유엔사,한미연합사-한영문2002/12/07 238
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/usfk.htm
U.S. Forces, Korea / Combined Forces Command
Combined Ground Component Command (GCC)
The longtime U.S. security commitment to the Republic of Korea (ROK) has both legal and moral sanctions. US legal obligations are those under U.N. Security Council Resolutions of 1950, by which the US leads the United Nations Command, and the ROK/US Mutual Security Agreement of 1954, which commits both nations to assist each other in case of attack from outside forces. The US is also partner in the operations of the ROK/US Combined Forces Command (CFC), an integrated headquarters established in 1978, and is responsible for planning for the defense of the Republic of Korea. The Commander of USFK also serves as Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command (CINCUNC) and the CFC. As CINCUNC, he is responsible for maintaining the armistice agreement which suspended the Korean War on July 27, 1953.
US Forces, Korea (USFK) is the joint headquarters through which US combat forces would be sent to the CFC’s fighting components – the Ground, Air, Naval and Combined Marine Forces Component Commands. Major USFK Elements include the Eighth US Army, US Air Forces Korea (Seventh Air Force) and US Naval Forces Korea. USFK includes more than 85 active installations in the Republic of Korea and has about 37,500 US military personnel assigned in Korea. Major U.S. units in the ROK include the Eighth U.S. Army and Seventh Air Force.
Principal equipment in EUSA includes 140 M1A1 tanks, 170 Bradley armored vehicles, 30 155mm self-propelled howitzers, 30 MRLs as well as a wide range of surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles, e.g., Patriot, and 70 AH-64 helicopters. EUSA has the capability to perform required tasks under various circumstances using this equipment.
US Air Forces Korea possesses approximately 100 aircraft: advanced fighters, e.g., 70 F-16s, 20 A-10 anti-tank attack planes, various types of intelligence-collecting and reconnaissance aircraft including U-2s, and the newest transport aircraft. With this highly modern equipment, US Air Forces Korea has sufficient capability to launch all-weather attacks and to conduct air support operations under all circumstances. In the event the Seventh Fleet and the Seventh Air Force Command augment them, the capability of USFK will substantially increase both quantitatively and qualitatively.
Limited manpower and equipment are allocated to US Naval Forces Korea, US Marine Forces Korea, and Special Operations Command Korea in peacetime. However, the US Pacific Command will augment these forces and commands should a crisis or war erupt, thus providing them with a higher combat capability.
Combined Forces Command (CFC)
The role of Combined Forces Command (CFC) during the armistice is to deter war. CFC’s wartime role is to defeat external aggression. Its mission statement is: “Deter hostile acts of external aggression against the Republic of Korea by a combined military effort of the United States of America and the ROK; and in the event deterrence fails, defeat an external armed attack against the ROK.” The CFC is commanded by a US general officer that who reports to the National Command Authorities of both countries. CFC’s military power resides collectively in the ROK Armed Forces, US Forces in Korea, and US augmentation from the Pacific and the United States. The security cooperation between the US and the ROK is extensive. Some of its key elements are combined defense planning, intelligence integration and sharing, a sophisticated logistical interface, educational exchanges, and defense industry cooperation.
Decades of fragile peace marked the history of “post-war” Korea, where the longest armistice ever remains tenuously in force. For most of these years, the directing headquarters was the United Nations Command (UNC), which had also directed combat operations in the 1950-53 war. The defense structure in Korea was eventually overtaken by the professional growth and development of the Republic of Korea’s (ROK) armed forces. As early as 1965 it was recognized that what worked in the war could be significantly improved by increasing ROK participation in the planning structure.
A combined operational planning staff, developed in 1968 as an adjunct to United Nations Command/United States Forces Korea/ Eighth United States Army Headquarters and the U.S.-led ‘I’ Corps (Group), evolved in 1971 as an integrated field army headquarters. However, it was not until 1978, as a bilateral agreement related to the planned U.S. ground combat force withdrawal of that time (subsequently canceled in 1981), that the senior headquarters in Korea was organized, as a combined staff.
Established on November 7, 1978, the ROK/U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC) is the warfighting headquarters. Its role is to deter, or defeat if necessary, outside aggression against the ROK. To accomplish that mission, the CFC has operational control over more than 600,000 active-duty military personnel of all services, of both countries. In wartime, augmentation could include some 3.5 million ROK reservists as well as additional U.S. forces deployed from outside the ROK. If North Korea attacked, the CFC would provide a coordinated defense through its Air, Ground, Naval and Combined Marine Forces Component Commands and the Combined Unconventional Warfare Task Force. In-country and augmentation U.S. forces would be provided to the CFC for employment by the respective combat component.
The CFC is commanded by a four-star U.S. general, with a four-star ROK Army general as deputy commander. Throughout the command structure, binational manning is readily apparent: if the chief of a staff section is Korean, the deputy is American and vice versa. This integrated structure exists within the component commands as well as the headquarters. All CFC components are tactically integrated through continuous combined and joint planning, training and exercises. Until 1994 a U.S. four star Commander operationally controlled the ROK military in peacetime, as well as in potential wartime. On conclusion of negotiations in 1994, peacetime operational control (OPCON) of the Republic of Korea military was transferred from the U.S. led Combined Forces Command, to the Republic of Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff (ROK JCS). Since 1994, the Republic of Korea and the United States have discussed and negotiated the next logical step in Alliance command arrangements, the full transfer of wartime operational control of ROK military forces from the U.S. led Combined Forces Command to a new ROK Joint Forces Command (JFC).
By 2005 Seoul had requested regaining wartime control of its armed forces. US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his South Korean counterpart Yoon Kwang-ung discussed the wartime operational command at the 32nd Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) held in Seoul in October 2005. Defense Minister Yoon said “The issue of wartime command transfer will become one of the main issues to be discussed at SCM.” The defense chiefs discussed transferring wartime command of the nation’s troops back to Seoul during the annual security consultations. Wartime operational control was part of a much broader discussion of command relationships. Seoul regained the right to control its armed forces in peacetime in 1994. Wartime command was originally transferred to the US-led United Nations Command in 1950.
Final negotiations to set a date for this transition were agreed to in 2007, with a ROK military OPCON transition from CFC to the ROK JFC date set for 17 April 2012. To achieve realignment of responsibilities in the transition of wartime OPCON in 2012, the ROK and U.S. militaries completed a transition road map – the Strategic Transition Plan (STP) – signed in 2007, identifying requirements and milestones for the next five years. Prior to the ROK assuming wartime operational control of its own forces in 2012, U.S. and ROK planners will develop new terms of reference, crisis action standard operating procedures, wartime command and control procedures, and operational plans through formal alliance consultative processes, such as the bi-monthly Security Policy Initiative and the annual Security Consultative and Military Committee Meetings.
Meeting at the G-20 economic summit in Toronto om 26 June 2010, President Barack Obama and South Korean President Lee Myung-bak agreed to delay the current April 17, 2012, date to December 2015. The postponement of the so-called OPCON plan “reflects the current security condition on the Korean peninsula and will strengthen the alliance of the two nations,” Lee was quoted by South Korea’s Yonhap News Agency in a joint press conference with Obama after the summit.
Combined Ground Component Command (GCC)
The Combined Ground Component Command (GCC) is led by the Commander-in-Chief (CinC) of the Combined Forces of Command and his staff. The Combined Field Army (CFA) was composed of the US Second Infantry Division, the Third Republic of Korea Army (TROKA) and the Seventh Republic of Korea Corps. The Capital Defense Command (CDC) is an independent command within the TROKA’s area of responsibility, defends the metropolitan Seoul, home to ten million Koreans. The CFA, CDC and the First Republic of Korea Army (FROKA) form the Combined Ground Component Command (GCC).
In April 1990, the United States Department of Defense announced a program to shift gradually the United States military presence in South Korea to a smaller and more supportive role as international political conditions and strengthened South Korean defense capabilities permitted. As part of this program, the United States and South Korea also agreed to disband the United States- Republic of Korea Combined Field Army and to separate the Ground Component Command from the Combined Forces Command during the 1991-1993 period. The two countries further agreed to appoint a South Korean senior officer as commander of the Ground Component Command.
In the joint statement issued after the close of the twenty-third United States Republic of Korea Security Consultative Meeting in November 1991, both countries declared that they had “agreed to postpone the second stage reduction of United States forces in Korea until such time as the North Korean threat and uncertainties of developing nuclear weapons have disappeared and the security in this region is fully guaranteed.” This fact meant that withdrawals would stop once United States forces were drawn down to the 36,000 target for stage one. It was also confirmed at the meeting that the United States Republic of Korea Combined Field Army would be dissolved and that a Korean general would be made Combined Forces Command ground component commander in 1992, further decreasing the United States Profile.
Despite the impression of total American control of Republic of Korea armed forces via CFC, the Korean units are independent forces. Only during time of war, does the Korean units subject itself to the CFC. Otherwise, Korean military operate independent of CFC in peacetime.
The major field training exercise was the Team Spirit series that began in 1976 and grew to nearly 200,000 ROK and U.S. participants commensurate with increased perceptions of the North Korean threat. U.S. participation in the exercise included augmentation forces of all services tactically deployed to the ROK from other Pacific bases and the continental United States. This exercise was last held in 1993.
Separate ROK and U.S. command post exercises were combined as Ulchi Focus Lens (UFL) in 1976. UFL is an annual joint and combined simulation-supported command post exercise that trains Combined Forces Command personnel and major component, subordinate and augmenting staffs using state-of-the-art wargaming computer simulations and support infrastructures.
At the unit level, frequent no-notice alerts, musters, and operational readiness inspections insure combat preparedness for ROK and U.S. forces. Both countries are pursuing ambitious modernization programs to maintain a viable ROK/U.S. military posture that will convince North Korea that any form of aggression or adventurism will fail. The ROK is making strides in equipment improvement through a rapidly expanding domestic defense industry, as well as purchases from foreign sources. U.S. efforts toward modernization include newer, more powerful weapon systems, greater mobility and helicopter lift capability, and vastly increased anti-armor capability.
———————————————————————————
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/unchg-co.htm
United Nations Command Honor Guard Company
The United Nations Command Honor Guard Company is primary mission is the security of the combatant commander, his household, his place of duty and other key command and control facilities in Seoul.
To train for that mission, the Honor Guard Company conducts regular exercises and training events. The unit takes part in quarterly Close Combat Battle Exercises and trains regularly with the 2nd Infantry Division.
The unit’s secondary mission consists of ceremonial duties.
———————————————————————————-
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/uncsb.htm
United Nations Command Security Battalion
The United Nations Command Security Battalion – Joint Security Area secures the Joint Security Area in order to provide the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, a secure environment in which to conduct negotiations with north Korean representatives. The UNCSB-JSA conducts security and reconnaissance patrols within the Demilitarized Zone and monitors the status of the Military Armistice Agreement. The battalion also provides for the security of all personnel within the Joint Security Area and its area of responsibility, to include the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, residents of Tae Song Dong, and the tourists and dignitaries who visit Panmunjom.
The United Nations Command Security Battalion – Joint Security Area is the Eighth Army’s premier war fighting battalion. It is unique in every sense of the word. Not only does it have a mission like none other – security for and patrol of a portion of the demilitarized zone between the Republic of Korea and North Korea, and conducting the CINC’s DMZ Orientation Program – but its composition is unlike any other unit on the Korean Peninsula.
The UNCSB-JSA is modified Light Infantry Battalion. It is comprised of both Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) and US Army soldiers. The ROKA element makes up roughly 60 percent of the unit while the US Army makes up the remaining 40 percent of the 550 person unit. Each soldier and officer assigned to the battalion is hand-picked and undergoes a rigorous testing program upon arrival to the JSA. Only after passing this, is he a full member of the battalion and can claim that he is”In Front of Them All!”
The soldiers who serve in the UNCSB-JSA are truly stationed on Freedom’s Frontier and stand face-to-face with Communism on a daily basis. It is because of this, that only the highest trained and disciplined soldiers from both armies are assigned to the battalion and proudly wear the blue and white scroll of the battalion.
Early in 1952, in anticipation of the end of the Korean Conflict, the United Nations Command outlined to the Eighth United States Army, Korea, responsibilities in connection with the establishment of the Military Armistice Commission. To comply with this directive, it was necessary to establish a unit which was to provide the necessary facilities and logistical support to the Military Armistice Commission and others engaged in the execution of the Armistice Agreement.
On 5 May, 1952, the United Nations Command, Military Armistice Commission Support Group (Provisional) was organized with an authorized strength of five officers and ten enlisted men. The United Nations Command Advance Camp was established in the vicinity of Munsan ne. The Support Group provided all necessary logistical support for the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC), the United Nations sponsored delegations to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) – Switzerland and Sweden, the Custodial Forces, India (CFI), the Non-repatriated Prisoners of War of the Chinese People’s Volunteer and the North Korean’s People’s Army (CPV/KPA), the Delegates of the Preliminary Conferences for Political Conferences (US Department Officials), and the CPV/KPA sponsored delegates of the NNSC (Czechoslovakia and Poland) for transportation and security when traveling south of the Military Demarcation Line. During peak operations from November 1953 to January 1954, the Group required a gross strength of 1,900 personnel for the support of approximately 32,000 people.
By February of 1954, the only remaining elements of the original Group were the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission and the NNSC. The unit was known at the United Nations Command Security Group. Their missions were: To provide for the security of Panmunjom. The command provided 24 hour security for all meetings as well as United Nations Command personnel and their guests within the Joint Security Area. They also controlled the entry into and exit from the Joint Security Area and Military Armistice Commission Headquarters Area. To provide for the Civil Affairs and Security of Tae Song Dong. To operate and maintain the Panmunjom tour program. This included up to 18 tours a day, 6 days a week. To provide logistical support for the NNSC and UNCMAC-related activities. To provide for the security and day-to-day operations of the United Nations Command Advance Camp (Camp Kitty Hawk).
In 1991, major changes took place with the removal of the 2d Infantry Division from the DMZ patrol mission. An additional mission was added: To provide for security patrols within its area of responsibility in the DMZ. The name of Camp Kitty Hawk was changed to Camp Bonifas and Camp Liberty Bell (formerly the 2d ID camp) was annexed and named East Bonifas. The United Nations Command Security Battalion now conducts up to 12 tours per day, 6 days a week. There are an average of 150,000 visitors to the JSA and Panmunjom per year.
———————————————————————————–
Combined Forces Command
MISSION OF THE ROK/US COMBINED FORCES COMMAND
——————————————————————————–
More than 46 years of fragile peace have marked the history of “post-war” Korea, where the longest armistice ever remains tenuously in force. For most of these years, the directing headquarters was the United Nations Command (UNC), which had also directed combat operations in the 1950-53 war.
The defense structure in Korea was eventually overtaken by the professional growth and development of the Republic of Korea
—————————————————————————————–
유엔사자료모음- 한글 2002/12/07 233
비무장지대 일부구역 개방에 대한
국제연합군과 조선인민군간 합의서
1. 쌍방은 정전협정에 따라 서울-신의주간 철도와 문산-개성간 도로가 통과하는 군사분계선과 비무장지대의 일부구역을 개방하여 그 구역을 남과 북의 관리구역(the area under the administration of the south and north)으로 함
2. 쌍방은 비무장지대 안의 일부구역 개방과 관련된 기술 및 실무적인 문제들과 남과 북의 관리구역에서 제기되는 군사적인 문제들을 정전협정에 따라 남과 북의 군대들 사이에 협의처리토록 함
제 30차 유엔총회 한국문제결의, 유엔사 해체문제(1975.11.17)
가. 우방측 결의 3390 a호
총회는(…) 1953년 7월27일자 정전협정은 이 지역의 평화와 안전을유지에 계속 불가피함을 인식하며 타방 직접 관계 당사자들이 정전협정 유지를 위하여 상호 수락할 수 있는 대안에 동의한다면, 미국정부는 1976.1.1자로 유엔군사령부를 종료할 용의가 있음을 확인한 1975.6.27자 미국정부의 안보리의장앞 공한에 유의하고,(…)
3. 정전협정의 계속적인 준수와 이지역에서의 평화와 안전의 최대한 유지를 보장할 필요성을 감안하여, 정전협정의 유지를 위한 적절한 방안과 더불어 유엔군사령부가 해체될수있도록 제 1단계 조치로서 모든 직접 관계 당사자들이 가능한 조속한 시일내에 협의를 시행할 것을 촉구한다.
4. 유엔군사령부가 1975.1.1을 기하여 해체할 수 있도록 그리하여 동 일자로 남한에는 유엔 기치하의 군대는 잔류하지 않도록 상기 협의가 완결되고 정전협정 유지를 위한 대안이 마련될 수있기를 희망한다.
나. 공산측 결의 3390 B호
(…) 한국에서 지속적인 평화를 보장하고 한국의 자주, 평화통일을 촉진시키기 위하여 한국의 국내문제에 대한 외부의 간섭을 종식시키고 이 지역의 긴장을 제거하며 군사적 충돌을 방지하기 위한 새로운 결정적 조치를 취하는 것이 긴요하다고 간주하면서
1. “유엔군 사령부”를 해체하고 유엔기치 아래남한에 주둔하는 모든 외군을 철수시키는 것이 필요하다고 간주한다.
2. 정전협정의 실제적 당사자들에게 “유에군사령부”의 해체 및 유엔기치 아래 남한에 주둔하는 모든 외군의 철수와 관련하여 한국에서의 긴장을 완화하고 평화를 유지, 공고히 하기위한 조치로서 한국 정전협정을 평화협정으로 대치하도록 촉구한다.
키신저미국국무장관 제 31차 유엔총회 연설문, 단계적 4자회담 제의 (197.9.30)
(…)
미국은 한국의 평화를 유지시키는 유일한 법적 장치인 정전협정이 계속유지되거나 혹은 다른조치로 대치되는 것을 전제로 유엔군사령부를 해체할 준비를 갖추고 있습니다. 우리는 북한의 동맹국들이 한국에 대해 관계개선 조치를 취할 용의를 보인다면 북한과 관계를 개선할 용의가 있습니다.
우리는 북한과 한반도의 장래를 협의할 용의가 있으나 한국의 참가 없이는 그렇게 하지 않을 것입니다.
작년가을 미국은 정전협정의 대안을 마련하기 위해 남,북한,미,중국이 참가하는 직접 당사자 회의를 제의 했습니다.(…)만일 그러한 회의가 지금 당장 실천될 수 없다면 미국은 단계적인 접근을 지지합니다. 회의의 장소와 범위에 관한 협의를 위해 남북한간의 예비회담이 즉각 시작 될 수 있을 것입니다.
이러한 단계에서 믹구 중국은 업저버나 자문역으로 참가할수있을 것이고, 만일 그러한 협의가 구체적 성과를 거두면 미국, 중국은 정식으로 회담에 참가할 수 잇을 것입니다.
(…) 우리는 북한과 기타 관련 당사자들이 이 절차에 긍정적인 반응을 보이든가 또는 건설적인 대안을 제시할 것을 바랍니다.
1951년 미국상원에서 증언하면서
‘나와 유엔과의 관계는 전혀 명목적인 것에 불과 하였다….요컨대 무슨 형식을 취하건 나는 유엔과는 전혀 관계가 없었다.
유엔본부 대변인까지도 미군사령부를 “유엔군사령부로 부르는 것은 옳지 않다.”라고 하였다.
유엔헌장 제 32조에 의하면 안보이사회에서 심의되는 분쟁의 당사국은 그가 유엔 성원국이 아니라 하더라도 그 심의에 초청되게 되었다. 그럼에도 불구하고 미국은 북한 대표의 참가를 거부하고 유엔으로 하여금 북측 대표를 초청하지 못하게 하였다. 미국의 이러한 책동의 비법성은 유엔총회 제 28차 회의 결의와 대비해 보면 더울 명백하다.
1973년 10월1일 유엔총회 제28차 회의에서는 조선문제를 토의 할때 조선민주주의인민공화국 대표를 무조건 초청할 것을 결정 하였다.
정전협정에 서명했던 미군사령관은 형식상으로 유엔군사령관의 명의를 띠었는데 1975년 유엔총회 제 30차 회의에서 유엔군사령부를 해체하고 유엔의 깃발 밑에 남조선에 있는 모든 외국군대를 철거시키며 조선에서 정전을 공고한 평화에로 전환시키고 조선의 자주적 평화통일을 촉진시키는데 유리한 조건을 조성할데 대하여라는우리측 결의안이 채택된후‘유엔군사령부’는 해체되었다. ‘유엔군사령부’가 해체되어 세상에 존재하지 않는 것 만큼 정전협정의 이행에 대해서 서명자인 유엔군사령관과 그후 후임자들이 책임져야 한다는 정전협정의 규정은 현실과 맞지 않는다.
(현대 국제법연구 (과학백과사전 종합 출판사 평양 1989 158~174에서 발췌. 조선전쟁의 법적 종결을 위한 조선민주주의 인민공화국의 투쟁)