주한미군지뢰회견자료집4 2006/02/07 96

4. 미군지뢰문제 해결을 위한 소파 3조와 4조의 개정

소파에서 가장 심각한 불평등 조항은 군사적 불평등 조항일 것이다. 아무런 통고도 없이 전쟁의 참화에 휘말릴 수 있는 조항이 3조 1항이다.

3조 1항 합중국은 시설과 구역 안에서 이러한 시설과 구역의 설정, 운영, 경호 및 관리에 필요한 모든 조치를 취할 수 있다.

예를 들면 미군의 시설과 구역 안에, 지뢰는 물론 핵무기까지도 우리 정부와 어떤 상의나 통보 없이도 설치할 수 있는 권한이 부여되어 있는 것이다. 주일미군 소파와 가장 큰 차이를 보이는 것이 바로 이 조항이다. 일본정부는 미군기지 안의 무기의 설치나 운영에 대한 통제권을 갖고 있는 데 비해 우리 정부는 통제권이 없기 때문이다. 이와 연관되어 미군은 철수 시에 지뢰매설지도를 인계하거나 지뢰제거를 할 의무를 지지 않는다. 즉 원상복구의무가 없는 것이다. 소파 4조 1, 2항에 따르면,

1. 합중국 정부는, 본 협정의 종료 시나 그 이전에 대한민국 정부에 시설과 구역을 반환할 때에, 이들 시설과 구역이 합중국 군대에 제공되었던 당시의 상태로 동 시설과 구역을 원상 회복하여야 할 의무를 지지 아니하며, 또한 이러한 원상 회복 대신으로 대한민국 정부에 보상하여야 할 의무도 지지 아니한다.

2. 대한민국 정부는 본 협정의 종료 시나 그 이전의 시설과 구역의 반환에 있어서, 동 시설과 구역에 가하여진 어떠한 개량에 대하여 또는 시설과 구역에 잔유한 건물 및 공작물에 대하여 합중국 정부에 어떠한 보상도 행할 의무를 지지 아니한다.

이러한 이유 때문에 미군이 매설한 지뢰에 대해 한국 정부는 어떠한 정보도 갖고 있지 못하며, 지뢰제거와 피해보상에 관한 어떠한 요구도 할 수 없는 것이다. 미군이 시설을 잘 사용하고 반환하였다면 상황은 또 다를 것이다. 그러나 지뢰와 같은 무차별 살상 무기를 제거는 커녕 인수인계도 하지 않고 갔다는 것은, 그 행위의 결과를 충분히 예측할 수 있음에도 행한, 고의적인 범죄에 해당한다. 위의 미군매설지뢰에 관한 실태조사에서 보듯 수많은 피해자가 있는데도 책임을 질 가해자가 없다면 지뢰에게 책임을 물어야 하는 것일까? 미군이 매설한 지뢰문제가 법 상식에 기초해서 자주적으로 해결되기 위해서도 소파의 3조 4조는 개정되어야 한다. 이들 조항과 관계되어 97년 연천 폭발물처리장의 열화우라늄탄 오폭 사고등이 제대로 해결되지 못한 채 흐지부지되고 말았다. 환경단체들을 중심으로 이들 조항의 문제점이 꾸준히 제기되어 왔다. 대인지뢰문제는 이러한 노력에 더하여 소파개정 방향에 또 하나의 가능성을 제공할 것이다.
역설적인 것은 미국이 약속대로 2006년 국제대인지뢰금지 협약에 가입한다면, 그리하여 그들이 매설한 지뢰를 제거하고, 책임을 진다면 이 조항은 내용상으로 수정되게 된다. 소파상 가장 핵심적인 문제인 시설과 구역에 관한 조항에 일대 변화가 오게 되는 것이다. 그러나 사실은 2006년 이전에라도 미국은 자신들이 주도해서 체결한 특정재래무기금지협약(CCW)에 의해 이러한 상황이 벌써 발생하였다. CCW 제2의정서의 3조 2항이 그것이다.

제 3 조. 지뢰․부비트랩 및 기타장치의 일반적 사용제한
2항. 각 체약당사국 또는 각 충돌당사자는 이 의정서의 규정에 의하여 자신이 사용하고 있는 모든
지뢰․부비트랩 및 기타장치에 대하여 책임을 지며, 의정서 제10조에 명시된 바와 같이 이것을 제거․철거․파괴 또는 유지할 것을 약속한다.

‘자신이 사용하고 있는 모든 지뢰’에 책임을 지며 ‘제거, 철거, 파괴 또는 유지할 것을 약속’ 하고 있기 때문에 미국은 한미소파와 관계없이 자신들이 매설에 사용한 지뢰에 대해 책임을 져야한다.
대인지뢰문제는 미국의 약속으로 스스로 발목이 묶여 있기 때문에 이미 담보가 마련된 셈이다. 소파개정운동이 그 핵심이라 할 수 있는 ‘시설과 구역’의 문제를 해결하기 위해 대인지뢰문제는 희망의 근거를 제시할 것이다.

자료4 과거와 현재의 미군기지현황은 생략

참고자료1

한국지뢰실태조사보고서
후방 36개 대인지뢰 매설지역 실태조사 보고서

2001년 7월 26일

한국대인지뢰대책회의․녹색연합

후원:

- 차 례 -

□ 외교통상부 1997년 9월 오슬로 국제회의 발언문 (1)
1997년 9월 1일 대인지뢰전면금지조약이 채택된 노르웨이 오슬로 국제회의에 참가한 이성주 수석대표의 연설문 (한글 발췌문과 영문 전문)

□ 부시 대통령에게 보내는 前 한미연합야전사령관 James
Hollingsworth를 포함한 퇴역 미군장성들의 영문서한 (5)
한반도에서의 대인지뢰 사용은 군사적 효용성이 없다 !

□ 한국 대인지뢰관련 주요 일지 (10)

□ 후방 36개 지역 세부 조사 내용 (12)
1. 대인지뢰에 대한 한국정부의 입장과 후방지역 지뢰상황 (12)
2. 후방지역 대인지뢰 조사결과 총괄 (14)
3. 후방지역 지뢰지대의 지역별 현황 (16)
4. 후방지역의 지뢰매설 현황 (17)
5. 한국의 민간인과 군인 지뢰피해자 현황 (27)

□ 지뢰관련 국제협약 해설과 국내외 변화사항 (32)
1) 한국의 The Amended Protocol II of CCW 가입 관련 일자보고 (32)
2) 오타와 대인지뢰금지조약(Mine Ban Treaty) 개요 (34)
3)「대인지뢰의 제거 및 피해보상 등에 관한 법률안」주요 내용 (35)

□ 외교통상부 1997년 9월 오슬로 국제회의 발언문
“이러한 진술이 과연 사실일까요?”

“한국에는 대인지뢰로 인한 어떠한 희생자도 존재하지 않습니다. 한국은 민간인의 피해가 없도록 철저하게 대인지뢰가 통제되고 있는 전형적인 사례에 해당합니다. 한국은 북한과 대치선상에 있는 155마일 비무장 지대를 제외한 그 어떤 지역에도 대인지뢰를 매설해 놓고 있지 않습니다. 또한 비무장지대는 철저하게 통제되어 있으며, 군은 지뢰 매설지도를 보유하고 있습니다. 지뢰 매설지역은 24시간 내내 철저하게 감시되고 있기 때문에 민간인의 접근이 완전히 차단되고 있습니다. 앙골라, 캄보디아 및 그 이외의 지역에서 발생한 사고들의 유형은 한국에서 일어난 적이 결코 없으며 앞으로도 없을 것입니다. 따라서 북한의 군사적 위협을 받고 있는 상황에서 한국의 대인지뢰 사용을 인정하는 것이야말로 제2의 한국전쟁을 방지하는 데 크나큰 도움이 될 것입니다. 한국에서 전쟁이 발발한다면, 전쟁 희생자들의 수는 아마 전 세계의 모든 지뢰 피해자들의 수를 압도하게 될 것입니다. 과거 50년 동안 지뢰사고가 없이 안전하게 대인지뢰를 사용해 왔음에도 불구하고, 전 세계의 대인지뢰금지를 위한 목표를 위해 한국에서 대인지뢰의 사용이 금지된다면, 그리하여 제2의 한국전쟁이 발발하게 된다면, 이것은 오히려 대인지뢰금지조약의 정당성을 위태롭게 할 지도 모릅니다.”

1997년 9월 1일 대인지뢰전면금지조약 초안이 채택된 노르웨이 오슬로 국제회의에 참가한 이성주 외교통상부 수석대표의 발언

<원문은 다음 장에>

◆ The position paper ◆
Speaker Lee Seong Joo, General of Depute Director, MOFA. 1997. 9. 1.

Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Delegates,
First of all, I would like to express our deep appreciation to the Government of Norway for hosting this important Diplomatic Conference. I am pleased to take part in this important process, even though we are here as an observer delegation rather than a full participant. By now many delegates here may be aware of the Republic of Korea’s views on this issue. But as an amendment has been proposed and is now under discussion, and as that particular amendment has a direct relevance to the security of my country, I wish to explain once more how we feel and how think about this important topic. At the outset I would like to make it quite clear that the Republic of Korea fully shares the concern of the international community over the scourge of Anti-Personnel Landmines. The proliferation of APLs and their indiscriminate and irresponsible use have caused a great deal of sufferings and casualties, particularly among civilian population. We are aware of the seriousness of the problem and therefore we agree with the emerging consensus that the international community must stop this. It is precisely for this reason that my Government has taken a number of measures over the past several years. In 1995 it adopted a one-year export moratorium. The moratorium was extended last year, and this year it is going to be extended again. We made a voluntary contribution to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance. Also, at present we are making preparations needed for our accession to the CCW and its Amended Protocol Ⅱ. These steps by my Government are a good testimony to Korea’s sympathy with the efforts of the international community to contain, minimize, and if possible to stop the tragic humanitarian consequences of APLs. We are here as an observer delegation, not because we are indifferent to the humanitarian cause, but rather because we have some serious problems that prevent us from fully subscribing to the complete ban on the use of APLs. Let me elaborate a little further on what are these problems and what are the reasons for our hesitation. My first point concerns the unique nature of our security situation. The Korean Peninsula is the only place in the world where the Cold War still lingers on. North Korea is quite unpredictable. North Korea continues to maintain its war machines in a high state of preparedness. In fact, Pyongyang has publicly stated for years its intention to use massively concentrated firepower in any forward advance against the Republic of Korea. With only 2.5 miles separating our capital from the Demilitarized Zone(DMZ), an outbreak of an all-out war is not a remote possibility for us. It is a clear and present danger. In fact, technically, my country has been at war with North Korea for nearly five decades. And, millions of men, women and children in my country live under a constant threat of another full-scale invasion. Let me now briefly touch upon what useful role the APLs have played so far and are expected to play in the future on the Korean peninsula. First, the use of APLs on the Korean Peninsula has been an essential element in deterring the possible aggression. It has helped prevent the recurrence of another devastating war. What North Korea has in mind is a blitzkrieg. They know that they will not succeed unless they could sweep through our capital and down to the southern tip of Korea in a matter if a few days. The first few days are therefore critical for North Korea to win and fir my country to repel the invasion. So our defense depends entirely upon our ability to delay or halt the advance of a highly mechanized and heavily armed North Korean Army. Minefields have been an indispensable component of our defensive barrier system, and are currently the solidly reliable instruments available. APLs have thus served as a powerful deterrence to military adventurism in Korea and will continue to do so. Secondly, APL deployments in Korea save lives. By preventing outbreak of another devastating war, it saves a great number of human lives, which such a war might have inevitably cost. Even in the event of another war in Korea, it will save the lives, both civilians and soldiers. It has been demonstrated that proper and efficient APL deployments in the battlefield can reduce casualties. We estimate that, should the ROK be denied the use of APLs, death tolls fir soldiers would increase by thousands per day in a possible Second Korean War. Now, against this unquestionable utilities the APLs provide in Korea, let me stress that its use in Korea has not caused any civilian casualties and inflicted suffering on their lives. Korea’s case is a classic example of a tightly controlled use of APLs. From the perspective of civilian safety, it differs from any other part of the world. The actual mined area on the Korean Peninsula is restricted to the 155-mile Demilitarized Zone(DMZ). The minefields there are fenced and clearly marked. They are thoroughly mapped and carefully documented. And they are also closely monitored by military personnel twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. Civilian access is completely denied. What happened in Angola, Cambodia and some other places in the world has not happened and will not happen in Korea. In sum, in Korea, the use of APLs has not caused and is not likely to cause civilian suffering; it has prevented and will prevent a war; and thus has saved human lives and will save them in the event of another war. It is worth noting that, should another war break out in Korea, the civilian casualties in the first several days will outnumber the civilian casualties caused by APLs throughout the world during the past several years. If, for the sake of “universality” of the ban, the use of APLs is banned in my country, where not only their utility but also safe use have been proven for the past five decades, and if such a ban invites another war in Korea which will inevitably result in a loss of so many lives, the credibility of the admirable humanitarian cause behind the international efforts to ban APLs will be irreparably damaged, and the treaty we are discussing today cannot avoid a very strong criticism.
Mr. Chairman,
I wish to reiterate our full endorsement of the humanitarian cause behind the movement for a total ban on APLs. However, we strongly believe that, in order to assure the universality and enforceability of such a ban, efforts should we made to understand why certain countries are cautious in joining this campaign, and determine which of the reasons offered by them may be recognized as valid and therefore accommodated. It is in this context that we welcome the amendment proposal dubmitted by the US delegation. We find it useful and believe that ir will serve as a good basis for our deliberation. We earnestly hope that the amendment could be acceptable to the other participants. In closing, I wish to express my sincere hope that this Conference will be successful in working out a more comprehensive and practical solution to the APL issue.
Thank you.

부시 대통령에게 보내는 前 한미연합야전사령관 James Hollingsworth를 포함한 퇴역미군 장성들의 영문 서한
◆ 한반도에서의 대인지뢰 사용은 군사적 효용성이 없다 ! ◆

前 美합참의장 데이비드 존스 장군, 前 한미연합야전사령관 제임스 홀링워스 장군, 걸프전 사령관을 역임한 노만슈와츠코프 장군을 비롯한 많은 퇴역 미군장성들은 한반도에서의 대인지뢰 사용이 군사적 효용성이 없으며 오히려 북한군의 침공시, 이를 격퇴하고 반격하기 위한 한미 연합군의 기동을 방해하고, 민간인을 지뢰피해에 노출시키게 된다고 주장해 왔다. 특히 베트남전쟁 시, 미군 사상자들의 1/3이 미군이 매설한 지뢰에 피해를 입었다라는 사례와 걸프전쟁 시 지뢰가 오히려 미군의 기동을 방해했다라는 사례를 제시하면서, 정밀한 야포 등을 포함한 대체무기의 개발 및 개선된 정보경고체계가 미군과 한국군에게 전투태세를 갖출 수 있는 시간을 더 많이 줄 수 있을 것이라고 주장해 왔다. 이들의 주장은 1996년 4월 3일자 뉴욕 타임스, 1996년 8월 8일자 뉴욕 타임스, 2001년 2월 25일자 워싱턴 타임스 등에 지속적으로 게재되어 왔으며, 2001년 5월 19일에는 부시 미국대통령에게 이러한 내용의 서한을 직접 발송하기도 하였다. 이에 한국대인지뢰대책회의는 가장 최근 자료인 2001년 2월 25일자 워싱턴 타임스에 게재된 이들의 주장과 2001년 5월 19일 작성된 서한을 국제대인지뢰금지운동(ICBL)으로부터 입수하여 공개한다.

May 19, 2001 WASHINGTON, USA, 25 feb 2001 (Washington Times)
By James Hollingsworth and Henry Emerson

The United States Army does not require anti-personnel (AP) landmines to protect its men and women in uniform or to increase its combat-effectiveness when waging war. Former President Bill Clinton claimed in 1997 that a U.S. signature on the Mine Ban Treaty would rob us of a weapon key to our forces’ security. This assertion was, at that time, and still is, untrue. Ironically, AP landmines have consistently demonstrated that they are, at best, minimal in their military utility, and at worse, deadly to the very troops that deploy them. U.S. combat strategy is based on an aggressive and highly mobile counter-attack when engaged by hostile forces. This response plan almost always makes AP mines a liability to our dismounted infantry. AP mines, in Operation Desert Storm especially, have shown that they slow our units and impede their ability to conduct fast-moving combat operations. Mines, either permanent or self-detonating, are blind -and time and time again they have proven to be as adept at maiming and killing our own troops as much as those of an opposing force. While serving several tours in Korea and Vietnam as combat arms commanders in some of those conflicts’ fiercest fighting, we saw firsthand the carnageour own mines inflicted on U.S. combatants and Korean and Vietnamese civilians. According to U.S. Army documents, a full third of U.S. casualties in Vietnam were caused by AP mines, and over ninety percent of those weapons responsible were made by the United States. In that conflict, the only advantage AP mines gave was to the North Vietnamese, who often recycled our weapons against us in their own mines and booby traps. The strategic failures of AP mines are only compounded by the human tragedy they cause for both civilians and our own soldiers. The International Committee of the Red Cross estimates that every twenty-two minutes someone, most often a civilian, is maimed or killed by an AP mine. Like civilian landmine survivors, U.S. soldiers that survive injury by AP mines have often been abandoned by their spouses, been unable to find gainful employment, and in some cases, have fallen into addiction or committed suicide. No treaty can bring back the lives and limbs sacrificed to this indiscriminate and counter-productive weapon, but U.S. participation in the Mine Ban Treaty can help ensure that American troops will, at the very least, not fall to our own mines while fighting tomorrow’s wars. No matter what minimal military utility, if any, AP mines may display, the cost they exact on armies and civilians is too great to continue reserving the right to deploy them. Unlike poison gas and chemical weapons, technologies banned because of the indiscriminate and horrific nature of the casualties they cause, AP landmines remain long after gas and chemicals have dispersed. The Mine Ban Treaty has demonstrated that preventing further mine use, not simply removing those mines already laid, is the only vaccine to this disease. Some congressional leaders maintain that the U.S. should continue on course with Clinton’s plan to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty in 2006, a date dependent on a successful search for “suitable” alternatives to AP mines. Development of “suitable” alternatives to AP mines is a ludicrous course of action when one considers that the U.S. Army already has tactics and technology that serve the same purpose of AP mines, blocking the movement of infantry units. If U.S. policy makers continue to believe in the general utility of AP mines, the best interests of the American soldier will never be fully served. As retired Lieutenant Generals with considerable combat command experience, we urge President Bush to instruct the Pentagon to develop operational doctrine that does not include the use of non-command detonated AP landmines or anti-handling devices. By sending the Mine Ban Treaty to the Senate for ratification, President Bush will demonstrate that he has the vision and political courage to forward a militarily sound solution to this crippling humanitarian problem. The world’s civilians as much as America’s soldiers do not deserve to be tragically disfigured, horribly maimed, or blown apart by a weapon emplaced in yesterday’s battlefields where children now play. President Bush should ban this weapon.

May 19, 2001

George W. Bush President of the United States of America The White House 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue Washington, DC 20500

Dear President Bush :
As retired senior officers and leaders in the U.S. armed forces, we are writing to express support for the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, a total prohibition on the stockpiling, transfer, production, and use of antipersonnel landmines (APM). It is our collective belief that the United States does not need to retain any APM, even in mixed systems with anti-tank mines. We feel strongly that it is in the best interests of the American soldier and our country that you “fast-track” U.S. accession to the Mine Ban Treaty. APM are outmoded weapons that have, time and again, proved to be a liability to our own troops. We believe that the military, diplomatic, and humanitarian advantages of speedy U.S. accession far outweigh the minimal military utility of these weapons. Current policy, Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 64, dictates that the U.S. will not join the Mine Ban Treaty before 2006, and even then depending on “suitable” new alternatives to APM having been found and fielded. Every NATO nation except the U.S. has embraced the Mine Ban Treaty. In doing so, our allies have demonstrated that they can accomplish their missions and protect their troops with weapons systems available now. Your predecessor, former President Clinton, portrayed APM as critical to the defense of the Republic of Korea (ROK) from the constant and real threat of North Korean invasion. Several of us are former commanders of elements of I-Corps (USA/ROK group), and believe that APM are not in any way critical or decisive in maintaining the peninsula’s security. In fact, freshly scattered mixed systems would slow a US and ROK counter-invasion by inhibiting the operational tempo of friendly armor and dismounted infantry units. It is our understanding that the standing response plan to a North Korean attack does not call for these weapons to be used to counter an initial attack. Other, more effective and less inhibiting weapons, not newly laid APM or mixed systems, would be employed to halt the first waves of a North Korean advance into South Korea. What’s more, the previous Administration’
s “Korea Exception” wrongly implied U.S. responsibility for the landmines currently deployed in the military control zone south of the DMZ. Those mines are under the jurisdiction and control of the ROK; U.S. accession to the Mine Ban Treaty would not require their removal. Our recommendation that you should send the treaty to the U.S. Senate for advice and consent is motivated by a deep concern for the welfare of the men and women of our armed services. As you know, Pentagon casualty reports from Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf attest to the tremendous toll that APM, many of them our own, have taken on our service men and women. Veterans across this country can testify to the devastating injuries this counterproductive weapon has inflicted on both U.S. servicemen and civilians in the countries where these weapons have been laid. We would not be urging this course of action if we did not believe it would enhance our combat mobility and effectiveness and, most importantly, protect our nation’s sons and daughters when we send them into harm’s way. Today, Armed Forces Day, we urge you, Mr. President, to ensure that no more U.S. servicemen or civilians fall to U.S. mines. Joining the Mine Ban Treaty as soon as possible will help bring about this achievable reality. We know that the American people will support you in protecting those who defend us. We certainly will. We look forward to hearing more about your position on the Mine Ban Treaty.

Respectfully,
￭ Rear Admiral Eugene Carroll,
USN-retired Former Assistant deputy Chief of Naval Operations
￭ Lt. General Henry E. Emerson,
USA-retiredFormer Commander of the XVIII Corps
￭ Lt. General James F. Hollingsworth,
USA-retiredFormer Commander of I-Corps (USA-ROK Group)
￭ Lt. General Harold Moore,
USA-retired Former Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Department of the Army and former commander of the Seventh Infantry Division, Korea
￭ Lt. General Dave Palmer,
USA-retired Former Superintendent of West Point
￭ Vice Admiral Jack Shanahan,
USN-retired Chairman, Military Advisory Committee To Business Leaders for Sensible Priorities
￭ Lt. General DeWitt C. Smith Jr., USA-retired
￭ Lt. General Walter Ulmer, USA-retired