한강하구전에 즈음한 인터뷰-한영문2010/08/05
한강하구전시회를 앞두고 김 레베카선생과 진행한 인터뷰입니다.
1.
“한강하구” 사진전에 오기에 앞서 2008년 당신이 출간한 <한강하구>(통일뉴스) 책을 읽어보았다. 이틀 내내 책을 손에서 도무지 놓을 수가 없었고, 완독을 하고난 다음에는 벅찬 감동으로 인해 온몸이 부들부들 떨렸다. 굉장한 메시지다. 한강하구가 책의 부제 그대로 “정전협정의 틈”이자 분단체제 역사 내내 그 활로가 끊겨온 “유라시아로의 창”이 될 수 있다는 건데, 이는 사실 당신의 옛 작업, 그러니까 <민통선 평화기행>(창비)에서도 퍽 절실하게 등장하는 테마 중 하나로 기억된다. 2003년에 나온 이 책에서 당신은 서남 뱃길과 남북 육로 양자가 분단으로 인해 차단되면서 우리가 “해양민족”으로서의 위상을 완전 잃어버린 것에 대해 탄식한 바 있고, 2002년 6월 발발했던 서해교전과 관련해서도 “북방한계선은 군사분계선과는 다르다”는 당시 이양호 국방부 장관의 설명을 세세히 인용해가면서 남쪽 주장의 허실을 밝혀냈었다. 특히 정전협정에 제시된 ‘무해통항권’ 관련 조항을 적극적으로 인정하자는 주장, 정전협정에 의거해볼 때 한강하구 지역 민통선은 사실상 불법이라는 주장 등은 강력한 실증적 위력을 갖고 있었다. 그리고 그러한 불법적인 관행을 계속 유지시키는 것이 남한을 비롯한 극동에서의 ‘유엔사 체제’라는 구조적 문제임을 남한 미군기지 주변 마을들의 여러 가지 안보피해 사례들을 생생히 보여주면서 설득력 있게 논구했다. 그로부터 5년이 지나서, 당신은 ‘한강하구’의 자연사, 문화사, 문명사까지를 도합해 ‘유라시아주의’라는 아래 민중이 주체가 되는 새 지정학을 구상해내기에 이르렀다.
어떻게 여기에까지 이르게 되었는지, 당신 작업이 이런 식으로 전개되어 나가게 된 곡절에 대해 좀 더 듣고 싶다. 특히 비무장지대에서 한강하구로 나아가게 된 계기, 그리고 이 한강하구와 유엔사, 유라시아와의 관계에 대해서도 설명해달라.
- 비무장지대작업을 하다보니 참으로 수많은 문제들이 나타났다. 대인지뢰, 고엽제, 민통선사람들의 문제등등 어느순간 두가지 질문이 생겼다. 첫 번째는 이런 문제들을 관통하는 본질적인 문제가 무엇인가 두 번째는 비무장지대의 영향력의 범위가 어디까지인가하는 것이었다. 첫 번째 질문에 대한 답은 유엔사였다. 정전협정에 의해 유엔사가 군사분계선이남지역을 군사통제하면서 모든 문제가 초래된 것이다. 대인지뢰매설과 고엽제살포에 대한 작전통제권을 가지고 있었던 것도 유엔사이고 비무장지대출입을 통제함으로써 한국주권의 문제와 충돌하는 것도 유엔사였다. 두 번째 질문에 대한 답은 유라시아였다. 비무장지대의 영향력은 한반도남북을 넘어 아시아와 유라시아까지를 범위로 했다. 세계라는 범위도 생각해 볼 수 있지만 아직 세계가 하나의 체계를 완성했다고 보긴 힘들었다. 그에 비해 유라시아는 1919년 윌슨의 민족자결주의라는 1차의제의 등장을 시작으로 2차유라시아의제인 1920년 레닌의 민족식민지테제, 3차유라시아의제인 1945년 루즈벨트의 유엔, 4차유라시아의제인 티토의 비동맹운동까지 끝없이 하나의 체계를 시도하며 성장해왔다. 이러한 유라시아의제의 형성과정은 의제설정을 주도한 리더십이 유라시아체계의 형성과정 역시 주도한다는 결론에 이르게 되었다. 유라시아의제의 주도권이 강대국주도형에서 약소국단결형으로 이행해가면서 약소국은 자국의 문제를 유라시아의제와 함께 해결하는 티토식전략을 보여주었다. 한국의 경우 이승만은 ‘반공’이란 의제를 던졌고 김정일은 ‘핵’이란 의제를 던지므로서 유라시아차원에서 국내문제까지 함께 해결하려고 시도했다. ‘북핵’이란 유라시아의제로 ‘북한’이란 의제까지 같이 해결하려는 티토식전략은 현재 북미평화협정으로 거의 현실화되고 있다. 문제는 남한이다. 남한은 유라시아의제설정능력이 나타나지 않음으로서 역사의 피동으로 밀려날 위기에 처해있는 것이다. 북미평화협정에 최소한 남북미3자의 평화협정이 되기 위해서는 남한에서도 유라시아차원의 의제를 건드려야 한다. 내가 보기에 현재의 조건에서 가장 적절한 의제는 ‘유엔군사령부해체’문제이다. 유엔사는 탄생부터 유라시아차원의 정치역학이 빚어낸 산물이었고 이미 비동맹운동의 성장으로 1975년 유엔총회에서 해체가 결정 난 존재이다. 유엔사문제에 대해 사색하다보니 일반인들이 이 문제를 이해하는 데에는 상당히 어려운 난관들이 도사리고 있음을 깨달았다. 우선 유엔사란 존재자체에 대한 눈과 귀로 인식하는 것이 가장 선행되어야 할 일이었고 식물의 씨앗처럼 어떤 핵을 건드리면 갈수록 유엔사문제의 핵심으로 진입할 수 있는 소재가 있어야했다. 그런 과정에서 발견된 것이 한강하구이다. 정전협정상 한강하구에 대한 민간인의 이용문제는 유엔사령관의 관리권이 미치지 않는 아킬레스건이다. ‘한강하구평화의 배띄우기’ 란 행사를 통해 한강하구문제가 유엔사문제를 인식하는 가장 빠른 지름길이란 것이 너무 쉽게 증명되었다.
- I’ve run across so many problems since I began working on the DMZ(Demilitarized Zone): AP(anti-personnel) mine, the herbicide, life and people in the CCL(Civilian Control Line), etc. And at some point, I’ve got two questions. First one was what the fundamental frame governing all these problems is, and second one was what the range of influence of the DMZ exactly is. The answer to the first question was given by the UNC(United Nations Command). The UNC has militarily controlled the southern portion below the MDL(Military Demarcation Line) since the enforcement of the Armistice Agreement in 1953, which has created all the problems. It was the UNC that has had the OPCON(Operation Control) on laying AP mines or spraying the Agent Orange, and it was the UNC that has conflicted with the issue of Korean sovereignty by maintaining entry control over the DMZ. My answer to the second question was Eurasia. The range of influence of the DMZ was including Asia and Eurasia beyond South and North in the Korean Peninsula. World could be thought as a ‘boundary’, but we couldn’t consider the world has yet completed a ‘system’.
To the contrary, Eurasia has never stopped developing itself as a ‘system’ since its first agenda which was Wilson’s National Self-determination in 1919, second agenda which was Lenin’s Theses on National and Colonial Questions in 1920, third agenda which was Roosevelt’s UN in 1945, and fourth agenda which was Tito’s Non-Aligned Movement in the 60′s. I came to a conclusion that through this process of Eurasian agenda formation, the leadership that led that formation also comes out as a leader in the formation of the system of Eurasia. As the initiative of Eurasian agendas makes a transition from a Great Powers-led model to a Lesser Powers-led one, the Lesser Powers have demonstrated a Titoian strategy, the core of which lies in solving their domestic problems by simultaneously solving a Eurasian agenda. In South Korea Rhee Syng-man proposed the ‘anti-communism’ agenda, and in the North Kim Jong-il tried to solve the North’s internal problems by proposing the ‘nuclear’ agenda on a Eurasian scale. The Titoian strategy to solve the agenda of ‘North Korea’ with the Eurasian agenda of ‘North Korea Nuclear’ has currently been working quite well with the NK-US Peace Agreement being in discussion. The problem is South Korea. As no capability to propose a Eurasian agenda in sight, South Korea is at a risk of being sidelined from history. For the NK-US Peace Agreement to become a tripartite peace agreement among South Korea, North Korea and the US at the least, South Korea should also start dealing with agendas on a Eurasian scale. As far as I’m concerned, the best agenda at this point is the ‘dissolution of the UNC’. The UNC from its birth has been a baby of the political dynamics at a Eurasian level, and has been voted into dissolution at the 1975 UN General Assembly. While I was into this issue of the UNC, I found out so many stumbling blocks have prevented ordinary people from having proper understanding the problem. First of all, we’re required to have a recognition of the UNC with our own eyes and ears, and then to have a ‘detonator’ subject which, like a seed of a plant, could develop us to the core of the UNC problem. What was found in the process was the Han River Estuary. The fact that according to the Armistice Agreement, civil shipping at the Han River Estuary is not under the UNC Administration makes it an Achilles’ tendon within the UNC control. I joined the ‘Peace Boat in the Han River Estuary’ event right after the historic South-North Summit in 2000, it was the first-ever event of South Korean civilians (mostly artists then) getting across the government-alleged MDL on the water in the area. This experience proved the Han River Estuary is the best short-cut to make people understand the problem of the UNC.
2.
<한강하구>의 맨 뒷부분 한강하구 관할권 문제와 관련해서 1953년 정전협정(체결과정과 그 세부 조항들에 대한 현재적, 주체적 해석)에 민간 주체의 주의를 돌리게 하고 있는데, 이 정전협정에 본구本具된 문제가 무엇이라고 보고 있기 때문인지, 다시 한 번 간략히 설명해줄 수 있는가. 특히 최근 나온 평통사의 <전쟁과 분단을 끝내는 한반도 평화협정>(한울)도 총 8장 37개조의 새 ‘평화협정’을 구상해보면서 ‘유엔사 해체’를 강력 주장하고 있는데. 이들과 당신의 시도에 비슷한 점, 또는 서로 다른 점이 있다면 무엇인가.
- 한강하구는 정전협정상 민간인에게 개방된 분단의 해방구와 같은 곳이다. 정전협정이 임시로 체결된 불완전협정이기에 민간인에 대한 강력한 통제를 실시하기엔 무리가 있었고 한강하구에 대한 민간선박자유항행규정은 정전협정 당사자들이 아무런 이견없이 단번에 통과된 사안이었다. 한국인들은 60여년간 정전협정이 헌법보다 위에서 군림하는 모습에 길들여져서 이것이 임시협정에 불과한 것이란 생각조차 감히 못하다보니 이런 조항이 있다는 것 자체가 놀라울 뿐이었던 것이다. 평통사가 주장하는 유엔사해체는 평화협정체결과정에서의 당연한 요구이다. 평통사는 이를 넘어 아예 주한미군철수까지 목적으로 하는 평화협정체결을 주장하고 있다. 의제선점이란 측면에서 이것은 대단히 중요한 일이다. 평화협정체결논의가 본격화되면 이안에 포함된 여러 쟁점들이 분화되면서 치열하게 논쟁될 것이다. 그중 가장 큰 논쟁은 유엔사해체문제가 될 것이다. 지금은 평통사 주장과의 차이점보다는 공통점을 강조할 때이다.
- The Estuary of the Han River is like a liberated area within the Division since it’s open to civil shipping according to the Armistice Agreement. The Armistice Agreement, because it was a provisional one, had difficulty implementing strong control over civilians. At the time of its conclusion, the unrestricted civil shipping in the waters of the Han River Estuary was passed at first go unanimously. South Koreans, accustomed for the past 60 years to the Armistice Agreement often and apparently ‘governing over’ the Constitution, can’t even imagine that the Agreement is just a provisional one. So the very article containing free civil shipping in the Han River Estuary strikes them like a thunder.
The dissolution of the UNC that Solidarity for Peace and Reunification of Korea(SPRK, ‘Pyongtongsa’) demand is a matter of course in the process of concluding the Peace Agreement. SPRK’s demand goes even further, since their Agreement includes the withdrawal of US Forces stationed in South Korea. This is extremely important in terms of taking initiative of agenda. Once the discussion of the Peace Agreement conclusion, there will arise quite a few points of contention over the proposed draft, and the biggest battle will be waged around the matter of the UNC dissolution. At present I think we should focus more on what our demands share than differ.
법은 특히 그 법이 원래 불평등한 관계에서 파생된 결과물이라면 더더욱 이후 약자측에 ‘내부 식민화(internal colonization)’의 거버넌스 기제로 작용하게 되고, 따라서 약자측일 수록 법 조항의 해석은 생존 투쟁과 직결될 수밖에 없는 문제일 것이라 사료된다. 이는 한국뿐만 아니라 가령 내부 선주민과 외부 유입 통치자들 간의 ‘주권 이양 조약’을 통해 민족국가를 구성한 서구 강대국들(미국, 캐나다, 호주, 뉴질랜드)의 선주민 민중에게도 똑같이 해당되는 문제이다. 말하자면 반백년이 지나도록 미국과 유엔사가 남한 민중을 ‘선주민화’하도록 남한 ‘정전체제’가 그냥 내버려둬 온 것은 물론 적극 추동해왔다고나 해야 할 것이다.
이 비극적인 반식민지 자기부정의 역사가 지금 ‘천안함 사태’를 계기로 다시 한 번 노골화되는 듯하다. 지난 25-27일 치러진 동해상 한미연합훈련에는 일본 해상자위대 장교까지 옵저버로 가세했고, 중국도 인민해방군 해군 3대 함대가 남중국해에서 대규모 합동훈련을 실시하는 등, 분할된 강대국들 간의 위력시위로 인해 현재 극동이 다시금 자못 소란스럽다. 고위직 입에서 ‘정권교체’란 말이 나오는가 하면, 일부 뉴스 기사도 한․미 연합군에 의한 북한 정권교체 작전이 이미 시작되었다는 식으로 떠들고 있다. 미국이 이라크와 아프가니스탄에 지난 8년 간 쏟아 부은 천문학적인 전비(지난달 말 미 의회조사국(CRS)의 보고서에 의하면 1조 달러)에도 불구하고 문제 지역의 경제적, 안보적 상황을 오히려 악화시킨 점이나, 미 국방부가 이라크 재건에 사용되어야할 이라크재건기금(DFI)의 96%에 달하는 이라크 원유와 가스 수출대금을 그동안 제멋대로 유용해온 점(최근 나온 이라크재건특별감사(SIGIR) 보고서에 의하면 총 87억불이 장부에서 사라짐) 등을 생각해보면, 만에 하나 북한에서 ‘정권 교체’란 것이 실제로 벌어진다 해도 더 큰 재앙이 되겠음을 충분히 짐작할 수 있다. 당신이 보기에, 특히 이번 작업 <한강하구>에 비추어, 한․미․일 삼국이 취하고 있는 이러한 조처와 행위들이 앞으로 남한 환경안보와 인간안보에 끼칠 영향은 무엇이라고 생각하는가. 한미 양국이 계획, 진행 중인 군사동맹구조 ‘개혁’들(전시 작통권 환수나 부대 이전, ‘군사협조본부’ 창설 등)에 대해서도 의견이 있다면 들려달라.
- 정전협정이 내부식민화의 수단으로 작용하는 것은 예를들면 지역문제와 겹쳐질 때이다. 영남지역패권주의와 반북주의의 배합이다. 그러나 내부식민화의 계기보다 더 중요하게 관찰해야 할 것은 식민화의 계기이다. 정전협정이 북과의 관계가 아니라 남한에 대해 어떻게 규정하고 있는가 살펴보면 남한을 ‘점령’지로 해석하고 있다는 점에 주목하지 않을 수 없다. 정전협정중에 “군사분계선이남은 유엔사령관이 군사통제한다.”는 문구가 자주 등장한다. 여기서 군사통제란 곧 점령을 의미한다는 것을 유엔사 스스로 1954년과 62년 한국정부에 보낸 공식문서에서 확인했다. 법적문서인 정전협정과 정치체제인 정전체제는 같은 뿌리이면서도 많은 차이를 벌리며 발전되어 왔다.
주한미군주둔에 의한 추상적식민화가 아니라 유엔사령부에 의한 구체적, 법적 점령화가 더 큰 문제인 것이다.
올해 한미연합훈련에 일본이 참관한 것을 두고 한미일군사삼각동맹의 부활이라고 평가한다. 법적문서로는 존재하지 않지만 체제의 현실에 의해 그런개념이 형성된다고 하는 것이다. 그러나 정전협정과 유엔사와 일본정부간 소파규정에 의해 한미일군사관계는 동맹이 아니라 하나의 단일한 지휘체계란 것을 알아야한다. 백령도앞바다에서 벌어진 천안함사건이 멀리 오키나와후템마기지이전 문제와 직접 연관되어 처리되는 것을 보라. 정전협정에 의해 서해5도지역에 대한 법적관리권이 유엔사에 있다는 사실과 후템마기지가 주한유엔사의 후방기지란 사실에서 유래되는 현상이다. 힘의 본질에서는 미국이 그 실체이지만 유엔사는 법적보장장치이다. 국제사회에서 법적수단을 확보하고 있는가 아닌가의 차이는 외교에서 엄청난 차이이다. 헤노코기지반대투쟁과 한강하구가 하나의 의제로 연결될 때 연대의 힘을 배가시킬 수있다.
- 작통권환수문제가 결국은 좌초되고 있다. 미군의 전략에 의해 판단된 문제였는데 한국의 정치에 의해 좌우된 것처럼 보이는 것은 일종의 착시현상이다. 또한 한미연합사해체가 아닌 유엔사해체를 통한 작통권환수가 완전한 과정이 될 수 있음이 확인되었다. 정전시위기인 천안함사태를 빌미로 작통권문제를 거꾸로 돌렸다. 정전시위기관리는 연합사의 임무가 아니라 유엔사의 임무이다. 연합사는 법적으로 전시로 돌입해야지 가동되는 기구인데 비해 유엔사는 전시이전인 현재의 정전상태에서 전시로 발전될 위기시 관리를 하고 있기 때문에 유엔사의 작전통제권 정확히 말하면 전시뿐아니라 정전시작전통제권까지 환수가 되어야 한다. 이것이 이번 천안함사태를 계기로 작통권환수절차가 연기된 사태에서 찾아야할 교훈이다.
- The Armistice Agreement can work as a means of internal colonization when it is overlapped on the regional problems, for example, when it’s interlinked in the combination of Youngnam region supremacy and anti-North ideology. But more important than the moments of internal colonization is those of colonization. When we look at how the Agreement defines not on the relation with the North but on the South, we can’t help but notice that it interprets the South as an ‘occupied’ territory. In the Agreement, there’s often a phrase such as: “territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command” Here the ‘military control’ means ‘occupation’, which was confirmed by the UNC through its official documents to the South Korean government in 1954 and 1962. The Armistice Agreement which is a legal instrument and the Armistice regime as a political regime have been developed while increasing gaps, although rooted in the same soil. So, what matters is not an abstract colonization by the US Forces here but a specific, legal occupation by the UNC.
Many have considered the Japanese participation in the ROK-US Joint Naval Exercises this year as a resurgence of the ROK-US-Japan Tripartite Military Alliance. Although such a thing doesn’t exist in legal document, it forms itself by a level of reality of the regime. But what we should remember is that through the Armistice Agreement and the SOFA(Status of Forces Agreement) between the UNC and the Japanese government, the military tripartism of ROK-US-Japan is not an alliance but a single command system. Look how the ‘Chonanham Incident’ on the water of Baekryeong Island (West Sea of Korea) in late March is being dealt combined with the relocation of Futenma Air Base in Okinawa. This is possible only because the legal administration of Five Islands in the West Sea of Korea is under the UNC by the Armistice Agreement, and that the Futenman Air Base is a rear base of the UNC in Korea. In terms of the nature of power, what matters is the US, but the UNC is what legally guarantees that power. Whether you have a legal instrument or not creates tremendous difference in terms of diplomacy in international society. One of the ways of doubling our empowerment is to connect the Henoko Anti-Base Struggle in Okinawa and the Han River Estuary in a single agenda.
- The Operational Control Recovery is being drifted as many have worried. It was decided by the US strategy. If it had ever been seen as politically determined within Korea, it’s an optical illusion. It also confirms that the command recovery can be completed not by the dissolution of the ROK-US Combined Forces Command(CFC) but by that of the UNC. Anyway, they rolled back the matter of command transfer with the excuse of Chonanhan Incident, which they say a crisis during armistice. Administration of crises during armistice is not the responsibility of the CFC but of the UNC. Whereas the CFC legally enters operation only during wartime, the UNC manages crises during armistice, when crises presently are the ones possibly to develop into a war. This indicates we should recover not only the operational control during wartime but also the one during armistice which is under the UNC. This is the lesson we should take from the series of incidents from Chonanham to the delay of the command recovery.
3.
책 3장 “한강하구 항행의 역사”를 보니 고려에서 조선조에 이르는 이런저런 운하 건설 구상을 소개하면서, 현 이명박 정권의 ‘4대강 운하’ 야망에 대해서도 수경스님의 절규를 빌어 일침을 가하고 있다. 단지 경제적 이익만 눈앞에 둔 “항행 위주”의 강에서 “생태와 개발, 수질과 수량문제, 문화교류와 관광 등 수많은 탈현대적 의제”의 강으로 발상을 전환할 것을 당신은 서구 유럽의 예를 빌어 적극 주장하고 있다. 그러면서 당신은 강(한강)이 단지 ‘생명평화’의 근본성만이 아니라 “봉건의 마지막 시대에서 시간을 멈춘” 우리 역사의 인과관계 문제, 곧 근대로의 전환이 곧 ‘단절’이 되어버린 우리가 현재 살고 있는 시간 자체의 봉건성에 비추어 분단극복 의제로 다뤄져야함을 역설한다. 이 대목에서 ‘정전’은 ‘근대’의 한 극점처럼 스스로 현상한다. 실로 놀라운 통찰이다. 당신이 우리 역사와 전통에 대한 끈질긴 격물치지(格物致知)적 추구를 통해 그러한 통찰에 도달한 것처럼 보이는 만큼, 우리에게 ‘탈근대’로의 원동력은 역시 과거에 놓여있는 것 아닌가 하는 생각을 지울 수가 없다. 또한 ‘탈근대’와 소위 ‘평화력’ 간의 긴밀한 연관성에 대해서도 주목하지 않을 수 없게 된다.
그동안 이명박 정부의 ‘4대강 사업’에 대해 수많은 비판이 제기되어 왔다, 합법 여부와 졸속 추진 문제, 추진 주체와 의심스런 경제효과 문제, 수질오염․침수․홍수 문제, 생물다양성 위협 등 기타 환경 문제, 등등. 부작용이 벌써 드러나고도 있다. 조․중․동은 일절 보도 안했지만 지난 7월 초에는 낙동강 하류 구미보 상판에서 균열이 발견되기도 했고, 중순에는 경남북 지역에 호우가 내리면서 함안보․합천보 공사장 침수를 비롯, 낙동강 지류에서 침수피해가 일어나기도 했다. 이번 <한강하구> 작업에 비추어, 당신이 현 ‘4대강 사업’에 전하고 싶은 메시지가 있다면 무엇인가. <민통선 평화기행> 중에도 북쪽 임남면과 마주한 양구 ‘평화의 댐’을 답사하는 대목이 나오는데, 혹 ‘4대강 사업’을 ‘정전체제’와 연관시켜 말해줄 수 있는가.
- 한강하구의 청주초란 사구는 이명박선거캠프에서 나들섬을 만들겠다고 발표한 곳이다. 이 나들섬은 한반도 대운하의 마지막 터미널로 상정되어 있었다. 현재 ‘대운하’가 ‘4대강’으로 축소되었지만 4대강이 탄력을 받으면 다시한번 대운하이야기가 나올 것이다. 대운하구상에서 최고정점이 한강하구이다. 내륙의 강이 개발의제에 초점이 맞추어져 있다면 한강하구는 남북화해협력 통일, 국제화의제까지 집약된 곳이다. 그러나 한강하구에서도 이명박캠프의 전략은 선무당질이었다. 나들섬구상을 제출할 때 국제해양법을 검토했다면 이것이 얼마나 자가당착인지를 깨달았을 것이다. 해양법에는 간출지란 조항이 있는데 간출지라 함은 밀물때 가라앉고 썰물때 드러나는 육지를 말한다. 문제는 간출지가 무인도와 달리 영토기선이 된다는 것이다. 나들섬은 간출지를 유인도로 만드는 구상이다. 현재의 간출지도 영토분쟁의 소재가 될수 있는데 이곳을 유인도로 만들면 영토분쟁의 화약고를 일부러 만드는 셈이 된다. 환경문제를 유보하면 참여정부 당시 모래준설사업이 오히려 영토분쟁의 소지를 없애는 데는 유리하다. 평화협정후 통일협정까지 얼마나 시간이 걸릴지 모르는데 더구나 현 정전상태에서 이런 구상을 내놓는 것은 한치 앞을 못 본 단견이다. 한강하구는 국경하천이자 국제하천이다. 한강이나 내륙의 강에는 없는 전혀 다른 성격이 한강하구라는 짧은 구간에 존재하는 것이다. 북한과 중국이 압록강과 두만강을 국경하천으로 오랫동안 공동관리해온 경험과 비교하는 것이 의미가 있는지는 모르겠으나, 한강하구에 대한 우리의 근대법적 인식수준을 보면 봉건조선과 거의 차이가 없다. 한강하구가 지연된 봉건극복의제이자 탈현대의제라는 것은 이런 배경 때문이다.
- There’s a sandhill called Chongjucho in the Han River Estuary, and it was schemed as a ‘Nadeul’ (meaning ‘where people come and go’) island in Lee Myung-bak camp during his presidential race. It was planned as last terminal of the Great Canal of the Korean Peninsula. Although at present the ‘Great Canal’ project was reduced to the ‘Four Rivers Project’, once the latter speeds up on its track there will come up again the talk of the Great Canal. In this Great Canal Project, the Han River Estuary makes a climax. Whereas the inland rivers are focused on developmental agenda, the Han River Estuary comprises South-North reconciliation and cooperation, reunification, and internationalization agendas.
But this Nadeul island project in the Lee Myung-back camp was simply a preposterous idea. If anybody there had ever looked up in the International Law of the Sea, they‘d have found what sheer inconsistency the project was. Within the International Law of the Sea, there’s a clause on ‘low tide elevation’, it’s a piece of land which submerges during flow tide and emerges during ebb tide. Problem is this low tide elevation, unlike an uninhibited island, makes a baseline of a territory. The Lee camp’s idea basically is to make the low tide elevation of Chongjucho an inhabited island. It’s already a pretty good excuse for territory dispute, and if it’s made into an inhabited island, it’s as good as creating hair-trigger circumstances around territory conflict. Environmental issues put aside, the sand dredging operation during the previous Participatory Government is much more ahead in getting rid of any arguable territory conflict. As we have no idea how long it’d take from the Peace Agreement to a Reunification Agreement, and since we’re currently under the Armistice regime, what this kind of project shows is that its mastermind is totally blind. The Han River Estuary is a river border and international river, which is not a character we can find from the Han River or other inland rivers. I comes to my mind that North Korea and China have long co-administered the Aprok River and Duman River as river borders. Anyway, our understanding about the Han River Estuary in terms of the Modern Law is as piteous as in the Feudal Age of Chosun Dynasty. This is why I say the Han River Estuary to us is an agenda of overcoming feudalism and of going beyond the modern.
영문
Looking at the Han River Estuary as Keyhole to Eurasia
- An Interview with a Peace-Activist and Photographer, Lee Shi-woo
Mr. Lee Shi-woo (44), a Korean peace-activist, writer and photographer, is throwing in downtown Seoul a small exhibition of his 10-year long work on the Han River Estuary. For him who’s been working all his life on the problems derived from the division of Korea and the US military control, what’s happening around the Korean Peninsula send strong signals particularly to South Korea. What he suggests as results is an easement of military confrontation through changing the 1953 Armistice Agreement into a Peace Agreement, and a new, bottom-up geopolitics of Eurasianism the very start point of which shall be the Han River Estuary. Because the Han River Estuary, covering from Odusan Reunification Watchtower where the Yimjin River and the Han River meet to the Mal Island at the end of Ganghwa, is ‘open’ to civil shipping according to the Armistice Agreement, many activists and citizens in Korea have regularly used the area for shaping up their movement for peaceful reunification by striking sail on its water since 2000.
He’s speaking more about his life-time work including the 2008 masterpiece
Q: Tell us how you’ve reached this subject of ‘Han River Estuary’ from your past work on the DMZ. How this particular area is related to the UNC and Eurasia?
A: I’ve run across so many problems since I began working on the DMZ(Demilitarized Zone): AP(anti-personnel) mine, the herbicide, life and people in the CCL(Civilian Control Line), etc. And at some point, I’ve got two questions. First one was what the fundamental frame governing all these problems is, and second one was what the range of influence of the DMZ exactly is. The answer to the first question was given by the UNC(United Nations Command). The UNC has militarily controlled the southern portion below the MDL(Military Demarcation Line) since the enforcement of the Armistice Agreement in 1953, which has created all the problems. It was the UNC that has had the OPCON(Operation Control) on laying AP mines or spraying the Agent Orange, and it was the UNC that has conflicted with the issue of Korean sovereignty by maintaining entry control over the DMZ. My answer to the second question was Eurasia. The range of influence of the DMZ was including Asia and Eurasia beyond South and North in the Korean Peninsula. World could be thought as a boundary but we couldn’t consider the world has yet completed a ‘system’. To the contrary, Eurasia has never stopped developing itself as a ‘system’ since its first agenda which was Wilson’s National Self-determination in 1919, second agenda which was Lenin’s Theses on National and Colonial Questions in 1920, third agenda which was Roosevelt’s UN in 1945, and fourth agenda which was Tito’s Non-Aligned Movement in the 60′s. I came to a conclusion that through this process of Eurasian agenda formation, the leadership that led that formation also comes out as a leader in the formation of the system of Eurasia. As the initiative of Eurasian agendas makes a transition from a Great Powers-led model to a Lesser Powers-led one, the Lesser Powers have demonstrated a Titoian strategy, the core of which lies in solving their domestic problems by simultaneously solving a Eurasian agenda. In South Korea Rhee Syng-man proposed the ‘anti-communism’ agenda, and in the North Kim Jong-il tried to solve the North’s internal problems by proposing the ‘nuclear’ agenda on a Eurasian scale. The Titoian strategy to solve the agenda of ‘North Korea’ with the Eurasian agenda of ‘North Korea Nuclear’ has currently been working quite well with the NK-US Peace Agreement being in discussion. The problem is South Korea. As no capability to propose a Eurasian agenda in sight, South Korea is at a risk of being sidelined from history. For the NK-US Peace Agreement to become a tripartite peace agreement among South Korea, North Korea and the US at the least, South Korea should also start dealing with agendas on a Eurasian scale. As far as I’m concerned, the best agenda at this point is the ‘dissolution of the UNC’. The UNC from its birth has been a baby of the political dynamics at a Eurasian level, and has been voted into dissolution at the 1975 UN General Assembly. While I was into this issue of the UNC, I found out so many stumbling blocks have prevented ordinary people from having proper understanding the problem. First of all, we’re required to have recognition of the UNC with our own eyes and ears, and then to have a ‘detonator’ subject which, like a seed of a plant, could develop us to the core of the UNC problem. What was found in the process was the Han River Estuary. The fact that according to the Armistice Agreement, civil shipping at the Han River Estuary is not under the UNC administration makes it an Achilles’ tendon within the UNC control. I joined the ‘Peace Boat in the Han River Estuary’ event right after the historic South-North Summit in 2000, it was the first-ever event of South Korean civilians (mostly artists then) getting across the government-alleged MDL on the water in the area. This experience proved the Han River Estuary is the best short-cut to make people understand the problem of the UNC.
Q: The last chapter of
A: The Estuary of the Han River is like a liberated area within the Division since it’s open to civil shipping according to the Armistice Agreement. The Armistice Agreement, because it was a provisional one, had difficulty implementing strong control over civilians. At the time of its conclusion, the unrestricted civil shipping in the waters of the Han River Estuary was passed at first go unanimously. South Koreans, accustomed for the past 60 years to the Armistice Agreement often and apparently ‘governing over’ the Constitution, can’t even imagine that the Agreement is just a provisional one. So the very article containing free civil shipping in the Han River Estuary strikes them like thunder.
Still, when we look at how the Agreement defines not on the relation with the North but on the South, we can’t help but notice that it interprets the South as an ‘occupied’ territory. In the Agreement, there’s often a phrase such as: “territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command”. Here the ‘military control’ means ‘occupation’, which was confirmed by the UNC through its official documents to the South Korean government in 1954 and 1962. The Armistice Agreement which is a legal instrument and the Armistice regime as a political regime have been developed while increasing gaps, although rooted in the same soil. So, what matters is not an ‘abstract’ colonization by the US Forces here but a specific, legal occupation by the UNC.
The dissolution of the UNC that Solidarity for Peace and Reunification of Korea(SPRK, ‘Pyongtongsa’) demand for example is a matter of course in the process of concluding the Peace Agreement. SPRK’s demand goes even further, since their Agreement includes the withdrawal of US Forces stationed in South Korea. This is extremely important in terms of taking initiative of agenda. Once the discussion of the Peace Agreement conclusion, there will arise quite a few points of contention over the proposed draft, and the biggest battle will be waged around the matter of the UNC dissolution. At present I think we should focus more on what our demands share than differ.
Q: What is your say on the increased military tension over the Peninsula at present, the restructuration of the ROK-US military alliance, etc.?
A: Many have considered the Japanese participation in the ROK-US Joint Naval Exercises this year as resurgence of the ROK-US-Japan Tripartite Military Alliance. Although such a thing doesn’t exist in legal document, it forms itself by a level of reality of the regime. But what we should remember is that through the Armistice Agreement and the SOFA(Status of Forces Agreement) between the UNC and the Japanese government, the military tripartism of ROK-US-Japan is not an alliance but a single command system. Look how the ‘Chonanham Incident’ on the water of Baekryeong Island (West Sea of Korea) in late March is being dealt combined with the relocation of Futenma Air Base in Okinawa. This is possible only because the legal administration of Five Islands in the West Sea of Korea is under the UNC by the Armistice Agreement, and that the Futenman Air Base is a rear base of the UNC in Korea. In terms of the nature of power, what matters is the US, but the UNC is what legally guarantees that power. Whether you have a legal instrument or not creates tremendous difference in terms of diplomacy in international society. One of the ways of doubling our empowerment is to connect the Henoko Anti-Base Struggle in Okinawa and the Han River Estuary in a single agenda.
The Operational Control Transfer is being drifted as many have worried. It was decided by the US strategy. If it had ever been seen as politically determined within Korea, it’s an optical illusion. It also confirms that the command transfer can be completed not by the dissolution of the ROK-US Combined Forces Command(CFC) but by that of the UNC. Anyway, they rolled back the matter of command transfer with the excuse of Chonanhan Incident, which they say a crisis during armistice. Administration of crises during armistice is not the responsibility of the CFC but of the UNC. Whereas the CFC legally enters operation only during wartime, the UNC manages crises during armistice, when crises presently are the ones possibly to develop into a war. This indicates we should recover not only the operational control during wartime but also the one during armistice which is under the UNC. This is the lesson we should take from the series of incidents from Chonanham to the delay of the command recovery.
Q: There have been so many outcries against the ‘Four Rivers Project’ currently bulldozed under the Lee Myung-bak government despite expert panels’ call for repeal (http://www.albummania.co.kr/gallery/view.asp?seq=126022) and overall popular objection. The problems mostly are about illegality and unfeasibility of the project itself, water pollution and flooding, threat to biodiversity, etc. Some construction sites in the Nakdong River have been flooded in July, for example, although Korean mainstream media didn’t say a thing about it. What is your say about the Project, particularly if you place it under the current Armistice regime?
A: There’s a sandhill called Chongjucho in the Han River Estuary, and it was schemed as a ‘Nadeul’ (meaning ‘where people come and go’) island in Lee Myung-bak camp during his presidential race. It was planned as last terminal of the Great Canal of the Korean Peninsula. Although at present the ‘Great Canal’ project was reduced to the ‘Four Rivers Project’, once the latter speeds up, there will come up again the talk of the Great Canal. In this Great Canal Project, the Han River Estuary makes a climax. Whereas the inland rivers are focused on developmental agenda, the Han River Estuary comprises South-North reconciliation and cooperation, reunification, and internationalization agendas.
But this Nadeul island project in the Lee Myung-bak camp was simply a preposterous idea. If anybody there had ever looked up in the International Law of the Sea, they‘d have found what sheer inconsistency the project was. Within the International Law of the Sea, there’s a clause on ‘low tide elevation’, it’s a piece of land which submerges during flow tide and emerges during ebb tide. Problem is this low tide elevation, unlike an uninhibited island, makes a baseline of a territory. The Lee camp’s idea basically is to make the low tide elevation of Chongjucho an inhabited island. It’s already a pretty good excuse for territory dispute, and if it’s made into an inhabited island, it’s as good as creating hair-trigger circumstances around territory conflict. Environmental issues put aside, the sand dredging operation during the previous Participatory Government is much more ahead in getting rid of any arguable territory conflict. As we have no idea how long it’d take from the Peace Agreement to a Reunification Agreement, and since we’re currently under the Armistice regime, what this kind of project shows is that its mastermind is totally blind. The Han River Estuary is a river border and international river, which is not a character we can find from the Han River or other inland rivers. It comes to my mind that North Korea and China have long co-administered the Aprok River and Duman River as river borders. Anyway, our understanding about the Han River Estuary in terms of the Modern Law is as piteous as in the Feudal Age of Chosun Dynasty. This is why I say the Han River Estuary to us is an agenda of overcoming feudalism and of going beyond the modern.
By Rebecca Kim (Researcher, Democracy and Social Movement Institute, Korea)
rebeccakim.asia@gmail.com