이수형-한미연합군사력

http://www.ieas.or.kr/vol13_1/13_1_6.pdf

INTRODUCTION
The June 13-15 inter-Korean summit signalled a turning point in
the security climate on the Korean peninsula. The summit will not
only contribute immensely to resolution of the half century of
animosity between the two Koreas, but it also opens a new era for
South-North peaceful coexistence and cooperation. Furthermore, it
envisions clear principles and methods for dismantling the Cold War
structure on the Korean peninsula and a Korean unification by the
Korean people themselves.
The improvement of inter-Korean relations is only the first step in
achieving the goal, which is to completely dismantle the Cold War
structure and establish a permanent peace regime on the Korean
peninsula. As a matter of fact, the Korean issue is closely related to
the four great powers surrounding the Korean peninsula. Thus, there
are two major factors to be considered in resolving the Korean issue;
the parties directly concerned, i.e., South-North Korean relations, and
the power structure of the four powers, namely, the U.S., Japan,
China, and Russia. The ROK-U.S. alliance especially relates to those
EAST ASIAN REVIEW Vol.13, No.1, Spring 2001, pp.105-119
The ROK-U.S. Combined Defense System
in the New Security Environment
Lee Soo-hyung
East Asian Review, 13(1), Spring 2001, pp.105-119
2001 by The Institute for East Asian Studies
Published by the IEAS, 508-143 Jungrung 2-Dong Songbuk-Ku Seoul 136-851 KOREA
.
two factors.
The ROK-U.S. alliance was established to prevent invasion by
the North, and during the last half century, the alliance has
remained central to the stability of the Korean peninsula and
Northeast Asia. However, with the end of the Cold War in the late
1980s, the strategic environment has changed drastically. Owing to
the changed environment, efforts to normalize U.S.-North Korea
relations, as well as improve South-North relations ironically, has
weakened the rationale of the ROK-U.S. alliance. Nevertheless, the
governments of the South Korea and the U.S. have officially
emphasized the continuation of the alliance.1) As a result, it is time
for South Korea and the U.S. to work to restructure the ROK-U.S.
alliance to fit the newly-changed security environment.
In this paper, certain anachronistic aspects of the ROK-U.S.
alliance, such as residual effects of the Cold War era, will be
examined, and plausible restructuring of the alliance will be
proposed in order to maximize the self-reliance of South Korea and
to strengthen security under the drastically-changing Northeast
Asian security environment. The restructuring of the alliance will be
the first step in the process of South-North relations and for
establishing a peaceful, unified system on the Korean peninsula.
THE POST-COLD WAR ERA AND THE CHANGING SECURITY
STRUCTURE IN NORTHEAST ASIA
International relations in the 20th century were formed through
complex interactions of the two World Wars and the Cold War. Even
though these wars were finished in the 20th century, they are still
influencing 21st century international relations. Especially, since the
106 EAST ASIAN REVIEW SPRING 2001
1) The U.S. government has the intention to maintain U.S. Forces Korea after the
unification. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2020 (Washington, D.C.: US GPO,
2000).
end of 1980s, post-Cold War international relations have shown two
distinguishing characteristics: asynchronicity and duplication.
Asynchronicity characterizes the relationships of Northeast Asia.
Even though changes at the end of the Cold War shook the
geopolitical structure of Europe to its foundation, the Cold War order
has remained albeit, partially, in Northeast Asia. Duplication
indicates that the Northeast Asia security structure still has Cold War
characteristics as well as attributes of the post-Cold War. That
asynchronical duplication provides Korea with both new
opportunities and challenges simultaneously, as far as a peace
system on the Korean peninsula is concerned.
Basically, the security structure on the Korean peninsula in the
Cold War era consisted of two axes: Inter-Korean relations and the
ROK-U.S. alliance. Instead, the complexity of the post-Cold War
characteristics in Northeast Asia, asynchronical duplication, created
dissonance in the U.S.　 global-regional interests and its security
strategies,2) and this finally led to a triangle in strategic relations;
South-North Koreas, South Korea-U.S., and North Korea-U.S. North
Korea　s declaration of withdrawal from the nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), on March 12, 1993, encouraged the
triangular relations even more.
While the asynchronic-duplicate nature highlighted the U.S.
role regarding South and North Korea in the 1990s, the security
environment at the beginning of the 21st century has become
more volatile. That is, the characteristic could further
reconciliations between the hostile countries as well as relax
the existing alliance. Thus, the changing environment of the
post-Cold War on the Korean peninsula might cause potential
THE ROK-US COMBINED DEFENSE SYSTEM 107
2) While the possibility of attack of the U.S. mainland resulted in attempts by the
U.S. to coordinate its global with regional interests and strategies, the current
complexity of the post-Cold War era has relatively weakened that possibility. Les
Aspin, Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress 1994
(Washington, D. C.: USGPO, January 1994), pp. 2-3.
conflicts between South Korea and the U.S. foreign policies
toward North Korea.
In this context, South Korea needs to establish a new national
security strategy to minimize the negative aspects, while maximizing
positive ones, caused by the asynchronic-duplicate character of the
post-Cold War. However, since the South Korean security strategy is
closely related to the ROK-U.S. alliance, it is impossible for South
Korea to maximize its national interests without restructuring the
alliance. The restructuring of the alliance is necessary to create a
trilateral security coordination among South Korea, the United States
and North Korea; to dismantle the Cold War system on the Korean
peninsula, and to create the basis for unification.
ANALYSIS OF THE ROK-U.S. ALLIANCE
Implications of the Alliance
In general, the alliance is a mixed blessing, in that it offers the
parties benefits such as shared material and human resources and
assured security, as well as disadvantages restricting each party　s
sovereignty. In contrast to a symmetric alliance established between
and among similar powers, each party　s obligation and benefits are
different in an asymmetric alliance, and each party　s perception and
expectations regarding the alliance are out of balance. An
asymmetric alliance is used by a major power as a means of
controlling other parties, while providing a security guarantee
unilaterally.
Even among asymmetric alliances, the extent of influence and
control over other parties by a stronger party varies according to
whether the alliance maintains bilateral or multilateral relations. For
instance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), an
outcome of the Cold War, has held an asymmetric power structure.
However, NATO　s multilateral nature allowed it to develop both
108 EAST ASIAN REVIEW SPRING 2001
political and military functions simultaneously. In practice, the
NATO structure is separated into political and military functions,
and moreover, its political structure controls the military.3)
In contrast with NATO, the ROK-U.S. alliance based on Mutual
Defense Treaty (MDT) between the Republic of Korea and United
States of America signed on October 1, 1953, maintains an
asymmetric bilateral structure, and its military relationship is
prioritized.4) Article 2 of the MDT reserves a base for 　political
consultation,　 and the ROK-U.S. Combined Defense System (CDS)
institutionalized since the late 1970s.5) Nevertheless, the alliance still
remains asymmetric, that is, the development of political function
enabling it to control the military showed relatively little
development. In consequence, the alliance emphasized a military
structure and consolidated asymmetric relations. In particular, the
ROK-U.S. CDS was biased toward military structure and function,
conspicuously on the wartime operational control issue6) and
information and crisis-management functions.7)
THE ROK-US COMBINED DEFENSE SYSTEM 109
3) NATO, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization 1949-1989 (Brussels: NATO Office
of Information and Press, 1989); NATO, NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO Office
of Information and Press, 1995).
4) Lee Sam-sung, The U.S. Foreign Policy toward South Korea and Korean Nationalism
(Seoul: Hangil Press, 1993), pp. 473-86.
5) While 　political consultation　 according to the multilateral asymmetric nature of
NATO is based on Article 4　　the parties will consult together, when any party　s
territorial integrity, political independence, or security is threatened by external
aggression　　of the North Atlantic Treaty, 　political consultation　 in the asymmetric
and bilateral ROK-U.S. alliance on Article 2 of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the
Republic of Korea and the United States of America. Article 2 states that the parties
will consult together whenever, in the opinion of either of them, the political
independence or security of either of the parties is threatened by external armed
attack. Separately and jointly, by self-help and mutual aid, the parties will maintain
and develop appropriate means to deter armed attack and will take suitable measures
in consultation and agreement to implement this treaty and to further its purposes.
6) Despite the fact that, on December 1, 1994, peacetime operational control authority
over all South Korean military units, then under the Command-in-Chief (CINC)
Structure and Function of the ROK-U.S. Combined Defense System
A. Security Consultative Meeting (SCM)
The security consultative meeting was established to promote
efficiency of military cooperation between South Korea and the
U.S., and to encourage consultation on security matters on the
Korean peninsula, including the Cheong Wa Dae (the Blue House)
terrorist incident and the Pueblo hijacking in 1968, and the dispatch
of South Korean soldiers to Vietnam. In February of 1968, former
U.S. Defense Secretary Cyrus R. Vance proposed establishing the
SCM. It was established at the ROK-U.S. summit in Hawaii in
April 1968, and the first Defense Minister level-meeting was held
in May of the same year.8)
With South Korea and the U.S. Defense Ministers heading each
delegation, the Chairmen of the respective Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS),
high-level military staff members and foreign service officials have
also participated in the SCM. The SCM consists of a ministerial-level
plenary session and five working-level subcommittees: Policy
Review, Security Cooperation, Logistics Cooperation, Defense
Industry and Technology Cooperation, and Joint Communiques.
110 EAST ASIAN REVIEW SPRING 2001
of the Combined Forces Command (CFC), was transferred to the ROK Armed
Forces, the CINC still holds operational control authority in peacetime, because
he has the ultimate responsibility for war operations. Thus, to expand its selfreliance
and establish a new national security strategy, South Korea should
complete the transfer of operational control authority as soon as possible.
7) Intelligence capability is a critical factor in a nation　s decision to establish
strategies and war plans. Since South Korea is completely dependent on the U.S.
for the Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) and the Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), South
Korea is hardly free from U.S. influence on information management and
situational analysis.
8) The meeting held in May of 1968 was an annual meeting of the ROK and the U.S.
Defense Ministers. However, it developed into the ROK-U.S. security consultative
meeting in the fourth Defense Ministers　 annual meeting in February of 1971,
since the Foreign Ministries of both the ROK and the U.S. participated in it.
The main functions of the SCM are establishment of the ROKU.
S. combined measures against North　s provocation on the Korean
peninsula; effective operations of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces;
establishment of communication and coordination system between
South Korea and the U.S.; and strengthening of the ROK-U.S. CDS
following the establishment of the ROK-U.S. Combined Command in
1978.9)
B. Military Committee Meeting (MCM)
The MCM, a working organization of the SCM, was established
at the 11th SCM in July of 1978, and assumes a consultativecoordinating
roles for the ROK-U.S. combined military strategies.
The plenary meeting of the Military Committee (MC) takes place
prior to the SCM, and the results of the MCM are reported to the
SCM which is held soon after the MCM is over. Current military
issues related to the Combined Forces Command are discussed at the
MC standing meeting whenever necessary
The plenary session consists of five persons　　two Chairmen of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, representatives delegated by the respective
Chairmen, and the Commander-in-Chief of the CFC (CINCCFC). In
the plenary session, participants analyze possible threats on the
Korean peninsula and take preventive military measures against
them. Moreover, they annually review the achievement of the
Combined Forces　 development and the direction of its military
strategy, and give strategic instructions and tactical guides to the
CINCCFC.10) On the other hand, the task of the permanent session, as
a consultative body, is to take rapid and proper measures in any
contingency. The session can be held at any time by the request of
either of South Korea or the U.S.11)
THE ROK-US COMBINED DEFENSE SYSTEM 111
9) Yu In-taek, Understanding Military Issues on the Korean Peninsula (Seoul: Pubmum
Press, 1996), p. 38.
10) The ROK Ministry of Defense, White Paper 1997. [www.mnd.go.kr].
11) Baek Jong-chun, 　Direction for the ROK-U.S. Combined Command System,　 in ROK-
The MCM　s missions are, first, to analyze the North　s military
threats on the Korean peninsula and to consult on preventive
measures, second, to hear the CFC　s annual reports, and third, to
review the CFC　s military operational directions and to propose
strategic instructions and tactical guides to CINCCFC. Fourth, it
reports results of the session to the SCM and receives additional
guidance from the SCM. In 1978, the MCM implemented 　Strategic
Direction No. 1,　 providing for establishment of the CFC. In
addition, to ensure the successful hosting of the 1986 Asian Games
and the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, the MCM assisted the South
Korean government in securing it from certain military threats.
C. Combined Forces Command (CFC)
The ROK-U.S. CFC was established on November 7, 1978,
according to the 　Terms of Reference for the Military Committee and
ROK-U.S. CFC　 agreed at the 10th SCM on July 26, 1977, and 　the
Strategic Direction No. 1　 of the MCM in 1978.12)
The CFC consists of a Commander-in-Chief (a U.S. four-star
General), the vice Commander-in-Chief (a South Korean four-star
General), seven General Staff offices, and six Special Staff offices. In
principle, the South Korean and the U.S. staff members are
symmetrically assigned to each posts from chiefs to general
managers in the CFC. Currently, around 280 South Korean and 260
U.S. soldiers are serving.13)
The command systems of the CFC are; First, the CINCCFC is a
U.S. four-star general who holds two positions concurrently as
commander of the UN Forces and commander of the USFK. The
CINCCFC exercises wartime operational authority, directing the
112 EAST ASIAN REVIEW SPRING 2001
U.S. Military Cooperation: Present and Future (Seoul: Sejong Institute, 1998), p. 44.
12) Oh Kwan-chi, Cha Young-ku, and Whang Dong-jun, Prospects for ROK-U.S.
Military Cooperation (Seoul: Sekyung, 1990), p. 204; The ROK Ministry of
Defense, White Paper 2000 (Seoul: Ministry of Defense, 2000), p. 89.
13) Yu In-taek, op. cit., p. 41.
Army, Navy, and Combined Force Air Component Commanders.
Second, since peacetime operational control authority over the ROK
Army was returned to South Korea on December 1, 1994, the
CINCCFC is only in charge of the Combined Delegated Authority
(CODA) by the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). In 1994,
South Korea and the U.S. totally revised the CODA, and the MCM
assigned a new mission on the peacetime operational control
authority to the CFC, issuing 　the Strategic Direction No. 2.　14)
As the peacetime operational control authority was transferred to
South Korea, overall authority over military operations, including
deployment, standing guard, patrolling, combined tactical training,
and alert system were returned to the South Korean JCS. However,
since the CINCCFC has final responsibility over war operations, he
is still endowed with various essential responsibilities over
peacetime operations. These responsibilities include establishment of
a wartime operational plan, Combined Forces military training, early
warning system, and management of military information. In
addition, the CINCCFC is given the final authority to decide the
alert-level for the ROK and the U.S. Forces in case the possibility of
war increases.
Evaluation of the Korea-U.S. Combined Defense System
Under the changing security environment on the Korean
peninsula, the CDS centered on the USFK and the CFC, has greatly
contributed to deterring the North　s military provocations. The CDS
has played a positive role in both deterrence and defense,
complementing the ROK Forces. It has likewise improved ROK Force
military operations, has upheld the Armistice Agreement, promoted
Korea-U.S. cooperation, and has cut military expenditures.15)
THE ROK-US COMBINED DEFENSE SYSTEM 113
14) The UN Command, established by a UN resolution, still holds a supervisory
mission to implement the 1953 Armistice Agreement. The ROK Ministry of
Defense, White Paper 1997-1998 (Seoul: Ministry of Defense, 1997), p. 75.
However, it cannot be denied that the CDS has also negatively
influenced South Korean national strategic development. First, it has
weakened South Korean efforts toward self-defense. Second, while
the USFK is not under the operational control of the CINCCFC, most
of the South Korean Forces are under its control. Third, the South
Korean government is restricted in crisis management, because of the
Combined Forces　s commanding system and the CINCCFC　s
overwhelming strong position. Fourth, it has limited South Korea　s
negotiation power both with the U.S. and North Korea. The exposure
of its military intelligence to the U.S. places South Korea in a
disadvantageous position. Furthermore, the Combined Forces　
command and control structure inspires the North to consider the
U.S. as a major concerned party in South-North military
confrontations, and it works as a pretext for the North　s argument
that it can sign a peace treaty directly with the U.S. On the other
hand, the South is fundamentally restricted from implementing its
own foreign policy related to certain military matters, since it has no
direct channel of negotiations on military issues with the North.
In short, despite apparent positive roles of the CDS for the
security on the Korean peninsula, it has negatively influenced the
South　s military sovereignty and self defense. Consequently, as the
security structure on the Korean peninsula formed the South-North-
U.S. triangular relationship due to the asynchronic duplicate
character of the post-Cold War era, the absurd situation surrounding
the ROK-U.S. combined defense should be resolved in order to
improve the relationship between the two Koreas, following the
principle of concerned parties.
114 EAST ASIAN REVIEW SPRING 2001
23) Yu Jae-kap, 　South Korea　s Position on the USFK,　 in Kang Sung-hak (eds.), The
USFK and ROK-U.S. Security Cooperation (Seoul: Sejong Institute, 1996), pp. 113-
122.
PROPOSALS FOR RESTRUCTURING OF
THE COMBINED DEFENSE SYSTEM
Enforcing the SCM　s Political Functions
Without improvement in the security consultative meeting　s
structure and function, the 　subordinate security situation　 that has
continued for the last half-century will perpetuate. That
subordination will weaken the South　s independent security
function which enables it to proactively deal with the ever-changing
security situation on the Korean peninsula, and it will prolong the
asymmetric structure of ROK-U.S. relations. In this vein, the SCM　s
political structure and function should be reemphasized.
The changed international security environment offers a strong
reason for restructuring the SCM. The Cold War system has changed,
resulting in several phenomena such as decentralization of power,
proliferation of actors and issues, and regional diversification.16)
Moreover, such phenomena have interacted, leading to collapse of
the system. As a result, the end of the Cold War system has created a
new international security environment that has forced either
transformation or even abandonment of the Cold War alliance.
Changes in NATO, which had saved Western Europe from the Soviet
threat during the Cold War era, is a good example.
The new face of NATO instructs us that the SCM, considered
the ROK-U.S. alliance, should be restructured to emphasize its
political or diplomatic role, rather than its military function.
Therefore, in the short-term perspective, the South Korean Foreign
Minister and the U.S. State Secretary should participate in the SCM,
and the South Korea-U.S. armaments control committee should be
established to deal with future South-North Korea armaments
THE ROK-US COMBINED DEFENSE SYSTEM 115
16) Glenn P. Hastedt, American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, and Future (Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1991), pp. 11-17.
issues. In addition, the SCM needs to be a standing one.
Consequently, all those measures will increase South Korea　s selfreliance,
in consideration of the broad concept of security from the
1980s, the triangular relationship of the security structure on the
Korean peninsula in the 1990s, recent Four-Party Talks, and
discussions on establishing North Korea-U.S. and North Korea-
Japan diplomatic relations.
For the long-term perspective, if the Korean peninsula is to be
stabilized and if the ROK-U.S. alliance is to be maintained, the SCM
must be reformed in order to promote peace and unification on the
Korean peninsula more efficiently. Then, a newly-established
committee, such as 　the ROK-U.S. defense planning committee　
represented by the ROK and U.S. Defense Ministers, could carry out
functions of the SCM. Consequently, through the long-term
restructuring of the SCM, South Korea will be more able to adapt
independently to rapidly-changing security situations around the
Korean peninsula without loss of security.
Political Symbolism of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces
The U.S. Forces Korea and the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces must
be fundamentally changed; in size, structure, and function. Thus far,
South Korea and the U.S. have taken some plausible steps,17)
however, those steps have not met the fundamentally changed
security environment on the Korean peninsula.
First of all, the political function of the USFK should be
emphasized. Even though U.S. Forces first stationed troops in Korea
at the South Korean government　s request, presently, the stationing
of troops there works mainly in the U.S.　s own strategic interest.
Needlessly to say, the primary role of the USFK is to prevent a
war on the Korean peninsula and to defend South Korea. However,
116 EAST ASIAN REVIEW SPRING 2001
17) For instance, South Korea and the U.S. agreed to dismiss the Combined Field
Command on July 1, 1992, and to establish a new Combined Marine Corps.
it has emphasized its military function only. Therefore, there was
worry that withdrawal or reduction of the USFK would weaken
South Korea　s security. Of course, the concern was also caused by
the psychological effect of playing a subordinate role throughout the
long-lasting ROK-U.S. alliance.
While at the time of the 1950-1953 Korean War, 327,000 troops
were on the peninsula, now there are only 37,000, less than 1/10 of
the number 50 years ago. Following each USFK reduction, fearing
the loss of U.S. deterrence, South Korea has worried about the
military threat from the North. However, despite gradual reductions,
there have been no major military conflicts between the two Koreas.
In fact, the U.S. commitment to security on the Korean peninsula is
more valuable than the practical deterrence　　i.e. number of
troops　　against the North.
According to the perspective of political symbolism, the USFK
presence is meaningful in that it represents common security
interests of the ROK-U.S. on the Korean peninsula, not to mention its
role to augment South Korean Forces. Thus, considering that the
South　s military forces are superior to the North　s,18) the mere
presence of the USFK, regardless of its size, signifies the U.S.
commitment.
Regarding the current ROK-U.S. CDS, the CFC size should be
reduced. However, CFC reduction preconditions its restructuring.
Restructuring would mean classification and specialization of the
forces, that is, the CFC should be restructured into the Main Defense
Forces (MDF), the Reaction Forces (RF), and the Augmentation
Forces (AF).
The MDF would assume the role of maintaining current
deterrence against the North. Therefore, it is desirable that the MDF
be composed of South Korean troops. However, South Korea could
assign the agreed number of soldiers to the MDF, even if the
THE ROK-US COMBINED DEFENSE SYSTEM 117
18) Ham Taek-young, The Political Economics of National Security: South-North Korea　s
Economic, Military and National Power (Seoul: Pubmun Press, 1998)
CINCCFC still holds the wartime operational control authority. That
is, South Korea can adjust the proportion of South Korean soldiers in
the MDF, according to its own judgement of situational changes in
wartime, by employing 　the Force Quota System.　 The RF would be
composed of a Rapid Deployment Forces (RDF). In this case also,
South Korea has the right to decide the quota of South Korean
soldiers in it. The AF would preferably be composed of U.S. soldiers
as a deterrent factor against the North.
After completion of restructuring of the CFC, most South Korean
soldiers would be under the control of South Korea in peacetime,
and a limited number of soldiers would be assigned under the
control of CINCCFC by mutual decision of the two governments.
Then, restrictions on South Korea　s military sovereignty, related to
wartime operational controls, could be lifted. In peacetime, the CFC
would maintain at a politically symbolic level, a very small number
of forces including some defense systems　　early warning,
surveillance, and an air defense system.
Such restructuring would provide a basis for a more symmetrical
partnership between South Korea and the U.S. than before.
Furthermore, while South Korea can establish a solid defense system
through its own command and control authority, the U.S. would be
able to contribute to the stabilization on the Korean peninsula
through its participation to the restructured CFC. In short, to
maximize South Korea　s political-military independence in light of
the shifting circumstances on the Korean peninsula, the political
symbolism of the USFK and the CFC should be strengthened.
CONCLUSION
This paper proposes to find a way to maximize South Korea　s
self-reliance and efficiency in terms of military strategy, and to point
out anachronistic discrepancies in the ROK-U.S. alliance, a remnant
of the Cold War era. Thus, the focus of this paper was on the
118 EAST ASIAN REVIEW SPRING 2001
alliance　s asymmetric structure, based mainly on military rationales.
During the past half century, the ROK-U.S. alliance played a
proper and important role, considering circumstances on the Korean
peninsula at the time. However, as the security structure on the
Korean peninsula has changed in the wake of the post-Cold War era,
especially as U.S.-North Korea relations have changed, the ROK-U.S.
alliance, based on the Cold War rationale, has lost its purpose.
Thus, the alliance should be reformed according to the changed
international security environment. The first principle for
restructuring the alliance is to maximize South Korea　s self-reliance.
Secondly, it is to promote South-North reconciliation, according to
the principle of concerned parties.
With such principles, the alliance needs to be restructured in
order to strengthen political and diplomatic structure and function,
while subduing the military function that has overemphasized the
asymmetric alliance. As for ROK-U.S. security consultative
meetings, the structure and function should be improved to
revitalize the political consultation articulated in Article 2 of the
Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the
United States of America. In an asymmetric-bilateral alliance,
increasing the independence of the weaker party and taking political
and diplomatic approaches are much more desirable than military
action.
Gradual restructuring of the ROK-U.S. Combined Defense
System will not be an easy task, nor will reforming the system.
Moreover, it is possible only with a national consensus in South
Korea and the reliable political leadership of both South Korea and
the U.S. To be sure, beyond the ROK-U.S. CDS restructuring
proposed in this paper, further discussion is necessary in order to
bring about a desirable ROK-U.S. alliance.
THE ROK-US COMBINED DEFENSE SYSTEM 119