Seojong-ni and Songtan were developing independently of one another. The Miracle of the Han appeared in Seojong-ni with the appearance of small shops and the town expanding towards Songtan. In between in the 1970s, there was still open spaces. With the increases in school age population in the Songtan area, the schools were upgraded to two story concrete structures. The Kumgak Elementary school with its smaller rural population had a one-story facility built on the south side of Hill 180 in the Shinjang area. The Taegwan Middle School and Taegwan High School remained the only higher education sites in the immediate Songtan area.

Songbuk Elementary School (1972) (Songbuk Elementary School) (NOTE: The original one-story wood structure built in 1954 replaced with two story concrete structure. The school consisted of two one-story structures and one two-story structure on the north end. The slopes to the playground were still earth covered. Burak Mountain is in the rear.)

Songshin Elementary and Taegwang Middle-High School (1974) (NOTE: The Songshin Elementary is to the left. The building is the Taegwang Middle-High School. The design for the school was typical of the times with a long hallway to the front and classrooms off the central hall. The “steps” to the school were the student tiers for events. On the school ground soccer goals are set up. The school playgrounds also doubled as the area’s playground before and after school hours.) (1974) (Ken Shallenbarger)

2005: (L) Songshin Elementary School (Aug 2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan); (R) Songshin Elementary and Taegwang Middle-High School across fence (Aug 2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan)

Mid-1970s

Construction in Songtan There were major construction project within Songtan in the mid-1970s. There were two factors involved with this growth spurt. First, when Park Chung-hee visited the area in 1975, the Osan AB Commander requested the building of a new road to the MSR-1 because of the congestion in the Shinjang Mall Road area. Following this, Milwal Road was expanded and straightened in the mid-1970s much to the consternation of the folks whose homes were “condemned” and were forced to relocate. One of these was Mr. Oh Sun-soo, owner of the Victoria Hotel and former owner of the GQ Tailor which had been in the same location outside the Main Gate since 1962. Mr. Oh grumbles that they were not compensated adequately, but the family relocated and started anew. Mr. Son Kwang-chil, owner of Hanyang Kalbi and long-time resident of Milwal Road, confirmed this. When the expansion started, the road was a one-lane dirt path with water ruts running down the street. The expansion chopped about 12 feet out of the left side looking up the hill, while the right side only lost about 6 feet — to create a two-lane road up the hill. Those forced to relocate were given a little money, but no land to replace their loss.

After Milwal Road was straightened and led directly to the Main Gate, the side road Shinjang Road to the Overpass was built. The Overpass was constructed over the Kyongbu Railway. After the Overpass was constructed, the Mokcheon crossing was closed. (NOTE: The Mokcheon Underpass was built in the 1980s.)

The Taegwang School Road was constructed leading to Seojong-ni and Route 340 to Anjung. On the opposite side of the Overpass, the Fashion Alley (Myongdong Street) was widened and built to the Shinjang Mall Road. (NOTE: The construction boom continued into the 1980s with houses built along the Taegwang School Road and the Mokcheon Underpass constructed. The remainder of the rice fields to the south of Taegwang Middle-High School was filled in and the construction of Pokchang Elementary School started. The plans were in the works to elevate Songtan-eup (town) to Songtan-shi (city) in 1981.)

Construction Everywhere (1974) (Ken Shallenbarger)

Construction Everywhere (1974) (Ken Shallenbarger)

Construction Everywhere: Multi-purpose tractor used on farms to till the fields and to haul sand for construction (1974) (Ken Shallenbarger)

The first street lights across from the base and replaced the old lights that hung from the electric poles. These street lights also appeared along the MSR-1 giving the “business district” a more modern appearance. The streets were widened and paved. However, the alleys remained packed dirt.

The introduction of charcoal briquettes for the hondol boiler system — hot-water floor heat — alleviated the chronic winter fuel shortage problem. The use of kerosene heaters also started to appear, but the use was strictly for spot heating — mainly in stores or other commercial activities. Also introduced were the septic tanks which allowed for the indoor bathrooms — replacing the old outdoor “water closet” that was hand-emptied of its “night-soil” contents for use in the fields as fertilizer by farmers.

However, the biggest sign of life getting better was the housing area now sported TV antennas on the rooftops. Even though there was only the government black-and-white channel that ran only 10-hours a day, the base AFKN TV broadcasts spilled over as the transmission wattage was cranked up just a little to accomodate the GIs who lived off-base.

Songtan houses in low-lying area (1971) (Harry Tezlaf) (NOTE: Americans live in this complex as noted by TV antennas. Low-lying area near rice fields susceptible to floods. Uncertain of location, but believe looking at Hill 170 and Namsan Village in distance.)
Songtan houses on outskirts (1971) (Harry Tezlaf) (Notice the charcoal briquettes that were used for the hondol system during winter. There briquettes had a problem with carbon monoxide poisoning and as the economy improved many houses converted to kerosene boilers.)

New Housing In the early 1970s, the last of the rice fields in the old Chicol Village area (Shinjang 1-dong area) was reclaimed. Now the area to the east of the Shinjang Mall Road sloped off into a low-lying area that was filled with shanty structures built in the 1960s. However, on the fringes, some of these structures were being torn down and replaced by newer multi-bedroom houses — especially constructed for rental to the GIs in the area.

The Namsan Village area was relatively empty with primarily farmers houses and housing would not expand into this area until the mid-1980s. However, small apartments started to appear on the slopes near the Main Gate on the perimeter as the housing filled the reclaimed rice fields of the Chicol-ni area (old Jae Yok-dong area).

On the Mokcheon side near the railroad tracks, the newer houses were built with low cinderblock and stucco exteriors with tile roofs. Most had a exterior wall and tiny interior courtyard. Some two story structures were built for multiple occupancy. The interior was a long room that combined living room and kitchen functions. There were two-three small bedrooms and one bathroom off of the living room. There were bars on all the windows because of a thievery problem (Slickey Boys). The smaller houses had ceramic tile roofs, while the larger units in the Mokcheon area had flat rooftops accessed by a small set of exterior stairs. The larger housing with rooftop areas were constructed for married Americans in the Mokcheon Village area near the railroad tracks.

Alleyway to Residential area (1974) (Ken Shallenbarger)

Songtan rooftops (1974) (Ken Shallenbarger)
Songtan rooftops (NOTE: The ceramic tile rooftops and use of concrete for structures indicate increased affluence in the area.) (1974) (Ken Shallenbarger)

After the building spurt in the mid-1970s, there was no further growth towards the back gate area. Most of the area remained rice fields to the west of Namsan Village. In 1973, the 554th CESHR Det 1 (Red Horse) started numerous large scale projects that enhanced the quality of life on Osan. One of these was the new barracks that were constructed on Hill 180. In addition, Mustang Village was built by Korean contractors for dependents. Though there continued to be a need for housing off-base, it was no longer as critical as it had been. However, for enlisted personnel married to Koreans, most would reside off-base because the command-sponsored housing on base was normally reserved officers or those in the staff positions.

Construction in Songbuk-dong and MSR-1 area In the Songbuk dong and Jisan-dong areas along MSR-1, two story concrete buildings with basements also went up along the MSR-1 (Taehyun Road) and MSR-1 Bypass (Songbuk Market Road). The downtown area of Songtan started to appear more “substantial” in the photos of the time — though on a small scale. Though not as tightly packed as it is nowadays, the store fronts and businesses lined the Songbuk-dong streets along both the MSR-1 and the MSR-1 Bypass Road up the ridgeline to the base. After the Terminal Ridge Road (location of the present Express Bus Terminal) the building spurt tapered off.

Map of the Songtan Area (2004) (Songbuk House Office)

In the Songtan Map above, the green hill in the center is the Jisan Park Hill (Songtan Park). To the left are the MSR-1 closest to the left and MSR-1 Bypass Road coming down past the hill. The pink area gives a general idea of the extent of population expansion in the 1970s. It was limited to “high ground” areas around the main roads and to the east it was all rice fields and swamps. This was the limiting factor for further expansion to the east. The Songtan area ended at the small rise near the southeast tip of Jisan Park Hill (Songtan Park). In Jisan Park Hill (Songtan Park) was a reservoir that was called “Paradise Lake” (Boduchang) and used as a recreation spot with row boats. (NOTE: On the map it is the carved out area that became the Jisan Elementary School.)

According to Mr. Kwon Oh-hoon Paradise Lake extended down to the corner of the intersection where there is a stationary shop and over to the Kunyong Apartments. Also supposedly this area of the hill was also known to contain charcoal kilns using the acacia trees in the area leading to the area being known as Sutkogae (Charcoal rise). (Source: Verbal Conversation Kalani O’Sullivan with Mr. Kwon Oh-hoon, owner of Dongsung Realty, on 23 Aug 2005.)

Railway Crossing on Mokcheon Road (Circa late 1970s) (51st FW Archives)
Railway Crossing on Mokcheon Road (Circa late 1970s) (51st FW Archives)

Railway Crossing on Mokcheon Road (Circa late 1970s) (51st FW Archives)
Train southbound on Kyongbu Line (1974) (Ken Shallenbarger)

2005: (R) Mokcheon Pedestrian Underpass (Jul 2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan) (NOTE: In the early 1980s, the Mokcheon Underpass was built just a little ways from the old railway crossing after it was closed. At that time, a road was constructed to the top of the hill to the Shinjang 1-dong House Office and Jungang Church. In the late 1990s, the Mokcheon Pedestrian Underpass was built.); (R) Mokcheon Pedestrian Underpass looking towards Shinjang Mall Road (2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan)

(L) Area to left of crossing as one heads into Songbuk-dong. Compare this photo to the same area in the 1959 photo. This area now filled with deserted houses and structures that are collapsing. (2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan) (R) Area to right of crossing as one heads into Songbuk-dong.

Throughout the country, the major highways were being paved. The old MSR-1 — now called National Road 1 — was paved as part the national program. President Park Chung-hee on 29 Sep 1969 opened the Osan-Chon leg of the 270-mile Seoul-Pusan Kyongbu Expressway. This highway, which would form the backbone of a nationwide mass transit network and improve military supply lines, was completed in 1970.

The appearance of MSR-1 with its wide paved expanse seemed strange with painted crosswalks and traffic lights. Buildings were starting to become more substantial looking and it started to take on the appearance of a prospering country town.

MSR-1 Junction near Police Box (1976) (Harry Tezlaf) (NOTE: This is the “Y” intersection that enters Tanhyeon Road (MSR-1) near the Songbuk Farmer’s Market. Notice the MSR-1 has been paved and there is a center line painted on the street. (See Harry Tezlaf 1967 photos of the intersection with same building on left in photo.)

MSR-1 (Tanhyeon Road) at the intersection to the Shinjang Mall Road. (1976) (Harry Tezlaf) (Notice the crosswalk and stoplight. There is a policeman standing on the far right of the crosswalk controlling the traffic light. This is at the Y intersection from the Mokcheon railway crossing — near where the Songtan Police Station is now. The road is heading up the ridgeline to the intersection with the Shinjang Overpass Road at the top of the ridgeline. One block up to the right was the Jaeil Theater.)

Tanhyeon Road (MSR-1) at the old intersection to the Shinjang Mall Road. (2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan) (The road is heading up the ridgeline. The Kyungmin Bank is on the left. Behind the bank was where the bus depot was. One block up to the right behind the Woori Bank was where the Jaeil Theater was.)

An official looking “police box” was constructed at the MSR-1 Mokcheon intersection in the 1960s — with the police riding white motorcycles or jeeps. However, by the late 1970s, the police box had been removed. Instead, the police stood at the corners and controlled the traffic lights manually. Cars were still considered a luxury item in Korea but small compact trucks and autos were beginning to appear. However, most of the vehicular traffic in the area were American military trucks or vehicles. The Mokcheon railroad crossing at the end of the Shinjang Mall Road sported a small office with a Korean National Railway employee monitoring the crossing. Telephones were also a luxury item but public telephones began to appear in many restaurants and store fronts.

2005: (L) MSR-1 (Tanhyeon Road) Intersection looking down Mokcheon Pedestrian Underpass Street looking toward Railway (2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan) (R) Intersection of Mokcheon Pedestrian Underpass Street looking towards Terminal Ridge Road (2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan) (NOTE: The intersection used to be police box location in 1960s-1970s. Now the Songtan Police Box is next to the intersection.)

Throughout the country the secondary roads were also paved. The two-lane road to Yongin was also paved along with the road to Anjung. Though passenger cars were still scarce, earth-hauling trucks operating on the highways were everywhere. Road construction was going on round the clock. The Osan Toll Gate opened up on the Kyongbu Expressway.

Expansion of Milwal Road According to Mr. Oh Sun-soo, his family owned a home just outside the Main Gate and GQ Tailors was started in this location in 1962. In 1976, Park Chung-hee visited Osan AB and the Wing Commander stated that the Shinjang Mall Road was too congested and that he needed another access road to the MSR-1. Park Chung-hee acquiesced to the request and work was started. Mr. Oh’s family lost their home and business — and were compensated with very little money. Thus he remembers well how this road came about.

Main Gate. (1955) (NOTE: At the Main Gate there is a house nearest the gate to the right of the road. This house used to belong to the family of Mr. Oh Sun-soo. The road to the MSR-1 would come around the back of the house and enter the base. The road that goes to the top of the picture near the middle is the Milwal Road. The road would have to go around a farm house at the Main Gate and then proceed diagonally to Milwal Road.)

The first step was to extend and widen Milwal Road from the top of the hill to the Main Gate. Viewing old photos, the alley way just to the right of the Main Gate as you exit was the original Milwal Road as it wound around a farm house then it went at a diagonal to the base of the hill and then up the hill. The widening process meant the complete reconstruction of the road and many people lost their homes and were given very little in compensation.

The Milwal Road where the Seojong (later Jungang) Theater was at the top of the hill and the fire station off to the right was the first to begin work on. The road was widened up the hill and houses were razed to make room for this expansion. Then at the top of the hill, the extension of the Milwal Road project cut another road straight down the hill. This created the “Y” intersection at the top of the hill.

Looking up Milwal Road (2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan)

At the top of the right road followed the perimeter until it reached the Hill 180 Gate. Up to the 1970s, this remained a narrow dirt road. Makum-ni sprouted up outside this gate as a “camptown” area in the 1950s, but soon withered as the Shinjang area became the center of the bar culture.

Milwal Road (1968) (Bill Bayless)

After the road up the hill was expanded, the Milwal-dong Road was cut straight down the hill until it intersected with the Songtan Subway Station Road. Again this construction required homes to be razed along the new Milwal Road. (NOTE: In conjunction with this construction, roads were cut to set up the grid pattern in the Shinjang 2-dong area.) On Songtan Subway Station Road, another overpass was built where the Songtan Subway Station would later be erected and opened in 2005. After one crossed the overpass it connected to Jwa-dong Road (MSR-1).

After the Songtan Subway Station Road, the road veered right where it intersected with the old road that passes along the hill line below the Taegwang Middle-High School. This road has a small overpass built in the 1960s that crosses over the Kyongbu line and intersects the Jwa-dong Road (MSR-1). This is the boundary of Seojong-dong.

Milwal Road continued down until it connected to what is now Pokchang Road.

In the 1990s, Pokchang Road was constructed in anticipation of the move of the troops from Yongsan as agreed upon in a 1990 Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the ROK and the US. Pokchang Road was to connect to the new area on the west side of Hill 180 that had been reserved for the Yongsan relocation.

However, the ROK failed to follow through on the funding and the move stagnated. In 2000, Pyeongtaek City demanded the area be turned over to the City because of lack of use. Immediately, the Ministry of Defense turned the area over to the ROKAF and constructed the Air Force Operations Center (AFOC) along the west perimeter. The Pokchang Road terminates at the AFOC Gate.

Map of Shinjang 1-dong & Shinjang 2-dong area (2005) (Map at Songbuk-dong House Office)
Construction of Shinjang Road and Shinjang Road Overpass While the Milwal Road construction was going on, the Shinjang Road expansion from the Main Gate to Milwal Road started. Near the T-intersection of Shinjang Road and Milwal Road, the trees were cut down to make room for the expansion. Milwal road had been expanded up the hill and houses demolished on both sides to make room for the expansion. Basically, the Shinjang Road from the Main Gate to the Overpass was a four-lane road expansion, while the Milwal Road was a two-lane road expansion.

Outside Main Gate during Milwal Expansion; From Milwal Road looking towards Main Gate (1976) (Harry Tezlaf) (NOTE: Notice new lamp posts and trees.)

Outside Main Gate before the Overpass to MSR-1 built (1974) (Ken Shallenbarger)
Outside of Main Gate (9 Jun 1977) (36th FS Fiends Site) (Notice the trees have been cut down and Milwal Road is expanded.)

Shinjang Road to the overpass was not constructued until 1978. There were four paths into the Shinjang 2-dong area. (1) The first was the present Jungang Market Alley that starts at the Shinjang Mall Road and curves left to the Jungang Open Market. (2) The second starts at Shinjang Mall Road and Fashion Alley (Myongdong Road) and curves to the overpass area to the area of the Songtan Tourist Hotel. After about 100 feet it veered right and followed a curving path to the front of the Shinsong Elementary School in the Songwang area. (NOTE: None of the landmarks that were mentioned existed in 1960s, but many 1960s-era homes still exist that mark this path.) (3) The third path first went behind the house of Mr. Oh Sun-soo to the right outside of the Main Gate. (Source: 1957 Photo of Main Gate area) It continued across to the alleyway at the rear of the Asia Hotel parking lot. It ran along the side of the Milwal hill at the present Prince Hotel and continued down to the area of the Songwang Church (Onnori Church). The path continued until the end of the housing at the base of the hill where the Jaeil Church is now located. (NOTE: The path near the Main Gate remains as the diagonal alleyway from the behind the 7-11 to the Shinjang Overpass Road. The narrow alley at the rear of the Asia Hotel Parking lot intersects with Milwal Road coming down from the Capital Hotel. Older residents say the path went up side of the hill at this point. One street down, there is a narrow side road on the side of the hill to mark this route to the Songwang area. Along this route, 1960s era houses are still seen, though upgraded.) (4) The fourth was a road that started at the Main Gate and went behind a farm house. (Source: 1957 photo of Main Gate area) The path cut diagonally to the base of Milwal Road, then a narrow dirt path rutted by water runoff. At the top of the hill, it veered right as the Hill 180 Gate Road that followed the perimeter. The houses started to be not so cramped along this narrow dirt path until one reached the Hill 180 Gate at Makum-ni. (NOTE: Milwal Road was “straightened to cut directly to the Main Gate. All that remains of the diagonal path is the alleyway just outside the Main Gate today. The road at the Y near the Capital Hotel leading to the Songtan Subway Road would not be built until the late 1970s.)

After Milwal Road was complete, then the work on the Shinjang Road and Overpass started. Over the ridgeline, the Terminal Ridge Road had already been cut to connect the MSR-1 (Taehyun Road) to the MSR-1 Bypass Road (Songbuk Market Road) in the 1960s. The overpass simply followed the path of the Terminal Ridge Road down to Milwal Road. (NOTE: The ridgeline and portions of the Shinjang area was cutback in the late 1980s to expand the railway to a four track system.)

Unlike the Songtan Subway Station overpass which was basically a bridge from one hill to another where the Kyongbu line had been cut in between, the Shinjang Road overpass required the construction of a ramp from the bottom of the ridge to the top of the ridgeline. Thus it is longer than the other overpasses in the area.

(L) Overpass Bridge to Main Gate (1984) (Mike Dunnagan); (R) Railroad Overpass on Shinjang Road (2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan)

2005: (L) Overpass on Shinjang 2-dong side (Aug 2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan) (R) Overpass from Taegwang School Road on Shinjang 2-dong side (Aug 2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan)

After the overpass construction was complete, the Mokcheon crossing on the Shinjang Mall Road was closed. In one sense, this closure added to the isolation of the Shinjang-dong area from the rest of Songtan. The commercial growth continued in the Songbuk-dong side of the town, while the Shinjang area remained linked to the base for its survival. Park Chung-hee was intending to attract tourists to garner much needed foreign exchange in the mid-1970s. As a result, Seoul, Kyongju, Pusan and the military camptowns such as Itaewon, Euijongbu and Osan were upgraded as “special tourism zones.” But this action made the Shinjang area whose economy was based solely on the American tourism shopping and bar trade.

Though Osan AB still provided up to 80 percent of the revenues for the Songtan area in the 1970s, it was slowly declining as small and mid-sized manufacturing relocated to the Pyeongtaek area from Seoul after the Kyongbu Expressway was opened and Route 1 (MSR-1) was paved. The move was to take advantage of the lower cost-of-living in the area, which in turn meant increased profits.

Intersection to base. (1974) (Ken Shanllenbarger) (NOTE: Roads paved by mid-1970s. Yellow Taxi and trucks from downtown. To base is to the left. Right is to the MSR-1 Bypass.)

MSR1 Police Box (1974) (Ken Shallenbarger) (NOTE: The Police Box is where the rail overpass on Shinjang road intersects with Tanhyeon Road (MSR-1). The policeman on the right is controlling the traffic light. To the left is downtown and straight ahead is the Express Bus Terminal.)
Same intersection on the left in 2005. To left is to downtown and to right to Seojong-ni. Straight ahead to Express Bus Terminal over hill. (Jun 2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan)

Overpass from the top of the hill. It appears much as it does today. (1978) (Harry Tezlaf) (NOTE: Coming from the base, the road to left goes to the “downtown” area and the road to the right goes to Jwa-dong (Sutkogae) )

Jwa-dong area After the overpass to the Main Gate was built, the bars that were on the hill leading up to the MSR-1, such as Papa Joe’s, moved back to the Shinjang-dong side of the tracks. This relocation was partially due to the base action to close down the “Sutkogae” area along Jwa-dong Road on the other side of the railroad tracks. Over the years, a segregated bar system had developed whereby the “Chicoville” (Chicol Village) bars were strictly whites-only, while the bars across the railroad tracks became “negro-only.”

In the 1970s, the U.S. experienced a rise in racial tensions and race riots erupted throughout America — epitomized by the LA Race Riots. In the local area, there were race riots between Camp Humphreys’ blacks and whites, as well as blacks and Koreans. These incidents spilled over into Camp Stanley and along the DMZ area. (See Osan & Songtan History “1971″) There were incidents on a smaller scale in Osan, but it was a problem throughout the USFK. The solution was to close the blacks only bar area through off-limits sanctions and move the bar area into the Shinjang Mall area where it could be controlled.

Papa Joe’s previously on Jwa-dong side of rail overpass (Sutkogae) (NOTE: Relocated to Songtan side due to drop in business after racial tensions) (1978) (Harry Tezlaf)

Construction in the Shinjang area The street from the Main Gate to the overpass was completely reconstructed as the road was widened, gutters laid and street lamps installed.

Front Gate (1975) (Ken Shallenbarger) (NOTE: The Namsan Village Road to right still had not been constructed. In the area was a hotel.)

Fashion Alley (Myongdong Street) was being constructed with as a wide street on one side of the overpass, while the Taegwang School Road started on the other side of the overpass area and ran parallel with the tracks down past the Songshin Elementary School and Taegwang Middle-High School to Seojong-ni. In the area near the Songshin Elementary School, the roads were being laid out in a grid pattern. (See “Late 1970s” for details of Construction in Shinjang 2-dong area.)

(L) New construction in Fashion Alley (Myongdong Street) (1978) (Harry Tezlaf) (R) New construction in Fashion Alley (Myongdong Street) (1978) (Harry Tezlaf) (NOTE: View from the new Railway overpass on Shinjang Road. Note that on the other side of the overpass, the construction of the Taegwang School Road was also being accomplished at the same time.)

The Jungang Open Market remained in the same location to the left of the overpass heading to MSR-1 but added a covering over the alleyways. The businesses that had first sprung up in the 1960s as commerce returned to the area remained in the Sogwang area, but the business center had moved to along MSR-1 into the Songbuk-dong area. The area became the center for used furniture and appliances, while small repair shops and other small businesses opened in the Songbuk-dong area.

Jungang Open Market (Circa 1970s) (51st FW Archives)

Junagang Open Market selling ground Chili (Gochu) powder (1974) (Ken Shallenbarger)

Junagang Open Market (NOTE: This area in same location near overpass, but now “hidden” by all the new shops.) (1974) (Ken Shallenbarger)

2005: Junagang Open Market (2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan)

2005: Junagang Open Market (2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan)

2005: 1970s Fire warning sign still in use (2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan)

Children’s ride (NOTE: The horses were on springs and children bounce up and down on them for a pitiance. These are still seen along the streets and in parks in many urban areas pushed by old “harabojis” (grandfathers).) (1974) (Ken Shallenbarger)

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Milwal Road

Outside Main Gate before the Overpass to MSR-1 built (1974) (Ken Shallenbarger)
Outside of Main Gate Before Overpass built (9 Jun 1977) (36th FS Fiends Site) (Notice the trees have been cut down and Milwal Road is expanded.)

2005: Mr. Son Kwang-chil, the owner of Hanyang Kalbi, has been a resident of Milwal Road since 1957. Hanyang Kalbi is located near the Citibank at the T-intersection leading to Shinjang Road and the overpass. He attended Songshin Elementary School in 1965 and operated a wholesale business from the same location as the restaurant starting in 1988. In 1998, Mr. Son opened the Hanyang Kalbi Restaurant in the same location. Bag Lady’s Tour of Songtan states: “Han Yang Bulgogi House: Back down on the street, turn to the right. This bulgogi house will be on your right. It is one of our two favorite bulgogi houses in Songtan. You can either sit on the floor Korean style or in chairs American style. Either way you will experience some great Korean food and culture.”

Hanyang Kalbi located near intersection to Shinjang Road overpass (2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan)
2005: Mr. Son Kwang-chil, owner Hanyang Kalbi (2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan) (NOTE: Mr. Son has lived in the same location since the 1950s.) Both he and his wife are Lion’s Club members and active in community.

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Kyonggi Bank Outside Main Gate (NOTE: Later became the Hanmi Bank (or Korea-America Bank (Hanguk-Miguk)) (1974) (Ken Shallenbarger)

2005: Old Hanmi Bank (old hangul on top of building) but now Citibank (2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan)

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Milwal Road – Main Gate

Main street outside of Main Gate (1974) (Ken Shallenbarger)

Main street outside of Main Gate (1974) (Ken Shallenbarger)

First Stores Outside Main Gate (1974) (Ken Shallenbarger) (NOTE: The Sign says that Young Chon Hotel is 150 yds down the Shinjang Mall area.)

Songtan outside Main Gate. (Circa 1978) (Pyeongtaek City)
(Source: Pyeongtaek History (CD), Pyeongtaek Si Sa)
(NOTE: Kasey Lee’s Tailor Shop moved closer to the Main Gate.)

2005: Mr. Lee Kyong-chu — or Kasey Lee as he is commonly known as — is the owner of the Kasey Lee Tailor Shop and in 2005, the President of the Songtan Chamber of Commerce. In 2004, he was the recipient of the USFK Friendship Award as a distinguished member who promoted friendly relations between the US and Korea.

Kasey Lee’s Tailor Shop across from the Main Gate (2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan)
Mr. Lee Kyong-chu (Kasey Lee) (2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan)

2005: Mr. Jim Price of the Hyong-Price Agency located across the alleyway from the 7-11 store, has been a fixture in the Shinjang area for many years and an invaluable source of information. A past commander of the VFW, he is one of the few remaining members of the Tuskegee Airmen.

(L) 7-11 at Shinjang Mall across from Hyon-Price Insurance (2002) (Unknown) (R) Mr. Jim Price and former Chief of Police Kim Yong-bin (2000) (Jim Price)

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Shops outside Main Gate (Jan 1978) (Harry Tezlaf) (NOTE: The shop on right has sign that reads “Lucky Yongchang” (Lucky Tailor Shop). Note that building is same with picture below except for cosmetic changes.)

2005: (L) Lucky Shop Outside Main Gate (2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan) (R) Lucky Shop Owner Choi Jae-hyun (2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan)

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Aragon Alley

Aragon Alley (1974) (Ken Shallenbarger) (NOTE: The only remaining original shops are Chon Kwang Dang Jewelry and Cho Pharmacy. The Tong Shim Hotel was torn down and replaced by the Korea Hotel in 1987. All of the shops to the rear of the photo have been torn down.)

Aragon Alley (1977) (51st FW Archives)

(L) Shinjang Mall area (2002) (Unknown) (R) 2005: (L) Chon Kwang Dang Jewelry on Aragon Alley; (R) Mr. Yi Eun-hak, owner of Chon Kwang Dang Jewelry Shop (2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan) (NOTE: Chon Kwang Dang Jewelry Shop established in 1962. In foreground left in picture above.)

2005: (L) Cho Pharmacy on Aragon Alley (2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan) (R) Mr. Cho Hoon, owner of Cho Pharmacy (2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan) (NOTE: Cho Pharmacy established in 1965. On left with “Yak” (drug) sign in picture above.)

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Rodeo Alley

Rodeo Alley (Gil) (1974) (Ken Shallenbarger)

Rodeo Alley (1978) (Thomas Utts)

(L) Rodeo Alley (2002) (Unknown) (R) 2005: Mr. Kim Young-hi, owner of Twin Blanket Shop. (2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan) (NOTE: Mr. Kim used to own the OB Makju and Chicken bar to right of the 1978 photo above. The bar was established in 1978. Afterwards, Mr. Kim established the Twin Blanket Shop in 1985 near the same location.)

2005: (L) Looking up the street to the Opera Club. (2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan) (R) Mr. Park Young-sim, owner of My Shop on Rodeo Alley, with daughter and grandson (2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan) (NOTE: My Shop is located in the basement area of a building to the right in the photo to the left. Prior to this shop, in 1974, Mr. Park had a shop on Aragon Alley at the end of the lane before moving his shop.)

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Young Chon Alley

Looking Down Yong Chon Hotel Alley (1976) (Harry Tezlaf) (NOTE: The Yong Chon Hotel is the first building on the left. There was a small bar row in the alleyway next between the hotel and the next building. The next buidling belongs to Mr. Kim Sang -do whose family resided on the third floor. Jae Yok Road joined the Yong Chon Alleyway. The Hilltop Club is the bar to the right. It was leveled when the Jae Yok Road was extended to Plaza Road. Across the street from the Yong Chon Hotel, the Yong Chon Annex parking garage was built.)

2005: Kim Sang-do, owner small electronics repair shop, and Jeong Tae-ho, President Young Chon Hotel (2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan) (NOTE: Mr. Kim Sang-do still resides in the same location. Mr. Jong Tae-ho is semi-retired and leaves the day-to-day operation of the hotel to his son. As long time residents of the area, both have a wealth of information on the community’s growth.)

Looking Up Young Chon Hotel Alley (1977) (51st FW Archives) (NOTE: The Yong Chon Hotel is the first building on the right with the Yong Chon Western Restaurant. The sign reads “Hotel Yong Chon Lang.” Where the Oriental Antique Company is is now the Shinjang Shopping Mall.)

2005: (L) Young Chon Hotel (2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan) (R) Young Chon Hotel Staff: (Left to Right) Kim Han-sik, K.S. Choi (Manager); Ma Ki-ben; Jong Yeon-hong (owner) (2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan)

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Shinjang Mall

Shinjang Mall (Circa late 1970s) (51st FW Archives) (NOTE: Telephoto lens gives distorted perspective. Hanil Church to right).)

Victoria Hotel (Circa 1977) (51st FW Archives) (NOTE: VFW located in basement of Victoria Hotel from 1964-1977)

2005: Mr. Oh Sun-soo is the owner of Victoria Hotel and the former owner of the GQ Tailors established in 1962. Mr. Oh is a two-time councilman for the area and highly respected member of the community. Born in the village of Mite Konji-ni (Lower Konji Village) in the Songbuk-dong area, he is one of the most knowledgable persons on the early history of the area. Now retired, the day-to-day management of the hotel is in the care of his son.

2005 (L) Victoria Hotel (2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan); (R) Mr. Oh Sun-soo, owner of the Victoria Hotel. (2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan)

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Mike’s All-Seaons Shop (NOTE: A landmark shop on the Shinjang Mall) (1974) (Ken Shallenbarger) (NOTE: At the time, Mike’s All Seasons was directly across from Aragon Alley.)

(L) Mike’s All Season Shop (2002)(Unknown) (R) 2005: Employees of Mike’s All Seasons Shop: Oh Young-seok, Kim No-mi and Song Sun-young (2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan) (NOTE: Bag Lady’s Tour of Songtan states: “Mike’s All Seasons: Quite possibly one of the most popular merchants in Songtan, Mike carries sportswear for every fan and does wonderful customized work. He is able to make T-shirts, sweatshirts, warm-up suits, hats, coins, etc. He has an extensive clientele and good prices. He is on the web! Bring a design for him to work up (silkscreen) for special events, etc.”.)

Mike’s Arcade & King’s Custom Tailor Shop (2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan)
Kim Chu’n-Kyong family (2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan)

Mr. Kim Chu’n-kyong was the original owner of Mike’s All Season Shop which he established in 1977. He sold it and started Mike’s Arcade in 1983 just down the Mall. (NOTE: Bag Lady’s Tour of Songtan states: “Mike’s Arcade: If you are pressed for time, and need to get some things fast–here is the place. It could be called a one stop shopping outlet. Located inside are a few areas: leatherwear, sweaters and souvenirs. One of the few places in the area to buy Korean Dolls, Mike’s Arcade is located in the rear alley which hosts Mr. Lim’s and Royal Bag and also on the corner of the main Shinjang Shopping Mall. Fountains are also available to purchase and usually line the side of his store in warm weather.”

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Mrs. Choi Hong-ryon of Songwang Blanket Shop (1974) (Ken Shallenbarger)

Ebenezer Jewelry Shop (2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan)
Mrs. Choi Hong-ryon at Ebenezer’s Jewelry Shop (2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan)

The Ebenezer Jewelry Store has been changed over the years as the Songwang Bag Shop, then Songwang Blanket Shop and finally the Ebenezer Jewelry Store — though the sign says in hangul “Songwang Sa.” Strangely, the sign has a biblical reference to the name, Ebenezer, printed on the store sign. Mrs. Choi Hong-ryon shown in the 1974 photo, is now 72 and has turned the ownership of the shop over to her son.

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Late 1970s The biggest improvement was the paving of the roads with Macadam. Even up to the mid-1970s, poor farmers would tear up the roads near their fields. Though the businesses were rapidly spreading outward from the Songbuk Open Market area, the center of downtown remained at the intersection of Shinjang Mall Road and MSR-1. The Songbuk Open Market, bus depot and Jaeil Theater were within one block of the intersection.

Jaeil Theater on MSR-1 (Circa 1977) (51st FW Archives) (NOTE: Now the area is the parking lot behind the Uri Bank on Tanhyeon Road (MSR-1).)

Jaeil Theater (Jan 1978) (Harry Tezlaf)

(L) Old Jaeil Theater location (2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan) (Notice the house in the background of old photo and the house in this photo.) (R) Old Jaeil Theater location (2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan)

Tanhyeon Road (MSR-1) at the old intersection to the Shinjang Mall Road. (2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan) (The road is heading up the ridgeline. The Kyungmin Bank is on the left. Behind the bank was where the bus depot was. One block up to the right behind the Woori Bank was where the Jaeil Theater was.)

By the late 1970s with the availability of cheap charcoal briquettes and inexpensive kerosene heaters, eliminated this problem. (NOTE: However, the portable kerosene heaters operated within enclosed spaces without ventilation still posed risks of carbon monoxide poisoning.) Though the paving of the streets started in the city areas, most of the smaller country roads would remain dirt until the 1990s when they were covered in concrete under a national program. The availability of road-building equipment and trained road building crews improved as major highway construction projects appeared throughout the country.

Within the Shinjang mall area, the road was paved up to the MSR-1. Most of the major alleyways were paved, but the smaller ones were still dirt. These would be upgraded at the owners’ expense. The shops fronting the mall area constructed false fronts that disguised the true nature of the structures — most of which were built in the 1960s. There were sidewalks with stanchions in front of the store. At the curb, covered gutters ran along the length of the street.

(L) Shinjang Mall Area with paved streets (Circa late 1970s) )51st FW Archives) (NOTE: The Stereo Club is to the far right with only a portion of its sign showing. Next to it are two small signs that are actually one building that would be demolished in 2005.) (R) Stereo Club with the building next door being demolished. (Jul 2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan)

Building next door to Stereo Club being demolished. (Jul 2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan)

In Jul 2005, the mudbrick and stucco building built in the 1960s next to the Stereo Club was demolished. Once the false front was torn down, a building with a transite (corrugated concrete/asbestoes) roof was revealed. Below this structure was the basement level with a small room and bath. This is at the same level as the Young Chon Hotel. It was accessed by a small flight of stairs from the mall area and by an alleyway to the rear of the Young Chon Hotel.)

Heading towards Main Gate area (1978) (Thomas Utts) (NOTE: Construction at Main Gate indicates the time period to be near 1978 when the Shinjang Road was being expanded. Note the stairs coming down at the Main Gate. Most of the shops have changed.)

Heading down Shinjang Mall Road (1978) (Thomas Utts) (NOTE: Most of shops in the photo are changed. Mike’s sign on right is Mikes Tailor Shop (now defunct) run by Mr. Chae. Aragon Club to the right. The Shinjang Mall Road turns right at the Victoria Hotel (with VFW sign) as it nears the rail spur.)

Jungang Open Market (1978) (Thomas Utts) (NOTE: Shot taken towards Fashion Alley (Myongdong Road). The Seoul Glass (window) shop Is now the Power Shop and the shop in the right foreground is now the Pyramid Shop.)

2005: (L) Jungang Open Market looking towards Shinjang Road (2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan) (NOTE: The Power Shop is in the location of the Seoul Glass Shop in 1978.) (R) Jungang Open Market looking towards Fashion Alley (Myongdong Road) (2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan) (NOTE: The Pyramid Shop is in the location of the shop in the right foreground with the awning in 1978. The owner of the Pyramid Shop in picture pointing out the shops in the 1978 photo.)

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Chunil Hotel Opens On Dec 1978 the Chunil Hotel opened with 31 beds — and later expanded to 33 beds. In 1979, the Chunil Hotel signed an Accommodation Services Contract with Osan Air Base. In 1997 Asia Hotel opened with 88 rooms. In 2004, the Chunil Hotel merged with the Asia Hotel. In Sep 2004 the hotel expanded to 91 room. In Dec 2004, it was registered as the Asia Tourist Hotel. (See Asia Hotel for details of hotel. This site features an exceptional map of the area.)

Mr. Kim Jae-won, owner of the Asia Hotel, in front of the Asia Hotel. (Sep 2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan)

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Construction in the Shinjang 2-dong Area The last of the rice fields at the base of Hill 180 was reclaimed in the late 1970s. The area became housing area and on the other side the Pokchang Elementary School was built. First the roads were laid out on a grid pattern, then the houses were constructed. Most of the new houses were built with red brick.

At the same time the massive reconstruction of the Shinjang/Milwal areas was going on, a few main arteries were cut following a grid pattern to provide access through the area, but the remainder of the “streets” were nothing more than small alleyways. As there were few cars in the 1970s, this was not a problem. To this day, the main streets in the Shinjang 2-dong Jungang Shopping Mall remain narrow and twisting following the topography of the land. If one looks at an overlay of the roads in the area, one can identify the development AFTER the late 1970s by the streets being laid out in a grid pattern, while streets BEFORE this period followed the topography and went in all directions with many dead ends. (NOTE: The “old” area would be if you drew a line from the Y-intersection at the top of Milwal Road directly across to the Taegwang School Road near the railway tracks. Everything from the line to the Overpass is the “old” area.)

Area right in front of Prince Hotel. (NOTE: Prince hotel built in 1988.) The Chong Su Tan Bathhouse chimney is seen. (Circa late 1970s) (51st FW Archives)

(L) (R) 2005: Corner Prince Hotel to left with fruit stand across the street (Aug 2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan)

2005: (L) Area right in front of Prince Hotel. (Circa late 1970s) (51st FW Archives) (R) Prince Hotel Staff: Kwon Oh-so and Chae Kwi-yong-; (Aug 2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan)

2005: (L) Chong Su Tan Bathhouse (Aug 2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan) (R) Street across from Prince Hotel looking toward Mall area (Aug 2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan)

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The Taegwang School Road was cut parallel with the Kyongbu Railway tracks. Starting at the Shinjang Road overpass –constructed in 1976 — it ran down past the Songtan Subway Street and continued down to Jijang-dong Road. (See Taegwang School Road.)

When the Milwal Road was straightened and expanded, a road was cut straight down the hill where the Hill 180 Gate Road (Shinchang-dong and Jokbong-ni area) turned right at a “Y” intersection. The Milwal Road went down the hill to the Songtan Subway Street where it curved right. (See Milwal Road.)

NOTE: Songtan Subway Road is used for reference only as the Songtan Subway Station was not built until 2005 and the overpass was constructed at that time. This road runs between the Songshin Elementary School constructed in 1965 and the Taegwang Middle-High School constructed in 1970.

The Songshin Elementary School was built on high ground in 1965, but Songwang Middle School next door used tents. In 1973, the Taegwang Middle-High School were built on reclaimed rice fields next to Songshin Elementary and replaced the Songwaqng Middle School. In the 1960s, the area covered by rice fields extended from the small rise on which the Songwang Church (Onnori Church) on the north to the area close to the road that forms the Seojong-dong boundary. See the 1965 photo of Harry Tezlaf of the rice fields to get an idea of the scope of this rice field area.)
The Hill 180 Gate Road (Shinchang-dong and Jokbong-ni area) extension that curved right is in-line with the hill on which the Jaeil Church was constructed in the early 1960s. It ran parallel with the Hill 180 Gate Road (Shinchang-dong and Jokbong-ni area) that ran above the Jaeil Church hill near the perimeter of the base. Photos of the late 1960s show few homes on the hill which Jaeil Church was located. However, by the 1970s, the houses were starting to crowd in around the church — though not as tightly as in the Shinjang Mall Road area. This area did NOT follow the grid pattern because of the mass of existing homes. (See Hill 180 Gate Road.)

The Milwal Road extension continues down until the road that runs around the south end of the Taegwang Middle-High School. This road is the boundary line of the Seojong-dong.

On the incline down from Milwal Road to the base of the hill in the “old” area remained a mix of different time-period constructions. They were clustered tightly together as the housing spread down the hill in the 1960s. In the “new” area, a grid pattern was set up based up the Milwal Road on one side and the Taegwang School Road on the other.

NOTE: The old road that curved down to the Songwang Church and ended at the edge of the rice field that became the Songshin Elementary School in 1965 was eliminated. Another curving road that followed the alleyway beside the Prince Hotel, across the street and curved down skirting the rice fields that became the Songshin Elementary and Taegwang Middle-High School. At the end of the Taegwang Middle-High School the rice field ended and there was a little rise. There was a curving road on the top of this small rise that became the Seojong-myeon boundary (when Seojong-ni was not a part of Songtan). Over the rise, there was a rice field that became the Pokchang Elementary School in the 1970s. (See Milwal Road)
After the roads were laid out, construction began in the reclaimed rice field areas. The houses outside of the “old” Jungang Open Market Shopping area — about two streets from the Shinjang Road Overpass — are red-brick constructions which were popular in the late 1970s-80s. Instead of the haphazard construction of the past, they were neatly lined homes laid out in a more orderly and planned manner. Though there were multi-story business buildings (shops below and homes above) erected, most of the structures were residential structures or pure business units.

In the newer areas where the rice fields had been reclaimed, the houses were more spacious. The new construction area is easy to identify by the neat lines of houses constructed with the red brick — as contrasted with the concrete structures that were built in earlier years. The red fire brick would be the material of choice up to the mid-1980s when low-rise apartments started to appear in the area. The construction followed the same design as was started in the Mokcheon area in the mid-1970s. These were one-story houses with a flat rooftop and inside there was a long living room. Off this room was the kitchen, bedrooms and single bathroom with an American style toilet. Two story structures were for multi-family residences with basically the same interior layouts. Septic tanks were now used.

2005: (L) Housing area on Taegwang School Road (2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan) (R) Taegwang School Road looking toward Seojong-ni (Aug 2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan)

In the Milwal Road area, the houses were still packed tightly near the base perimeter, but now newer structures were replacing the old mudbrick and stucco houses — and all of the mudwattle country houses disappeared. But all-in-all it remained a hodge-podge of houses from 1980s red-brick structures to the low transite-roofed buildings from the 1960s. The smaller roads in the Milwal-dong area basically left alone. In other words, a few major roads that were constructed to run parallel with the hillside, but the majority of the streets remained as they were — narrow, winding dead-end alleys. Towards the Hill 180 Gate, the poorer residents of the area resided and the houses remained ramshackle structures of the 1960s and the roads unimproved.

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Paradise Lake (Boduchang) In the 1970s, there was very little in the way of entertainment in the area, besides the bars and movies. The one place that was available for recreation was Paradise Lake (Boduchang). Actually a reservoir, it had row boats. On the banks, there was a recreation area for children.

The reservoir was fed by the Jisan Stream that flowed past the Songbuk Elementary School. The Jisan Stream flowed to the Songbuk Elementary and then meandered following the base of the hills opposite the school past Are Konji-ni and down to the Mokcheon area.

Before Route 1 was built there was a natural sump area formed by the Burak Mountain to the east and the Jisan Hill and ridgeline to the west. This sump area that formed Paradise Lake (Boduchang) extended from what is now the Jisan Hyundai Apartments and about half of the Jisan Kunyong Apartments. It did not extend past the present Route 1 area. In order to get to Songbuk Elementary School, children walked along a path at the base of Jisan Park Hill (Songtan Park) near what is now the Jangmi Apartments and then along the base of the Burak Mountain to the school.

Paradise Lake (1976) (Harry Tezlaf) (NOTE: The weeping willows are the trees to the left in the photo. The trees are in the rear on the slope — not near the lake.)

Weeping Willow Trees in Photo In the 1976 photo of Paradise Lake, there appears to be weeping willows in the background. The only place that weeping willows are found in the area are along the boundary of the Jisan Elementary School. The weeping willow location is the now defunct children’s park just above the Jisan Elementary School. The car parking area was where the Jisan Elementary School is now.

The weeping willows are almost twenty feet above the level of the Paradise Lake. The photo angle in the picture and poor quality make the trees creates an illusion that the trees are near the banks, but in actuality they are on the slopes behind the parking area. (NOTE: Because the weeping willow root systems are invasive of any water pipes or plumbing nearby, these trees in recent years have been removed from most urban areas in recent years.)

2005 (L) Defunct Amusement Park (Aug 2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan) (R) Rear of Jisan Elementary School (Aug 2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan) (NOTE: The weeping willows are seen to the far right on the boundary.)

The area was accessible by car from the MSR-1 Bypass Road using what is known as the Chae-euk Gongwon Road (Gym Exercise Road). This road now passes along the side of the Jisan Elementary School and the Jisan Kunyong Apartments and then intersects with Route 1.

Presently, the Jisan Park hills (Songtan Park) contain hiking trails as well as exercise areas at the base of the hill. The MSR-1 side of the Jisan hill has a Buddhist temple.

The reservoir was large and covered the area of the Hyundai Apartments and Kunyong Apartments — up to about its entrance across from the Jisan Elementary School. This reservoir area ran in front of the Jisan Elementary School and the small stationary shop on the corner across the street. According to Mr. Kwon Oh-hoon Paradise Lake edge was on the corner of the intersection where there is a stationary shop and over to the Kunyong Apartments. Also supposedly this area of the hill was also known to contain charcoal kilns using the acacia trees in the area leading to the area being known as Sutkogae (Charcoal rise). (Source: Verbal Conversation Kalani O’Sullivan with Mr. Kwon Oh-hoon, owner of Dongsung Realty, on 23 Aug 2005.)

According to the owner of the stationary shop-toy store (Jisan Mungu Hwangu), Paradise Lake covered the Hyundai Apartment and Kunyong Apartment area up to about the entrance to the apartment complex across from the Jisan Elementary School. It then extended across what would become Route 1. (Source: Conversation Kalani O’Sullivan with owner Jisan Mungu-Hwangu Stationary Shop, 25 Aug 2005.) The stationary shop is a 1960s structure with a transite roof and because of its lower level, it lends credence to the lake being at the lower level.

Jisan Mungu Hwangu (Stationary-Toy Store) across from Jisan Elementary School (2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan) (NOTE: Notice the roof is transite indicating 1960s construction. The level of “Paradise Lake” could NOT have been above the level of this store. Acacia tree growing next to store denote the edge of lake area.)

From general observation, the acacia trees that only found next to the road and do NOT seem to be up the hill. This leads us to believe that the acacia trees were planted along the banks.

Map of Jisan Park Hill area (2005) (Map at Songbuk-dong House Office)

In the mid-1980s, the reservoir (Paradise Lake) was drained and the area dug out to be used as fill for the reclamation of the rice fields and swamps in the area. If one looks at the map of the Jisan Hill, one will see how a large piece was taken out of the hill.

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SONGTAN HISTORY (PART II)

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For comments or inputs, contact Kalani O’Sullivan .

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