푸에블로기밀해제자료 번역문 2007/02/15 1067

푸에블로와 유엔사2-위기절차의 원고에 쓰였던 기밀해제자료의 번역문입니다.
중요한 부분의 번역이 되어 있으니 연구자료로 쓸 수 있을 것입니다. 참고하시고 인용을 해야할때는 번역문을 꼼꼼히다듬어쓰시길 바랍니다.

http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xxix/index.html

1. 위기조치문서(p1)
2. 외교문서(p121)

1. pueblo crisis 위기조치문서
212. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/
Washington, January 23, 1968, 0855Z.
국무부가 소련대사에게 보내는 전문(한국1.23.22:55)
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Also sent to Seoul and repeated to Tokyo. Drafted by Bundy; cleared by Brigadier General Steakley and in substance by Rusk and McNamara; and approved by Gendreau (S/S-O).
102940. Literally Eyes Only for Ambassador. From the Secretary.
1. Captain of small Navy trawler-class surface ship, USS Pueblo, has reported that at approximately 0010 our time tonight,/2/ his vessel, according to his report, clearly outside any definition of territorial waters, was taken under fire with small number of badly wounded casualties. Vessel was then surrounded by North Korean naval craft which had been firing on it, and our last report from Captain was that he was being either towed or escorted into Wonsan harbor, roughly 25 miles distance.
/2/The time given is approximately 2:10 p.m. Korean Standard Time on Tuesday afternoon, January 23. Eastern Standard Time is 14 hours behind Korean Standard Time and Greenwich Mean Time is 9 hours behind Korean Standard Time. Numerous detailed chronologies based on transmissions from the Pueblo were prepared in the days and weeks following the seizure of the ship to document the exact sequence of events and time frame involved as precisely as possible. Defense Intelligence Agency, Special Intelligence Summary, “Situation Regarding USS Pueblo,” DIASIS 24-68, January 24, contains an analysis of the seizure of the Pueblo and a chronology of events. (NSA, Center for Cryptologic History, Historical Files, V. Initial Reaction, Box 4) Chronologies are also in the Johnson Library, National Security File, National Security Council History, Pueblo Crisis 1968, Vol. I, Basic Study and Presidential Decisions, and ibid., Vol. III, Day-by-Day Documents, Part One.
2. Seoul, through UNC, should immediately seek MAC meeting. We understand you have already done so in connection with Seoul incidents, and although we are not clear whether attack and seizure can be construed as armistice violation, we would propose to use MAC channel in any event./3/ 서울 유엔사를 통해 즉각 군정위미팅을 요청할것이다. 우리는 당신이 이미 서울사건과 연관된 일을 알고 있을 것으로 이해하며, 비록 공격인지 나포인지 명백하진 않지만 정전위반으로 해석될 수 있으며, 우리는 여하간 군정위채널을 이용할 것을 제안한다.
/3/In telegram 102967 to Seoul, January 23, the Department instructed Porter to inform the ROKG of the incident; see footnote 2, Document 145.
1월23일 서울에 보낸 전문 102967에서 국무부는 포터에게 지시하여 한국정부에 사건을 알리도록 했다.
3. Moscow should immediately reach Gromyko or highest available official to present facts and to express in strongest terms our view that Soviets should be in touch with North Koreans to obtain immediate release of vessel and appropriate care for wounded men. You should point out strongly that incident is bound to raise serious tension with North Koreans and must quickly become public. We believe Soviets should act at once to convey our position and strongest protest to North Koreans and should bring their influence to bear in the interest of avoiding any further consequences.
우린 믿는다 소련이 즉시 우리 위치를 보호하고 북에 강력하게 항의하며 그 어떤 미래의 결과를 회피하는 것에 대한 관심을 분담하기 위하여 그들의 영향력을 발휘하길

4. You may point out지적 to Soviets that vessels of this type have been in international waters in this area for a considerable length of time and you may note, as you think appropriate, that its mission is similar to that of Soviet trawlers active in many parts of the world including close proximity근접 of USA.
5. In addition, Moscow should convey facts immediately to Wilson party/4/ with suggestion that Wilson raise matter urgently긴급 with Kosygin.
/4/Reference is to British Prime Minister Harold Wilson who was visiting Moscow at that time.
6. All publicity공표 on this matter will be handled from Washington. Orders to this effect have gone to military commands involved and you should hold matter on closest possible basis both before and after any announcement here.
모든 공표는 워싱턴에서 취급할 것이다. 이 결과에 대한 명령은 군사지휘관들을 포함하여 시행되고 당신은 언급된 전이나 후에 가장 근접한 가능한 전제위에서 문제를 다루어야한다
Rusk
 
213. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, January 23, 1968, 12:58-2:30 p.m.(*한국24일 14:58-16:30)
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson’s Notes of Meetings, Pueblo I. Top Secret. Drafted by Tom Johnson. The meeting was held in the White House.
SUBJECTNotes of the President’s Tuesday National Security Lunch
Secretary McNamara told Clark Clifford/2/ that “this is what it is like on a typical day. We had an inadvertent고의아닌 intrusion침입 into Cambodia. We lost a B-52 with four H-bombs aboard. We had an intelligence ship captured by the North Koreans.”
/2/Clifford was at this time Secretary of Defense-designate.클리포드는 국방장관대리
Clark Clifford asked, “May I leave now?”
The President asked if there had been any reaction반응 from the Soviets on the ship incident. Rostow said a message was coming up now. 소련이 이 사건에 어떤 반응을 보였나?
Secretary Rusk said the Soviets had advised the U.S. Government that they had nothing to do with the incident and that the U.S. Government should talk with North Korea./3/
소련은 미국정부에 자신들은 사고와 아무연관이 없고 미국은 북한과 대화해야한다고 충고했다.
/3/The Soviet response is in telegram 2550 from Moscow, January 23. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US)
Secretary Rusk said the problem of rescuing the ship and its crew is considerably상당한 different from retaliation보복 resulting from기인한 an attack. 배와 선원의 구조문제는 공격으로부터 발생한 보복과는 상당한 차이가 있다.
The President asked what are the alternatives.대안 The President said he was sure they included:
1. Hitting the North Koreans with U.S. forces 미군이 북을 치는것2. Getting a thorough explanation 설득을 통한 해결3. Capturing one of their ships 그들의 배중 하나를 나포하는 것
The President said he was anxious걱정 to know exactly정확히 what happened.
Secretary McNamara said he had no explanation other than the information that the ship was in international waters, more than fifteen miles out.
Secretary Rusk said that his department is studying the Armistice Agreement on the definition of international waters.
러스크는 정전협정에 공해의 정의에 대해 국무부에서 연구하고 있다고 말했다.He said there is a close relation to waters “contiguous”근접 to North Korea, but the armistice does not define new international boundaries for the high seas. Where the ship was before the incident is unknown.정전협정에는 해양에서의 국제경계에 대한 새로운 정의가 없다. 사고 전 배가 어디있었는지 모른다.
General Wheeler said this was not necessarily the case. Using a map, General Wheeler pointed to the position of the ship at 9:25 the night before and at 12 noon it was 25 miles off shore and 16 miles away from the nearest land associated with North Korea.
Secretary McNamara said it was unclear whether or not the ship had strayed방황 into waters near the coast of North Korea prior to the incident.맥나마라 말하길 배가 어디있었는지 불명확하다.
Secretary Rusk said the North Koreans put out괴롭히다. 내쫒다 a very bitter신랄한 statement charging비난 the U.S. Government with spying and aggression침략. General Wheeler said the North Koreans charged us with engaging in acts of aggression불법공격.
Secretary McNamara said the alternatives 대안 included picking up units of the North Korean fleet or units of the North Korean army along the DMZ or re-enforcing U.S. troops in South Korea. He said we could fly U.S. aircraft from the states to re-enforce units currently stationed there. 북측배나 부대를 납치하는 대안
Secretary McNamara said if this incident indicates any new threat협박 on South Korea, this would be [un]desirable바람직한 because North Korean air power is stronger than South Korean air power. The opposite is true of ground forces. Another alternative is to send additional naval forces.
CIA Director Helms said this incident is one in a series of increased harassment괴롭힘. He cited인용the recent plot against Blue House and many violations along the demilitarized zone.
[Here follows a brief discussion of a B-52 crash추락 in Greenland.]
Returning귀환 to the ship incident off North Korea, Secretary McNamara said there was a period beginning about 10 p.m. in which DoD is not aware of알아채다exactly what happened aboard the ship. Secretary Rusk said the commander of the ship did not ask for air cover or help or did not try to get out of the area quickly.
General Wheeler said at 12 o’clock Korean time (noon) the ship encountered만나다 a North Korean patrol boat. The Pueblo indicated it was a hydrographic수위측정ship when approached. At 13:45 hours the message came back that the ship was being boarded. General Wheeler said the machine gun aboard the ship was not uncovered. The General showed the President a photograph of the ship.
Director Helms said he advised the Senate의회 Foreign Relations Committee this morning of information about the incident.
Secretary Rusk then read from a cable which was brought into the meeting on a session which Ambassador Thompson had with the Soviets in Moscow. The Soviets said this was not their problem. They said the presence of U.S. troops in South Korea is a source of tension. .They said they would not take action on the matter./4/소련은 자기들 문제가 아니라고 말했고 주한미군의 시위는 긴장의 근원이다라고 했다. 그들은 이 문제에 대해 조치를 취하지 않을 것이라고 했다.
/4/Thompson met with Soviet Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Kuznetsov on January 23 to discuss the facts surrounding the incident. (Ibid.)
The President asked what other channels are open to us.
우리에게 다른 채널이 열려있냐고 물었다.

Secretary Rusk said the Mixed [Military] Armistice Commission meets at midnight tonight to discuss the attack on Blue House. We will raise the matter of the ship at that time.
오늘 밤 청와대 공격건으로 양측군정위가 만난다. 우리는 그때 배문제를 거론 할것이다.

The President asked what has been the reaction of the South Koreans?
Secretary Rusk said the Minister of Defense국방장관 chided꾸짖다 us for urging몰아대다 them not to retaliate when they are attacked and yet now finding ourselves caught in급습 this situation.
It is unclear whether our men were wounded부상 by self-destruct devices or by enemy fire.
General Wheeler said the man who lost a leg was engaged in blowing up equipment. He said the use of the term “wounded” seemed odd이상한 unless enemy fire was involved on some of the casualties.
The President said we need to see what our options are in this situation.
우리의 옵션이 무엇인지 알 필요가 있다.

Secretary McNamara said he had a couple of people working on this under Paul Nitze.
Secretary Rusk said the North Koreans may want to trade these sailors for infiltrators침입자 who have been captured crossing into월남 South Korea.
북한사람들은 남으로 침입했다 잡힌 침입자들을 이들 선원과 교환할 것을 원할 것이다.

The President said he thinks that this incident is related to the whole picture. He said he would not be surprised if something happened in Berlin to coincide동시다발 with what is going on in Vietnam and in Korea.
존슨은 생각을 말했다. 이 사건은 세계적인 구도와 연관되어 있다. 그는 말하길 만약 한국과 베트남에서 무슨 일이 동시다발로 베를린에서 어떤 일이 일어난다면 그것은 놀라운 일이 아니다.

[Here follows a brief discussion of the situation in Vietnam.]
Walt Rostow asked should the incident be referred to the United Nations, involving the ship.
로스토 이 사건을 유엔에 요구하는 것이 어떤가하고 물었다.

The President said this would be protective and would show a lack부족 of malice살의 on our part.
존슨은 그것이 방어적이고 우리쪽의 살의의 결핍을 보일 수 있다고 했다.

Secretary Rusk said we might like to take this to the Security Council. First, we should see what comes from the Mixed [Military] Armistice Commission.
러스크는 말했다. 안보리에 이것을 가지고 가는 것이 좋을 것이다. 첫째 우리는 군정위로부터 무엇이 올지 봐야한다.

Director Helms said the Soviets have their own ships of this kind including two ships off the Korean coast to keep an eye on the Red Chinese. In addition, they have one ship off Guam.
[Here follows a discussion of various unrelated matters.]
 
214. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, and Commander of United States, Korea (Bonesteel) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp)/1/
Seoul, January 23, 1968, 1405Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Pueblo, 23 January 1968 to December 1968. Secret; Immediate; Noforn. Repeated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and passed to the Department of Defense, the White House, the Department of State, and the Defense Intelligence Agency.
유엔사령관이 태평양사령관에게 보낸전문
합참에 전해졌고 국방부와 백악관,국무부,국방정보국에 패스됐다.
231405Z/UK 50223. Subject: Briefing of ROK Minister of Defense on Pueblo incident (S). 푸에블로사건에 대한 한국국방장관의 보고

1. (S) C/S UNC/USFK briefed ROK MND at about 1830 I, 23 Jan 68, local (0930 Z) after approval received for classified briefing. MND was emotionally irate성난 and indicated지적 US had done little after North Korean raid aimed겨냥 at assassination암살 of President Park except call meeting at Panmunjom and take normal operational steps, but because of Pueblo incident brought F-105′s into Osan without prior ROK knowledge, was moving Enterprise, and seemed to be ready to risk위험 war.
68년 1월23일 18:30/한국시간(1월24일08:30)에 유엔사령관은 한국국방장관에게 보고했다.
한국국방장관은 감정적으로 화가 나있었고 박대통령 암살을 겨냥한 북의 습격이후 판문점미팅과 일상작전단계유지를 제외하고, 작은 일만을 한데비해 푸에블로 때문에는 한국군에 사전통지도 없이 오산에 F-105를 가져왔고, 엔터프라이즈 항모를 이동시키고 있다. 그리고 그것은 전쟁을 위험하게 준비하는 것처럼 보였다고 지적했다..

2. (S) He said would refrain참다 from retaliatory raids against North Korea for time being, but if North Koreans made other significant raids, he would promise nothing further.
그는 (이일이 진행되고) 있는 시간 동안 북에 대한 보복공격은 참을것이라고 말했다. 그러나 만약 북이 다른 주목할만한 공격을 한다면 그는 앞으로 아무것도 약속할 수 없다고 했다.

3. (S) He commented it would be wrong to cancel Armistice Commission meeting set for 1100 hours tomorrow because it had been announced publicly with purpose to protest vicious잔인한 attack on President’s mansion, Seoul.
그는 서울 대통령관저에 대한 잔인한 공격에 저항하기 위한 목적으로 공개적인 발표를 했기 때문에 내일(25일) 11시에 잡은 정전위미팅을 취소한 것은 잘못이라고 지적했다.
 
215. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to Secretary Defense McNamara/1/
Washington, January 23, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea–Pueblo Incident, Vol. I, Part B (through January). Secret; Sensitive. Also sent to Nitze, Rostow, Rusk, Katzenbach, Bundy, General Carroll, Hughes, and General Carter. Rostow sent this memorandum under a January 23 covering note to the President indicating that it contained Helm’s “personal assessment.” Rostow’s note indicates that the President saw the memorandum.
SUBJECTNorth Korean Intentions 북의 목적

1. Per McNamara’s request, the Director of Central Intelligence herewith submits a preliminary예비 assessment of the Pueblo incident./2/
/2/In advance of Rusk’s luncheon meeting with the President on January 23 INR prepared an assessment containing conclusions similar to those in this document. (Memorandum from Greene to Denney, January 23; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, NK Seizure of USS Pueblo, INR/OD, January 1968)

2. Since the fall of 1966, North Korea has been pursuing a tougher, more aggressive policy toward South Korea and the US. Pyongyang has deliberately heightened tensions along the DMZ, landed infiltration teams inside South Korea, and has been more aggressive in shooting incidents involving South Korean fishing vessels and patrol boats. This policy is probably intended by the North Korean leadership primarily as a demonstration against US and ROK action in Vietnam./3/
1966년 가을이래 북은 긴장을 유발해 왔는데 이는 아마도 미국과 한국이 베트남에 취한 조치에 대항한 시위인 것 같다.
/3/See SNIE 14.2-67, “North Korean Intentions and Capabilities with Respect to South Korea,” dated 21 September 1967. [Footnote in the source text; see Document 130.]

3. The attempt of an armed North Korean infiltration team to attack the presidential mansion in Seoul was the most conspicuous두드러진 exploit착취 of this North Korean policy thus far. Now the seizure of the USS Pueblo adds a direct involvement with the US in an unusually dramatic way.

4. In our view the two incidents were not planned jointly. The attack in Seoul almost certainly involved considerable advance planning. It is unlikely that the attack was timed to coincide with the seizure of the Pueblo, which did not begin patrolling until 10 January.

5. Nevertheless, the circumstances of the Pueblo’s capture indicate that the North Koreans acted deliberately. If the local North Korean commander was exceeding his instructions, there was ample time for Pyongyang to countermand his actions.

6. What is known thus far does not suggest that the North Koreans are deliberately creating a pretext for hostilities. At this stage, however, regardless of whether they planned for it or not, they are probably now prepared to face a period of sharply heightened tensions. They claim요구, and they may believe, that the Pueblo was within their territorial waters. They will undertake a heavy propaganda exploitation이용 of the affair사건 for some days at least. They will probably not release the crew or the ship promptly unless they judge that the US will resort의지 to retaliatory action, such as an air attack against the patrol craft involved in seizing the Pueblo.

7. Pyongyang will be aware자각that the ROK on its own motion will probably undertake some violent retaliation for the episode in Seoul, presumably in the DMZ. The prospect of this will probably cause the North Koreans to exercise some caution in handling the further course of the affair.

8. If tensions rise sharply, the Soviets seem bound to take a hand at least privately. They will almost certainly advise the North Koreans to terminate끝내다 the episode at an early date.
 
216. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea/1/
국무부에서 주한미대사에게 보낸 전문
Washington, January 23, 1968, 2121Z.(한국24일11:21)
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 KOR/UN. Secret; Flash. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD and the White House. Drafted by Fleck and Berger; cleared by Steadman, Meeker, Bundy, Rostow, and Read; and approved by Rusk.(역자주 POLAD:Foreign Policy Advisors국무부외교정책고문)
103144. Ref: Seoul 3562./2/
/2/In telegram 3562 from Seoul, January 23, the Embassy referred to the upcoming MAC meeting called to protest the Blue House raid and indicated that, due to time constraints, it preferred to raise the Pueblo issue at a subsequent meeting. (Ibid.) In response the Department of State instructed the Embassy to raise the issue at the January 24 MAC meeting. (Telegram 103026 to Seoul, January 23; ibid., POL 33-6 KOR N-US)
1. Senior UNCMAC member should make strong, dignified and hard statements on both North Korean raid on Seoul and on seizure of Pueblo, keeping both in balance so as not to give South Koreans feeling we attaching more importance to latter.
유엔사군정위수석대표는 강하고, 위엄있고, 열정적인 성명서를 만들 것이다. 북의 서울습격과 푸에블로나포 모두에 대해, 그리고 한국인의 감정을 상하지 않도록 양쪽다 균형을 유지할것과 우리는 후반에 더 중요한 것을 첨부할 것임을 내용으로.
2. If North Koreans question validity정당성 of raising올리다Pueblo under Armistice Agreement, you are to ignore무시 question and avoid argument논쟁 on this. Wish you to concentrate on fact that raids and Pueblo seizure, following last year’s harassments in DMZ and raids, are part of a new pattern of North Korean belligerence and aggressive actions which dangerously increase tensions in this area. If they are persisted in, they will have the most serious consequences to the maintenance of the Armistice and to the preservation of peace in Korea. North Koreans should be warned that these acts cannot be perpetrated with impunity.
만약 북이 정전협정 아래 푸에블로의 제기된 정당성에 의문을 표한다면 당신은 질문을 무시하라 그리고 이것에 대한 논쟁을 회피하라.
3. Leave it to you to work out statement on raiders. With respect to Pueblo you are to draw on DOD statement and State Dept. Spokesman’s statement ignoring approach to Soviets, and stressing the following:/3/
/3/Initial statements issued by the Departments of Defense and State on January 23, as well as President Johnson’s address to the nation on January 26, are in Department of State Bulletin, February 12, 1968, pp. 189-190.
a. Pueblo was in international waters at 39 degrees 25’05″ North, 127 degrees 54’09″ East.b. Seizure was in violation of international law. Request an apology for this illegal action.c. Vessel and crew must be returned intact and immediately.d. U.S. reserves right to ask for compensation under International Law.
4. You should end presentation with the following words: I have been instructed by the U.S. Government/4/ to say the following directly to you. The events of last year, and especially the last few days, have put new complexion on the situation in Korea. The North Korean regime has embarked on campaign of provocation, sabotage, and assassination in violation of the Armistice Agreement and international law. The Republic of Korea and the United States threaten no one. If the North Korean regime persists in this campaign, which can only endanger the peace of this area, the responsibility for the consequences will rest with the North Korean regime.
4.당신은 다음의 단어들로 진술을 끝내야 할 것이다: 나는 당신에게 직접 다음과 같이 말하라는 미국정부의 지시를 받았다. 작년, 그리고 특히 바로 몇일전의 사건들은 한반도 상황에 새로운 국면을 조성했다. 북정권은 정전협정과 국제법을 위반하는 자극,사보타지,암살등의 군사행동에 관여하고 있다. 한국과 미국은 아무런 협박도 하지 않는다. 만약 북정권이 이지역의 평화를 위험에 빠뜨리는 이같은 행동을 지속한다면 그 결과에 대한 책임은 북정권에 달려있다.

/5/
/4/The Department of State underscored the importance of the statement being made on behalf of the U.S. Government, even though U.S. participation in the MAC was as a representative of the United Nations. The Department insisted that the statement refer to the “US and US alone,” because Washington did “not want to highlight UNC capacity and thus stimulate UN delegations in New York to question our right to speak in this capacity.” (Telegram 103324 to Seoul, January 23; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 KOR/UN)
/5/A U.S. observer described the atmosphere of the meeting as “not tense” and the North Koreans as chatting and acting “generally in jocular manner, laughing outright at statement of US demands” presented by Rear Admiral Smith in response to the Blue House raid and the Pueblo incident. A summary of the meeting was transmitted in telegram 3597 from Seoul, January 24. A verbatim text of Smith’s statement is in telegram 3608 from Seoul, January 25, and a translation of the statement made by the North Korean Senior Representative, General Pak Chang Kuk, is in telegram 3624 from Seoul, January 25. (All ibid.)
Rusk
 

217. Summary Minutes of Meeting/1/미팅회의록개요
Washington, January 24, 1968, 10:30-11:45 a.m.(한국 24일, 24:30-01:45)
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Bromley Smith, Meeting of Pueblo Group, January 24, 1968, 10:30 a.m. Top Secret. Notes of this meeting were also drafted by George Christian. (Ibid., Meeting Notes File, Meeting at State on Pueblo) When McNamara informed the President of this meeting and its participants in a phone conversation earlier the same morning, the President suggested that Clifford also attend, explaining that “he ought to learn it, cause it’s gonna be heavy.” (Ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and McNamara, January 24, 1968, 9:18 a.m.,Tape F68.01, PNO 1)이 모임의 기록은 조지크리스챤이 초안했다. 맥나마라가 이모임에 대해 알렸을 때 그리고 같은 날 아침 일찍 참석자들에게 전화대화로 알렸을 때 대통령은 제안했다. 클리포드 또한 “그는 그것을 알게해야한다, 그것은 중요해질 것이기 때문이다”라고 설명하는 것을 주목했다.
SUBJECTSummary Minutes of Pueblo Group
PARTICIPANTS
Secretary McNamaraDeputy Secretary NitzeAssistant Secretary WarnkeRichard SteadmanGeneral Earle Wheeler
Under Secretary KatzenbachDeputy Assistant Secretary Samuel Berger
CIA Director Helms[name not declassified] -> 누구일까?
Walt RostowClark CliffordGeorge Christian

Prior to the beginning of the meeting, George Christian raised the question of how to deal with the press. In response to his question as to what should be said about our going to the Russians with the request that they ask the North Koreans to return the Pueblo and its crew, it was suggested that he say the U.S. has been in touch with Moscow, is not satisfied with the Russian response and will be in touch with the Russians again. The suggestion was made that the press could be told that Ambassador Goldberg was seeing U Thant this morning. As to what could be said about U.S. reaction to the incident, it was suggested that he say the capture of the Pueblo, because it was a matter of great gravity엄중, was being closely studied prior to the President’s decision on his course of action.
Secretary McNamara said the purpose of this meeting should be defined and further organizational arrangements decided. He felt that we should try to answer three questions:/2/
/2/In his phone conversation with the President that morning McNamara raised the importance of the three questions. In response to the President’s query의혹 concerning the actions of the Pueblo’s commander, McNamara replied: “Mr. President, I honestly don’t know. I called Nick [Katzenbach] this morning and later Walt [Rostow] and said I think we need a Cuban Missile Crisis approach to this, and, goddamn, we ought to get locked in a room and you ought to keep us there, insist we stay there, until we come up with answers to three questions: What was the Korean objective? Why did they do it? Secondly, what are they going to do now–blackmail us, let it go, you know, what? And, thirdly, what should we do now? There are a whole series of things we’ve thought of here–quarantine them, steal one of their ships, etc., etc., etc. But we just have got to act quickly. I don’t think we can let the day go by before reporting to you our at least tentative views on those three questions.” The President commented, “I told Walt that I thought we ought to have done that beginning at 2 o’clock night before last and yesterday and then today too,” to which McNamara responded, “I think you’re right.” (Ibid.)
1. What were the North Koreans trying to do by capturing the Pueblo?2. What do we think the Koreans will now do?3. How does the U.S. respond to this incident?
Secretary McNamara suggested that an organization similar to that which handled the Cuban crisis should be set up. He felt we needed to close promptly즉시 the gaps in our knowledge and to gather the considered views of those attending the meeting so that recommendations could be made to the President before midnight. He said we must respond응답 firmly and promptly to the North Korean action.
Under Secretary Katzenbach suggested an interdepartmental group under the chairmanship of Deputy Assistant Secretary Berger.
In response to a question by Mr. Rostow, Secretary McNamara said the seriousness of the incident was made clear by our belief that the North Koreans are not about to give up the Pueblo soon.
Director Helms, in answer to the question of why the Koreans captured the Pueblo, suggested two motivations:
1. To hinder저지 the movement of Koreans to South Vietnam, and2. To harass괴롭히다 the U.S. in its conduct of the war in Vietnam.
He referred to several reports from Bloc sources concerning proposals to open a second front제2전선 in Korea. He also had a report that China would like to see the war in Korea reopened. He concluded that their present estimate was that the North Koreans would not reopen the war now but would make the situation as tough as거친 possible for us. He said essentially it is a question of whether we or they have the tougher will.
Secretary McNamara doubted that the North Korean purpose was to reduce the level of Korean forces in South Vietnam. He said that there were 1,200,000 free world forces in South Korea, and that the risk involved in capturing the Pueblo was much too high if the purpose was to effect the level of forces by 10 to 15,000 troops. He wondered whether they did not have another objective which involved tying down the U.S.–a much more serious objective.
Mr. Helms said he agreed that one objective would be to create the appearance of a second front which would reduce U.S. freedom of action. Mr. Rostow pointed out that the Soviets had this objective in the Middle East crisis but that it hadn’t worked very well. Mr. Helms called attention to the response of Soviet Foreign Office official, Kuznetsov, when asked by Ambassador Thompson to convey our concern to the North Koreans. He noted that Kuznetsov replied negatively without reference to anyone and without promising to consult his superiors.고위급/3/ It was obvious that the Russians knew what was going on in North Korea. Secretary McNamara agreed that the Russians were knowledgeable.
/3/As reported by Thompson in telegram 2550 from Moscow, January 23. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US)
Mr. Berger said it may well be that the Russians assumed we could not respond very effectively to North Korean provocation and that they agreed that the North Koreans should take advantage of the “target of opportunity,” i.e., the presence of the Pueblo off North Korea.
Secretary McNamara responded that there is a great deal we can do, including mining기뢰부설, conducting a quarantine검역, blocking shipping into North Korea, etc.
Mr. Berger said that possibly the North Koreans wanted to create a second Vietnam. They knew that we were holding down the South Koreans who are anxious걱정 to retaliate for recent North Korean raids. Both Secretary McNamara and Mr. Helms agreed that this was a possible motivation for the action.
Mr. Rostow said that possibly they were thinking that the U.S. would be reluctant마지못해하는 in an election year to make a major response involving such actions as calling up the reserves. It is possible that they are challenging us and trying to make our problems more difficult. He noted that their action had already led us to divert전환 the aircraft carrier Enterprise from South Vietnam by putting it into the Sea of Japan off North Korea. He said it is possible that the attempt to assassinate암살 President Park was part of this plan.
Mr. Katzenbach described the action as a calculated attack on a target of opportunity. He noted that the North Koreans didn’t know the Pueblo was coming their way before the 10th of January. After that date they may have planned to capture it, acting when the Pueblo was off Wonsan. He said that what the North Koreans do now depends a great deal on what the U.S. does. He doubted that the North Koreans would return the ship or the crew.
The North Koreans, according to an intercept, will hold the crew for ten days at least in order to interrogate them. General Wheeler noted that the North Koreans had held some of our pilots for a year and had treated them very roughly before releasing them. Secretary McNamara added that the fact that they will be holding the U.S. crew increases the seriousness of the situation.
Deputy Secretary Nitze said the North Korean motivation might be their hope that pressure on us might lead us to take a weaker position on Vietnam negotiations. Thus, it might be necessary for us to ask Congress for additional authority to take military action in order to make clear to the Soviets that they must not misunderstand our attitude toward the Pueblo incident. 소비에트를 위한 군사조치 의회가 결의할 필요
Secretary McNamara said if their effort was aimed겨냥 at tying묶다 our hands in other areas, they had succeeded since we cannot move in South Vietnam until the Pueblo incident is resolved.결과로는 베트남에서의 기동을 묶은 셈
Both Mr. Christian and Mr. Rostow mentioned the large number of telegrams from private U.S. citizens which had already been received by the White House. These messages, spontaneously자발적으로 sent, were demanding요구 immediate U.S. action.여론의 반등
Mr. Rostow suggested that the North Vietnamese [Korean] action may have been timed with the North Vietnamese military action at Qhe Sanh.
Mr. Katzenbach doubted the relationship. The North Korean Premier, Kim Il-Song, is opposed to negotiation of the Vietnam war. If there is a relationship, he did not understand why the Russians were opposed to doing anything about North Korea.
Mr. Rostow said he assumed that the Soviets knew of the North Vietnamese action. Considerable pressure was being exerted on us, both in Vietnam and in Korea.
Mr. Helms commented that North Korea wants to be in the hands of neither the Russians or the Communist Chinese. Mr. Rostow added that Soviet influence is more effective in North Korea than it is in North Vietnam. One far-out possibility was that the North Korean action was prompted by the Chinese in an effort to cross up the negotiations on Vietnam. Mr. Helms commented that the attack on the South Korean President’s home had been planned for at least two years.
Mr. Katzenbach said the most plausible position is that the Pueblo incident was a North Korean action which had been undertaken with the consent of the Russians and Communist Chinese. Mr. Rostow restated his view that the Pueblo incident may be tied in with numerous Communist actions in the Pacific area. He added that the Russians may have been interested in getting the equipment from the Pueblo.소련의 푸에블로장비관심
Mr. Berger said that the North Koreans may be stepping up harassment of all kinds. It could be that the Soviets knew of the North Korean campaign and decided against interfering.간섭
All agreed that the North Koreans will hold the ship and the crew and that they will not respond to diplomatic pressure alone.
Mr. Rostow reviewed some of the diplomatic actions being taken or which could be taken:
1. Ambassador Goldberg is to see UN Secretary General U Thant at 11:00 A.M. He is to try to interest U Thant in a solution of the Pueblo incident but is not to request the Secretary General’s good offices./4/
/4/Goldberg provided a summary of his meeting with U Thant in telegram 3481 from New York, January 24, at which U Thant expressed a willingness to use his good offices to seek Soviet views about the Pueblo incident. U Thant told Goldberg that since “North Korea is ’75 per cent in Sov camp’” the Soviets should be contacted first. U Thant also observed that the incident underscored his belief that the United Nations should have North Korean and North Vietnamese observers. (Ibid.)
2. We could take the issue to the UN Security Council in order to buy time in which a decision can be made as to what U.S. military action is to be taken. There would be no expectation기대 that a solution could come out of the UN Security Council meeting.
3. A letter from the President to U Thant might be used to give the Secretary General a sense of the gravity of the situation. The letter would link North Korean infiltration, including the Blue House effort, to the Pueblo capture.
4. A second effort to enlist the Russians in promoting a solution might consist of a Presidential letter to Kosygin.
Secretary McNamara said we must first decide what we will do. Mr. Berger pointed out that although Korean President Park has agreed not to retaliate for the present, the Koreans will do so no matter what we say if harassments continue to increase. General Wheeler said our commander in Korea is already deeply concerned and had asked whether he should play the current situation hot or cool with the Koreans.
합참의장 휠러는 말했다. 우리의 주한미군사령관은 이미 깊이 관련되었다. 그리고 그는 최근 상황에 한국과 함께 격정적으로 행동할지 냉정하게 행동할지를 물었다.
General Wheeler said he was not now prepared to recommend specific military actions but we could do any or all of the following:
휠러는 말했다. 그는 지금 특별한 군사조치를 추천할 준비가 안 되어 있다. 그러나 다음과 같이 어떤 것이나 모든 것을 할 수 있다.
1. Reinforce our military strength in South Korea and in the area nearby. We could send additional air and naval units to Korea and to areas closer to Korea. One question was whether we could use Japanese facilities in this reinforcement activity. If we can, it would make a great deal of다량의 difference. Mr. Berger replied that we could use Japanese facilities. Mr. Katzenbach said we should consider sending a Presidential letter to Sato or possibly a Presidential emissary.
한국과 그 인근지역안에서의 우리의 군사적강도를 강화하고, 우리는 한국과 그 인접지역에 공군과 해군을 추가로 보낼 수 있다. 한가지 의문은 우리가 이러한 강화조치에 일본시설을 사용할수있는지 여부이다. 만약 그렇게 할 수 있다면 엄청난 차이를 벌일 수 있을 것이다. 비거는 우리는 일본시설을 사용할 수 있다고 답변했다. 카젠바흐는 말하길 “우리는 사토총리에게 대통령편지나 가능하다면 대통령 사절을 보낼 수 있다.”고 했다.

2. We could use our naval preponderance in the area, both surface and under sea, to do any of the following:
우리는 이지역에서의 우리의 해군력 우위를 사용하여 수상과 수중에서 다음과 같은 일을 할 수 있다.

a. find North Korean shipping at sea which could be seized or sunk. The purpose would be to seize or destroy something of value to North Korea which was at sea.
바다에서 북한배를 발견하여 나포하거나 침몰시킨다. 그 목적은 바다에서 북에게 가치있는 어떤것을 나포하거나 파괴시키는 것이다.

b. blockade North Korea by mining selected harbors, either with standard mines or with MARK 36 bombs. Submarines could also be used in this effort.
선택된 만에 표준기뢰나 마크36폭탄으로 기뢰를 부설하여 북을 봉쇄하기. 잠수함 역시 이를 위해 사용할 수 있다.

c. punitive activities against North Korean coastal ocean-going traffic and the blocking of all such traffic. 북의 연안해로 나는 통항에 응징을 가하거나 그같은 모든 통항을 봉쇄하기

d. air and naval strikes against selective targets. The port of Wonsan was a tough target because it was well defended. Railroad and POL storage were other targets.
선택된 목표물을 공군이나 해군이 타격하기. 원산항은 잘 방어되어 있기에 투박한 목표이다. 철길이나 연료탱크는 다른 목표이다.

e. a raid in force on an isolated outpost along the Korean DMZ. Although General Wheeler did not favor this suggestion, he said it would be possible to destroy such an outpost and capture the garrison.
비무장지대를 따라 고립된 포스트를 공격하기. 비록 휠러제독은 이 제안을 명백히 하진 않았지만 그는 말하길 그런 아웃포스트를 공격할 수 있고 초병을 체포할 수 있다고…

f. photo reconnaissance should be undertaken before any other action. A drone unit had been moved to Okinawa and RF 4 planes are in South Korea. These could be used if weather permits. Mr. Helms said that Black Shield could be available for use within 24 hours./5/
사진 수색은 어떤 다른 조치이전에 착수해야한다. 무인비행기부대는 오끼나와에 이동해 있고 RF4는 남한에 있다. 이들은 날씨만 허락되면 사용할 수 있다. 헬름스국장은 검은 방패는 24시간안에 사용 가능하다고 말했다.

*1964년 쿠바사태때 CIA에 의해 1967년 카데나에서 첫임무수행 A-12.
http://www.afa.org/magazine/Jan1995/0195shield.asp 1968.1.26부터 북한 정찰 그뒤 왕비늘 작전으로 발전 현재까지 지속 블랙실드가 임무를 수행한 날은 보통 알려져 있듯이 24일 아닌 26일이다. 24일은 블랙실드가 논의된 시점이다. 24일로 기록된 문서는 다음은 미 국무부 동아시아과가 1972년 작성한 대북한 현안 보고서 초안으로, 이 비밀 문건 가운데 ‘미 정찰기의 정보 수집 활동’ 항목은 1급비밀(top secret)로 분류되어 있는데, 미국이 북한 상공에서 정찰기를 통한 정보 수집 활동을 개시한 것은 푸에블로 호 납치 사건이 일어난 이튿날인 1968년 1월24일부터이며, 그 이후 ‘왕비늘(Giant Scale)’ 작전이라는 이름으로 전략 정찰기 SR-71을 동원해 정찰 활동을 계속해왔다는 사실이 밝히고 있다. Title:The U.S. Posture Toward North Korea Source : December 26, 1999 Note : ksa-020 Korean Security Archives
/5/Black Shield missions consisted of intelligence-gathering수집 overflights to conduct photographic reconnaissance. A memorandum prepared by the Directorate of Intelligence, CIA, January 29, assessing평가 the results of the Black Shield mission over North Korea on January 26 and discussing the photographic information obtained by the flight is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea–Pueblo Incident–Miscellaneous, Vol. I.
Secretary McNamara suggested two general types of action:두가지일반적타입의조치제안
1. A general military movement into the Korean area which would signal our present intentions and be an indication of things to come.
상징적인 우리의 현재 의지와 다가올 일의 암시가 존재하는 한반도지역 안으로의 전면적인 군사적 기동

2. A buildup증강 of U.S. military forces which could include the call up of military reserves and a request of Congress to authorize the extension연장 of the terms of service of those now in the military.
예비군소집과 현재 군복무기간의 연장을 승인하는 의회의 요구를 포함하는 미군사력의 증강

Mr. Rostow said one thing we might do would be to direct the South Koreans to seize the Soviet hydrologic ship which is now following the Enterprise. This action would be symmetrical with the North Korean action and it would get the South Koreans involved in the situation. 남한에 소련선박 나포 지시.

Mr. Nitze said such an action would provide an obvious명백한 reposte반격; i.e., the Soviets might shoot back.

Mr. Clifford asked whether there was any merit in trying to get the ship back. General Wheeler responded응답 that this would be very difficult to do because of the air defense around Wonsan and the shallow얕은 waters of the port.
원산주변 방공의 어려움

Mr.Katzenbach said an effort to get the ship back would create psychological problems, i.e., that we placed greater value on the ship than on the personnel.
카젠바크는 말하길 배를 돌려받기 위한 노력은 즉 우리가 대원들보다 배에 대한 가치를 더 크게 두는 것과 같은 심리적인 문제를 일으킬 수 있다.

General Wheeler said that he hated유감 to see a U.S. ship in the hands of an enemy. In addition, there was some equipment still on board the ship, including a computer which would be compromised기능마비된. He repeated that an effort to sink the Pueblo by submarine would be very difficult because of the shallow water.
An air attack on the ship would encounter교전 stiff단호한 North Korean resistance.
휠러는 말했다. 적의 손안에 있는 배를 본다는 것은 유감이다. 추가로 기능마비된 컴퓨터를 포함하여 배갑판에 아직 약간의 설비들이 있다. 그는 얕은 바다 때문에 매우 어려울 수 있는 잠수함에 의한 푸에블로를 침몰시키기 위한 노력에 대해 반복해서 말했다. 배에 대한 공중공격은 북의 저항을 단호하게 대응할 것이다.

Secretary McNamara said there were three areas in which action should be taken:
1. on the diplomatic track; 외교해결
2. reinforce our total military strength, using existing Presidential authority such as extending the term of military service; 전력투사
3. applying U.S. military power in the area such as restricting제한 foreign shipping, the use of mines, blockade, etc.해상봉쇄
맥나마라는 취할수있는 조치로서 세가지 영역이 있다고 했다.
1. 외교적 해결 2. 군복무기간연장같은 현재의 대통령권한을 이용하여 우리의 총군사력을 증강 3.기뢰와 해상봉쇄등을 이용한 외국배의 항행을 제한하는 것 같은 미군사력의 사용

Mr. Katzenbach said one idea would be to put another U.S. ship in the area where the Pueblo was seized and give this ship full air and naval protection.
This would indicate that we believed we had a right to put the Pueblo where it was, but also have a beneficial유익한 effect on U.S. prestige위신.
카잔바흐가 말한 한가지 아이디어는 푸에블로가 나포된 지역안의 다른 미국배를 옮기는 것이다. 그리고 이 배에 충분한 공군과 해군의 방호를 실시한다.
이것은 어디엔가 있는 푸에블로를 옮길 수 있는 권리가 우리에게 있음을 믿게하고 또한 미국의 위신에 유익한 효과를 가져다 줄 것을 암시한다.

General Wheeler said the U.S.S. Banner would be available for such a mission.
휠러는 베너호가 그 임무수행에 가능하다고 말했다.

Mr. Helms said that for some weeks we have wanted to know more about North Korean troop dispositions배치. However, the State Department had opposed a Black Shield mission. Current developments would probably alter변경 this earlier judgment판단.
헬름스는 몇주동안 우리는 북의 군사력 배치에 대해 더 알기를 원했다고 말했다. 그러나 국무부는 블랙쉴드임무에 반대했다. 최근의 상황발전은 아마도 이러한 초기판단을 변경해야 할 것이었다.

Mr. Rostow said we should put in writing what we know about the incident, what things we are not sure about, and then instruct지시 the intelligence community to focus on whether the Pueblo incident is related to Qhe Sanh or the attack on the Blue House; also, whether the motive is diversionary.

Secretary McNamara agreed with this method of proceeding. He thought we should have a plan for photo reconnaissance, including authorization of a Black Shield mission, by the end of the day.
맥나마라는 이러한 진행방법에 동의했다. 그는 오늘밤까지 블랙실드임무의 허가를 포함한 사진수색에 대한 계획을 가져야 한다고 생각했다.

Mr. Rostow said that at the 1:00 P.M. NSC meeting, we should be prepared to report to the President on the work already done–the intelligence situation, the reconnaissance option, diplomatic moves, reinforcing military moves, including existing Presidential powers.
1시 NSC미팅에서 로스토우는 대통령에게 이미 한 일들에-현존하는 대통령의 힘을 포함하여 정보상황, 수색옵션, 외교적 움직임, 증강된 군사력의 이동등에 대해 보고하기 위한 준비를 해야한다고 했다.

He said that military and diplomatic moves should be used to convey전달 to the North Koreans and the Russians that they have miscalculated오산 the effect of the Pueblo incident on the U.S. In addition, we should initiate a military build-up on the scene.
그는 군사,외교적 움직임은 북과 미국에서의 푸에블로호사건의 효과에 대해 오산하고 있는 러시아에 전달되는데 사용될 것이다. 추가로 우리는 현 정황에서 군사력 증강을 시작해야한다.

Mr. Katzenbach suggested that we must answer the question: “What next.” All agreed that before we start down the road, we must carefully look at where it will end.
카젠바흐는 우리는 다음은 무엇인가란 질문에 답해야 한다고 제안했다. 우리가 길에서 내려가기 시작하기 전에 우리는 그것이 어디서 끝날 것인지 조심스럽게 지켜봐야한다는데 모두 동의했다.

Mr. Clifford said the North Koreans will say that the Pueblo was within their territorial waters. He asked how we could prove to everyone that the ship was in international waters.
클리포드는 북은 그들의 영해안에 푸에블로가 있었다고 말 할 것이다. 그는 어떻게 우리배가 공해상에 있었다는 것을 모두에게 증명할 수 있는가를 질문했다

Mr. Katzenbach noted that the South Koreans seized a North Korean ship some 40 miles offshore.
카젠바흐는 남이 북측 배를 약 40마일 해안에서 나포한 것에 주목했다.

General Wheeler added that this was a case of hot pursuit; therefore, would not be applicable to the Pueblo incident.
휠러는 추가했다. 그것은 맹렬한 추격에 해당한다. 그러므로 푸에블로사건에 적용할 수 없다.

There followed a discussion of how we could prove the exact location of the Pueblo.
푸에블로의 정확한 위치를 우리가 어떻게 증명할 것인가에 대한 토론이 뒤따랐다.

The ship had been on its track since January 10 but had maintained radio silence. It had instructions to go no closer than 13 nautical miles from shore. Mr. Clifford asked whether we could use intercepts도청 to disprove반증들다 the North Korean claim that the Pueblo was within its territorial waters.
클리포드는 그들의 영해안에 푸에블로가 있었다는 것을 요구하는 북에 대해 반증하기 위한 도청내용을 사용할 수 있는지 물었다.

Mr. McNamara said we would have to use such intercepts because of the seriousness of the actions we would be taking.
He added that we would need the fullest justification정당성 for our action which would have to be based on proof of the exact location of the Pueblo when it was attacked.
맥나마라는 우리가 말하고 있는 조치의 심각성 때문에 그런 도청내용을 사용해야 할 것이다고 말했다.
그는 공격받았을 때의 푸에블로의 위치에 대한 증거에 기반한 우리의 조치에 대한 가장 충분한 정당성이 필요하다고 덧붙였다.

Mr. Nitze added that the North Koreans had 83 of our military personnel to brainwash세뇌 and possibly make confessions자백.
Turning to the photo reconnaissance problem, Mr. Nitze noted that one pass with the Black Shield was quite safe but two or three passes would make it vulnerable
사진수색문제로 돌아가 니츠는 블랙실드가 가진 매우 안전한 한가지 관문과 공격받기 쉬운 둘 또는 세가지 관문에 주목했다.

Mr. Berger asked what we would do if the North Koreans fired on the photo reconnaissance plane. General Wheeler noted that the North Koreans have been practicing with SAMs against targets flying at altitudes used by Black Shield. The drone would create no problem but its reconnaissance was of a limited usefulness. Mr. McNamara added that Black Shield was essential.
비거가 만약 북이 사진수색기를 공격한다면 우리가 무엇을 할수있는지 물었고, 휠러는 북이 불랙실드에 의해 사용되어 온 고도를 나는 비행체에 대항하여 샘미사일로 연습해왔다는 것에 주목했다. 무인비행체는 문제가 없으나 그의 수색은 제한된 유용성밖에 없다. 맥나마라는 블랙쉴드는 필요불가결한 것이라고 덧붙였다.

Mr. Rostow reviewed the work to be done by 1:00 P.M. and the papers to be prepared for the group when it meets again at 6:00 P.M. in State Department.
로스토우는 13시에 되어진 일을 검토했고 국무부에서 18시에 다시 만났을 때 그룹을 위해 준비해야 할 보고서를 검토했다.

Mr. Helms will have the reconnaissance plan. Defense will list our military capabilities for action in the area. Existing Presidential authority will be compiled by Defense. CIA will prepare intelligence refinements including why the Koreans took the action and what their present intentions are. State will prepare the diplomatic options and the decisions to be taken in this area. State will also prepare the basis for U.S. action and its presentation to the public. An overall scenario or plan of action will be pulled together by State.
헬름스는 수색계획을 수립할 것이고, 국방성은 이지역 안에 있는 우리의 군사력 리스트를 작성할 것이고, 현행대통령권한은 방위에 적용될 것이다. CIA는 북이 왜 그런 조치를 취했는지 그들이 현재 목적이 무엇인지를 포함한 정제된 정보를 준비할 것이다. 국무부는 외교적 옵션과 이 지역 안에서 취해진 결정에 대해 준비할 것이다. 또한 미국의 조치에 대한 기초와 공식발표문을 준비할 것이다. 전체적인시나리오와 계획은 국무부에 의해 함께 이끌어 갈 것이다

Mr. Clifford said in his view the question was whether the loss of a U.S. ship with its crew was worth a major military confrontation대결with North Korea.
클리포드는 그의 관점에서 미국배와 선원의 손실은 북과 주요한 대결을 할만한 가치를 갖고 있는지에 대해 질문을 말했다.

Secretary McNamara felt that by this afternoon we would be able to narrow the options open to us to apply military pressure. 좁은 옵션만이 가능We could probably reach agreement on how the North Koreans would react반항 and what we would do, depending upon their further reaction. However, it is necessary to give the North Koreans promptly민첩하게 a clear message of our firmness확고.
맥나마라는 이날 오후에 군사적 압력을 적용하기 위해 우리에게 열려진 옵션이 매우 좁을 것이라고 느꼈다. 우리는 아마도 어떻게 북이 반항할 것인가와 그들의 미래의 반항에 끌려우리가 무엇을 할 수 있는지에 대한 합의에 도달할 것이다. 그럼에도 불구하고 북에게 즉시 우리의 명확하고 확고한 의사를 보여줄 필요가 있다.

Mr. Christian asked that consideration고려사항 be given to whether the President should inform알리다 the public as to what we are doing.
크리스챤은 우리가 하고 있는 것에 대해 대통령이 공식적으로 알리든 아니든간에 고려해야할 사항을 물었다.

145. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/
Seoul, January 24, 1968, 1031Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. President Johnson received a retyped copy of this telegram attached to a January 24 memorandum from Rostow stating, “This will give you the flavor취향 of President Pak’s reaction to recent events in Korea.” The memorandum indicates that President Johnson saw it. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Cables, Vol. V)
3598. For the Secretary. Ref: A. State 102967; B. Seoul 3571./2/
/2/Telegram 102967 to Seoul, January 23, instructed Porter to inform the ROKG of U.S. intentions to act through the UNC and MAC as well as to enlist모병 the assistance of the Soviet Union in urging재촉 the North Koreans to release the Pueblo and its crew. Porter was also told to advise the ROKG “in strongest terms against any attempt at action against North Korea in retaliation보복 for Seoul raid기습,” particularly in light of the added tensions arising from the Pueblo seizure. In telegram 3571, January 24, Porter reported on his forceful conversation on those matters with the Korean Prime Minister,총리 who, in turn, briefed Pak. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US)
1. President Park reacted strongly to representations made to Prime Minister to effect that ROK Government avoid reprisals보복 against North Koreans. He asked me to call this afternoon and kept me for hour and half. He opened with request for statement of position as I knew it, with emphasis on Pueblo incident. I recounted자세히말하다 facts as they have been transmitted전달 to us as well as attitude태도 we took in MAC meeting this morning. I also told him of naval movements and said he could rely의존 on us to remain in contact with him as this affair developed.
나는 그에게 해군의 움직임에 대해 말했고 그리고 이 일이 발전되었으므로 그에게 접촉을 유지하기위해 우리에게 의존해야 할 것이라고 말했다. /3/
/3/Documentation on the MAC meetings with the North Koreans and the movement of naval vessels into the region is in the compilation on the Pueblo crisis.
2. Park commented immediately on fact that we had asked North Korea for apology사과 and immediate return of the ship. To this we should have added, he said, that we wanted assurance that there would be no more raiding of any kind into South Korean territory. I said UNC had asked for MAC meeting because we wanted to get at North Koreans on subject of the raid, and the ship affair had developed later. He could be sure that raid would figure prominently현저한 in exchange at Panmunjom though we had no precise indication from ROK Government prior to my conversation with him as to what it desired. Park said that the problem would become acute격렬 when North Koreans say first, that there was no raid, that attack on Blue House in Seoul was simply a peoples’ uprising봉기; and second, when they reject our request for apology and refuse to return the ship. If we try to minimize the affair from then on, American prestige will fall greatly as matter has gone too far on both sides.
3. I said the matter has to be considered very carefully and that we must think about rather than react immediately to the enemy’s initiatives. The enemy had taken these actions at times and in places of대신에 his own choosing. He was not undoubtedly in an alert posture, and there were many reasons why we should not accommodate순응 him. It was this which led us to make representations to the Prime Minister this morning on subject of reprisals보복.
4. Park said vehemently격렬하게 that we seemed to be more worried about reprisals by ROK Government than we are about getting satisfaction만족 out of North Koreans. He said he respects the UN Command and the wishes of the American ally and he will not undertake unilateral일방적인 reprisals at this point. He wanted to make it very clear, however, that retaliation will become inevitable피할수없는 if there are any more attacks by the North on South Korea. He said objective of the raid was to kill the President and his family and they had very nearly succeeded. He knows that there are 2400 additional men in North Korea with similar training and purpose. These men have been taken from North Korean Army and given special training. They are located in six centers and he would like to strike them and eliminate제거 entire unit in one blow. He said he is convinced확신 that this will have to be done sooner or later or they will come down here again and again, striking at many different targets.
5. Park said that if United States gets no satisfaction in matter of the Pueblo we should strike North Korean naval ships along east coast after first neutralizing North Korean air power. The South Korean Government would be glad to cooperate in such a venture.
박은 말했다. 만약 미국이 푸에블로문제에서 만족한 결과를 얻지 못하면 우리는 먼저 북측 공군을 중립화시킨 후에 동해안을 따라 북측선박을 타격할 것이다. 남측정부는 그같은 위험에 협력하는 것을 기쁘게 생각할 것이다.

6. When he paused I said his friend President Johnson would be pleased to have his assurance that there would be no unilateral action against the North by the ROK Government. I said we understand that he has been subjected받기쉬운 to great provocation자극 but that he would be measured in United States and everywhere else throughout the non-Communist world by restraint he shows in these difficult circumstances. He repeated again his view that we are going to have to do something because of the attitude we have taken in demanding apology and immediate return of the ship, and he wants added to that in any way we can get it across that there must also be assurance to the South Korean Government that there will be no more forays침략 from the North. He is convinced납득 that if we have to act against North Korea, Chinese internal troubles will keep them from moving provided they are given assurance that there will be no threat위협 to their territorial integrity보전.
7. Meeting terminated on note of reiteration반복 that ROK Government would engage in no unilateral reprisals in connection with this incident. I assured him that we would consult fully with him as developments occur.
8. Comment: I think we have what we want from him in the way of assurance, but if there is another incident all bets내기 are off. I suggest you consider brief message from President Johnson to Park admiring찬미 his restraint억제 and statesmanship정치적 수완 and assuring him of close cooperation and consultation.
Porter

146. Telegram From the Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command and of United States Forces, Korea (Bonesteel) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)/1/
Seoul, January 24, 1968, 1240Z.(한국25일 02:40)
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea–Pueblo Incident, Events Leading up to; . . . . Secret; Immediate; Limdis; Specat; Exclusive. Also sent to CINCPAC.
(역자주:Specat:Top Secret by adding a Special Category특별범주가추가된1급비밀/Limdis: Limited Distribution대외비 /Secret:2급비밀 /Confidential:3급비밀 )
241240Z/UK 50245. Specat Limdis for Admiral Sharp and Gen Wheeler. Subject: North Korean Posture (U). 샤프대장과 휠러장군을 위한 특별범주1급비밀,대외비

1. (S) This is an attempt by me to draw some conclusions regarding관하여 North Korean posture from events of last few days.

2. (S) First conclusion is that these events, the strident귀에 거슬리는 outpourings쏟아내다 of propaganda from Pyongyang echoed from Moscow, and North Korean statements at today’s Armistice Commission meeting all tend to전념 confirm previous reports from this headquarters that North Koreans intend to의도 wage보상 in earnest진지하게 an advanced version of “porous warfare흡수전” combining unconventional warfare, continuously reiterated반복 propaganda themes, psychological warfare and subversion and sabotage.
첫 번째 결론은 이 사건이 모스크바로부터 영향을 받은 평양이 귀에 거슬리는 선전을 쏟아내게 하고 있다는 것과 북이 오늘 군정위미팅에서 비재래전과 연합된 흡수전, 계속되는 선전주제의 반복, 심리전과 그 하위버전, 사보타지등 보상을 위해 진지하게 발전시키고 있는 사령부에서의 사전보고를 확인하는데만 전념하고 있다는 것이다.

The pattern seems clearly to indicate that Kim Il-Sung is a determined practitioner개업의사 of the concepts advanced by Che Guevara in his article on “Many Vietnams” published 12 August 1967 in the Tricontinental, a publication of the Havana-based “Afro-Asia-Latin American People’s Solidarity Organization.”
김일성이 지시한 것이 명백해 보이는 그 패턴은 아바나에 있는 아프리카아시아라틴아메리카민중연대조직의 출판물로서 세대륙에서 1967년 8월12일 출판된 “많은 비엩남”에서 체게바라에 의해 발전된 ‘개념의개업자’패턴이라고 판단된다.

There are also additional evidences that he still suffers참다 from belief확신 that U.S. military effort so extended연장 in support of Vietnam that U.S. unable adequately적절히 assist ROKs, except perhaps by nuclear weapons which he seems to believe would not be used in current context of dissidence불일치 and antiwar feeling in U.S.
또한 추가적인 증거가 있다. 최근의 엇갈리는 맥락과 미국의 비엩남지원연장에 대한 확신에 대해 아직까지 피해받고 있다는 증거가 그것이다. 그것은 반전감정과는 거리가 먼 것 같은 핵무기를 제외하고는 미국이 한국에 적절한 지원을 하는 것을 어렵게 하는 것이다.
3. (S) The Blue House raid on night of 20-21 January confirmed in accurate정확한 detail the previous intelligence reported from here that North Koreans had trained and developed “30 man suicide자살 teams.” Information obtained from the one agent captured indicates 2400 men in special units had been under arduous험한 training for two years and that later raids may be undertaken by teams of company size. Credibility신용 this sole유일한 captive포로 not corroborated확인 from other sources established but he has provided much information and retraced되풀이 on the ground the infiltration route of his team with confirmatory확신 external외부 evidence.
4. (S) Current propaganda blasts adhere집착 strictly to same basic themes reported from here over past year. Essentially the two themes are: (a) U.S. imperialists with Park Chung Hee puppets괴뢰 are aggressors침략자 vying경쟁 to provoke new Korean War and (b) subversive파괴분자 and guerrilla raids south of DMZ are manifestations시위 of revolutionary South Korean patriots and not conducted by North Koreans.
5. (S) Continuing evidence crop up나타나다 in both North Korean actions and statements that Kim Il-Sung may be suffering from serious miscalculation as to U.S. capacity to react in Korea at same time war continues in Vietnam. This contains seeds of real danger if credibility of U.S. deterrent against overt명백 action remains in doubt.
계속되는 증거는 행동과 성명서 양쪽에서 나타나고 있다. 그것은 김일성이 계속되는 비엩남전쟁과 같은 시간에 한국에서 대응하기 위한 미국의 능력에 대해 심각한 오산을 함으로서 피해받고 있다는 것이다.

6. (S) Our estimate of North Korean capabilities and effectiveness of their “porous war” tactics is undergoing받다 continuing reevaluation재평가 and we attribute추정 even high capabilities now than previously given them. I am considering at the moment employing another battalion plus from the 7th U.S. division to reinforce local defense capabilities of Nike/Herc sites and special weapons storage areas.
나는 지금 나이키/허큘러스사이트와 특수무기저장지역의 지역방위능력을 강화하기 위하여 7사단에 더하여 다른 대대를 고용하는 것을 고려한다.

There have been today numerous fire fights and sightings of smaller agent groups in I Corp area north of Seoul, probably remnants나머지 of the original Blue House raiding team. A number of casualties have been suffered by both sides. We anticipate increasing team infiltrations in near future to include agent boat landings. In this connection, in my discussion with ROK MND this morning I found him seriously concerned at what he called his “underestimation” of numbers and effectiveness of well-trained North Korean teams. He wishes to present to UNC/USFK in near future plan for rotating mobilizations within rear area security divisions to provide 16,000 men for coast watching and associated counter- landing operations. Will report later on this when concept clearer.
오늘 원래 청와대침략팀의 잔여세력으로 보이는 무리들이 서울북쪽 1군단지역에서 작은행동그룹으로 관찰되었고 많은 교전이 있었다. 많은 희생자들이 양측에 의해 상처입었다. 우리는 가까운 장래에 보트상륙부대를 포함하는 증강 된 보복팀이 예상된다. 관련하여 나의한국국방장관과의 오늘아침 토의에서 그가 과소평가된 숫자라고 한 것과 잘 훈련된 북측팀의 영향력에 대해 심각해하는 것을 알았다. 그는 유엔사와 주한미군사가 가까운 장래에 해안감시와 연합상륙작전을 위한 16,000명을 후방지역방어사단내에 순환기동하는 계획을 보여주길 원했다. 개념이 더 명확해질 때 이것에 대해서는 나중에 보고할 것이다.

7. (S) In summary, I believe North Korean pattern of operations is proceeding along lines previously predicted예언된 in numerous messages from here and as briefed in Washington at army commander’s conference, USIB, etc. My concern, however, is that while some of our predictions have seemed “far out”보통이아닌 the North Korean actions have exceeded them and at higher tempo.
8. (S) The original North Korean objectives of: (a) diverting efforts from Vietnam, (b) harassing ROK economic development, and (c) the underlying theme regularly stated by Kim Il-Sung of encouraging고무 South Korean revolutionaries and achieving unification–on Communist terms–before or in early 70′s seem to be making headway전진, at least with respect to the first two objectives.
9. (S) In light of above, recommend expeditious decision regarding some augmentation U.S. Eighth Army, particularly for local security reinforcements. We are also reviewing sea infiltration threat and may soon recommend that to extent feasible ROK Navy and Air Force resources involved be further supported by additional U.S. Navy sea surveillance flights and possibly assistance of two U.S. destroyers.
위의 관점에서 미8군의 약간의 증강에 관한 신속한 결정을 추천한다. 특히 지역안보강화를 추천한다. 우리는 또한 바다침투위협을 검토하고 있다. 그리고 추가적인 미해군 감시비행과 두 대의 미구축함의 지원에 의해 앞으로 지원되는 것까지 포함하여 가용범위의 한국해군과 공군원천에 대해서도 곧 추천할 것이다.

 
218. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, January 24, 1968, 1 p.m. (한국 25일 03시)
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson’s Notes of Meetings, Pueblo II, 1:00 p.m. Top Secret. Drafted by Tom Johnson. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room at the White House. A memorandum of this meeting was also prepared by Harold H. Saunders, and summary notes of this and a brief meeting following the NSC meeting were prepared by Bromley Smith. (Both ibid., National Security File, National Security Council Meetings, Vol. IV, Tab 62, January 24, 1968)
SUBJECTNotes of the President’s Meeting With the National Security Council
PART I
The President: The Security Council meeting was set up before the ship incident. I want Secretary McNamara to bring you up to date on this matter. In addition we have asked Cyrus Vance and Lucius Battle for their opinions and judgments on Cyprus.
Secretary McNamara: All of you know the information which has been published. I will not go over any of that. We do not know what happened except that this incident was pre-planned. The earliest date on which it could have been planned was January 10 since this was the first time the North Koreans knew that the ship would be in the area.
Three things are clear:
1. It was a conscious자각 effort to provoke자극 a response or a lack of response.
2. The Soviets knew of it in advance.
3. The North Koreans have no intention of returning the men or the ship. I view this situation very seriously.
There are three key questions which are unanswered:
1. Why did they do it?
2. What will they do now?
3. How should we respond?

The President: Did the skipper선장 ask for help?
선장은 구조요청을 했었나?

General Wheeler: There was a message from the ship “These fellows mean business. SOS. SOS.” His next message was that they were boarding the ship.
At 1200 (noon) the first North Korean vessel made contact with the Pueblo. One hour later, 3 other North Korean vessels appeared and several MIG fighters were seen overhead.
12시 북측 배와 첫 조우. 1시간 후 3척의 다른 북측배와 몇 대의 미그기 출현
It is important to remember that we have harassments괴롭힘 of this type all the time. The skipper선장 probably considered it just that–an harassment–until between 1:00 and 1:45. This was when he recognized it as a very different situation from a normal harassment. At 1:45 he sent out the call for help.
1시에서 1시45분 사이에 괴롭힘을 당함
Convert that to Eastern Standard Time, the first encounter충돌 was at 2200 (10:00 p.m. EST).
동부표준시로 바꾸면 첫 충돌은 22시(한국시간23일 12시)
This was when he was ordered to “heave to or I will open fire on you.”
At 2345 (11:45 EST) Pueblo radioed she was being boarded.
23일 12:45분 경계에 있다는 통신
At 2354 (11:54 EST) the first SOS came.(23일 12:54 첫 SOS)
We ceased중지 to hear from the Pueblo 31 minutes later.
그로부터 31분 뒤(23일14:26) 푸에블로로부터의 청취가 중지됐다.

The President: Were there no planes available which were prepared to come to the aid of this vessel? Every press story I have seen this morning said that U.S. planes were only 30 minutes away부재중.
대통령은 이 배들을 구조하여 데려오기 위해 준비된 가용한 비행기가 없는가? 오늘아침 내가 본 모든 기사는 미국비행기가 30분이나 부재중이었다고 말했다.

Secretary McNamara: Air defenses in the Wonsan area are extensive광대한. If we had sent airplanes to support and intercept, it is likely that these extensive air defense measures would be brought into play활동시키다. In addition, it is necessary to consider the time of day and the approach of darkness.
원산의 방공망은 광대하다. 만약 우리가 지원과 차단을 위한 비행기를 보낸다면 이들 광대한 방공수단들을 가동시키게 하는 것과 같다.

General Wheeler: Aircraft would have needed to refuel in the air. Twilight여명 comes at 5:09. Darkness comes at 5:38. There were only 3-1/2 hours of light. The Commander of the Fifth Air Force issued an order to dispatch급파 aircraft but then reversed the order because of the approach of darkness and the superiority우세 of enemy forces in the area.
비행기는 공중급유가 필요하다. 5시9분에 여명이 온다, 5시38분에는 어둠이 온다. 밝은시간은 오직3시간 30분이다. 5공군사령관은 비행기급파명령을 하달했으나 곧 그 지역 적 공군력의 우세와 어둠이 다가왔기 때문에 명령을 유보했다.

Secretary McNamara: The North Koreans have a large air base in Wonsan.
북은 원산에 큰 비행장을 가지고 있다.

Walt Rostow: We need to get together협조 on these times. I have a document which agrees with yours that the first contact was at 2200. I have that the first SOS was received at 2328. McNamara said this was 2354. I have information that the ship went off the air 0032. Secretary McNamara said the ship went off the air at 0025. For a matter of historical accuracy, we need to determine what is the correct time.
우리는 지금 협조가 필요하다. 나는 첫 접촉이 22시라는 당신들이 합의한 문서를 가지고 있다. 나는 첫 번째 구조신호를 23시28분에 받았다고 들었다. 맥나마라는 그것을 23시54분이라고 했다. 나는 0시32분에 배가 사건으로부터 떠났다는 정보를 가지고 있다. 맥나마라는 배가 사건종료된 시간은 0시25분이라고 했다. 역사적인 정확도의 문제를 위하여 우리는 정확한 시간을 결정할 필요가 있다.

The President: I want you to assemble for me all the facts on this matter. Until now, I have been under the impression that 이라고 생각하다the ship did not ask for help. Get all the facts and document them well so I can study this matter further.
나는 로스토우 당신이 이 문제와 관련된 모든 사실을 나에게 모아주기를 원한다. 지금까지 나는 배가 구조요청을 하지 않았다고 생각하고 있었다. 모든 사실을 획득하고 그들을 잘 기록해야 내가 이 문제의 미래에 대해 연구할 수 있다.

Secretary Rusk: The negative reaction of North Korea and the Soviet Union was to be expected예상. One would expect the Soviets not to take responsibility. The reaction of the North Koreans last night at Panmunjom was consistent일관 with what I had expected. There are two conclusions:
북과 소련의 부정적인 반응은 예상되었다. 하나는 소련이 책임지려하지 않을 것으로 예상된다. 어젯밤 판문점에서의 북의 반응은 예상했던 대로 일관 되었었다. 두가지 결론을 내릴 수 있다.
1. It looks as if this incident was pre-planned.
2. The Soviets may have had advance notice사전통고 of what was planned./2/
1. 이 사건은 사전준비된 것처럼 보인다.
2. 소련은 계획되었던 것을 사전통지 했을지도 모른다.
/2/On January 24 the Bureau of Intelligence and Research issued Intelligence Note 67, which concluded that the Soviet Union “appears to have been caught unawares뜻밖에 by the Pueblo incident,” based on a lack of evidence suggesting암시 that “Moscow instigated부추기다 the North Korean seizure of the Pueblo or that Moscow even knew in advance that the incident would take place.” In terms of Moscow’s response to the incident, the report suggested “that the USSR wants to avoid all direct involvement in the present differences between the US and North Korea.” (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Pueblo, 23 January 1968 through December 1968) An Intelligence Memorandum issued by the CIA on the same day rejected Chinese involvement and concluded that the Soviets were behind neither the Blue House raid nor the seizure of the Pueblo. (Intelligence Memorandum No. 0580/68, “Confrontation in Korea,” January 24; ibid.)소련의 무관함에 대한 정보

The President: What were the reasons for it? 그 이유는 뭔가

Secretary Rusk: It could be a number of things. They may be trying to put additional pressure on us with reference to관계하에 Vietnam. They may be trying to open up a second front. I do not see much in it unless they had either of these two objectives in mind.
그 이유는 많다. 그들은 비엩남과의 관계하에 우리에게 추가적인 압력을 가하려고 노력했을 것이다. 그들은 제2전선을 만들려고 할 것이다. 나는 그들이 마음속에 두가지 목적을 다 가지고 있었던 것이 아니라면 그럴 가능성이 많다고 보진 않는다.

The President: Have you fully briefed the members of Congress?
회의 참석자들은 충분히 보고했는가?

General Wheeler: General Brown already has talked with Senator Russell. He will see Senator Mundt, Senator Dodd and Senator Thurmond later today as directed by the President.
Senator Russell seemed satisfied with the explanation given him today by General Brown. He was unhappy that an American ship was taken without a shot being fired on our side.
The House Armed Services Committee was briefed this morning at its regular meeting. I will give the President a full report on that as soon as possible.
브라운제독이 이미 러셀상원의원에게 말했다. 그는 각하의 지시에 따라 문트, 돋, 쓰루몬트의원을 오늘 늦게 만날 것이다.
러셀의원은 브라운제독이 오늘 그에게 한 설명을 만족해하는 것 같았다. 그는 미국함선이 발사하지 않은 것을 불행해 했다.
하원무장병역위원회는 오늘아침 정규미팅에서 보고했다. 난 가능한 한 대통령에게 충분한 보고서를 제출할 것이다.

The President: All of the Committees will begin investigations of this incident once it cools down. Should we do anything to head this off?
모든 위원회는 이 사건이전처럼 냉정하게 조사를 시작할 것이다. 우리는 이것을 가로막기 위해 어떤 것을 할 수 있나?

Secretary McNamara: Until we know precisely정확 what we are going to do, I do not recommend meeting with the Congress. They are not interested as much in what happened, which I think has been explained, as in what we plan to do.
우리가 무엇을 해야할지 정확히 알 때까지 나는 의회에서 추천을 위한 미팅을 할 수 없다. 그들은 우리가 행동하기 위한 계획을 내가 설명해 왔다고 생각하고 있는데, 무엇이 일어났는지 많은 관심이 없었다.

Secretary Rusk: In my meeting with the House Foreign Affairs Committee this morning, they were outraged격분 at the action by the North Koreans. They realize it is a very serious matter. They were understanding and were not pushing any particular개별적인 course of action.
오늘아침 하원외교업무위원회와 나의 미팅에서 그들은 북에 의해 자행된 조치에 대해 격분되어 있었다. 그들은 이것이 매우 심각한 문제라는 것을 깨달고 있다. 그들은 어떤 개별적인 조치를 압박하지 않았고, 상황을 이해하고 있었다.

The President: What other ways are there for us to find out more about exactly what happened?
정말 무슨일이 더 일어났는지 알기위하여 우리에게 존재하는 다른 방법이 무엇이 있는가?

General Wheeler: We will receive additional information for continued research by NSA on intercepts. In addition we will learn more from statements by the North Koreans and the Soviets.
우리는 NSA도청에 의해 계속해서 조사되고 있는 추가정보를 받을 것이다. 추가로 우리는 북과 소련의 성명으로부터 더 많은 것을 알게 될 것이다.

Leonard Marks: From North Korean press reports, it is obvious they are trying to create the following impressions느낌:
1. They want to create fear공포 among the South Koreans.
2. They are trying to create the impression that increased infiltration will take place.
3. They are making very flat statements about this being a “spy boat” which was carrying on hostile actions.
북으로부터 발표된 보고에 의하면 그들은 다음과 같은 느낌을 만들려고 노력하는 것이 명백하다.
1. 그들은 남한과의 사이에서 공포가 만들어지길 원한다.
2. 그들은 침투를 할 것이라는 느낌을 만들기 위해 노력하고 있다.
3. 그들은 적대행위를 수행하는 간첩선의 존재에 대한 매우 두꺼운 성명서를 만들었다.

Richard Helms: I would agree with what has been said. This appears to be an effort by North Korea to support the North Vietnamese in their efforts. They want to distract혼란 attention from Vietnam. (헬름스의 일관된 베트남 관계설)
나는 이야기되어 온 것에 찬성한다. 이것은 그들의 노력이 북베트남을 지원하기 위한 북의 노력으로 나타나고 있다. 그들은 베트남에 대한 주의를 혼란시키길 원한다.

The President: They may also want to detain구류 the Carrier Enterprise.
그들은 엔터프라이즈항모가 발목 잡혀 있기를 원할 것이다.

The President then read the Reuters wire account of an alleged혐의 confession 자백 by Commander L.M. Bucher, Captain of the Pueblo. The text of alleged confession is attached at Appendix A./3/
/3/Not printed.
대통령은 그러고나서 푸에블로선장 부커사령관이 혐의를 자백한 근거를 보도한 로이터의 전보를 읽었다.

Secretary Rusk: We should analyze the tapes to determine if this is Bucher. I frankly do not see how they could get a U.S. Navy Commander to make statements like that.
우리는 만약 이것이 부커라는 것을 결정하기 위해 테이프를 분석해야할 것이다. 나는 솔직히 그들이 해군사령관이 얻은 그같은 성명서를 만들었다고 보지 않는다.

The President: Look very closely at this record. 봐라 이건 매우 근접한 기록이다.

(General Wheeler and Secretary McNamara said this was being done.되고 있는 중)
Secretary McNamara: It is important to remember that we did not know where this ship was prior to the time of this incident. Our best reports are that the ship was outside of territorial waters.
이 사건의 초기에 이 배가 어디에 있었는지 우리가 모르고 있었다는 것을 기억하는 것이 중요하다. 우리의 가장최신의 보고는 배가 영해밖에 있었다는 것이다.

The President: Is there much chance of error? 착오의 기회가 많았었나

Secretary McNamara: Admiral Moorer, Chief of Naval Operations, said there is less than 1% chance of error in daylight conditions such as existed at the time. The radio intercepts of the North Korean craft placed them in the same area reported by the Pueblo: that was between 15-1/2 and 17-1/2 miles from shore.
해군작전과장 무어러제독은 그 당시 존재했던 주간상황에서는 착오가 일어날 기회가 1%도 안된다고 말했다. 북측배의 무선도청은 푸에블로호에 의해 보고된 것과 같은 지역에 있는 그들에게 신청되었다. 그 지역은 해안으로부터 15.5에서 17.5마일 사이에 있었다.

Richard Helms: Our fix is 15-1/2 to 17. Both of these figures are outside of territorial waters.
우리의 위치결정은 15.5-17.5마일이다. 이들 두그림 모두 영해밖에 있다.

Secretary McNamara: The ship did destroy some of its classified equipment. We do know that not all classified equipment was destroyed.
배는 그들의 기밀장비 몇개를 파괴시켰다. 우리는 모든 기밀장비가 파괴되지 않았다는 것을 알고 있다.

The President: How much of a problem does that create for us?/4/
우리에게 발생할 많은 문제들은 어떤 것이 있는가?
/4/On January 24 the Director of the NSA cabled해저전신으로 통신된 two reports to the Special Security Office of DIA and the JCS evaluating the impact of the loss of the ship and its equipment. Regarding the effect on communications security, the Director stated that the capture of the Pueblo represented “a major intelligence coup타격,쿠데타without parallel유래없는 in modern history.” Similarly, the overall loss and impact on U.S. ability to conduct signals intelligence was deemed “very severe.”
(Both in Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea–Pueblo Incident, Codeword Material, Vol. I, Part B [through January])
An NSA analysis prepared after the crew had been returned and debriefed concluded that “The unnecessary capture of excess equipment and materials was the most significant loss sustained in the cryptographic area.” (“Cryptologic-Cryptographic Damage Assessment: USS Pueblo, AGER-2, 23 January-23 December 1968″; NSA, Center for Cryptologic History, Historical Files, Carton VIII)
1월24일 NSA국장은 DIA의 특별보안국과 합참에 배와 그들 장비의 소실로 인한 충격을 평가하고 있는 합참에 두개의 보고서를 해저전신으로 통신했다. 통신보안측면에서 관해서 국장은 푸에블로의 나포는 현대사에서 유래가 없는 중요한 정보타격을 의미한다고 주장했다. 비슷하게는 신호정보를 생산하기 위한 미국의 능력에 전체적인 손실과 충격은 매우 심각한 것으로 생각되었다. NSA는 대원들이 돌아온 후 과도한 기구와 재료들의 불필요한 나포가 암호영역에서 지속된 가장 중대한 손실로 결론이 났음을 보고한 후 분석을 준비했다.

Secretary McNamara: This is much less of a problem than the diplomatic problems and the prestige위신.
이것은 외교문제나 위신보다 훨씬 적은 문제이다.

Walt Rostow: The confession by the Captain appears to have been written by the Soviets. This is not the language of an American ship captain. The Soviets may have had a hand in drafting it.
선장의 자백은 소련에 의해 작성된 것으로 보인다. 이것은 미국선장의 언어가 아니다. 소련은 그것의 초안작성에 협력했을 것이다.

Secretary McNamara: The impression that the Soviets were informed in advance사전에 is supported by their actions in Moscow. When Ambassador Thompson went to the Soviets, he received a Soviet position입장 on this quite promptly신속히. It is unlikely that the Soviets could have reached [received] the information about the incident, conferred about it, and then taken a position so quickly without advance knowledge that the incident was to take place.
소련이 사전에 알고 있었다는 느낌은 모스크바에서의 그들의 조치에 의해 입증되었다.
톰슨대사가 소련에 갔을 때 그는 꽤 신속하게 소련의 입장을 전해 받았다. 소련은 사고에 대해 정보를 받았거나 그것에 대해 협력했던 것 같지 않다. 그리고 꽤 빨리 사고가 일어난 것에 대한 사전지식 없이 입장을 취했다.

Richard Helms: This is a very serious matter. It appears the North Koreans are doing this in support of the North Vietnamese against us. It looks, at this time, like collusion공모 between the North Koreans and the Soviets. It appears to be another attempt to divert us from our efforts in Vietnam.
이것은 매우 심각한 문제이다. 북은 우리에 대항해 북베트남을 지원해왔다는 것이 드러났다. 당시에 북과 소련사이엔 공모가 있었던 것처럼 보인다. 베트남에서의 우리의 노력으로부터 우리의 주의를 딴데로 돌리기 위한 또다른 시도가 나타나고 있다.

Last August, the Polish Military Mission went to North Korea. It was learned [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that the North Koreans have sent 30 pilots to North Vietnam. They also gave the North Vietnamese 10 MIG-21′s. North Korea wants to do all it can to help the North Vietnamese. In addition, they want to keep the ROK from sending more troops to assist the South Vietnamese.[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] said the Soviets are putting pressure on North Korea to take some of the pressure off Vietnam. They advised that 2500 North Korean officers have been trained for sabotage and terrorism in South Korea.
8월말 폴란드 군사사절단이 북에 갔다.(1줄이하의 원텍스트가 기밀) 북은 북베트남에 30명의 파일럿을 보냈다. 그들은 또한 북베트남에 10대의 미그21을 주었다. 북은 북베트남을 도울 수 있는 모든 것을 하기를 원한다. 추가로 그들은 한국이 남베트남을 지원하기 위해 더이상의 파병을 하지 못하게 되길 원한다.
(한줄이하의 원텍스트가 기밀)~은 소련이 베트남을 압박하는 어떤 것을 북이 하도록 압력을 가하고 있다고 말했다

The President: Would not it be wise now that we have definite information where the incident occurred to tell Senator Fulbright so that he will be more responsible about his statements?/5/
풀브라이트상원의원이 말한 사고장소에 대한 정확한 정보를 우리가 가지는 것에 대해 지금 그것은 지혜롭지 않다. 그래서 그는 그의 성명서에 대하여 더 책임질 것이다.
/5/The memorandum for the record of this meeting by Saunders indicates that the discussion continued, focusing first on the Cyprus problem and then on the situation in Vietnam.
At the conclusion of the meeting McNamara suggested the Pueblo Group meet to discuss a response to the confession apparently명백히 made by Commander Bucher. According to notes by Bromley Smith that brief meeting ended with Nitze being given responsibility for preparing a statement for release that evening.
사운더스에 의해 열린 이 미팅의 기록에 대한 비망록은 처음엔 키프러스문제에 초점이 맞춰져있고 그 다음은 베트남상황이 계속 토론된 것이 표현되어 있다.
미팅의 막바지에 맥나라마는 푸에블로그룹이 만나 부커사령관에 의해 만들어진 자백의 명백한 책임을 토론할 것을 제안했다. 브롬리스미스의 노트에 의하면 보고미팅은 그날 저녁 발표될 성명서를 준비하기 위한 임무가 니츠에게 주어지는 것으로 끝났다.

219. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/
주한미대사가 국무부로 보내는 전문
Seoul, January 24, 1968, 2105Z. (한국 25일 11:05)
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Flash; Exdis.
3600. From Ambassador Porter. Ref: State 103652./2/
/2/In telegram 103652 to Seoul, January 24, the Department of State requested Porter’s assessment of why the North Koreans seized the Pueblo and what might be expected from them in the future. (Ibid.)
24일 국무부는 왜 북이 푸에블로를 나포했는가와 미래에 그들로부터 무엇을 기대하는가에 대한 포터의 평가를 요청했다.
1. General dearth of hard info on North Korea here makes it difficult to judge NK motivations and interests./3/ In case of Pueblo, it is more difficult for us to make judgement since we do not know how long Pueblo was in area and what its actions and equipment were.
/3/In the view of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the North Koreans, being “an extremely security conscious nation,” seized the Pueblo “to silence a US collector, embarrass the US and improve North Korea’s image,” conclusions drawn “largely because of its plausibility and the lack of evidence to substantiate the seizure as part of an overall plan to initiate hostilities or motivated by other reasons.” The assessment discounted the possibility that North Korea acted under instructions from Moscow and fully rejected any involvement by Communist China. (Telegram from the Chief of Staff, Air Force, to the Strategic Air Command, January 24; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Pueblo, 23 January 1968 to December 1968)
2. Pueblo incident and Blue House raid are clearly related. Once Seoul raid had been successfully carried out, North Koreans, uncertain of what actions we and ROKs might take, may have desired to remove major source of information on their own countermeasures. In so doing, North Koreans may well have had Israeli action against USS Liberty in mind./4/ Although there has been some speculation that action was taken to provide KPA with major “victory” for its 20th anniversary February 8, it seems unlikely to us that North Koreans would have taken such grave risk for propaganda purposes alone.
/4/The intelligence-gathering vessel USS Liberty was deployed in the eastern Mediterranean on May 23, 1967, in response to mounting tensions in the Middle East that culminated in the Six-Day War between Israel and its neighboring Arab states in June of that year. While in international waters off the coast of Israel and the United Arab Republic, the Liberty came under attack through a series of misunderstandings and errors on June 8 first by Israeli jet bombers and then by Israeli torpedo boats. Although heavily damaged and its crew decimated, the Liberty sailed to sanctuary. A history of the incident was written by the National Security Agency/Central Security Service, Attack on a SIGINT Collector, the U.S.S. Liberty, United States Cryptologic History: Special Series, Crisis Collection, Vol. 1 (1981).
3. While timing of Pueblo seizure is related to Seoul raid, there is complex of reasons why NK would undertake both. In this, Vietnam plays central role. Kim Il-Sung has long advocated greater Communist assistance to NVN and his latest pronouncement, calling for “more positive actions” to aid Hanoi, was carried by AP on Jan 18. At time when all aspects of Vietnam struggle are intensifying, NK leadership may well have felt that they could make no greater contribution to Communist cause and to their own purposes in Korea than to take bold actions designed to reduce support in ROK for augmented or even continued participation in Vietnam, to take advantage of current political difficulties of and to further reduce public confidence in Pak govt, and to shake mutual confidence between U.S. and ROK. Bold action could also, of course, create a diversion in Korean peninsula and force U.S. to divert military resources from Vietnam effort and stimulate additional domestic and overseas pressures against U.S. Asian policy.
4. Forecasting NK actions is risky game. Certainly their past conduct in refusing to release our helicopter in 1965 and returning pilots only after lengthy negotiation, plus their pattern of treatment of ROK fishermen, gives no ground for optimism that they will react favorably by releasing vessel and crew immediately. We are more inclined to believe that they will attempt to exploit개발,착취 their possession소유권 of ship and crew to maximum extent범위 from both technical and propaganda points of view. After these purposes have been ably served, they will probably return crew, but under conditions of considerable humiliation to U.S.
5. Although activities of past few days may cause them to proceed with caution, we can expect North Koreans to continue to carry out their basic plan for increased subversive effort against ROK this year, especially if they are not penalized in some way for these two coups. Their propaganda is attempting to make it appear that major revolt is already sweeping South, which they must sustain by action.
6. NK will not permit any action by us to go unchallenged. They seem confident and sure of themselves and appear convinced확신 that we have neither capability nor determination to deal with them while so heavily engaged in Vietnam.
Porter
 
220. Minutes of Meeting/1/
Washington, January 24, 1968, 6 p.m. (한국 25일 08:00-09:30)
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Bromley Smith, [Meeting on Pueblo Crisis, January 24, 1968, 6:00 p.m.]. Top Secret. Drafted by Bromley Smith. The meeting was held in Katzenbach’s office at the State Department and ended shortly before 7:30 p.m. (Ibid., Rusk Appointment Book)

SUBJECT Meeting on Korean Crisis Without the President
국무부 카젠바흐사무실에서 대통령없는 한국위기모임

Secretary McNamara: The President does not now have the power to extend확장 the tours of duty of military personnel without legislation.법률 He does have the power to call up reserve units without Congressional action and without declaring a national emergency. It would be no problem to move promptly to Korea substantial견고한 forces consisting of Army, Navy, and Marine Corps planes (100 to 300). This would be easy and relatively riskless, and should be done. We have considerable flexibility in force movements, call-ups and application of force. We could also restrict제한 commerce교역 or mine selected ports.
대통령은 지금 법에 의하지 않고는 군인들의 임무수행기간을 연장할 힘을 가지고 있지 않다. 그는 입법부의 조치없이 그리고 국가비상사태를 선언하지 않고 예비군을 소집할 수 있는 힘은 가지고 있다. 한반도에 육군과, 해군 그리고 해병대의 100-300대의 비행기로 이루어진 강력한 병력을 즉시 움직이는 것은 문제없다. 이것이 비교적 리스크 없이 쉽게 할 수 있는 일이다. 우리는 병력이동과 소집 그리고 병력의 적용에 있어서 상당한 유연성을 가지고 있다. 또한 우리는 교역을 제한하고 항구에 기뢰를 설치할 수 있다.

Under Secretary Katzenbach: It is important to distinguish구별 between symbolic movement of forces and actual use. The former전자 does not commit you, the latter does.
병력의 상징적 이동과 실제사용을 구별하는 것이 중요하다. 전자는 당신에게 위임되지 않는다. 후자는 위임된다.

Secretary McNamara: We must distinguish between (a) the call-up of forces; (b) the movement of forces; and (c) the actual use of our forces. There will be time between the call-up of forces and the movement of these forces for diplomatic activity.
우린 병력의 소집과, 이동, 실제사용사이를 구별해야 한다. 병력의 소집과 외교적 조치를 위한 이들 병력의 이동사이엔 시간간격이 있을 것이다.

Secretary McNamara: There are airfield limitations on the number of planes which can be handled, but we can put in about 300 maximum.
비행장이 취급할 수 있는 비행기수의 한계가 있으나 우린 최대300대 정도를 놓을 수 있다.

General Wheeler: The Enterprise can be kept where it is and by the 29th can be reinforced by the Kitty Hawk. There are 130 strike aircraft on the two carriers. We can also bring in additional destroyers and cruisers. Some would have to cross the Pacific, but we could end up with a substantial augmentation증강.
엔터프라이즈, 키티호크에 의해 증강될 수 있는 27대가 있고, 그것들이 있는 곳을 유지할 수 있다. 두 항모위에는 130대의 전투기가 있다. 우리는 추가로 구축함과 순양함을 배치시킬 수 있다. 어떤 것은 태평양을 통과해야하나 우리는 견고한 증강을 끝낼 수 있다.

Secretary Rusk: Was the alleged confession of the Pueblo’s captain a voice broadcast?/2/
방송에 푸에블로선장의 근거없는 자백에 대한 목소리방송이 있는가?
/2/Bucher read a confession over Radio Pyongyang. (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Korea–Pueblo Incident)
/2/부커는 평양라디오로 자백서를 읽었다.

Director Helms: Yes, but the recording made in Okinawa was not good. The tape is en route here. The accent was American but the language was stilted and unlike that which an American would use.
예. 그러나 오끼나와에서 만들어진 기록은 상태가 좋지 않다. 테입은 여기로 오는 도중에 있다. 억양은 미국이지만 언어는 미국인이 사용하는 것과 닮지 않았거나 과장되어 있다.

Secretary Rusk: Diplomatic moves available to us in the next 48 hours include the use of the UN Security Council. There are difficulties but also much reason in the idea. The United Nations has had a special relationship to Korea, and there has been a long history of association with the problem. There is a preliminary obligation의무 to refer the matter to the United Nations before taking military action. This is not exactly정확히 a Charter provision조항, but is in the atmosphere분위기 of the Charter. We did so in the Cuban missile crisis before heading for a military confrontation. It is one way of putting prestige위신 factors in계산에넣다 the refrigerator for a few days. Security Council debate논쟁 affords할수있다 a framework in which contact can be made with the other side without engaging major prestige. We should try diplomacy by going to the Council at once.동시에 We are not yet ready to move militarily to meet an enemy response to our initial military action. Council consideration could also afford an important breathing spell in public feeling.
우리에게 가능한 외교적 움직임은 유엔안보리의 사용을 포함하여 다음 48시간이다. 생각속의 많은 근거 또한 어렵다. 유엔은 한국과 특별한 인연을 가지고 있으며 연관된 문제들의 긴 역사를 가지고 있다. 군사조치를 취하기 전, 유엔에 문제를 회부할 예비의무가 있다. 이것은 헌장조항이 명확하진 않다. 그러나 헌장의 분위기는 그렇다. 우리는 쿠바미슬위기를 군사대결로 방향을 잡기 전에 그렇게 했었다. 한가지 방법은 몇일 동안의 냉각기를 계산에 넣고 위신을 유지하는 것이다. 안보리에서 중요한 위신을 개입시키지 않고 다른 측면에서 만들 수 있는 접촉의 틀을 논쟁할 수 있다. 우리는 안보리로 가는 동시에 외교적 노력을 해야할 것이다. 우리는 초기군사적조치에 답하여 적을 만나기 위한 군사적 이동을 할 준비가 아직 안되어 있다. 안보리의 고려는 공적감정형성에 중요한 호흡할 수 있는 시간을 줄 수 있다.

Assistant Secretary Sisco: We have a paper outlining two possibilities./3/
우린 두가지 가능성의 윤곽의 서류를 가지고 있다.
/3/Not further identified. Sisco also prepared a paper containing three potential options for approaching the UN: 1) submitting a factual report to the Security Council; 2) requesting the good offices of the Secretary General; and 3) consulting with a few key members of the Security Council and with the South Koreans prior to convening the Security Council. (Memorandum from Sisco to Rusk and Katzenbach, January 24; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US)
시스코는 유엔과 교섭하기위한 3가지 잠재적 옵션을 포함하는 서류를 준비했다. 1안보리에 사실에 입각한 보고서 제출하기 2. 사무총장의 훌륭한 주선을 요청하는 것 3. 안보리회의전에 남한과 안보리의 몇몇 주요이사국과 협의하는 것

One, the Secretary General사무총장 to undertake책임 good offices to see what he can do through private talks. There is some indication지시 that he would be willing to try. This would take a long time and any result is unlikely. Meanwhile, in the Security Council we might seek탐색 statements from friendly governments urging release of the ship and the crew. This might be one way of proceeding for the next two days in the Security Council, simply aiming for the series of statements with no other UN action.
하나는 사무총장이 사적인 비공개대화를 통해 무엇을 할 수 있는지 알아보고 좋은 주선을 하도록 책임지게 하는 것이다. 그가 노력할 수 있는 의지를 약간 지시할 수 있다. 이것은 긴 시간과 원치 않는 어떤 결과를 가져온다. 한편 안보리에서 우리와 친한 정부들이 배와 선원의 석방을 요구하는 성명서를 찾아보는 것이다. 안보리에서의 다음 이틀동안 절차상의 한가지 길은 단순히 유엔의 어떤 조치도 없이 일련의 성명서를 목표로 삼고 가는 것이다.

The second possibility would aim목표삼다 for a resolution calling for the release of the ship and crew and might possibly inject the Secretary General into the issue. Many problems would be encountered만나다 in pursuing 추적 the latter course. We have seven sure votes. To get a majority is problematical. We would face a Soviet veto. During a Council debate, we would be able to mobilize support.
두 번째 가능성은 배와 선원의 석방 요구결의를 목표로 삼고 가능한 한 이슈안으로 사무총장을 끌어들이는 것이다. 많은 문제들이 뒤 쫒는 후반부일정에서 만나게 된다. 우린 반드시 7번 투표한다. 과반수를 얻는 것은 불확실하다. 우린 소련의 비토에 직면할 것이다. 안보리 협상동안 우리는 지원을 동원하는 것이 가능하다.

Special Assistant Rostow: In the Cuban missile crisis we did not get into the United Nations until we had made our move. There is a danger that if we go into the Security Council, we would find ourselves blocked from taking military action. In the Cuban crisis we faced the danger that the UN would freeze the status quo.현상유지 The UN resolution might state that actions were to be taken without use of force. This could prevent or hinder our freedom of action. We also have to be careful not to get the South Koreans up in arms by a lack of adequate충분한 response.
쿠바미슬위기에서 우리는 우리의 움직임을 만들 때까지 유엔의 옷을 입지 못했다. 만약 우리가 안보리로 들어간다면 그것은 위험하다. 우리는 군사적조치를 취하는 것으로부터 우리스스로 봉쇄되었음을 발견할 것이다. 쿠바위기에서 우리는 유엔이 현상유지상태로 얼어버리는 위험에 직면했었다. 유엔결의는 힘을 사용하지 않고 취해지는 조치에 대해서 선언할 것이다. 이것은 우리의 행동의 자유를 막거나 방해할 것이다. 우리는 또한 한국이 충분한 책임을 지지 않는 상태에서 무장하지 않도록 조심해야 한다.

Secretary Rusk: This is somewhat different from the Cuban crisis. Then, the presence of the missiles was not generally known. We were able to announce the presence of the missiles at the time we announced our action. Here, the basic facts are already known concerning the Pueblo affair. We could work out with the UN that we would be bound not to act for only so long. We may even need a Soviet veto.
이것은 쿠바위기와 어느정도 차이가 있다. 미사일의 존재는 일반적으로 알려져 있지 않았다. 우리는 그 당시 미사일의 존재를 발표할 수 있었고 우리의 조치를 발표했다. 여기서의 기본적인 사실은 푸에블로사건이 이미 알려져 있다는 것이다. 우리는 우리가 상당기간 행동할 수 없도록 제한시킬 유엔과 함께 일해야 할 것이다. 우리는 소련의 비토조차 필요할 것이다.

Mr. Sisco: The analogy유비 is closer to the Tonkin Gulf incident. We convoked소집 the Security Council, made statements, but asked for no formal action.
유사사례로는 통킹만사건이 근접하다. 우리는 안보리를 소집했고 성명서를 만들었고, 형식적인 조치도 요구하지 못했다.

General Wheeler: Is it possible to go to the Security Council even if we ask for no formal action without getting the Secretary General into the act?
만약 우리가 사무총장을 한몫 끼어들게 하지 않고, 형식적인 조치도 요구할 수 없다면 안보리로 가는 것이 가능한가?

Mr. Sisco: Yes, but some would surely want to involve him.
그러나 어느정도는 정말 그를 포함하기를 원해야 할 것이다.

Secretary Rusk: We would not tell Council members we did not want formal action. We might indeed want to press a resolution to a vote which might involve the veto.
우리는 형식적인 조치를 원치 않는다고 안보리회원국에 말할 수 없다. 우리는 참으로 비토까지 포함하여 투표를 통한 결의안이 발표되길 원한다.

Mr. Rostow: The question is how do we get out of it if it does not work?
질문이 있다. 만약 일이 그렇게 되지 않았을 때 우리가 빠져나갈 수 있는 방법은 무엇인가?

Mr. Katzenbach: In the Cuban crisis, the OAS was insulation고립 from the United Nations.
쿠바위기 당시 미주기구는 유엔으로부터 고립되어 있었다.

Secretary Rusk: Would we be strong in the United Nations on the issues in this case?
우리는 이 경우 이슈들을 유엔안에서 확고하게 할 수 있는가?

Legal Adviser Meeker: Yes. We could have used all force to prevent the capture, according to international law. No legal theory is wholly전적으로 satisfactory만족, but here we have strong grounds–self defense–stronger if we first take it to the UN./4/
법률자문 미커: 우리는 국제법에 따라 나포를 예방하기 위하여 모든 힘을 사용해왔다. 전적으로 만족한 법 이론은 없다. 그러나 우리는 만약 유엔에서 그것을 처음 말한다면 자위라는 강력한 배경을 가지고 있다.
/4/Meeker set forth his analysis of the legal aspects of the Pueblo incident in a memorandum to Rusk, January 24. A second analysis by Meeker, January 26, approached the issue using the hypothesis가설 that the Pueblo entered North Korean territorial waters at some point. (Both Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, NK Seizure of USS Pueblo, INR/OD, January 1968)
미커에 의한 두 번째 분석에 의하면(1월 26일) 푸에블로가 북의 영해 어느 지점에 들어갔는가를 사용된 가설로 이슈에 접근했다.

Secretary McNamara: I am concerned about the question of territorial waters, and our inability무능 to support this without adequate evidence. We have January 10-22 to account for (in addition to indications that at the time of seizure, we were indeed outside territorial waters by a safe distance). The captain’s alleged statement indicated he had been in territorial waters. Should we be worried about the “hot pursuit”맹렬한 추적 argument? (Mr. Katzenbach said “hot pursuit” was not involved.)
나는 영해와 충분한 증거없이 지원하고 있는 우리의 무능과 연관하여 질문이 있다. 우리는 1월10-22일에 책임을 지고 있다.(추가암시는 나포당시 우리는 안전거리를 두고 영해 밖에 확실히 있었다) 선장의 것으로 추정되는 성명서는 그가 영해안에 있었던 것으로 되어 있다. 우리는 맹렬한 추적의 논거에 대해 걱정해야할 것이다.

Secretary Rusk: We might consider demanding힘든 that the captain be produced at the Security Council. We could be in difficulty if captured documents included, for instance이를테면, statements from the crew saying that they went under the Soviet guns and took pictures anyway.
우리는 안보리에 선장이 만들어 놓은 힘든상황을 고려해야할 것이다. 만약 이를테면 선원들이 소련 총아래 갔고 어쨌든 사진을 찍었다고 말한 성명서가 포함된 문서가 포획됐다면 우리는 곤란하게 될 것이다.

Secretary McNamara: I do not know whether we were in territorial waters at some point or not. Is there any concern that the log일지 would show that the ship was in territorial waters?
나는 우리가 영해안의 한점에 있었는지 아닌지 모른다. 배가 영해안에 있었던 것을 보여주는 일지가 어떤 연관이 있는가?

Secretary Rusk: We can, of course, produce the orders (for whatever they may be worth).
물론 우리는 그들이 가치가 있다고 하는 무엇이든 명령할 수 있다.

Mr. Meeker: The North Koreans claim 12 miles, as does the Soviet Union. Warships may not be subject to seizure, anyway, even in territorial waters if they do not engage in hostile action.
북은 소련이 하는 것처럼 12마일을 요구하고 있다. 어쨌든 만약 그들의 적대행위가 개입되지 않았다면 영해안에서 조차 전함은 나포대상이 아닐지도 모른다.

Secretary Rusk: At the United Nations, at least there would be pressures압력 to settle진정 the matter. And no one could believe that the matter is likely to be settled unless we get our ship and men out.
유엔에서 문제를 해결하기 위해 최소한 압박을 가할 것이다. 우리가 우리의 배와 선원을 구해내지 않는다면 문제가 그럴듯하게 안정될 것이라고 아무도 믿지 않는다.

General Wheeler: Can we put heat on the Soviets to help settle this matter?
우리는 이문제가 안정되도록 도와달라고 소련을 강하게 압박할 수 있을까?

Secretary Rusk: Yes, unless the Soviets want to open a second front in Korea.
소련이 한국에 제2전선을 열기를 원치 않는다면 그렇다.

Mr. Nitze: There would be nothing inconsistent모순 in taking the first two actions recommended by Secretary McNamara, i.e., calling up forces and moving forces, and also taking거둬들임 our case to the United Nations.
맥나마라장관에 의해 추천된 병력소집, 병력이동 그리고 또 유엔이 우리상황을 거둬들이도록하기 등에서, 처음의 두가지 조치를 취하는데는 아무런 모순도 없을 것이다.

Secretary Rusk: That is agreed. We must be braced for anything. The call-up of forces makes our diplomacy more creditable. For instance, the call-up of reserves had an immediate effect on the Russians in the Berlin crisis.
If we go to the United Nations, can we be entrapped by the other side taking no action while we end up being inhibited억제 in taking the actions we want to?
그것에 동의한다. 우리는 어느 것이든 대비해야 한다. 병력소집은 우리의 외교를 더욱 신뢰할만한 것으로 만들 것이다. 예를들면 베를린위기 때 예비군소집은 러시아에 즉각적인 영향을 주었다. 만약 우리가 유엔에 간다면 결국 우리가 원하는 조치를 취하는 것을 억제받는 동안 다른 측면에서 아무조치를 취하지 않으므로서 우리는 함정에 빠지게 될 것이다.

Mr. Sisco: This danger should prove to be manageable in the UN. Probably the most we would encounter would be a resolution inhibiting in a general sense our action, but we could probably avoid even that.
이것의 위험을 증명하는 것은 유엔에서는 다루기 쉬운 것이다. 아마도 대개 우리는 싸워야 할 것이며 일반적 느낌의 우리조치가 결의를 억제할 것이다. 그러나 우리는 아마도 그 조차 회피해야 할 것이다.

Mr. Rostow: If we go to the UN, it is essential to include the attempt to assassinate President Park.
만약 우리가 유엔으로 간다면 그것은 박대통령을 암살하기 위한 시도를 포함한 본질적인 것이 될 것이다.

Secretary Rusk: The first thing to do tonight is to get off a telegram to the Koreans asking them to agree to a letter to the Security Council on both subjects. Then we can talk with New York about when to convene the Security Council.
오늘밤 해야 할 첫 번째 일은 두 주제에 대해 안보리에 편지 보내는 것을 동의하도록 한국에 요구하는 전문을 보내는 것이다. 그런 다음 우리는 안보리회의소집시간에 대해 뉴욕과 논의 할 수 있다.

Mr. Clifford: We need a period to quiet down가라앉다 the feelings which have been engendered. Going to the Security Council would be the best avenue to do this. I do not know how strong설득력있는 our case would be. The North Koreans would probably continue to say that we had violated their territorial waters. It is possible that they might build a better case than we could. If we move precipitately with military force, it might turn out that we had a hard case to prove. Submission of our case to the Security Council has the value of doing something, of recognizing that world body, and of permitting the American people to quiet down in the next 4 or 5 days. This is possibly but the first in a series of incidents. This one is not as sharp as I would like to see it. We should get ready for the next one which may be clearer.
I am concerned about using this incident as the basis for major military actions. As in the case of the USS Liberty, this is not a clear case./5/ If we can find a way out with face, we should do so. There will probably be a better case later on.
우리는 생겼던 감정을 가라앉힐 필요가 있다. 안보리로 가는 것이 이것을 하기위한 최상의 길일 것이다. 우리상황을 어떻게 설득할 수 있는지 나는 모른다. 북은 아마도 계속 말할 것이다. 우리가 그들의 영해를 위반했다고. 그들은 우리가 할 수 있는 것보다 더한 상황을 만들려고 할 가능성이 있다. 우리가 만약 무턱대고 군사력의 이동을 재촉하면 그것은 우리가 입증해야하는 어려운 상황으로 뒤집힐 것이다. 우리상황을 안보리에 제출하는 것은 무엇인가 한다는 것과 세계대부분이 알게 한다는 것, 미국국민들이 바로 다음 4-5일동안 가라앉게 되는 것을 허락한다는 의미가 있다. 이것은 가능하다. 그러나 이것은 사건시리즈의 처음일 뿐이다. 한가지는 내가 알고 싶어하는 만큼 명백하지 않다는 것이다. 우린 바로 다음하나가 보다 명백해 지도록 준비를 갖추어야 할 것이다. 나는 주요군사조치를 위한 기초로서 이 사건을 이용하는 것에 대해 걱정스럽다. 리버티호의 경우와 같이 이것은 명백하질 않다. 만약 우리가 직면한 상황으로부터 벗어날 수 있는 방법이 있다면 우리는 그렇게 해야 할 것이다. 그것은 아마도 뒤에 보다 나은 상황이 될 것이다.
/5/See footnote 4, Document 219.

Secretary Rusk: If the North Koreans come in with conclusive proof that our ship was in territorial waters, we could say in the Security Council that we regretted that action and that now they should give back our men and our ship.
만약 북이 우리의 배가 영해안에 있었다는 결정적인 증거를 들이대면 우리는 지금 우리 인원과 배를 돌려달라고 한 조치에 대해 안보리에서 유감을 표명해야 할 것이다.

Mr. Berger: And about the attempt to assassinate Park?
그리고 박통을 암살하려 했던 시도에 대해서는?

Secretary Rusk: They should be called upon to stop such actions. If the UN debate slops over to debate on Vietnam, that is all right, too.
그들은 그같은 행동을 중단하라고 요구할 것이다. 만약 유엔 토론이 베트남에 대한 토론으로 흘러넘친다면 그것은 잘된 일이다.

Mr. Katzenbach: The Pueblo was almost an unarmed ship. If we were doing something wrong they could have protested. We presented no immediate threat to them. In the previous case of the USS Liberty, it could have been an immediate threat.
푸에블로는 거의 비무장의 배이다. 만약 우리가 무엇인가 잘못한다면 그들은 항의 할 것이다. 우린 그들에게 즉시위협이 없도록 했다. 예전에 리버티호의 경우에는 즉시위협이 가해졌었다.

Secretary McNamara: How long would we be in the UN?
유엔에 얼마나 오래 있을 것 같은가?

Secretary Rusk: Two or three days or we could spin it out longer.
2일이나 3일 또는 더 오래 끌 수도 있다.

Mr. Sisco: This would depend partly on whether we limit efforts to debate only. If there were a resolution, it would draw things out.
이것은 우리가 오직 토론만을 하는 것으로 제한할 것인지에 부분적으로 의존할 것이다.

Mr. Warnke: Does self-defense wear out허비?
스스로 방어하는데 허비할 것인가?

Mr. Meeker: Self-defense after a time “wears out”. It begins to get stale김빠진.
자위는 한시간 후면 허비이다. 김빠지기 시작한다.

Secretary Rusk: We have a much cleaner case than Clark Clifford implied. But if we go to the United Nations, it is important that we not go defensively.
우린 클락클리포드가 암시한 것보다 훨씬 명백한 사례를 가지고 있다. 그러나 만약 우리가 유엔으로 간다면 우리가 방어적이 되지 않는 것은 중요하다.

Secretary McNamara: I am reluctant to use military force unless we see what we gain and what we lose. I believe we have a good case. If our people do, too, and we do not react, there could be a serious effect on the Vietnam situation. It is not clear what would come after the UN.
나는 우리가 무엇을 얻을 것인지, 무엇을 잃을 것인지 알지 못하고 군사력을 사용하는 것은 마음이 내키지 않는다. 나는 우리가 좋은 사례를 가지고 있다고 믿는다. 만약 우리의 국민들이 그리고 우리가 대응하지 않는다면 베트남상황의 심각한 영향을 받게 될 것이다. 유엔이후에 무엇일 올 것인지 명백하지 않다.

Mr. Katzenbach: Time spent in the UN costs less than time spent any other way.
유엔비용이 다른 어떤 방법보다 시간이 적게 든다.

Secretary Rusk: The pressure on us is that our men and our ship are in Wonsan.
우리에게 압박은 원산에 있는 우리의 대원과 배이다.

Secretary McNamara: If the talk in the UN goes on for two months, then we can’t use military force. The UN is okay if it is not dragged out.
만약 두달동안 유엔에서의 대화가 계속된다면 그다음 우리는 군사력을 사용할 수 없다. 만약 오래끌지 않는다면 유엔도 좋다.

Mr. Rostow: We have to move forces so as to act위하여 as a counter force to UN Talks. We should let the Soviet Union know that we base our actions on the doctrine of self defense. This doctrine will be part of our case in deciding what action must follow if we do not get satisfaction.
우리는 유엔대화에 대한 대응력으로서 조치를 취할 수 있기 위하여 병력을 움직여야 한다. 우리는 소련에게 우리가 자위독트린에 의해 우리의 조치가 기반하고 있음을 알게 해줘야 한다. 이 독트린은 만약 만족할 수 없어도 따라야만 할 조치에 결정적인 우리상황의 일부분이 될 것이다.

Secretary Rusk: A telegram from Ambassador Porter says that the two incidents (Pueblo and attack on Park) are clearly related./6/ The North Koreans will keep up harassments. Then they will probably return the ship and personnel but under circumstances which will make it as humiliating as possible for the United States. This could result in undermining our support in South Vietnam. Porter expects increased penetration and subversive activities by North Korea./6/Document 219.
포터대사의 전문은 두사건(박통공격과 푸에블로)이 명백히 연관되어 있다고 말한다. 북은 애먹이는 상태를 계속 유지할 것이다. 그다음 그들은 아마도 배와 대원을 돌려줄텐데 그러나 그것은 미국을 가능한 한 굴욕감을 주는 상황아래서일 것이다. 이것은 결국 남베트남에 대한 우리의 지원을 보이지 않게 손상시킬 것이다. 포터는 북에 의한 침략과 전복활동이 증가될 것으로 예상했다.

Secretary Rusk: Berger and Sisco should draft a message to Seoul so that tomorrow we can go to the Security Council. We should also send a circular cable to the Korean troop club. If the situation leads to renewed fighting between North and South Korea, we want these people to be interested and to get nervous신경과민. We want them to say something to the Russians or to the North Koreans or to any others where they could help build pressure. We should give the 16 nations full details.
비거와 시스코는 내일 우리가 안보리로 간다는 것에 대해 서울에 메시지를 특파해야 할 것이다. 서울에 우리는 또 한국군대 클럽에 순환케이블을 보내야 할 것이다. 만약 상황이 남북사이의 투쟁을 다시 초래한다면 우리는 한국국민들이 관심을 갖게 되고, 신경을 쓰게 되길 원한다. 우리는 러시아나 북이나 또는 그들이 압력을 가하는데 도움을 줄 수 있는 어떤 다른사람들에게 무엇인가 말하길 그들에게 원한다. 우리는 16개 나라에 상세히 설명해야 할 것이다.

Mr. Berger: We often brief the 16 here. 우리는 여기 16개국에 종종 보고한다.

Secretary Rusk: All right, plus the letters. We should talk with Sato. We should also probably make a new approach to the Soviet Union. We can wait for a fuller report from Prime Minister Wilson, but if that is not satisfactory, or if Wilson did not take the matter up with조회하다. the Soviets, we should press hard again.
좋다. 편지를 추가해라. 우리는 사토에게 말해야 할 것이다. 우리는 아마도 소련에 새로이 접근해야 할 것이다. 우리는 윌슨총리에게 충분한 보고서를 기다리게 할 수 있다. 그러나 만약 그것이 만족치 못하거나, 만약 윌슨이 소련에 문제를 조회하지 않았다면 우리는 다시한번 강하게 압박해야 할 것이다.

Mr. Katzenbach: On Sato, the question is how it is to be done, since we will be using Japanese facilities if major military steps are taken. If we got General Max Taylor to talk with Sato, it would be more dramatic, if that is what you want.
사토에 대해 질문이 있다. 우리가 만약 중요한 군사적 단계에 돌입해야 한다면 우리가 일본시설을 사용하도록 될 것이므로 어떻게 그것을 할 수 있는가이다. 만약 우리가 맥스테일러장군에게 사토와 얘기하도록 시켰다면, 그것이 우리가 원하는 것이라면 그것은 더욱 극적으로 될 것이다.

Mr. Berger: We were thinking in terms of관하여 an interim approach to Sato, asking the Japanese to express concern to the Soviets.
우리는 사토와의 임시교섭과 소련과 연관된 발표를 일본에 요청하는 것에 관하여 생각해오고 있었다.

Secretary Rusk: Now let us talk of other moves. What sort of ship is the Banner?
지금 우리에게 다른 움직임에 대한 토론이 놓여있다. 배너의 임무는 무엇인가?

General Wheeler: The Banner is a COMINT collector. It is now on the west coast of Japan.
배너는 코민트수집이다. 지금 일본 서해에 있다.

Mr. Nitze: It would take about four days for the Banner to get into position off Korea.
배너가 한국과 떨어진 위치로 들어가는 데는 4일정도가 걸릴 것이다.

General Wheeler: We should not undertake this without ample naval escort and air cover. If there is action, the odds should be on our side. The Banner is now in port in Japan for changes of its codes.
우리는 이것을 광범위한 해군호위와 항공호위 없이 임무 수행할 수 없다. 만약 행동이 있다면 우리측에 승산이 있다. 배너는 지금 일본항구에서 암호교체중이다.

Secretary Rusk: Replacing the Pueblo with the Banner is in range as a gesture.
푸에블로를 대신하는 제스츄어로서 배너가 이 지역에 있다.

Secretary McNamara: We might buy some time by saying that we are replacing the captured ship. Such action would add a risk but would convey a message that we are not deterred by the capture of the Pueblo.
우리는 나포된 배를 대신해야 한다는 말로서 약간의 시간을 벌어야 할 것이다. 그같은 조치는 위험을 더한다. 그러나 푸에블로의 나포에 의해 우리가 억제되고 있진 않다는 메시지를 전달해야 할 것이다.

Secretary Rusk: We might want the Banner to rendezvous with the Enterprise.
우리는 배너가 엔터프라이즈와 랑데뷰하길 원한다.

Mr. Katzenbach: If we put the Banner in the same place as the Pueblo was, it will demonstrate our right to do this and our power to do it. The disadvantage is the possible impact on United Nations members if it makes people nervous.
만약 우리가 배너를 푸에블로와 같은 장소에 배치하면 그것은 우리가 그렇게 할 수 있다는 권리와 힘을 시위하는 것이 될 것이다. 불리한 것은 만약 그것이 사람들을 신경질적으로 만든다면 유엔회원국에 충격을 줄 가능성이 있다는 것이다.

Mr. Nitze: Such action would help us in the Security Council.
그같은 조치는 안보리가 우리를 도울 것이다.

Secretary Rusk: Let us consider B, C, and G as preparatory moves./7/ As far as the end of the trail is concerned, the use of military force would make us feel better about it, but does not get our ship and our men back. We do not want to take on a second front if we can avoid it. We might consider passive interference with the port of Wonsan.
준비된 움직임으로서 B,C와 G를 검토하자. 사고여파의 끝까지 연관되어 있고, 군사력사용은 그것에 대해 우리를 더 잘 느낄 수 있게 만들 것이다. 그러나 우리의 배와 대원들을 돌아오게 할 수는 없다. 만약 우리가 그것을 회피할 수만 있다면 우리는 제2전선과 다투길 원치 않는다. 우리는 원산항에서의 소극적인 충돌을 고려해야 할 것이다.
/7/The options were set forth in an Index prepared for this meeting. In addition to Diplomatic Options–approaching the UN, Sato, and the Soviets–other possible actions were: a) sending in the Banner; b) deploying air and naval forces; c) making reconnaissance flights over North Korea; d) interfering with North Korean shipping; e) blockading selected North Korean harbors; f) making selected air strikes; and g) calling up military reserves and extending the term of military service. (Korean Crisis, Index, attached to list of preferred actions stemming from the meeting, January 24; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US)
옵션은 이 미팅을 위하여 다음 목록이 준비되었다. 추가로 외교적인 옵션-유엔, 사토,그리고 소비에트-과 가능한 조치는 a) 배너 보내기 b) 공군과 해군력 배치 c) 북측상공에 정찰비행하기 d) 북측 항행 간섭하기 e) 선택된 북측만을 봉쇄하기 f) 선택된 공습하기 g) 예비군 소집과 군복무기간 연장하기 (한국위기 목록,1월24일 미팅에서 유래한 준비된 조치리스트 첨부)

Secretary McNamara: It can be done with mines but it does invite escalation.
어뢰를 설치할 수 있다. 그러나 그것은 강도의 확대를 초래한다.

Secretary Rusk: We have a better chance of getting our ship and men back before rather than after using military force.
우리는 군사력을 사용한 후보다는 전에 우리 배와 대원들을 돌려받을 더 좋은 기회를 가지고 있다.

Secretary McNamara: Using the Banner would reduce our loss of face and reduce the necessity to use force if we do not get back our ship and men. It will have a lesser effect if we delay.
배너의 사용은 우리의 체면의 손실을 감소시키고, 만약 우리가 배와 대원을 돌려받을 수 없게 되어 병력을 사용할 필요성을 감축시킬 것이다.

Secretary Rusk: We don’t know yet the intentions of the North Koreans. An air cap over the Banner would be necessary. We can’t have disaster again. I understand that North Korea has substantial air power. Our cover has to be big. What should be the extent of our call-up of reserve planes?
우리는 아직까지 북측의 의지를 모른다. 배너 상공에 공중호위가 필요할 것이다. 우린 다시 대실패를 할 수는 없다. 나는 북이 거대한 항공력을 가지고 있다고 이해한다. 우리의 호위도 거대해야 한다. 우리의 예비비행기소집의 범위를 어떻게 할 것인가?

Secretary McNamara: Our purpose should be demonstration. There should be quite a few. We should call up at least 250 planes. Four hundred were called up at the time of the Cuban crisis.
우리의 목적은 시위이다. 그것은 꽤 작을 것이다. 우리는 최소한 250대의 비행기를 소집해야 할 것이다. 쿠바위기 당시엔 400대가 소집되었었다.

Mr. Rostow: I am not recommending it, but the most symmetrical suggestion I have seen is to have South Korea pick up a Soviet ship. There is one similar to the Pueblo in the region.
나는 그것을 추천하지 않는다. 그러나 가장 균형잡힌 제안을 나는 남측이 소련배를 나포하는 것이라고 본다. 이 지역에 푸에블로와 비슷한 소련배가 하나 있다.

Secretary Rusk: We would, however, be acting just as outrageously as the North Koreans.
우리는 어떻게든 북과 똑같이 마찬가지로 난폭하게 행동해야 할 것이다.

Mr. Rostow: Blocking the harbor is a warlike act, too. We do not want to appear weak to the American people by doing no more than beg구걸 in the United Nations.만봉쇄는 또한 호전적인 행동이다. 우리는 유엔에 단지 구걸이나 함으로써 미국국민들에게서 약한모습이 나타나는 것을 원치 않는다.

Secretary McNamara: The point Walt makes is well taken. It is not only the reaction of our people which we must take into account but also that of the Asians.~뿐아니라 ~도 The North Koreans have attempted an assassination, taken our ship, humiliated our captain. The Soviets do have a vessel doing the same sort of thing and we do not do anything about it. We cannot continue too long without acting.
포인트는 월트가 만드는 것을 잘했다는 것이다. 그것은 우리가 계산에 넣어야만 하는 우리 국민들에 대한 대응 뿐아니라 아시아인들에게도 그렇다. 북은 암살을 시도했으며 우리배를 가져갔고, 우리의 선장을 욕보였다. 소련은 같은 일을 하고 있는 배를 가지고 있는데 우리는 그것에 대해 어떤 것도 하지 못하고 있다. 우리는 행동없이 오랫동안 지속할 순 없다.

General Wheeler: (In response to a question from Secretary Rusk.) There is quite a bit of air patrolling in the Korean DMZ. There are also photo and ELINT missions from time to time. 비무장지대 정찰 강화방안
(러스크의 질문에 대한 답으로) 코리아 비무장지대에 항공정찰이 아주조금 실시되고 있다. 때때로 또한 사진과 엘린트임무가 있다.

Secretary Rusk: It is important that we make clear that what we do in Korea will not reduce what we are doing in Vietnam. We might pick up North Korean merchant vessels, but there are only a few such ships, according to these reports. We might, however, influence Japan in the direction of economic sanctions.
우리가 베트남에서 하는 일을 감축하지 않고 한국에서 우리가 무엇을 할 수 있는지 명백히 하는 것이 중요하다. 우리는 북측 상선을 나포할 수 있다. 그러나 이 보고서에 의하면 오직매우 적은 수의 배만이 있다. 우리는 어떻게든 일본을 경제제재의 방향으로 움직여야 한다.

Secretary McNamara: This might have political effect, but it would have little economic effect because the Russians would step in.
이것은 정치적인 효과를 가질 것이다. 그러나 이것은 러시아의 간섭으로 적은 경제적 효과밖엔 못 볼 것이다.

Secretary Rusk: We should gin up our friends to make statements decrying the North Korean action. NATO should have an interest in this affair, too.
우리는 우리의 친구들이 북의 조치를 비방하는 성명서를 만들도록 선동해야 할 것이다. 나토가 이일에 또한 관심을 갖도록 해야 할 것이다.

Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara recommended the following actions to buy time: Adding 250 planes to those already based in the area and the call-up of 250 reserve planes with crews.
러스크와 맥나마라가 시간을 벌기 위해 다음 조치들을 추천했다: 이미 이 지역에 주둔해 있는 250대의 비행기를 추가하는 것과, 250예비비행기와 함께 대원들을 소집한다.

General Wheeler: The Banner should join the Enterprise. Aerial reconnaissance should include the use of drones무인비행체 plus Black Shield.
배너는 엔터프라이즈와 귀속시켰고, 공중수색은 블랙실드에 추가하여 무인비행체의 사용을 포함해야 할 것이다.

Director Helms: I recommend that we run three reconnaissance flights in one day and get it done. Seventeen minutes for Black Shield on one flight.
나는 우리가 하루에 3번의 수색비행을 하고 그일을 하도록 할 것을 추천한다. 한번의 비행마다 블랙실드는 17분이 걸린다.

Secretary McNamara: We must indeed fill in the gaps on our intelligence if we contemplate military action. If we have a three-pass통과된mission the first time, there would be a very low loss rate expected. I favor찬성 the three-pass mission.
우리는 만약 군사조치를 계획하고 있다면 우리의 정보갭을 확실히 채워야 한다. 만약 우리가 처음에 세가지의 통과된 임무를 수행한다면 그것은 매우 적은 손실비율만이 예상되었다. 나는 3가지 통과된 임무를 찬성한다.

Secretary Rusk: That is okay, but I have not been greatly impressed with drones.
좋다. 그러나 나는 무인비행체를 거대하게 징발해본 적이 없다.

General Wheeler: That is wrong. They take excellent pictures. Eight of the last ten have survived. One met with mechanical failure and one was shot down.
그것이 걱정이다. 그들은 뛰어난 그림을 획득한다. 마지막 10개중 8개는 운영하고 있다. 하나는 기술적 실패를 경험했고, 하나는 격추됐다.

Secretary McNamara: Another benefit in using them is political.
그들을 사용하는 또다른 이익은 정치적인 것이다.

Secretary Rusk: Do they take better photographs?
그들이 사진은 더 잘 찍는가

Director Helms: Slightly better. 약간 더

Secretary Rusk: I see an advantage of taking a quick look at Wonsan. We ought to have the Task Force examine items B, E, and F in the index outline. We should be able to say that we have checked these out thoroughly.완전히 We are not prepared to recommend yet, but we should at least know where we are concerning these.
나는 원산을 신속히 보고 획득의 우세를 알고 있다. 기동부대가 아웃라인 목록에서 B,E,F아이템을 시험해봐야 한다. 우리는 이것들을 완전히 확인했다고 말할 수 있어야 할 것이다. 우리는 아직 추천할 준비가 되어 있지 않다. 그러나 우리는 최소한 우리가 이것들과 연관되어 있는 것을 알아야 할 것이다.

Mr. Katzenbach: We have the wraps on South Korea now but we do not know how long we can keep them on or indeed how long we will want to.
우리는 지금 한국을 감싸야 한다. 그러나 우리는 얼마나 오랫동안 우리가 그들을 지킬 수 있는지 또는 확실히 얼마나 우리가 희망하고 있을 것인지 모르고 있다.

General Wheeler: General Bonesteel has been urging restraint on the South Koreans who have plans to make retaliatory raids. South Korean officers have been instructed not to let General Bonesteel see these plans. His question is whether we want to play the South Koreans cool or hot. At the present time, he is playing them cool.
본스틸 장군은 보복성 습격을 할 계획을 가진 남측을 억제할 것을 주장해왔다. 남측의 장교들은 이 계획을 알고 있는 본스틸장군의 허락 없이도 교육 받아왔다. 그의 질문은 우리가 남한이 냉정하거나 뜨겁게 행동하기를 원하는 것 인지이다. 현재의 시간에 그는 그들을 쿨하게 움직이고 있다.

Secretary McNamara: We should continue to try to keep the South Koreans cool, at least during the Security Council debate.
우리는 최소한 안보리투표 동안 남측을 냉정하게 유지할 수 있도록 노력을 지속해야 한다.

Mr. Rostow: We should consider the Park proposal to take out by air attacks the North Korean training bases.
우리는 북의 훈련기지를 공습에 의해 파괴하자는 박통의 제안을 고려해야 할 것이다.
Bromley Smith
 
221. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, January 24, 1968, 7:50-8:25 p.m.(한국 25일 09:50-10:25)
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson’s Notes of Meetings, Pueblo III. Top Secret. Drafted by Tom Johnson. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room.백악관내각실
SUBJECTNotes of the President’s Meeting
PARTICIPANTSSecretary RuskSecretary McNamaraClark CliffordWalt RostowGeorge ChristianTom Johnson
The President opened the meeting by reading a memorandum from Bob Fleming on the network press coverage보도 at 6:30 p.m. (Attachment A.)/2/
/2/Not printed.
Secretary Rusk: We met early tonight. We have received a message from Ambassador Porter in Korea. He thinks the Pueblo incident and the Blue House plot are connected with North Korean support for North Vietnam.
우리는 오늘밤 늦게 만났다. 우리는 한국의 포터대사로부터 메시지를 받았다. 그는 푸에블로사건과 청와대 암살음모가 북이 북베트남을 지원하는 것과 연관되었다고 생각한다.

We propose the following diplomatic action: 우리는 다음의 외교적 조치를 제안한다.

1. We should take this matter to the Security Council. In the United Nations there is a long and strong background for our position in Korea. This would gain time for us. It also would give the Secretary General reason to proceed with private discussions. I think we should take it there, although it is likely that no resolution will pass.
우리는 이 문제를 안보리에 가져가야 할 것이다. 유엔에는 한국에 대한 우리의 지위에 대해 오래되고 강력한 배경이 있다. 이것은 우리에게 시간을 벌게 할 것이다. 그것은 또한 사무총장에게 기본적인 토론을 진행시킬 이유를 줄 것이다. 나는 우리가 그렇게 하는 것이 비록 어떤 해결도 줄 수 없을 것 같을지라도 통과해야 할 것이라고 생각한다.

2. Send a telegram tonight to the Republic of Korea to get their agreement on what should be put to the United Nations.
오늘밤 유엔에 회부하는 것에 대한 그들의 동의를 얻기 위하여 한국에 전문을 보낸다.

3. Go to the 16 countries who as part of the UN forces had troops in Korea. We should inform them of the situation and get them nervous about it. We should alert them to the possibility of a renewed crisis in which they are involved.
한국에 있는 유엔군참전국인 16개국에 간다. 우리는 그들에게 상황을 알려줘야 하고 그리고 그것에 대해 그들에게 강렬한 반응을 얻어야 할 것이다. 우리는 그들이 포함된 부활된 위기의 가능성에 대해 그들에게 경고해야 할 것이다.

4. We should go to Prime Minister Sato of Japan. He has substantial trade with North Korea. He may be able to bring some leverage지렛대 to bear with참아주다 North Korea.
우리는 일본의 사토 총리에게 가야할 것이다. 그는 북과 실질적인 무역을 하고 있다. 그는 북을 참게 할 수 있는 어떤 지렛대를 가지고 올 것이다.

5. We should go back to the Soviets and tell them that their first response was not enough.
우리는 소련으로 되돌아 가야할 것이다. 그리고 그들에게 그들의 첫 번째 의무가 충분치 않다고 말해야 할 것이다.

The President: I think we should get Ambassador Goldberg down here tomorrow morning for an 8:30 breakfast. Can all of you make it?
나는 골드버그대사와 여기서 내일아침 8:30 아침식사 동안 우리가 식사해야 할 것으로 생각한다. 여러분 그렇게 할 수 있는가?

Secretary Rusk: Secretary Fowler and I are having breakfast tomorrow to go over our positions prior to meeting with Wilbur Mills.
포울러장관과 나는 윌버밀스와의 미팅 전에 우리의 위치를 점검하기 위해 내일 아침식사를 하기도 되어 있다.

The President: Why don’t the two of you come to the breakfast and then talk afterwards about your problem.
Dean, ask Goldberg to jot down his notes and recommendations. Tell him I do not have confidence in the UN but I do have faith in him (Ambassador Goldberg). I want him to know that we are not going to make decisions about things to put to the UN without him here.
왜 당신 둘은 아침식사에 오지 못하고, 그런다음 당신의 문제에 대하여 후에 이야기 하겠다는 것인가. 딘, 골드버그에게 그의 기록과 추천안을 적어두도록 요청하시오. 그에게 말하시오. 나는 유엔에 신뢰를 가지고 있지 않지만 그에 대한 신뢰는 가지고 있다고. 나는 여기서 그가 없이 유엔에서 선택한 일에 대해 결정하지 않을 것이라는 것을 그가 알기를 원하오.

Secretary McNamara: We do want moves which will buy us time. I propose the following steps:
우린 시간을 벌 수 있는 움직임을 원한다. 나는 다음 단계를 제안한다.

1. Proceed to move armed forces from the U.S. and other places in the area to South Korea and South Korean waters. I propose moving about 250 aircraft in addition to those that are aboard the Enterprise.
한국과 한국바다지역의 다른 장소와 미국으로부터 무장된 병력의 이동을 계속했다. 나는 엔터프라이즈 갑판에 있는 것에 추가하여 약 250대의 비행기를 움직이게 할 것을 제안한다.

The President: Why don’t we move the Enterprise back to Vietnam. We do not want them thinking we are diverting from our responsibilities there, do we?
왜 엔터프라이즈를 베트남으로 돌려보내지 않는가? 우리는 그들이 우리가 우리의 임무를 변환했다고 생각하기를 원치 않는다. 어떤가?

Secretary McNamara: The Enterprise can remain off Korea without any effect whatever on our actions in Vietnam. It was going to the Gulf of Tonkin to supplant탈취 and not supplement any operations. We can keep the carrier it was to replace on station off Vietnam.
엔터프라이즈는 베트남에서의 우리의 조치에 무엇이든 어떤 영향도 끼침이 없이 코리아 밖에 유지할 것이다. 그것은 어떤 작전도 추가하지 않고 통킹만을 탈취할 것이다. 우리는 항모가 주둔지 멀리에서도 복귀할 수 있도록 유지할 것이다.

The President: Are you sure that we have enough air power and support to take care of the situation at Khesanh?
정말로 우리는 충분한 공군력을 가지고 있고 케산상황을 보호하기 위해 지원할 수 있는가?

Secretary McNamara: We do have a problem, but I am reasonably confident that what General Wheeler and General Westmoreland have reported is satisfactory.
우리는 문제를 가지고 있다. 그러나 나는 휠러장군과 웨스트모얼랜드장군이 만족할만한 보고를 한 것에 대해 상당히 확신하고 있다.

The President: What’s the strength of the North Korean air force?
북의 공군력은 얼마나 강한다.

Secretary McNamara: They have approximately 400 jets compared to비교 200 jets in South Korea.
남의 200대의 제트기에 비해 그들은 약400대를 가지고 있다.

The President: How does the aircraft we are sending compare with the North Koreans’?
북과 비교하여 우리가 보낼 비행기는 어떤가?

Secretary McNamara: Our aircraft would be superior to the bulk of their air force. We propose to send, roughly 63 Air Force F-4′s; 33 Marine F-4′s; 50 F-100′s; 50 A-4′s; 30 F-8′s; 22 F-105′s; and possibly some other aircraft. The F-4′s and most of the other planes do have bombing capacity.
My second recommendation is that the President has authority to call up units of the reserves. I recommend that we activate selected Air Force and Marine units. There will be approximately 200 to 300 Air Force units involved. All of these units are in a high state of readiness. This would be calling up to active duty approximately 250 aircraft. These would become part of the strategic reserve taking the place of the 400 regular jets which we will have the capability of sending to South Korea.
우리의 비행기는 그들의 공군보다 훨씬 큰 것이다. 우리는 대략 63대의 공군 f-4와 33대의 해병대 f-4, 50대의 f-100, 50대의 a-4; 30대의 f-8; 22대의 f-105; 그리고 가능한 다른 비행기들을 보낼 것을 제안한다. f-4 와 다른 대부분의 비행기들은 폭격능력을 가지고 있다. 나의 두 번째 추천은 대통령이 예비역부대 소집 결정을 하는 것이다. 나는 능동적인 공군과 해병대를 추천한다. 그것은 약 200-300대의 공군부대를 포함할 것이다. 이들 모든 부대는 높은 준비태세를 갖추고 있다. 이것은 약 250대의 임무수행을 소집하는 것이 될 것이다. 이것은 한국에 파견능력을 가진 400대의 정규제트기의 발생하고 있는 전략예비군의 일부가 될 것이다.

The President authorized the Secretary to begin making initial plans and draw up the necessary papers for the dispatch급파 of the aircraft to South Korea and the activation of the units suggested. The President stressed that he would authorize more than what has been suggested if it is considered necessary. He said he would prefer to have more than enough to take care of whatever job might be required.
대통령의 권한을 위임받은 장관은 초기계획수립을 시작하였고, 남한에 비행기의 급파를 위한 필요서류를 작성했고, 부대들의 활동을 제안했다. 대통령은 그에게 만약 고려할 필요가 있다면 제안했던 것보다 더많은 권한을 부여할 것이라고 강조했다. 그는 요구되는 일이면 무엇이든지 처리하기 위해 보다 충분하게 선택할 것이라고 말했다

Secretary McNamara: I propose, although there is some difference of opinion on this, that we move the USS Banner in to replace the Pueblo off North Korea. We are planning to send it into the area to join the Enterprise so that if we decide to move, it will be in position.If we decide to replace the Pueblo with the Banner we should be prepared to cover it with air and other support units.
나는 비록 이에 대해 약간의 여론의 이견이 있을지라도 우리는 북측바다 밖에 푸에블로호를 대신하여 배너호를 이동할 것을 제안한다. 우리는 엔터프라이즈에 귀속시키기 위해 지역안으로 보낼 것을 계획 중이다. 그래서 만약 우리가 이동을 결정한다면 그것은 적소에 놓이게 될 것이다. 만약 우리가 푸에블로를 배너로 대체하는 것을 결정한다면 우리는 공군과 다른 지원부대로 호위하기 위한 준비에 들어갈 것이다.

The President: First, Bob, I want you to be prepared to move and be ready to make these decisions effective after the breakfast tomorrow morning.
2. Take the tentative steps which are required to get ready for this action.
3. I would send 300 planes. Get more than you think you really need.
“Be ready to go when you come out of this meeting.”
첫째로 밥 나는 이동을 위해 준비되길 원하며 내일아침 식사 후에 이 결정을 효과적으로 만들기 위한 준비가 되길 바란다.
2. 이 조치를 준비하는데 요구되는 임시조치를 취하라
3. 나는 300대의 비행기를 보낼 것이다. 당신이 정말 필요하다고 생각하는 것보다 많이 얻어라
“당신이 이 미팅에서 벗어났을 때면 갈 수 있는 준비가 되어 있다”

Secretary McNamara: We also would like to send Oxcart flight over North Korea tomorrow. The President approved this action.
우리는 또한 내일 북측 상공에 옥스카트를 보내야 할 것이다. 대통령은 이 조치도 승인했었다.

Secretary Rusk: Also under consideration is sending a drone over Wonsan. However this has not been recommended to the President.
If we put the Banner back on station, we must have adequate cover for it. A second incident in which we come out second best would be disastrous.
또한 심사숙고하여 원산위에 무인비행체를 보낸다. 그러나 이것은 대통령께 추천되지 않았다. 만약 우리가 배너를 주둔지에 복귀시킨다면 우리는 그것을 위해 적절한 호위를 해야만 한다. 최대의 재해가 될 두 번째 사고는 벗어나야 한다.

The President: What about the B-52′s? Should we send some in?
b-52는 어떤가 우리가 몇 대를 그곳으로 보낼 수 있는가?

Secretary McNamara: They can operate easily from Okinawa. Flying time is only about 2-1/2 hours.
그들은 오끼나와에서 쉽게 전개될 수 있다. 비행시간은 오직 약 2시간 30분이다.

Walt Rostow: At what level do we propose to reapproach the Soviets on this subject? Do we reapproach them at the Thompson-Gromyko level?
어떤 레벨에서든 우리가 이 주제에 대해 소련과 재 접촉할 것을 제안한다. 톰슨-그로미코선에서 그들을 재접촉하자?

The President: I see no difference in this situation than in the one in which Kosygin messaged me raising hell over Israel. The President then sent Tom Johnson into the Oval Office to get the hot line messages which had been exchanged during the Middle East crisis./3/ /3/See footnote 4, Document 219.
The President read portions of Chairman Kosygin’s initial message to President Johnson on the situation in the Middle East.
나는 이 상황이 코시긴이 나에게 연락했던 이스라엘 상공에서의 야단법석과 차이가 없다. 대통령은 그다음 중동위기동안 메시지를 교환했던 핫라인으로 연락하기 위해 대통령집무실 (타원형 룸)로 톰슨을 보냈다. 대통령은 중동상황에 대해 존슨대통령에게 보낸 코시긴의장의 초기메세지 한 부분을 읽었다.

Secretary Rusk: I think a message to Kosygin from the President would be appropriate at this time.
나는 대통령이 코시긴에게 보낸 메시지는 이때에 적절했던 것으로 생각한다.

The President: Go ahead and draft a message tonight for dispatch tomorrow. Make it strong.
내일 급파하기 위해 오늘밤 메시지초안을 만들고 추진하라. 그것을 감동적으로 만들어라

Walt Rostow suggested that the message be sent through the hot line.
로스토우는 핫라인으로 보낼 메시지를 제안했다.

The President: I will not use the hot line on this. We will send it as quickly as possible by cable.
나는 이것에 대해서는 핫라인을 사용하지 않을 것이다. 우리는 가능한 빨리 전화선으로 보낼 것이다.

The President asked Clark Clifford if he expected any problems during the testimony on Thursday before the Congress.
대통령은 의회전 목요일 증언하는 동안 어떤 문제가 예상되는가하고 물었다.

Clark Clifford: I expect no real problems, although Senator Tower made a comment today that he was disappointed at the appointment. The Senator said he thought the President would now also be running the Defense Department as he is now running the White House and State Department.
나는 어떤 문제도 없을 것으로 예상한다. 비록 타워상원의원이 지시에 실망하여 오늘 코멘트를 했지만. 상원의원은 백악관과 국무부가 서두름으로서 국방부 또한 지금 서두르고 있다고 그는 생각한다고 말했다.

The President asked Secretary McNamara if he had appointed a board to thoroughly investigate the Gulf of Tonkin incident.
대통령은 맥나마라장관에게 통킹만사건에 대한 철저한 조사를 회의에 지시할 것에 대해 물었다.

Secretary McNamara: Yes, a special representative was sent to review the matter. In addition the Navy appointed a special panel to investigate it.
We will have good men to testify if called upon.
문제를 검토하기 위해 특별사절을 보냈다. 추가로 해군에게 그것을 조사하기 위한 특별조사단을 지시했다. 우리는 요청하면 증명해줄 좋은 사람들을 가지고 있다.

222. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Japan/1/
국무부에서 주일미대사에게 보낸 전문
Washington, January 25, 1968, 0029Z. (한국 25일 14:29)
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to the White House. Drafted by Berger; cleared by Katzenbach, Nitze, and Read; and approved by Rusk.
104628. For Ambassador from Secretary.
1. Seek immediate appointment with Sato and inform him that with President Pak’s concurrence we are taking Korean situation to Security Council. Ambassador Goldberg has asked for Council meeting January 25. We know Japan will be prepared to support our efforts in UN. We are also continuing our efforts with Soviet Union (this very secret) and others./2/

/2/In a January 25 letter to Sato President Johnson expressed concern about North Korea’s raids into South Korea and seizure of the Pueblo, indicated that Japan would be kept informed of U.S. intentions, and asked that Sato “consider approaching the Soviet Union in order to impress on them your own serious concern with the developing situation and also to consider what approaches you might make to the North Koreans, or actions you might make, to impress on them the seriousness of the situation.” (Telegram 104284 to Tokyo, January 25; ibid., POL 15-1 KOR S) In response Ambassador Johnson learned that Miki would speak to the Soviet Ambassador about Japan’s concerns arising from North Korean actions. (Telegram 4998 from Tokyo, January 25; ibid.) Sato replied to the President’s letter by stating that Japan had been in contact with the Soviets and was considering additional ways Japan might assist in solving the crises. (Letter from Sato, January 30; ibid., POL 33-6 KOR N-US)
2. We are also considering certain limited military precautionary moves. These would include movement of additional air and naval units from US to South Korea. Amount of US air currently in and around South Korea is minimum we need and we want to strengthen this against contingencies.
3. We are also considering but have not yet decided to move 15 B-52′s from US to Okinawa and wish Sato to know of our planning and possible decision in advance. This very secret for his information.
4. We mean for time being to explore and exhaust all diplomatic possibilities before considering what further moves need to be made.
5. We recognize Japan’s intense interest and indirect involvement in moves we make vis-a-vis Korea. We are not in belligerent mood and mean to make our moves carefully and deliberately.
Rusk

 
147. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea/1/
Washington, January 25, 1968, 0325Z. (한국 25일 17:25)
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 KOR/UN. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Rusk; cleared by Berger, Rostow, and McNamara; and approved by Rusk.
(역자주:Immediate; 급전/Nodis-No Distribution배포금지)
104293. Eyes Only보기만하라for the Ambassador from the Secretary. In addition to UN matter for you to discuss with President Pak described in separate telegram,/2/ you should tell President Pak that President Johnson feels complete solidarity with the Republic of Korea in this tense situation and wishes to be sure that we both are prepared for all contingencies. You should also inform Pak that his agreement to exercise restraint while we are sorting things out is greatly appreciated here.
/2/In telegram 104283, January 25, Porter received instructions to discuss with Pak the U.S. view “that it desirable and advantageous for US to call for early meeting of UNSC to consider North Korean seizure of USS Pueblo and its crew and recent North Korean terrorist attacks in Seoul.” Porter was also to give Pak the draft text of the letter Goldberg would submit when requesting the meeting. (Ibid., POL 33-6 KOR N-US) In reply Porter reported that Pak agreed with the potential advantages of bringing the matter before the Security Council and expressed satisfaction that not only the Pueblo incident, but also the Blue House raid would be brought before the United Nations. (Telegram 3626 from Seoul, January 25; ibid.) The text of Goldberg’s January 26 letter is in Department of State Bulletin, February 12, 1968, p. 199.
The President is considering an immediate decision to send promptly a large number of US land-based and carrier-based aircraft (perhaps 250-300) to Korea and immediately adjacent areas.
Please ask President Pak under condition of the greatest secrecy whether this deployment would create any problems for him.
Naturally, the accommodation of additional aircraft in the Republic of Korea would be worked out through established channels. The immediate question is whether President Pak sees any major political problems in such a deployment.
대통령은 한국과 인접지역에 미국의 지상주둔비행기와 항모비행기(아마250-300대)를 신속히 보내기 위한 결정을 고려중이다. 최고의 보안상태에서 박통에게 물어보라. 이 전개가 그에게 어떤 문제를 만들 수 있는지 아닌지. 당연히 한국에 추가되는 비행기에 대한 숙박과 편의는 수립된 채널을 통해 수행되어야 할 것이다. 긴급한질문은 박통이 이같은 전개를 어떤 정치적 문제로 바라보는가이다.
You may also tell him that this augmentation would represent no diversion whatever from Viet-Nam and would be promptly replenished in the US itself. You must underscore with him the secrecy of this possibility and treat it with the utmost discretion in your own Mission.
Request reply Nodis ASAP./3/
/3/In telegram 3623 from Seoul, January 25, Porter relayed Park’s appreciation for the President’s support and his willingness to accept the additional aircraft. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 KOR/UN) Rostow forwarded the telegram to President Johnson, noting that sending the planes to Korea “could have a calming effect there–at least.” Rostow’s memorandum indicates the President saw the telegram. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea–Pueblo Incident, Vol. I, Part A [through January])
Rusk
 
223. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, January 25, 1968. (한국 25일 22:30)
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson’s Notes of Meetings, Pueblo IV, 8:30 a.m. Top Secret. Drafted by Tom Johnson. The meeting was held at the White House.
SUBJECTNotes of the President’s Breakfast Meeting
PARTICIPANTSSecretary RuskSecretary McNamaraAmbassador Goldberg(1965년 이후 국제연합의 미국 수석대표) Walt RostowGeorge ChristianTom Johnson
Mr. Rostow: We have just received a message from President Park of the Republic of Korea. He is pleased that we are taking the matter to the Security Council and raising both the Pueblo incident and the Blue House incident./2/
우리는 한국의 박대통령으로부터 메시지를 받았다. 그는 우리가 푸에블로사건과 청와대사건 모두를 안보리에 올리는 것과 안보리에서 문제를 논의하는 것에 대해 기뻐했다.
/2/Pak’s message was relayed in telegram 3626 from Seoul, January 25. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US)
At the UN we can urge the following:
–Urge that the ship and men be returned.
–Urge the North Koreans to behave with respect to the 38th Parallel.
–Urge a resolution for return of the ship.
We must not do anything which would tie our hands in the United Nations.
유엔에서 우리는 다음 문제를 주장할 수 있다.
–배와 대원을 송환하라는 주장
–38선을 존중하고 점쟎게 굴라는 주장
–배송환을 위한 결의를 하라는 주장
우리는 유엔에서 우리의 손을 묶을 어떤 것도 해서는 안된다.

Ambassador Goldberg: Going to the Security Council will give us time. There is a danger of getting our hands tied. The South Koreans also are sensitive to the North Koreans being heard before the United Nations.
안보리로 가기위해 우리에게 시간을 주어야 한다. 그것은 우리의 손을 묶을 위험이 있다. 남한은 유엔을 듣기 이전에 북에 대해 감정적이다.

The President: What are the gambles we take by going to the UN?
유엔으로 가기 위해 우리는 어떤 도박을 해야하나?

Ambassador Goldberg: It is best to urge a resolution demanding the return of the ship. I do not recommend a resolution asking the UN to condemn the action of the North Koreans. We should ask the UN to support a return to the Armistice Agreements. Of course the Soviets will veto that resolution, but taking this action will satisfy the diplomatic needs./3/
배의 송환을 요구하는 결의를 주장하는 것이 최선이다. 나는 북의 조치를 비난하기 위해 유엔에 요구하는 결의안을 추천하지 않는다. 우리는 정전협정으로 돌아가는 것을 지원하기 위해 유엔에 요구해야 할 것이다. 물론 소련은 결의안에 비토할 것이다. 그러나 이 조치를 취하는 것은 외교적 필요를 만족시킬 것이다.
/3/Telegram 104660 to USUN, January 25, details these guidelines and transmits a draft resolution. (Ibid., UN 3 SC) Goldberg’s letter to the president of the Security Council, his statements made to that body on January 26 and 27, as well as a UNC report on Korea are in Department of State Bulletin, February 12, 1968, pp. 193-200. Although the Pueblo seizure was discussed by the Security Council, no vote was taken on a resolution. Instead the Council adopted a Canadian proposal suggesting the matter be discussed privately between members. Negotiations were held on January 28, but not resumed, and the matter was not returned to the Security Council for consideration. (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1968, pp. 168-173)
1월25일 전문104660을 미국유엔에 이들 가이드라인을 상세히 하고 결의안 초안을 발송했다. 골드버그의 편지는 안보리 의장에게 보냈고 그의 성명서는 2월 12일 국무부블루틴안의 유엔사보고서는 26일과 27일 몸통이 만들어졌다. 비록 푸에블로나포가 안보리에서 토의되었다할지라도 결의안을 채택하기 위한 투표는 없었다. 대신 안보리에서는 캐나다가 사적인 참가국들 사이에 토론된 문제를 제의한 제안이 채택되었다. 협상은 1월28일 열렸으나 계속되지 않았고 문제도 안보리의 고려사항으로 복귀되지 않았다.
It is interesting that Malik will be the Soviet representative today. You will remember that he was absent on the last vote which sent the UN forces to Korea. You can be certain that he will not be absent this time.
As I see it, we will get the following votes:
말리크가 오늘 소련대리인이 될 것이라는 것은 흥미 있는 것이다. 당신은 한국에 유엔군을 보내는 마지막 선거에서 그가 출석치 않았던 것을 기억할 것이다. 당신은 이때에는 그가 궐석치 않을 것이라는 것을 확실히 할 것이다. 내가 아는바에 의하면 우리는 다음과 같은 투표를 얻을 것이다.

United States–YesGreat Britain–YesRepublic of China–YesCanada–YesDenmark–YesBrazil–YesParaguay–YesFrance–?Senegal–?Ethiopia–YesIndia–NoPakistan–?Hungary–No
Ambassador Goldberg said France has always been with us on the Korean issue, but he considered it questionable whether or not they will vote with us now.
골드버그대사는 말했다. 프랑스는 항상 코리아문제에 우리와 함께 했었다. 그러나 그들이 지금 우리와 함께 투표할 것인지 아닌지 의심스러운 것으로 고려된다.

The President urged that we send a message to President Ayub Khan of Pakistan telling him that we definitely need their support on a matter of this importance. However, the President and Ambassador Goldberg noted that Pakistan has problems with China and may vote no.
대통령은 우리는 파키스탄 칸대통령에게 우리가 이 중요한 문제에 그들의 지원이 확실히 필요하다는 것을 그에게 말하는 메시지를 보냈다고 주장했다. 그러나 대통령과 골드버그대사는 파키스탄이 중국과 함께 문제를 가지고 있다는 것과 투표에서 반대할 것에 주목했다.

The President: Was the Turner Joy an intelligence ship? (This was one of the ships attacked during the Gulf of Tonkin.)
첩보함 터너조이는 있는가?(통킹만 사건 동안 공격받은 배중의 하나이다.)

Secretary McNamara: The Turner Joy and the Pueblo are not the same type of ship. They do have some collection devices.
터너조이와 푸에블로는 같은 타입의 배가 아니다. 그들은 약간의 계략을 수집한다.

Ambassador Goldberg: Returning to the UN votes, Korea has been a UN matter since 1950. We do need Pakistan’s vote. A Pakistani is president of the council. He expressed great personal support for us in a conversation yesterday./4/ He is in a delicate position.
유엔 투표로 돌아가서 코리아는 1950년 이래 유엔문제였다. 우리는 파키스탄의 투표를 필요로 한다. 파키스탄인이 안보리 의장이다. 그는 어제회의에서 우리에게 개인적인 큰 지원을 표시했다. 그는 민감한 자리에 있다.
/4/A summary of the conversation was transmitted in telegram 3481 from USUN, January 24. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea–Pueblo Incident, USUN Cables, Vol. I, January to March 1968)
There is another alternative. We could use the good offices of the Secretary General. He has indicated some willingness to do this. We could put a time limit on the Secretary General. In the Security Council we could do much the same thing (put a time limit on it).
I would take the matter to the Security Council tomorrow. I think we should call for an urgent긴급 session. We may not get a resolution, but it will take care of our diplomatic situation.
다른 대안이 있다. 우리는 사무총장의 좋은 사무실을 사용할 수 있다. 그는 이것을 하기 위한 약간의 자발성을 보이고 있다. 우리는 사무총장에게 시간제한을 가하게 해야 한다. 안보리에서 그 같은 일을 우리는 많이 한다. 나는 내일 안보리에서 문제를 다룰 것이다. 나는 우리가 긴급세션을 요구해야한다고 생각한다. 우리는 결의를 얻지 못할 것이다. 그러나 우리의 외교적 상황을 보호할 것이다.

The President: Why did the Soviets say in this message that they have passed along our position to North Korea?/5/
왜 소련은 북에게 우리의 지위를 건네준 것이라고 이 메시지에서 말했던 것일까?
/5/Reference is to telegram 2566 from Moscow, January 25, given to the President earlier that morning, which reports that Kuznetsov told Thompson that the North Koreans were informed of Thompson’s approach to the Soviets immediately after the seizure of the Pueblo. (Memorandum from Rostow to the President, January 25; ibid., Vol. I, Part B [through January]).
모스크바에서 온 전문2566을 참조. 1월25일 쿠즈네초프가 톰슨에게 북이 푸에블로사건직후 소련에 톰슨이 접근한 것에 대해 알고 있었다고 말했던 보고서를 그날 이른 아침 대통령에게 주었다.(로스토우가 대통령에게 준 메모랜덤)

Secretary Rusk: It looks like an added measure on their part. On the matter of the UN, a resolution which would be hostile to the U.S. would not receive more than 3 to 4 votes.
그쪽에서 판단이 추가됐던 것처럼 보인다. 유엔문제에서 미국에 적대적인 결의안은 3-4표보다 많지는 않을 것이다.

Ambassador Goldberg: Do we push a resolution to a vote? I would think we would do this only if we have 9 votes.
우리는 결의안 투표를 밀것인가? 만약 우리가 9표를 얻는다면 우리는 이것을 해야 할 것이라고 생각한다.

The President: Our primary objective is to gain time, to give all concerned an opportunity for reasoning together. It will give the Soviets time to bring influence to bear on North Korea if they will. I want to raise a question about sending a carrier and other aircraft in. Doesn’t this raise a challenge to the enemy?
우리의 기본적인 목적은 시간을 얻는 것이며, 함께 논의하기 위해 모든 연관된 기회를 주기 위한 것이다. 그것은 소련이 그들이 하려고 한다면 북에 권력을 휘둘러 영향을 초래할 수 있는 시간을 줄 것이다. 나는 항모와 다른 비행기들을 보내는 것에 대해 질문이 있길 원한다. 이것은 적에게 도전을 유발하진 않을 것인가?

Ambassador Thompson says in his cable that this action seems paradoxical. I think that is worth considering. How will the North Koreans, Soviets, and the Chinese react to the show of force? Won’t it lessen our chances of getting the ship and the men out rather than increase them?
What I am asking is this: What’s our objective as far as all of this, particularly the action before the UN?
톰슨대사가 그의 전화로 이 조치를 역설적으로 보인다고 말한다. 나는 그것을 숙고할 가치가 있다고 생각한다. 북과 소련과 중국은 우리가 힘을 보여주는 것에 대해 어떻게 대응할 것인가? 그들을 증가시키는 것보다 배와 대원을 구출할 수 있는 우리의 기회가 적어지지는 않을까?
내가 묻고 있는 이것은 무엇인가 : 유엔으로 가기전에 취할 특별한 조치와 이 모든 것에 대한 우리의 목적은 무엇인가
As I see it, our objective is to:
1. Spread out our actions before the UN to show them how serious this matter is and to show them how we have been mistreated.
2. Give us time to try to work something out and to give the Soviets an opportunity to try to bring their influence to bear on the North Koreans.
3. Show the world we are not bellicose.
But there may be a conflict in our doing this before the UN and our sending new planes over there.
Can’t the Enterprise take care of the situation for a few days?
내가 보기에 우리의 목적은
1. 유엔으로 가기 전에 이 문제의 심각성을 어떻게 그들에게 보여줄 것인가와 우리가 혹사시켜왔던 것을 어떻게 그들에게 보여주기 위해 우리의 조치를 전개하기 위한 것
2.우리에게 무엇인가 할 수 있도록 노력할 수 있는 시간을 주는 것과 소련이 북에 권력을 휘둘러 그들의 영향을 받도록 노력할 수 있는 기회를 주는 것
3. 세계에 우리가 호전적이지 않다는 것을 보여주는 것이다.
그러나 유엔에 가기 전에 우리의 일과 그곳의 상공에 새로운 비행기를 보내는 것은 충돌을 야기할 것이다. 엔터프라이즈는 몇일 동안이나 상황을 지켜줄 수 있는가?

Secretary McNamara: We do need more air power in the area if we are attacked.
I see no difference between us having the Enterprise already there with increased air power available and putting in what we need to have to take care of the situation. We already have built up our position with the placement of the Enterprise in the area. To do what Ambassador Thompson has suggested (not putting any additional forces in there) would mean pulling the Enterprise off station.
만약 우리가 공격한다면 이 지역의 공군력이 더 필요하다. 난 가능한 공군력의 증가와 더불어 이미 엔터프라이즈가 하는 것과 상황의 보호를 위해 우리가 필요로 하는 것에 집중하는 것엔 차이가 없다고 본다. 우리는 이미 이 지역에서 엔터프라이즈의 배치와 함께 우리의 지위를 수립했다. 톰슨 대사가 제안했던 (그곳에 어떤 추가병력의 배치없이) 엔터프라이즈를 정박항에서 출발하도록 하는 것을 의미한다.

The President: Secretary McNamara, you look at where you are going to get units and tell me the minimum time that it required to move in an emergency.
맥나마라장관 당신은 당신이 부대를 얻을 수 있는 곳이 어디인지를 보라. 그리고 응급시에 그것을 이동시키기 위해 요구되는 최소한의 시간을 나에게 말하라.

Secretary McNamara: I have all of that information now, Mr. President. In addition I have an Executive Order for the President’s signature which will authorize the call up of the reserve units (Attachment A)./6/
각하. 나는 지금 모든 정보를 가지고 있다. 추가로 나는 예비역부대를 소집할 권한을 갖게 될 대통령의 서명을 기다리는 실행명령을 가지고 있다.
/6/Not printed. The text of the statement informing the public of the call-up of Air Force and Navy reserves made by the President on January 26 is in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book I, p. 77.
미국대통령 공식문서 1월26일 대통령에 의해 만들어진 공군, 해군 예비군 소집을 공식적으로 알리는 성명서
In addition I have two press releases which I want George Christian to review and change if necessary. The first press release announces the call up. The second press release announces the actual sending of additional units to South Korea.
We can move the USS Kitty Hawk into the area without public knowledge. She is only two days steaming-time away.
The Joint Chiefs feel very strongly that they do not want to move the Enterprise. It would be wasted낭비 effort to replace it with another ship. We propose sending 303 air craft to South Korea. We propose to call up 332 air craft.
추가로 난 내가 원했고, 조지 크리스챤이 검토하고 만약 필요하다면 바꿀 수 있는 두가지 보도발표문을 가지고 있다. 첫째. 보도발표는 소집을 알린다. 둘째 보도발표는 남한에 추가부대의 실제 파병을 알린다. 우리는 공식통고 없이 이 지역안으로 키티호크항모를 이동할 수 있다. 키티호크는 김 내뿜는 시간없이 이틀을 있게된다. 합참은 엔터프라이즈를 이동하길 원치 않는다는 것을 매우 강하게 느끼고 있다. 다른 배와 함께 그것을 재배치하려는 노력은 낭비가 될 것이다. 우리는 303대의 비행기를 남한에 보내길 원한다. 우리는 332대의 비행기를 소집할 것을 제안한다.

Ambassador Goldberg: I would recommend not making public announcement of the call up. I think you should go ahead with계속하다 the action without public announcement and we will do everything to settle결정 this matter diplomatically. However, the call up will strengthen my position before the UN and will show the seriousness of the situation. I do not see any conflict between the call up and what we will be doing diplomatically. In that I disagree with의견이 다른 Ambassador Thompson.
나는 공식발표 없이 소집할 것을 추천하고 싶다. 나는 앞으로도 공식발표 없이 조치를 계속해나가야 한다고 생각한다. 그리고 우리는 모든 것을 외교적으로 결정해야 할 것이다. 그러나 소집은 유엔전에 나의 입장을 강하게 할 것이다. 그리고 상황의 심각성을 보여줄 것이다. 난 소집과 우리가 외교적으로 하려는 것 사이에 어떤 충돌이 있는지 모르겠다. 그 점에서 나는 톰슨대사와 의견이 다르다.

Walt Rostow: As I see it, international law states that the seizure of a ship of the high seas justifies counteraction and equivalent reprisal.
내가 알기로는 국제법은 해양에서의 배의 나포에 대해 정당한 저항과 동등한 보복을 주장한다.

The President: Walt, I do not want to win the argument and lose the sale.
왈트 나는 세일을 잃고 논쟁에서 이기길 원치 않는다.

The President then read again the Thompson cable. He stressed the sentence “They (the Communists) always react negatively to a show of force.”/7/
대통령은 그런 다음 톰슨의 전보를 다시 읽었다. 그는 “그들은 항상 병력의 사용에 부정적으로 대응했다”는 문장을 강조했다.
/7/In telegram 2566 from Moscow, January 25, Thomson included this statement after commenting that “the presence of our naval force off Wonsan will make it virtually실제로 impossible for the North Koreans to return our vessel and crew,” and the show of force would hinder방해 the Soviets from acting as an intermediary매개or quietly exerting influence on the North Koreans to ease평정 the crises. (Memorandum from Rostow to the President, January 25; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea–Pueblo Incident, Vol. I, Part B [through January])
1월25일 모스크바에서온 전문 2566에서, 톰슨은 “원산 밖에 우리의 해군력을 현시하는 것은 북이 우리의 배와 선원을 송환하는 것을 실제 불가능하게 할 것이다.”그리고 힘을 보여주는 것이 북이 위기를 평정하도록 매개하거나 조용히 영향을 행사할 수 있는 행동으로부터 소련을 방해할 것이라는 코멘트 후에 이 문장을 포함시켰다.

Walt Rostow: Mr. President, this was not the lesson of the Cuban missile crises or the Berlin crises.
각하 이것은 쿠바미슬위기나 베를린위기의 교훈은 아니다.

Secretary McNamara: The North Korean air force has substantial superiority over the South Korean air force. If we have trouble we need to reenforce.
북의 공군력은 남의 공군력보다 실질적으로 앞서있다. 만약 우리에게 고민이 있다면 병력증강이 필요하다는 것이다.

The President: But when we send out vast armada, won’t the Soviets and the Chinese say that they must be ready to protect their little brothers?
Won’t this really increase the tension? Is this a move to defer연기 South Korea? What are we going to do after the aircraft are there? Where does all of this lead us?
그러나 우리가 거대한 무적함대를 파견했을 때, 소련과 중국은 그들의 작은 형제를 방어하기 위해 준비해야 한다고 말하진 않을 것인가?
이것은 진실로 긴장이 증가되는 것이 아닌가? 남측으로 이동하는 것을 연기할 것인가? 그곳에 비행기가 있은 이후에 우리는 무엇을 할 것인가? 우리를 이끄는 이 모든 것은 어디인가?

Secretary McNamara: I think we will be closer to doing something diplomatically with a call up than without. I would recommend the call up today. I would defer연기 public knowledge of the actual movement of the aircraft. For your information, I ordered diverted 10,000 tons of bombs enroute to South Vietnam. We do not have sufficient충분한 bombs in South Korea.
However, we must announce the call up. This will leak누설. Men have to be called from their homes. There is no way it would hold.
난 우리가 소집없이 하는 것 보다는 소집하는것이 외교적으로 어떤 것을 하는 것에 근접해질 것이라고 생각한다. 나는 오늘 소집 할 것을 추천한다. 나는 비행기의 실질적인 이동에 대한 공식적인 보도는 연기할 것이다. 여러분의 정보에 의해, 나는 남베트남에 가는 도중에 있는 폭탄10000톤을 전환하도록 명령했다. 우리는 남측에 충분한 폭탄을 가지고 있지 않다. 그러나 우리는 소집을 발표해야 한다. 이것은 누설될 것이다. 사람들은 그들의 집에서 호출 받아야 한다. 기밀을 붙잡아 둘 수 있는 방법은 없다.

Secretary Rusk: I would announce the call up today. I would go before the Security Council with the matter. By tomorrow evening, we can announce that we are actually sending these squadrons to Korea.
나는 오늘 소집령을 발표할 것이다. 난 문제를 안보리에 회부하기 전에 갈 것이다. 내일 저녁에 우리는 남측에 이들 분대를 실제로 보낸다는 발표를 할 것이다.

Ambassador Goldberg: I would proceed with stand-by arrangements배열 without announcement. We will parallel these efforts with diplomatic discussions.
나는 발표없이 배치준비를 진행할 것이다. 우리는 동시에 외교적 토의를 위해 힘쓸 것이다.

Secretary McNamara: The President must sign an Executive Order. There is no way we can do this (make the call up) without public announcement.
George Christian: It would not hold to try to keep from having a public announcement.
대통령은 실행명령에 사인해야 한다. 공식발표 없이 우리가 소집할 수 있는 방법은 없다.

Secretary Rusk: The North Koreans may have decided to make a try at South Korea. We must jar귀에거슬리는소리 the North Koreans loose from the idea of taking South Korea. This call up may do just that (prevent the North Koreans from thinking about offensive action against South Korea).
북은 남에 무엇인가 시도하기 위한 결정을 할 것이다. 우리는 남이 하고 있는 생각으로부터 벗어나 있는 북에게 귀에 거슬리는 소리를 해야 한다. 이것은 (북이 남에 대해 공격적인 조치를 생각하는 것을 예방하하기 위해)바로 소집해야 할 것이다.

The President: Bob (Secretary McNamara), we must assume they have calculated what our response will be to this. Will this action (calling up reserve units and sending aircraft to South Korea) jeopardize위난 our position elsewhere, particularly in Berlin?
밥 우리는 그들이 계산한 것에 의해 발생될 우리의 임무를 떠맡아야 한다. 이 조치(예비군소집과 남측에 비행기 보내기)는 우리의 지위를 어딘가 다른 곳에서 특히 베를린에서 위태롭게 할 것이다.

Secretary McNamara: No, we have other units here and a number of units in Europe. In this country we have aircraft we could move to Berlin. In my opinion, we are in very good shape. The 332 aircraft that we are calling up are cats and dogs, but the 303 aircraft which are being sent to South Korea are in very good shape.
아니다. 우리는 여기에 다른 부대를 가지고 있고 유럽에는 많은 부대를 가지고 있다. 이들 나라는 우리가 베를린으로 이동할 수 있는 비행기를 가지고 있다. 나의 견해로는 우리는 매우 좋은 상태에 있다. 332대의 비행기는 고양이와 개를 소집하는 것이나 303대는 매우 좋은 상태로 남측에 보내게 될 것이다.

The President: What can we do to bring Congress in on this?
We have got to have a good discussion to see if the Fulbrights represent this country. If they do, we are committing a grave error to send men out. You remember how much trouble we got into on the Tonkin Gulf incident.
I think that Senator Dodd, Senator Thurmond and Senator Russell will balance off what might be said by Senators Fulbright, Mansfield and others.
이것을 의회에 가져가기 위해 우리는 무엇을 할 수 있는가? 우리는 만약 풀브라이트가 이 나라들을 대표한다면 좋은 토론이 될 것이란 것을 알게 될 것이다. 만약 그들이 공격한다면 우리는 사람을 보내는 것에 대해 중대한 잘못을 저지르는 것이다. 당신은 우리가 통킹만 사건속으로 들어간 것이 얼마나 많은 문제를 낳았었는지 기억하라.

Secretary McNamara: The President has the authority to call the reserves. It would be valuable to ask for legislation extending the tours of duty of those now serving.
대통령은 예비군 소집권한을 가지고 있다. 지금 복무하는 사람들의 근무기간 연장법을 요청할 가치가 있을 것이다.

The President: That legislation입법 would put the boys (U.S. troops) on their side. We must keep them on our side.
그 입법으로 의회측에선 (미군)아이들을 배치할 것이다. 우리측에선 그들을 유지해야 한다.

Secretary McNamara: The best action we could ask for in the Congress would be for involuntary본의아닌 extension. It would permit us to keep on active service a sizeable number of highly qualified personnel.
최상의 조치는 본의 아닌 연장에 대해 의회에 요청하는 것이다. 그것은 적절한 숫자의 높은 질의 대원들이 역동적인 임무를 유지할 수 있도록 우리에게 허락할 것이다.

Ambassador Goldberg: Have you consulted with Congressional leaders?
의회지도자들과 당신이 상담을 해봐라.

The President: We need to go to the Congress on this matter.
우리는 이 문제를 의회에 가져가는 것이 필요하다.

Secretary Rusk: I do not recognize Senator Church by the statement he made today. He virtually asked for a declaration of war against Korea. He is a hot Korean supporter.
오늘 처치상원의원이 한 말을 의하면, 나는 그를 인정할 수 없다. 그는 코리아에 대항한 전쟁선포를 실질적으로 요청하였다. 그는 열렬한 한국의 지원자이다.

The President: I am sure one of the reasons is that he has a Pocatello, Idaho, boy captured out there. What concerns me is this. When we get the planes out there and all of the forces you have recommended, what do we do then?
나는 포카텔로, 아이다호 소년 납치사건에 대한 증거중의 하나를 가지고 있다. 나를 연관시킨 무엇인가가 이것이다. 당신이 추천한대로 우리가 그곳에 비행기와 모든 병력을 보낼 때 우리는 그다음 무엇을 해야 하는가?

Secretary McNamara: The lowest form of military action is the minding of the coast of North Korea by air. They do have some ports of significant value, but in Wonsan. They do have patrol craft at Wonsan.
군사적 조치의 최하형식은 비행기로 북측연안에 기뢰부설을 하는 것이다. 그들은 중요한 가치를 가진 부두 몇 개를 가지고 있다. 그러나 원산에 있다. 그들은 원산에 비행정찰을 할 것이다.

Secretary Rusk: What about grabbing some of their ships?
그들 배를 몇척 나포하는 것은 어떤가?

Secretary McNamara: We cannot find any of their ships. They have only 4 small vessels and they aren’t of much consequence.
우린 그들의 어떤 배도 발견할 수 없다. 그들은 4척의 작은 배만을 가지고 있고 그들은 별로 중요하지 않다.

The President: As I see it, these are the steps we should undertake:
1. Take our case to Pakistan and ask them to be with us on this matter
2. Send a message to Park. Tell him that the North Korean side probably will be heard if the matter is raised before the UN.
3. Bob (Secretary McNamara), sit down with the Joint Chiefs and see what we can ask of the Congress in the way of legislation to get an overt명백한 action by them in support of our show of force.
4. Get a letter to Kosygin explaining our position and the need for their doing what they can in this matter.
5. Send a message to Prime Minister Sato of Japan outlining the situation.
6. Put our view before all our ambassadors and attaches. We should meet again about noon (the meeting was scheduled for 1:15 for lunch in the Family Dining Room). I want to get Senator Russell’s judgment. He wants the Senate to go back on record in support of what we are doing. Let’s not let the Congress say we are going to war without consulting them.
내가 보기에 우리는 착수할 수 있는 단계가 있다.
1. 파키스탄에 우리의 상황을 설명하고, 그들이 이 문제에서 우리와 함께 있기를 요청한다.
2. 박통에게 메시지를 보낸다. 만약 유엔 전에 이문제가 부각된다면 아마도 북측은 듣게 될 것이라는 것을 그에게 말한다.
3. 맥나마라는 합참과 함께 앉아라. 그리고 우리의 병력시위를 지원하기 위해 그들에 의해 명백한 조치를 얻을 수 있는 입법방법을 의회에 요청할 수 있는지 보아라.
4. 코시긴에게 우리의 태도와, 이 문제에서 그들이 할 수 있는 것을 하기위해 필요한 것을 설명하는 편지를 보내라
5. 사토총리에게 상황의 윤곽을 설명해 주는 메시지를 보내라
6. 우리의 모든 대사들에게 사전에 우리의 관점을 설명하고 첨부하라. 우리는 오후에 다시 만나자.(가족식당에서 점심을 위해 1:15분에 예정된 미팅) 나는 러셀 상원의원의 판단을 원한다. 그는 우리가 하려는 일을 지원하는 선언이 상원에서 배신되어지길 원한다. 의회에 자문하지 않고 전쟁으로 가기위해 의회가 그렇게 말하지 못하도록 하자

Dean (Secretary Rusk), let’s get the Cabinet back together to discuss Ambassador Roth’s new proposal. It looks as though he has sold the proposal to Mills. I am concerned about financial panic in this country. Roth and Mills think this will stop everything except the textile business.
로쓰대사의 새로운 제안을 내각에 되돌려 보내 함께 토론하자. 그는 마치 밀즈에게 그 제안을 팔았던 것처럼 보인다. 나는 이 나라에서 경제공황이 걱정된다. 로쓰와 밀은 섬유산업을 제외하고는 모든 것을 중단해야 할 것으로 생각한다.

Secretary Fowler has done a good job. Don’t shove him. He is under a terrific strain.
Secretary Trowbridge went to the hospital last night with recurring chest pains. I am afraid he may have another heart situation. He had a heart attack two years ago.
Secretary McNamara then discussed the Executive Order which would call to active duty units of the Air Force Reserve.
포울러장관은 잘하고 있다. 그를 떠밀지 마라. 그는 대단한 긴장하에 있다. 트로브리지 장관은 재발하는 가슴 통증으로 어제밤 병원에 갔다. 나는 그가 다른 심장질환이 있을지 걱정된다. 그는 2년간 심장발작에 시달렸다. 맥나마라장관은 다음으로 공군 예비역부대의 능동적인 임무를 청하기 위한 실행명령을 논의했다.

The President: I would put in the letter to Kosygin that “I do not know what North Korea has in mind but I do know that neither you or I want to increase world tensions in this area.”
나는 코시긴에게 북이 어떤 생각을 가졌는지 모르지만 당신과 내가 이 지역에서 세계적 긴장이 증가하는 것을 원치 않는다는 것을 안다”는 편지를 보냈다.

The complete text of the message to Chairman Kosygin is attached as Attachment B./8/ 코시긴 의장에게 보낸 완전한 문서는 부록에 첨부됐다.
/8/Reference is to Document 224.

Secretary McNamara and General Wheeler should get the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk moving. Also get your unit Commanders alerted. “Anytime you have a world crisis we must have our tanks loaded, our caps on and our planes ready. Let’s not be accused비난 of being unprepared.”
맥나마라와 휠러는 키티호크를 기동시킨다. 또한 휘하 부대의 사령관들에게 경계를 발령했다. “언제든 당신은 세계 위기 속에 있다. 우리는 우리의 탱크를 선적하고 우리의 호위와 비행기를 준비해야만 한다. 준비되어 있지 않다는 비난을 받지 마라”

224. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/
Washington, January 25, 1968, 1627Z. (한국 26일 06:27)
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted at the White House, cleared by Rusk, and approved by Read.
104325. Ref: Moscow 2566./2/ Please deliver soonest to Gromyko following message from President Johnson to Chairman Kosygin:
/2/See footnotes 5 and 7, Document 223.
“January 25, 1968
Dear Mr. Chairman: On previous occasions you and I have discussed with each other the duty of all great powers to exercise their maximum effort to maintain the peace. On this basis I am urging your most serious personal attention to the irrational action of North Korean authorities in seizing the USS Pueblo in international waters in the Sea of Japan. This calculated action by North Korea is almost literally without precedent in modern times and cannot be accepted. It was engaged in no hostile action, it was clearly in international waters and was seized under circumstances which we find literally intolerable. You yourself have similar ships in various parts of the world, including at least one now present in the Sea of Japan, and could not accept action of the sort perpetrated by the North Koreans.
I was disappointed that Mr. Kuznetsov, in a conversation with Ambassador Thompson, seemed to brush the matter aside as something which does not involve Soviet responsibility. This does not reflect the true responsibilities of our two governments for the reduction of tensions and for the prevention of conflict. This act of provocation by North Korea has created a deep sense of outrage among the American people.
I do not know what North Korea has in mind in this situation. But, recalling our conversations at Glassboro, I am sure that we must agree that our common interests in preserving world peace would not be served by increased tensions in this area of the world.
I am taking the liberty of addressing this frank message to you in the hope that you will use whatever influence you have in Pyongyang and press them to release immediately the USS Pueblo and its officers and men. I hope you will find it possible to be responsive to our concern. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson.”
Rusk
 
225. Notes of Meeting/1/푸에블로5차회의
Washington, January 25, 1968.(한국 26일 03:26)
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson’s Notes of Meetings, Pueblo V, 1:26 p.m. Top Secret. Drafted by Tom Johnson. The meeting was held in the family dining room at the White House. 백악관 가족식당서 오후1:26분 미팅
SUBJECTNotes of the President’s Luncheon Meeting
PARTICIPANTSSecretary RuskSecretary McNamaraUnder Secretary KatzenbachGeneral WheelerWalt RostowU.N. Representative GoldbergMr. Samuel Berger–State DepartmentClark CliffordRichard HelmsGeorge ChristianTom Johnson
The President discussed the draft letter to President Park of Korea. That letter is attached as appendix A./2/
대통령은 박통에게 보내는 편지 초안을 토의했다. 그 편지는 목록에 첨부했다.
/2/Document 151.

Walt Rostow: I would like to ask a few “devil’s advocate” questions:
–How much time do we use up by our actions at the U.N.?
–Do we have control of the time situation if we get involved in U.N. debate?
–What is the danger if we go to the U.N. for some sort of humiliation굴욕? (What is the possibility of the resolution resulting in some humiliating statements?)
–How much danger is there in a resolution for us?
나는 몇 명의 악마옹호자에게 질문을 요청해야겠다.
–유엔에서 우리의 조치를 사용하기 위해 얼마나 많은 시간이 필요한가? 만약 우리가 유엔 서의 토론을 수반한다면 시간조건을 통제할 수 있을까?
–만약 우리가 어떤 굴욕적인 몇가지 임무를 위하여 유엔에 간다면 무엇이 위험한가?(결과적으로 굴욕적인 성명서가 될 결의안의 가능성은 무엇인가?)
–우리에게 결의안이 있다는 것은 얼마나 위험한가?

Ambassador Goldberg: We are not in control at the time completely. We can say this is a matter of utmost최고 urgency긴급. We can say that we will have 24 hours and that time is of the essence.불가결한 We can control the time within reasonable limits.
In addition, we can wind up the Security Council exercise on Monday or Tuesday. Then we can knock it off or extend it according to our wishes.
우리는 시간을 완벽히 통제할 수 없다. 최고 긴급한 문제를 우리는 말할 수 있다. 우리는 24시간을 가지게 될 것이고 그 시간은 중요한시간이라고 말할 수 있다. 우리는 적절한 한계내에서 시간을 통제할 수 있다. 추가로 우리는 월요일이나 목요일 안보리실행을 긴장시킬 수 있다. 그다음 우리는 우리의 희망에 따라 연장하거나 끊기 위해 노크할 수 있다.

Walt Rostow: There are less fish hooks in this if we do not go for a resolution.
만약 우리가 해결을 위해 가는 게 아니라면 이는 낚시 바늘보다 적은 것이다.

Secretary Rusk: We ourselves need time to get our aircraft and other forces to the area, to talk with Congress, and to give the Soviets an opportunity to bring their influence to bear on the North Koreans.
우리는 우리의 비행기와 다른 병력을 그 지역에 파견할 시간과 의회에 말할 시간, 그리고 소련이 북에 권력을 휘둘러 그들의 영향력을 행사할 기회를 주기 위한 시간이 필요하다.

Secretary Katzenbach: I do not think the Security Council will tie the Korean incident to Vietnam. The non-communists will not want to discuss it.
나는 안보리가 베트남과 코리아사건을 묶을 것이라고 생각지 않는다. 비공산권 국가는 그것을 논의하는 것을 원치 않을 것이다.

Ambassador Goldberg: We will not be able to keep Vietnam out entirely.
베트남문제를 완전히 들어오게 할 가능성은 없을 것이다.

Walt Rostow: We just received information that a North Korean aircraft is flying to Moscow with two men and 792 pounds of cargo aboard. This could be equipment taken from the Pueblo. It is suggestive that the Soviets were in on this.
우리는 방금 북측 비행기가 두명의 대원과 792파운드의 짐을 태워 모스크바로 날아갔다는 정보를 받았다. 이것은 푸에블로에서 취한 설비일 것이다. 이것은 소련이 이 사건안에 있다는 것을 시사하는 것이다.

Secretary Katzenbach: Could CIA pick up on film the area where the boat is, via satellite photography?
CIA는 위성사진을 통해 배가 있던 곳의 필름을 뽑을 수 있나?

CIA Director Helms: We are programmed for that area.
우리는 그 지역에 대한 계획이 세워져 있다.

Secretary McNamara: Shouldn’t we send a vessel to the area where the Pueblo dumped overboard its equipment to dive for it?
푸에블로가 배 밖으로 내던진 장비를 잠수하여 찾기 위해 배를 보낼 순 없었는가?

General Wheeler: Based on radio messages, we have information that the North Koreans are diving for it at this time.
전파메세지에 의하면 우리는 이때 북이 잠수한다는 정보를 가지고 있다.

Secretary Katzenbach: Couldn’t we get photographic evidence showing the spot where the divers are located and also the coast line. This would be absolute proof of the ship’s position and the fact that the ship was also outside territorial waters.
우리는 잠수부들이 위치한 곳과 해안선의 점으로 보이는 사진증거를 얻을 수 없었다. 이것은 배의 위치와 배가 영해 밖에 있었다는 사실에 대한 완벽한 증거가 될 것이다.

Richard Helms: If we send a plane up there he had better be ready for a fight. They have MIGs flying cover for the divers, I am sure.
만약 우리가 그 위로 비행기를 보낸다면 그는 싸울 준비를 해야 할 것이다. 북은 잠수부들을 호위하기 위해 비행할 수 있는 미그기를 가지고 있다고 난 확신한다.

Secretary McNamara: The particular plane that we will fly over they will not be able to fight because of the nature of the aircraft. Of course, if there were other aircraft sent, there likely would be aerial interception.
특수한 비행기는 비행기의 특성상 그들과 싸우기 위해서가 아니라 호위하기 위해서 날것이다. 물론 공중요격기와 같은 다른 비행기도 있다.

Richard Helms: We will send the plane tonight our time, which is early morning there. What we get will depend on the climatic기후 conditions.
우리는 그곳에서는 이른 아침인 우리시간으로 오늘밤 비행기를 보낼 것이다. 우리는 기후 상태에 의존하게 될 것이다.

Secretary Katzenbach: Do you think the stuff본질 that was thrown던져진 overboard배밖으로 was damaged sufficiently to make it of no value?
당신은 배밖으로 던져져 손상된 무가치한 것을 충분히 발견하는 것이 본질이라고 생각하는가?

Secretary McNamara: I doubt it. We just do not know.
나는 그것이 의심스럽다. 우리는 정확히 모른다.

The President: What is the answer why the Air Force cancelled the orders?
공군명령이 취소된 이유에 대한 답은 무엇인가?

Secretary McNamara: It was because of darkness and the time before darkness made the effort marginal최저한의. Also, there was a substantial enemy force there. So the commander felt he should not do it and cancelled the order.
그것은 어둠과 최소한의 노력을 해볼 여명시간 때문이었다. 또한 강대한 적의 병력이 있다. 그래서 사령관은 그가 그것을 할 수 없다고 느꼈고 명령을 취소했다.

The President: Dean and Bob, what should we do?
러스크 맥나마라 우리는 무엇을 할 수 있나?

Secretary Rusk: I would recommend going ahead to the Security Council.
나는 안보리를 추진하는 것을 추천한다.

Ambassador Goldberg: I could go to the Security Council tonight and ask for an emergency session. I would call on the President of the Security Council, give him a letter, and release the letter.
나는 오늘밤 안보리에 갈 것이다. 그리고 긴급세션을 요청할 것이다. 난 안보리의장을 방문하여 그에게 편지를 주고 편지를 발표할 것이다.

The President: What do we do from there?
그곳에서 우린 무엇을 할 것인가?

Secretary Rusk: We’ve gone to Kosygin. We’ve gone to Sato. This will get the Secretary General in it. Indonesia, also, has been contacted. The ambassadors of the 16 countries which had troops in Korea are being contacted.
우린 코시긴에게 갔었다. 우린 사토에게 갔었다. 이것은 사무총장에게 연락할 것이다. 인도네시아 또한 접촉했다. 한국에 부대를 가진 16개국 대사와 접촉하고 있다.

The President: How do we get the ship and the boys back?
어떻게 배와 대원들을 송환시킬 것인가?

Secretary McNamara: 1. We need authorization to extend duty. 2. We need authorization to call up individual reservists
This would give us something to get a vote on in the Congress. We could ask for special authority to increase aid to the Republic of Korea. I would ask Congress to validate정당한 authority to call up civilian aircraft if we are short on transport
1.우리는 임무의 연장에 대한 권한 위임이 필요하다. 2. 개별적인 예비병 소집을 위한 권한 위임이 필요하다. 의회에서 투표를 얻기 위한 어떤 것을 우리에게 주어야 할 것이다. 우리는 한국에 보급을 증가시키기 위한 특별권한을 요청할 것이다. 나는 만약 우리에게 수송능력이 부족하다면 민간항공기를 소집 할 수 있는 정당한 권한을 의회에 요청할 것이다.

The President: Clark, how did your testimony증언 go this morning? (Mr. Clifford was called to testify on his nomination지명 to the Senate as Secretary of Defense.)
클라크 오늘아침 당신의 증언은 어땠나?(클리포드는 국방장관을 대신하여 상원에서 그의 지명에 대한 증언을 위해 불려갔었다)

Clark Clifford: I think I got through the testimony all right this morning.
나는 오늘 아침 증언이 순조롭게 합격했다고 생각된다.

Secretary McNamara: The request to extend tours and call people from the reserves is a good one. We could use this legislation.
복무기간 연장요청과 예비역 중에서 사람을 소집하는 것은 좋은 일이다. 우리는 이 입법을 사용할 것이다.

Secretary Katzenbach: Would this legislation give authority or would it actually activate units?
이번 입법은 권한을 주고 또한 실질적으로 부대를 전시편제 시킬 것이다.

Secretary McNamara: It would give the President authority. I would request authority to call up about 150,000 reservists.
입법은 대통령에게 권한을 준다. 나는 15만 예비병소집에 대한 권한을 요청할 것이다.

Secretary Katzenbach: A request for $100 million in aid does not serve the purpose at all.
보급에서 100만달러에 대한 청구로는 모든 목적을 수행할 수 없다.

The President: Now that all of you have said that, what I want to know is how we are going to get that ship out.
지금 당신이 가진 모든 것을 말했다. 내가 알고 싶은 것은 어떻게 우리가 배를 빼내올 것인가를 알고 싶다.

Secretary McNamara: What I recommend immediately is that we ask for authority to call up individual reservists, not units.
내가 즉시 추천하고자 하는 것은 부대가 아닌 개인적인 예비병들을 소집할 권한을 요청하는 것이다.

Secretary Rusk: We also must face the situation of infiltration.
우린 침투상황을 직시해야 한다.

General Wheeler: We must be in a position to cope대처 with any eventuality.
우리는 어떤 우발사태에도 대처할 수 있는 처지에 있어야 한다.

Secretary Rusk: Remember that North Korea has a 1961 alliance with the Soviet Union and China.
북이 1961년 소련,중국과 동맹관계를 맺은 것을 기억하라

Secretary McNamara: The Joint Chiefs want an extension of the terms of service. The Marines lose 1600 trained men per month. Mr. President, you improve quicker the quality of our armed forces by extension of tours than by any other method. 2,500 men a day leave the service.
합참은 복무기간 연장을 원한다. 해병은 매달 훈련된 대원 1600명을 잃고 있다. 각하는 다른 어떤 방법보다 복무기간연장을 통해 우리의 무장력의 질을 더 빨리 향상시켜야 한다.

The President: When we get all our men out there and all these planes out there and all these extensions, what do we do then?
우리가 거기서 모든 우리 대원과 비행기와 이들 기간연장을 획득했을 때, 그 다음엔 우리는 무엇을 해야하나?

Secretary McNamara: Mr. President, we are not prepared to make a recommendation on that today.
각하 우리는 오늘 추천을 만드는 것도 준비되어 있지 않다.

Secretary Rusk: I have reservations about the Tonkin Gulf resolution unless the other side forces our hand.
나는 다른 측 병력이 우리의 손안에 있지 않는 한 통킹만 해결에 대해서는 유보한다.

Ambassador Goldberg: As a layman, I would like to give you one reaction you may want to consider. I think we want to avoid taking steps which would make it look as if we are seizing on this incident to plug up all the loopholes틈 that are existing in our current military posture. We do not want it to appear through any of our actions that we are using this to fill the gaps on our military program.
아마추어로서 나는 당신이 고민하길 원하는 한가지 반응을 하고 싶다. 우린 최근의 군사적태세에 존재하는 모든 틈에 깃발을 꽂기 위해 이 사건에 체포된 것처럼 보이는 단계를 밟는 것을 회피하길 원한다. 우리는 우리 군사프로그램의 갭을 메우기 위해 사용하는 우리의 어떤 조치를 통해 그 단계가 나타나길 바라지 않고 있다.
Secretary McNamara: Arthur, the facts just will not support that view. If I do not need these men I will not ask for them. We do not have gaps on our forces we have to fill.
아서, 실제사실은 그 관점을 찬성할 수 없을 것이다. 만약 내가 이 사람들을 필요로 하지 않는다면 나는 그들에게 요청하지 않을 것이다. 우리는 우리가 채우고자하는 우리의 병력에 갭을 가지고 있지 않다.

Secretary Katzenbach: Won’t they relate this to Vietnam (the extension of military tours).
그들의 군복무기간연장은 베트남과 연관되어 있지 않다.

General Wheeler: We could carry on with our rotation in Vietnam at the same time we do what is necessary in Korea.
우리는 베트남에서 우리의 교대가 이루어지는 같은 시간에 한국에서도 필요한 것을 할 수 있다.

Secretary McNamara: I can assure you that we have no plans whatever to extend tours in Vietnam absent Korea. In fact, we think that one of the reasons why morale사기 is so high in Vietnam is because of the limited tour of duty. We think it is a good system.
나는 보증할 수 있다. 우리는 한국대신 베트남에서의 복무기간연장을 위해 어떤 것이든 아무런 계획도 가지고 있지 않다. 사실 베트남의 사기가 그렇게 높은 이유중 하나는 임무수행기간이 제한되어 있다는 것이라고 생각한다. 그것은 훌륭한 시스템이다.

Director Helms: Isn’t there a shortage부족of U.S. officers in Korea?
한국에서 미국 장교는 부족하지 않은가?

General Wheeler: There is a world-wide shortage of Captains and Majors throughout the army.
세계적으로 육군 전체에 대위와 소령이 부족하다.

(The President was interrupted중단 by the telephone. He talked for several minutes with Senator Dirksen. After the conversation ended the President reported that he had told Senator Dirksen that we will take whatever diplomatic moves that are available, that we will meet whatever needs the military has, and then we will make decisions about our courses of action. I told him our principal interests were in getting the ship back and in getting the boys back. We must come up with a way to get that ship back.)
대통령은 전화때문에 중단했다. 그는 몇분동안 덕슨상원의원과 통화했다. 대통령의 대화가 끝난 후에 그는 덕슨상원의원에게 한말을 보고했다. 그것은 무엇이든 군사적 필요성이 생겼을 때, 우리는 무엇보다 가능한 한 외교적 움직임을 취할 것이다. 그런 다음 우리는 위기조치코스에 대하여 결정할 것이다. 나는 그에게 말했다. 우리의 원칙적인 관심사는 배와 선원을 돌려 받는 것이다라고. 우리는 배를 돌려받을 수 있는 길을 찾아내야 한다.

Secretary Katzenbach: Mr. President, the only way to get that ship out with the crew is talking through diplomatic channels. We must make it clear that this is the wiser더 현명한 course for North Korea. It is only through diplomatic channels that we will get them out. We must show them that this matter is sufficiently serious to release the ship and the crew. I think we should take our steps fairly slowly. We should see how we are doing in the United Nations before we ask for broader authority in Korea.
각하. 배와 선원을 송환받을 수 있는 유일한 방법은 외교채널을 통한 것이다. 우리는 그것을 명백히 하는 것이 북에 대한 더 현명한 절차이다. 외교채널을 통하는 것이 우리가 그들을 구출할 유일한 길이다. 우리는 이 문제가 배와 선원을 석방시킬 수 있는 충분히 심각한 것임을 그들에게 보여주어야 한다. 난 우리가 우리의 단계를 공평하고 천천히 취해가야 할 것이라고 생각한다. 우리는 한국에서의 폭넓은 권한을 요청하기 전에 유엔에서 우리가 할일이 무엇인가를 알아야 할 것이다.

Secretary Rusk: We cannot shoot the men out of there. The North Koreans do not have vessels on the high seas that we can seize.
우리는 그곳의 바깥에서 사람들을 쏠수 없다. 북은 우리가 체포할 수 있는 해양에서의 배를 갖고 있지 않다.

Director Helms: The only North Korean we have in our possession소유 is the number two man in the North Korean news agency who defected부족. His point of view is that they will exploit the incident and then turn the ship loose for humanitarian reasons.
북에서 오직 우리 소유안에 있는 것은 북한통신사에 있는 두사람이다. 그의 관점은 그들이
사건을 이용할 것이고, 그런 다음 인도적취지로 배를 풀어 돌려보낼 것이라는 것이다.

The President: That is about the same thing the Ambassador to Korea said.
주한미대사가 같은 일에 대해 그같이 말했다.

Ambassador Goldberg: They do have territorial shipping. Assuming they have ships plying at coastal waters, couldn’t we seize one of these?
그들은 영해를 항해하고 있다. 건방지게도 그들은 배를 연안해에서 운항하고 있다. 우리는 이들 중 하나를 체포할 수 없나?

Secretary McNamara: They have only four, and they are of very little importance.
그들은 오직 4척이고 그들의 중요성은 아주 적다.

Ambassador Goldberg: Grabbing체포 anything of theirs is permitted by law in limited retaliation of this act. However, sowing매설 mines is an act of war. This would not be considered retaliatory.
그들의 어떤 것을 체포하는 것은 제한적보복법에 의해 인정된다. 그러나 기뢰매설은 전쟁법 이다. 이것은 신중한 보복이 아니다.

Secretary Katzenbach: Military action alone does not get them back. Seizing a couple of ships does not get them back. I think they are more concerned about what we may do. This is more important than taking some limited action so that they know what our response is. You are worse off 형편이더나쁘다when they do not know what you might do.
군사적조치만으로 그들을 빼올 순 없다. 배 한쌍을 체포하는 것으로는 그들을 빼올 수 없다. 내 생각에 그들은 우리가 하려는 것에 더 관심이 있다. 우리의 응답이 무엇인지를 그들이 아는 것이 어떤 제한된 조치보다 더 중요하다. 우리가 하려는 것을 그들이 모를 때 형편은 더 나쁘다.

Secretary McNamara: We would like to move certain forces to the area. We need to pace ourselves. The Chiefs would like to move 26 B-52s, 15 to Okinawa and 11 to Guam.
우리는 그 지역에 확실히 병력을 이동시킬 것이다. 우리는 스스로의 속도가 필요하다. 합참의장은 B-52 26대, 즉 오끼나와에 있는 15대와 괌에 있는 11대를 보내는 것이 좋겠다.

The President: Go ahead and send the B-52s. 비-52를 보내라

Secretary Rusk: We should touch base with Sato before we do this. 우리는 이것을 하기전에 사토와 접촉해야 한다.

Walt Rostow: Ambassador Goldberg called this an incident. What is important is the North Korean policy and what is behind that policy. We know this is new pressure against South Korea and ourselves. If we are to act we must be prepared for any action they may take.
골드버그대사는 이 사건을 심의에 부쳤다. 북의 정책과 그 정책의 배경이 중요하다. 우리는 이것이 남한과 우리스스로에게 새로운 압력이란 것을 안다. 만약 우리가 행동한다면 그들이 취할 어떤 조치에도 준비해야 한다.

The President: What else do you have in mind, Bob?
맥나마라 당신 생각은 다른 무엇이 있나?

Secretary McNamara: I would move other aircraft to the area.
나는 그 지역으로 다른 비행기를 이동시킬 것이다.

The President: Why not move them out?
왜 비행기를 이동시키지 않았나?

Secretary McNamara: I think for two reasons we should delay in moving the aircraft. It reduces감소,적응 our effectiveness of approach at the U.N. We are not contemplating any action right away.
나는 우리가 비행기파견을 지연시킨 두가지 이유가 있다고 생각한다. 유엔접촉에 대한 효과가 감소한 것과 우리가 곧바로 어떤 조치도 고려치 않았던 것이다.

Dick Helms: We do not see any signs of a major offensive action by the North Koreans into South Korea.
북이 남에 대한 주요한 공격적 조치를 취한다는 어떤 신호도 우리는 보지 못했다.

Ambassador Goldberg: I would like to address myself to에게 말을걸다 the points raised by Bob McNamara. He is the man who will be responsible if our diplomatic efforts at the U.N. fail. I think to make military moves would not bother괴롭히다 me. As the letter to Ayub Khan said, we do want to settle this matter by diplomatic means if possible./3/
/3/See footnote 7, Document 228.
I see some positive signs that would be provided by the military action (of sending air units to South Korea).
나는 맥나마라가 제기한 점에 대해 나 스스로에게 말한다. 그는 만약 유엔에서의 우리의 외교적 노력이 실패한다면 책임을 질 사람이다. 군사적 움직임은 나를 괴롭히지 않는다고 난 생각한다. 칸에게 편지로 우리가 가능한 한 외교수단에 의해 이문제가 진정되길 원한다고 말했다.

Secretary McNamara: Let’s get Sato’s permission first. We’ll then move the B-52s.
먼저 사토의 허가를 얻어야 한다. 그 다음 B-52를 움직일 것이다.

Secretary Rusk: Let’s do not call it permission. It is notification.
그것은 허가요구사항이 아니다 통지사항이다.

The President: We must move up our forces to awaken the people to the danger. I would move our forces to the bases we already have. I would move them without saying much. I would be guided by the views of the military. Let’s get our defenses in position. The intercepts show North Korea is going into full mobilization. I would not send the B-52s out to bomb North Korea but I would put them into position유리한지점. The Chiefs think they should be moved. We have got to해야한다 have our hand out and our guard up.
우리는 위험으로부터 국민들을 자각시키기 위해 우리의 군사력을 이동시켜야 한다. 나는 이미 하던대로 기지에서 병력을 이동시킬 것이다. 나는 많은 말을 하지 않고 그들을 움직일 것이다. 나는 군사적관점에 의해 유도할 것이다. 우리를 방어하자. 도청에 의하면 북은 충분한 동원상태로 들어갔음을 보여준다. 난 북을 폭격하기 위해 B-52를 보내지 않았다. 그러나 난 그들을 유리한 지점에 배치할 것이다. 합참의장은 그들이 움직였을 것이라고 생각한다. (우리는 징벌하고 경계를 높여야한다.)

Secretary Rusk: I am inclined to agree with Arthur that the military moves will support our diplomatic efforts at the U.N. It will show the urgency and the seriousness of the matter.
나는 유엔에서의 우리의 외교적 노력을 지원할 군사적 움직임에 대해 골드버그대사에게 동의하고 싶다. 그것은 긴급함과 문제의 심각성을 보여줄 것이다.

Secretary McNamara: It is easy then. We will move the B-52s this afternoon.
그렇다면 그것은 쉽다. 오늘 오후 B-52를 이동할 것이다.

Secretary Rusk: I do not see why you have to announce these units squadron by squadron, and give our battle plan.
나는 당신이 왜 이들 분대분대마다 알려주어야 하는지, 그리고 우리의 전투 계획을 주어야 하는지 모르겠다.

Secretary McNamara: It will leak새다 all over the place if we don’t.
만일 우리가 그렇게 하지 않으면 모든 곳으로 새나갈 것이다.

George Christian: I always feel like we should give all the information we can on a matter like this. Our position looks rather weak when we fail to give the units and later it leaks out all over.
나는 항상 우리가 이같은 문제에 대해 우리가 할 수 있는 모든 정보를 줄 수 있는 것처럼 느낀다. 우리의 위치는 우리가 부대에 주는 것이 실패했을 때나 도처에 정보가 새나간 후에 오히려 약해 보인다.

The President: Clark, what is your judgment판단 on this whole situation?
클락 이 모든 상황에 대한 당신의 판단은 무엇인가?

Clark Clifford: It has been my experience that when a situation of this type arises the public is first outraged분노. Later they change their mind. If anything, I have a feeling that we need to proceed with caution. The situation about the ship is rather fuzzy유연 in my mind. I have great concern about us getting out생산word of mobilization동원 in this country. Suppose가정 tomorrow that the North Koreans announce that they are mobilizing. Then we really build this situation up. Then, what if we do nothing? I am not comfortable편안 with this large military build-up증강. 군사력 증강은 편치않다
We may find that the matter will simmer down가라앉다 a lot during the U.N. discussion. I feel I should urge압박 great caution in this matter and that we should proceed나아가다 accordingly적절히. If it appears we pose a threat위협 to North Korea and do nothing, we are in a very difficult situation.

Secretary Rusk: If North Korea goes crazy and launches an attack we couldn’t do very much.
만약 북이 광적이 되거나 공격을 추진한다면 우리는 할 수 있는 것이 많지 않다.

General Wheeler: I would agree with that. The South Korean airforce is very weak compared with North Korea.
나도 그것에 동의한다. 남의 공군은 북에 비해 매우 약하다.

Secretary McNamara: But we must remember that we have the Enterprise and that it could retaliate with substantial force. There is a place where you get into a very critical position with this build-up.
그러나 우리는 기억해야 한다. 우리가 엔터프라이즈를 가지고 있고 그것은 거대한 군사력과 함께 보복할 수 있다. 당신은 군사력을 구축함과 동시에 매우 미묘한 위치로 들어가 있게 된다.

The President: Then it becomes do we do something or nothing. What is your judgment, General Wheeler?
그러면 우리는 어떤 것을 하거나 아무것도 못하게 된다. 휠러장군 당신의 판단은 무엇인가?

General Wheeler: I would like to proceed with positioning our force in South Korea as recommended. I would place 170 land-based aircraft in the area. I would proceed to station the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk off North Korea. I would put her on the coast available to us. This would give us 300 carrier aircraft and 150 land-based aircraft. This would give us ample aircraft to protect us against any eventuality.
나는 추천대로 남측에 우리의 병력배치를 계속 할 것이다. 나는 이 지역에 지상주둔 비행기 170대를 둘 것이다. 북의 바깥에 키티호크 항모를 정박시킬 것이다. 나는 우리가 이용할 수 있는 해안에 항모를 둘 것이다. 이것은 우리에게 300대의 항모비행기와 150대의 지상주둔비행기를 줄 것이다. 이것은 어떤 우발사태에서도 우리를 보호할 수 있는 충분한 비행기를 줄 것이다.

The President: Why now?
왜 지금인가?

General Wheeler: We can move the aircraft quickly, but we have to have at least 18 hours to give the pilots a night’s sleep and to provide some time to shake down on the bases. We must move maintenance units and spare parts. It would be four to five days before all of the units are operationally ready. The 26 B-52s will give us heavy strike capability if preemptive strikes begin.
우리는 비행기를 빨리 이동시킬 수 있다. 그러나 우리는 비행사들이 밤잠을 자도록 해야하고, 기지들에서 시운전할 수 있는 약간의 시간을 제공하기 위하여 최소한 18시간은 가져야 한다. 우리는 유지부대와 잔여부대를 이동해야 한다. 모든 부대는 4-5일 전에 작전적으로 준비되어 있어야 할 것이다. 26대의 B-52는 만약 선제타격이 시작되면 엄청난 타격능력을 우리에게 줄 것이다.

The President: General Wheeler, how do you appraise평가 our actions in light of what effect they will have on North Korea? What I am saying is, is it worth it to have your extra assurance when it may be viewed as a great provocation자극?
휠러장군 당신은 그들이 북에 끼칠 효과에 덕을 보게 될 우리의 조치를 어떻게 평가하나? 내가 말하려는 것은 그것이 엄청난 자극으로 보였을 때 당신이 특별히 보증할만한 가치가 있나?

General Wheeler: First I do not think we can take the B-52s away가져가다 from Vietnam. General Westmoreland faces a very serious situation. In recent cables he has asked for 120 B-52 mission capability per month. We are doing that. We should reach that level by February
It would be imprudent to draw down on Westmoreland’s supply of B-52s. He is about to have the most vicious잔인한 battle of the Vietnam war.
B-52s have an all-weather capability. If other aircraft area unable to fly, the B-52s become very vital in support of our ground forces.
첫째, 베트남에서 B-52를 가져올 수 있다고 생각지 않는다. 웨스트모얼랜드장군이 매우 심각한 상황에 직면해 있다. 최근의 전보는 그가 매달 120대의 B-52 파견가능성을 요청했다. 우리는 그것을 할 것이다. 우리는 2월에 그 수준에 도달 할 것이다.
웨스트모얼랜드에게 B-52공급을 중단하는 것은 경솔한 것이다. 그는 베트남전에서 가장 잔인한 전투를 치르고 있다.
To the larger question, all military schools teach us that military power is in existence to enhance강화 our foreign policy capabilities and to preserve the internal내부의 security of the United States.
I think that more military moves would support our diplomatic efforts that are our first order of business. But we should be prepared to move on the other front if the need arises. Some would regard고려 this as a provocation, I am sure. I know the Soviets would. I believe that it will prove증명 to friend and enemy alike that there is determination on the part of the United States to do everything it can on both the diplomatic and the military front if necessary.
Public sentiment does change, but while we are moving on the diplomatic front we must be prepared to do something else if necessary.
더 큰 질문이 있다. 모든 군사학교에서 우리에게 가르친다. 군사력은 외교정책능력을 강화하기 위해 존재하는 것이고, 미국내부의 안보를 보존하는 것이라고.
나는 더 많은 군사적 움직임은 우리의 첫 사업명령인 외교적 노력을 지원할 것으로 생각된다. 그러나 우리는 만약 필요성이 제기된다면 다른 전선으로 움직일 준비가 되어있다. 이것을 도전으로서 고려할 것임을 나는 확신한다. 나는 그것이 소련일 것임을 알고 있다. 외교와 필요하다면 군사적 전선 양쪽에서 할 수 있는 모든 것을 하기위한 미국의 한부분으로서의 결심이 있는 것과 마찬가지로 나는 그것이 친구와 적을 증명하게 될 것으로 믿는다.
대중의 감정은 변한다. 그러나 우리가 외교전선에서 움직이는 동안 필요하다면 다른 어떤 것을 할 준비가 되어 있어야 한다.

Secretary McNamara: We will alert our B-52s. We can get by with not announcing this. By alerting them tonight, we can reduce the lead time.
우리는 B-52에 경계명령을 내릴 것이다. 우리는 이것을 발표하지 않고 빠져나갈 수 있다. 오늘밤 그들을 경계상태에 둠으로서 우리는 그 시간을 감소시킬 것이다.

The President: Buzz, what you are saying is that you do not know what you will be called upon to do but you do know that if we take the B-52s away from Westmoreland that this would be inappropriate부적당. You believe we should put in the others to be ready in the event of an attack.
버즈휠러, 당신이 말하고 있는 것은 당신이 그것을 하기위해 요구했던 것을 모른다는 것이다. 당신은 만약 우리가 웨스트모얼랜드에게서 B-52를 가져온다면 이것은 부적당하다고 생각하고 있다. 당신은 우리가 공격을 할 경우에는 준비된 다른 것을 배치해야 한다고 믿고 있다.

General Wheeler: That is correct정확, sir. You will recall that in 1950 the North Koreans moved in artillery and moved across the DMZ. I would not discount할인 the possibility of this happening again. I would want the B-52s and the fighter bombers to back up후원 the ground forces.
정확합니다. 각하. 당신은 북이 1950년 포대를 움직여 DMZ를 관통한 것을 상기해야 할 것이다. 나는 다시 이런 일이 일어날 가능성이 적다고 보지 않는다. 나는 B-52와 전투기,폭격기가 지상군을 후원하길 원한다.

The President: What you would do is have them so they could pulverize분쇄 the enemy before they got across the DMZ if necessary.
당신은 그들을 가지고 필요하다면 DMZ를 적들이 통과하기 전에 분쇄해야 할 것이다.

General Wheeler: That is correct, sir. Also they are continuing their infiltration across the DMZ. The most symbolic act of the infiltrators was the attack on Blue House.
President Park said he would stand still for a reasonable time. But I think Park will retaliate if there is another Blue House incident or something of that type. I would like to have my units there in case they are needed. If diplomatic efforts fail there will be pressure to take retaliatory actions against North Koreans. We must be ready to react to what they might do. Although we don’t like to imagine it, there could be a restart of the Korean War. I asked the President to approve moving the units in the soonest possible time.
정확합니다. 각하. 또한 그들은 DMZ를 통한 그들의 침투를 계속하고 있다. 가장 상징적인 침투행동은 청와대습격이었다. 박통은 말했다. 적당한 시간동안 조용히 서있을 것이라고. 그러나 나는 만약 또 다른 청와대 사고나 그같은 유형의 어떤일이 있을 때 박은 보복할 것이라고 생각한다. 나는 그들이 필요한 경우에 나의 부대를 움직일 것이다. 만약 외교노력이 실패한다면 북에 보복조치를 취해야 한다는 압력을 받게 될 것이다. 우리는 그들이 하고자 하는 대응에 준비가 되어 있다. 비록 우리가 원치 않아도 한국전의 재시작이다. 나는 대통령께 요청한다. 가능한 가장 빠른 시간에 부대가 움직이는 것을 승인해 줄 것을.
–We should place the Kitty Hawk in the Japan area in the next four days.
–I would deploy the 26 B-52s.
–I would issue instructions covertly 은밀히for the movement of the 173 aircraft.
–우리는 다음 4일안에 일본에 있는 키티호크를 배치해야 할 것이다.
–나는 26대의 비-52 전개할 것이다.
–173대의 비행기 기동을 위한 은밀한 지시를 발표할 것이다.

Ambassador Goldberg: These military actions will create a sense of urgency for the U.N. to act. The only time those guys (the representatives to the United Nations) will do anything is when they have to.
이같은 군사적 조치는 유엔의 행동을 위한 긴급한 느낌을 만들 것이다. 유엔대표들에게 오직 시간이란 어떤 것을 그들이 해야 할 때이다.

Clark Clifford: Buzz Wheeler makes a very logical case. But it disturbs걱정 me deeply. I think the President must proceed on the basis of probabilities개연성 and not possibilities. I think the North Koreans are not able to mount a massive military activity. They are engaged in harassments.
We should not send fleets of our aircraft to Korea. I think that is wrong. I think this heightens tension and builds it up.
If North Korea is planning something important that could then begin the provocation for us moving. I would get the planes and crews ready here at home. But our moral posture will be better if the North Koreans move first.
I am deeply sorry about the ship and the 83 men but I do not think it is worth a resumption재발 of the Korean War.
버즈휠러는 매우 논리적인 상황을 만든다. 그러나 그것은 나에게 깊은 걱정거리이다. 나는 대통령이 개연성과 가능성에 기초하여 진행해야 한다고 생각한다. 난 북이 거대한 군사행동을 준비하고 있지 않다고 생각한다. 그들은 괴롭히기에 착수한 것이다.
우리는 코리아에 우리의 비행전단을 보내지 않았다. 나는 그것은 잘못이라고 생각한다. 이것은 높은 긴장이고 그것이 실제 만들어진 것이라고 생각한다. 만약 북이 어떤 중요한 것을 계획하고 있다면 그것은 우리의 움직임에 대해 도전하기 시작하는 것이다. 난 비행기와 승무원들을 집에서 준비시키고 있다. 그러나 우리의 정신적태세는 만약 북의 첫 움직임이 있다면 더 잘 될 것이다. 나는 배와 83명의 승무원에 대해 마음 속 깊이 미안하다. 그러나 나는 한국전쟁을 재발시킬 가치가 있다고 생각지 않는다.

The President: We know what we will do if we had these planes out there and if North Korea attacked. What do we do if we get the planes out there and North Korea does not attack? That is something we must consider.
[1 paragraph (1 line of source text) not declassified]
I want to get some of the Joint Chiefs of Staff opinion as to why they believe they need the aircraft there now if we do not expect an attack.
Of course we should authorize Ambassador Goldberg to go to the U.N. and present our case. Let’s meet again tonight at 6:30.
 우리는 알고 있다. 만약 우리가 비행기를 보냈고 만약 북한이 공격했다면 우리가 무엇을 할 것인지를. 만약 우리가 비행기를 보냈고 북이 침공하지 않는다면 우린 무엇을 할 것인가? 우리는 그것을 고민해 봐야 한다.
난 만약 공격이 예상되지 않는다면 지금 거기에 있는 비행기들이 필요하다고 믿는 그들에 대하여 합참의장의 몇가지 의견을 듣길 원한다.
물론 우리는 골드버그 대사에게 유엔으로 가는 것과 현재 우리의 상황에 대한 권한위임을 할 것이다. 오늘밤 6:30분에 다시 만나자.

226. Notes of Meeting/1/ 푸에블로 6차회의
Washington, January 25, 1968, 6:30-7:45 p.m. (한국 26일 08:30-09:45)
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson’s Notes of Meetings, Pueblo VI, 6:30. Top Secret. Drafted by Tom Johnson.
SUBJECTNotes on the President’s Thursday Night Meeting on the Pueblo Incident
ATTENDING WERE THE FOLLOWINGThe PresidentSecretary McNamaraGeneral WheelerCIA Director HelmsUnder Secretary KatzenbachSecretary NitzeClark CliffordWalt RostowGeorge ChristianTom Johnson
The President: What recommendations do you have? 무엇을 추천하는가?
General Wheeler: We are looking at four or five military possibilities:
1. The placement of mines in the Wonsan Harbor. This would require substantial air action to handle the situation properly and require neutralization of air fields in the area. We would have to destroy the Wonsan military facilities. It is probable that we would require naval aircraft for support.
2. Mine other North Korean ports. We would select two or three important ports. The same problems requiring the need for air support would be present.
3. Interdict금지coastal shipping. For this we also need heavy air cover.
4. Strike any one of a list of targets in North Korea by air or by air and naval gun fire. Hopefully we will have better photographs of North Korea after a reconnaissance mission tonight.
5. Replace Pueblo with another ship protected by ample air and naval cover.
Anything else would require substantial military action.
The suggestion has been made that we seize North Korean ships. But they have no large ocean going craft. And we do not know where the four small vessels they have are located.
우리는 4-5가지 가능성이 있다고 본다.
1. 원산만에 기뢰 설치. 아마도 이 상황을 다루기 위해 상당한 공군력을 요구한다. 그리고 그 지역 상공의 중립화를 요구한다. 우리는 원산의 군사시설을 파괴 할 것이다. 아마도 지원을 위하여 해군 비행기가 요구될 것이다.
2. 다른 북측 항구에 기뢰설치. 우리는 둘 또는 세 개의 중요한 부두를 선택할 것이다. 같은 문제로 요구되는 현재의 항공지원이 필요하다.
3. 연안항행금지. 이 또한 거대한 항공호위가 필요하다.
4. 공군에 의한 또는 공군이나 해군 공격에 의한 북에 있는 목표물중의 하나를 타격하기.
오늘밤 정찰임무 이후 북의 사진을 더 갖게 될 희망이 있다.
5. 우리의 강화된 공군과 해군호위에 의해 방어되는 다른 배를 푸에블로 대신 배치하기.
다른 어떤 것은 실질적인 군사조치를 요구할 것이다. 북측배를 우리가 나포한다는 제안이 있었다. 그러나 그들은 해양으로 나가는 큰 배가 없다. 그리고 우리는 4척의 작은 배가 어디 있는지를 모른다.

The President: What are we going to do with the aircraft that we plan to send to South Korea. Will they be there for purely defense purposes in case of further incidents?
우리가 남측에 보내기로 계획한 비행기는 언제 가는가. 그들은 미래의 사고 상황에 방어목적으로만 거기에 있게 할 것인가?

General Wheeler: They would be there in the event that a decision was made to take reprisal보복 action against North Korea in addition to their defensive value.
그들은 그들의 방어적 가치에 더하여 북에 대항한 보복조치를 결정하는 경우를 위해 있다.

Secretary McNamara: If the North Koreans were to release the ship and or the crew in ten to twelve days the only thing we would have suffered경험 would be humiliation. If we decide to replace the Pueblo with the U.S.S. Banner, we will need air support to protect it.
If we do not get the Pueblo back the President would want full air power there to take care of any massive response. In my judgment, mining would be the smallest increment of military action.
만약 북이 배와 선원을 10일에서 12일 사이에 풀어준다면 우리는 오직 인간적인 경험을 하는 것이 될 것이다. 만약 우리가 푸에블로를 대신하여 배너를 배치한다면 우리는 그것을 보호할 항공지원이 필요할 것이다. 만약 우리가 푸에블로를 빼내지 못한다면 대통령은 어떤 커다란 책임을 지키기 위해 충분한 공군력을 원할 것이다. 나의 판단으로는 최하의 군사조치는 기뢰부설이다.

Under Secretary Katzenbach: We could keep their shipping and their patrol boats in the Wonsan Harbor.
우리는 원산만에서 그들의 항행과 순찰함을 지킬 것이다.

Secretary McNamara: To do that we must have air cover and naval craft.
우리는 공군호위와 해군선박을 가지고 할 것이다.

Under Secretary Katzenbach: The North Koreans have made gains right away. I believe they regard this action as a low risk effort. They have shown that they can do this. They may underestimate our difficulties elsewhere or place a high value on causing us more difficulties in this area. There is some indication this may be what they want to do. They are seeking to make life much more difficult for us.
There is no evidence (Richard Helms also confirmed this) that the North Koreans want to start another war.
They may be willing to return the crew and the ship. They may get something from the equipment aboard the ship.
But this still조용히 leaves us with the fact that they took a tug끌다at Uncle Sam’s beard턱수염 and got away with it. I would put a high probability개연성 factor on their returning this ship.
북은 바로 이익을 볼 것이다. 나는 그들이 손실이 적은 노력으로서 이 조치를 주시하고 있다고 믿는다. 그들은 이것을 할 수 있음을 보여주었다. 그들은 다른 곳에서 우리의 어려움을 과소평가하게 하거나, 이 지역에서 우리에게 주위할 가치가 더 많은 어려움들을 배치시킬 것이다. 그들은 우리의 일상을 더 많이 어렵게 할일을 찾고 있다. 북이 또다른 전쟁의 시작을 원한다는 것에 대한 증거는 없다.(헬름스도 이는 확인했다) 그들은 배와 선원을 송환할 의지는 있을 것이다. 그들은 배 갑판위에 설비중에서 어떤 것을 얻었을 것이다. 그러나 이것은 그들이 샘아저씨의 턱수염을 끌고가 달아나버린 버린 사실과 함께 우리에게서 조용히 떠나갔다.

The President: Well, what do we do now?
자 지금 우리는 무엇을 하지?

Under Secretary Katzenbach: I would prefer to see the screw turned on North Korea.
In gradual steps we would move aircraft to South Korea. It makes good sense to move in the fighter bombers for the reasons Buzz (General Wheeler) has given, and also to show the North Koreans and the United Nations the seriousness of the situation.
I would send in a squadron of aircraft tomorrow. Then send in other planes on Saturday and more on Sunday. I do have a question about the B-52′s. If you send the B-52′s to the area without any public knowledge there is not much punch that this gives to the diplomatic effort. If we send the B-52′s to the area with public knowledge that this is connected to Korea it may be too big. This may be too much. But you do increase the potential of the United Nations doing something by sending in the fighter bombers.
나는 북이 나사못을 풀었다고 본다. 우리는 단계적으로 남한에 비행기를 이동시킬 것이다. 그것은 휠러장군이 부여했던 이유를 가지고 전투기와 폭격기들이 이동하는 훌륭한 장면을 연출할 것이다. 그리고 북과 유엔에 사태의 심각성을 보여줄 것이다.
나는 내일 비행분대를 보낼 것이다. 그런 다음 토요일 다른 비행기를 보내고 일요일에는 더 보낼 것이다. 나는 B-52에 대해 질문이 있다. 만약 당신이 어떤 공표도 없이 그 지역에 B-52를 보낸다면 외교적 노력을 하고 있는 것에 대해 많은 타격을 가하지 않는 것이다. 만약 우리가 그 지역에 B-52를 보낸다고 공표하면 한국과 연관되는 것이고, 또한 그 연관을 키우는 것이다. 이 또한 많은 것을 키우는 것이 될 것이다. 그러나 당신은 전투기와 폭격기를 보내는 것에 의해, 어떤 것을 하는 것에 대한 유엔의 잠재성을 증가시킬 수 있다.

The President: What is the practical실제 effect of this?
이것의 실제효과는 무엇인가?

Under Secretary Katzenbach: I think that will get rid of제거 the issue quicker. By moving the aircraft in gradually you will get more out of it than by doing it all at one time or by not doing it at all.
나는 빨리 이슈를 제거하게 될 것이라고 본다. 단계적인 비행기의 이동에 의해 당신은 한번에 모든 것을 하거나, 모든 것을 못하는 것보다는 더많은 것을 얻을 것이다.

The President: The incident, Pueblo seizure, may be more than a pinprick바늘로 쿡 찌르기. In my judgment this must be coordinated with what is happening in South Vietnam. (Stepped up attacks on U.S. units in Vietnam along with major North Vietnamese and Viet Cong build ups.)
푸에블로 나포사건은 바늘로 쿡찌르기 이상이 될 것이다. 나의 판단으로는 남베트남에서 일어나는 것과 조정시켜야 한다.(비엩콩의 건설과 북비엩남의 요충지를 따라 비엩남에서 미국부대들에 대한 공격이 바쁘게 진행되고 있었다.)

Secretary McNamara: I agree with that, although I have no real evidence of the connection.
I view this situation very seriously. The great danger that we must avoid is that the Soviets and the North Vietnamese will interpret something that we do as a sign of weakness. If we show weakness and are not firm, I think it will prolong the Vietnam war substantially.
비록 나는 실제 연관에 대한 증거는 없지만 그것에 동의한다. 내보기에 이 상황은 매우 심각하다. 커다란 위험은 소련과 북베트남이 우리가 하는 어떤 것을 약해짐의 신호로서 해석하게 되는 것을 회피해야 한다는 것이다. 만약 우리가 약한 모습을 보이고 견고하지 않으면면 베트남전쟁은 더 늘어질 것이다.

Clark Clifford: I would like to view this matter differently. Let us assume가정 for the moment that our only goal is to get the men and the ship back. What would be the best way to achieve that end? If we get the ship and the men back without taking substantial military action the President will get credit for restraint.
We may have gotten a hair pulled from our beard. I would be ready to sacrifice희생 that hair because our options are limited at this time.
We must be ready for the next try. We have very few alternatives at this point. So, again I ask what are the best ways to get the ship and the men back.
나는 이 문제를 달리 본다. 우리의 유일한 목적이 대원과 배를 돌려받는 것이었다고 일단은 가정해보자. 그것을 종결지을 최선의 방법은 무엇인가? 만약 우리가 실질적인 대규모 군사조치를 취하지 않고 배와 대원을 돌려받을 수 있다면 대통령은 ‘억제’에 성공했다는 명성을 얻게 될 것이다. 우리는 우리의 수염에서 뽑은 털을 가지고 있었다. 나는 지금의 우리의 제한된 옵션 때문에 털을 희생시킬 준비가 되어 있다.

The President: I see little hope that the United Nations will yield산출 anything productive. We do need to show that this is a very serious matter. We must show to the North Koreans and their brothers that they must avoid the confrontation. We need to show our plan in the United Nations and display some muscle강제 to back up뒷받침 that plan.
Tommy Thompson (Ambassador to Moscow) said the Communist never react well to a show of force. That was not the lesson learned in the Middle East and in the Cuban Missile Crisis. We must not let them misjudge our strength so that they will be encouraged격려 to do this type of thing again. Personally I would like to find some of their ships and do the same thing to them which they have done to us.
What about some other alternatives양자택일 that we have not discussed such as the South Koreans taking offensive action across the DMZ. The North Koreans have been doing a lot of infiltrating and harassment, so why not reciprocate보복?
나는 유엔에서 어떤 것을 만들어 내리라는 작은 희망이 있음을 안다. 우리는 이것이 매우 심각한 문제라는 것을 보여줄 필요가 있다. 우리는 북과 그들의 형제국들에게 그들이 대결을 피해야 한다는 것을 보여주어야만 한다. 우리는 유엔에 우리의 계획을 보여줄 필요가 있고, 계획을 뒷받침 할 약간의 강제를 과시할 필요가 있다.
톰슨소련대사는 공산주의자들은 힘을 보이는 것에 대해 결코 좋게 대응하지 않는다고 말했다. 그것은 중동과 쿠바미슬위기에서 배운 교훈이 아니다. 우리는 그들이 다시 이런 타입의 일을 하는 것에 대해 고무되도록 우리의 힘을 오판하는 것을 허락하지 말아야 한다. 개인적으로 나는 그들의 배를 몇 척 찾아서 그들에게 같은 일을 하고 싶다. 그들이 우리에게 한 것처럼…
다른 선택은 어떤가? 우리가 논의 하지 않은 남측이 DMZ를 따라서 공격적인 조치를 취하는 것 같은 것 말일세. 북은 많은 침입과 괴롭히기를 해왔다, 그런데 왜 보복이 없는가?

General Wheeler: The ROK are eager열망 to go into North Korea on hit and run raids like those taken into South Korea by the North Koreans. We have exercised great restraint on the South Koreans to the point where the South Koreans will no longer tell our American General the ROK plans.
한국은 북에 의해 남쪽안으로 그들이 들어왔던 것처럼 치고달리는 급습에 의해 북으로 들어가고자 하는 열망이 있다. 자기들 계획을 주한미군사령관에게 말하지 않을 남한이란 곳에서 우리는 엄청난 억제력을 연습해 왔다.

Under Secretary Nitze: Mr. President, we discussed the fact that the Pueblo threw overboard classified equipment. Another alternative is for us to send a destroyer into the area where the gear was thrown overboard. The destroyer would have divers aboard to bring the gear up. This is completely legal and it is possible that the North Koreans would take action against this vessel. If they did we would be in a good position in the eyes of world opinion to retaliate. We do not know if they are trying to recover that gear themselves.
각하, 우리는 푸에블로갑판에서 기밀장비가 던져진 사실을 논의 했었다. 또다른 선택은 갑판에서 던져진 기구가 있는 지역으로 구축함을 보내는 것이다. 구축함은 잠수부들이 기구를 건져올려 배에 가져오도록 한다. 이것은 완전히 합법적인 것이고, 북이 이 배에 조치를 취해도 가능한 것이다. 만약 그들이 움직인다면 우리는 세계여론관점에서 보복하기 좋은 위치에 있게 되는 것이다. 만약 그들 스스로 그 기구를 발견하려고 하는 중이라면 알 수는 없다.

The President: I thought we had an intercept that showed that they are trying to recover the material with divers. Isn’t that true Walt?
나는 그들이 잠수부에게 물건을 찾게 하고 있는 것으로 보인다는 도청을 갖고 있다고 생각했다. 월트 그것은 사실이 아닌가?

Walt Rostow: That is correct. We had an intercept today which indicated they are diving in the area.
정확하다. 우리는 오늘 그들이 그 지역에 잠수하는 것을 지시한 도청을 가지고 있다.

Secretary Nitze: There will be an oxcart달구지 mission tonight which should give us some additional information about that.
오늘밤 그것에 대해 우리에게 추가 정보를 줄 옥스카트임무가 있을 것이다.

Walt Rostow: Our alternatives are basically two:
1. Actions to get the ship back.2. Actions to strike back되치다 in retaliation for this ship seizure.
We should search all photographs and look for their ships. Personally I would not be opposed to seizing a Korean ship flying a Polish flag. We should strain for ways to find their ships and determine operational methods to place mines without knocking out their airfields and other facilities used for defense. Of course we must be fully prepared for what counter actions the North Koreans might be prepared to take.
우리의 선택은 기본적으로 두가지이다.
1. 배를 빼내 올 조치
2. 배의 나포에 대하여 보복으로 되받아 칠 조치
우리는 모든 사진을 탐색하고 그들의 배를 찾아야 할 것이다. 개인적으로 나는 폴란드 깃발을 휘날리는 북측 배를 나포하는 것에 반대하지 않는다. 우리는 그들의 배를 발견하기 위한 방법을 위해 긴장해야 할 것이다. 그리고 그들의 비행장이나 다른 방어를 위해 사용하는 시설을 파괴하지 않고 기뢰를 설치 할 수 있는 작전적방법을 결심해야 할 것이다. 물론 우리는 준비된 북과 맞대응하기 위해 충분히 준비해야 할 것이다.

The President: Would you address yourself to the question presented by Clark Clifford: What will produce the ship.
당신은 클락클리포드에 의해 제출된 질문에 대해 스스로에게 이야기할 수 있나; 무엇으로 배를(구출할 방법을) 만들 것인가?

Walt Rostow: A conviction by the North Koreans that they will run into more trouble than it is worth. That will produce the ship.
They think we are strained and tied down in Vietnam.
Therefore a measured show of force is appropriate. I feel we should put in additional air power for the following reasons:
A. We need increased air power in the Republic of Korea anyway. This incident dramatizes the deficiency of the aircraft in South Korea. It was surprising that we only had four planes there and that they were “out to lunch.”
B. If this effort fails and we undertake to disgorge the ship, we still need heavy air cover.
북에 의한 한가지 확신은 그들은 가치있는 것 보다는 문제 속으로 몰아갈 것이란 점이다.그것이 배를(구출할 방법을) 만들 것이다. 그들은 우리가 베트남에 긴장되어 있고 묶여 있다고 생각한다. 따라서 신중한 병력시위는 적절하다. 난 우리가 다음 이유에 따라 추가적인 공군력을 배치해야 할 것을 느낀다:
A. 우리는 어쨌든 한국에 공군력의 증강이 필요하다. 이 사건은 남한에서의 비행기의 결핍을 극적으로 표현한다. 우리에게 거기에 오직 4대의 비행기만이 있다는 것과 그들이 외출중이라는 것은 놀라운 것이다.
B. 만약 이런 노력이 실패한다면 그리고 배를 토해내도록 착수해야 한다면 우리는 여전히 중량급의 항공호위가 필요하다.

The President: The only thing you know is to put more aircraft there. Is that the answer to Clark’s question? Thompson says this will make them more entrenched.
오직 당신이 알고 있는 것은 거기에 비행기를 더 배치해야 한다는 것이다. 그것이 클라크의 질문에 대한 답인가? 톰슨대사는 말한다. 이것은 그들을 더욱 참호속의 숨게 할 것이라고.

Under Secretary Katzenbach: What I believe Ambassador Thompson had in mind was that we should not say “hand over or else.” They are tough little bastards. I do not think Tommy had in mind a series of steps to make North Korea know that we are about to do something and that we mean business.
I think a measured show of force supports our diplomatic efforts. You can tell publicly–I do not think it has been mentioned before–that we are giving South Korea two destroyers. You can move in the B-52′s. In my judgment all of these actions support our diplomatic efforts.
We can start by saying that no North Korean shipping will come out of two or three harbors. By blocking them off, we take reversible steps. In other words these are steps that do not require that we take additional steps.
We should not let the North Koreans think that the Security Council is the way we have planned to deal with this. They must know we are prepared to take further actions, military ones if necessary.
나는 톰슨 대사가 우리가 ‘건네줬거나 다른 손에 있다’고 말하지 않았다는 것을 명심하고 있다고 믿는다. 그들은 거친 작은 개자식들이다. 나는 토미가 우리가 무엇인가 하려는 것에 대해 그리고 우리가 사업적인 수단을 사용한다는 것을 알고 있을 북이 만들어 가고 있는 일련의 단계로 확신하고 있다고 생각지 않는다.
나는 신중한 힘의 시위는 우리의 외교적 노력을 지원한다고 생각한다. 당신은 우리가 남측에 두 대의 구축함을 주려는 것에 대해 공공연하게 말할 수 있다.(나는 전에 언급한 적이 없다고 생각하는데) 당신은 B-52를 움직일 수 있다. 나의 판단으로는 이들 모든 조치는 우리의 외교적 노력을 지원한다.
우리는 둘이나 세개의 만에서 나올 북측 배가 없다고 말할 수 있다. 그들을 봉쇄함으로써 우리는 상황을 뒤집을 수 있는 단계를 취할 수 있다. 이것은 바꿔말하면 추가단계에 대한 요구가 없는 단계이다. 우리가 이 문제를 다루기 위해 계획했던 안보리가 길이다라는 생각을 북은 허락지 않을 것이다. 그들은 우리가 필요하다면 군사적인 조치를 미래에 취할 준비가 되어 있다는 것을 알아야만 한다.

The President: You and Bob McNamara work out a schedule of movements for the aircraft to South Korea. What do you say in answer to Clark Clifford’s question. What do we do if this is our whole objective.
당신과 맥나마라는 남측에 비행기를 보내기 위한 일정을 착수하라. 클락클리포드의 질문에 대한 답이 무엇인지 말하라. 만약 이것이 우리의 전체 목적이라면 우리는 무엇을 해야 하는가?

Secretary McNamara: We must protect ourselves from permitting the North Koreans and the North Vietnamese and the Soviets getting the belief that we are weak. I would go back to Kosygin. I think the Soviets knew of this or if they did not they have enough influence to shape the conduct of North Korea. I would not deal in a belligerent, public way, but I would show them that it is essential to give up the ship and the men.
우리는 북과 북베트남 소련이 우리가 약하다고 인정하는 것으로부터 우리 스스로를 방어해야 한다. 나는 코시긴으로 되돌아갈 것이다. 나는 소련이 북의 행동형태에 충분히 영향을 미칠 수 없거나, 이것을 알고 있다고 생각한다. 나는 공식적인 방법에 의한 교전으로 다루진 않을 것이지만 그들이 배와 선원을 포기하도록 실재적인 것을 보여줄 것이다.

Director Helms: What is wrong in telling the North Koreans they must get the ship to us by a certain date or face the consequences.
결국 확실한 데이터나 외적증거에 의해 우리에게서 배를 나포했다고, 북에 말하는 것은 잘못인가?

The President: The simple answer to that is that we do not want a war with the Chinese and the Soviets.
간단한 답은 우리가 중국이나 소련과의 전쟁을 원치 않는다는 것이다.

General Wheeler: Here is a proposed schedule for movement of tactical air. We are talking about an order of 8 days using forces in West Pac. In the first three days you would have 28 F-104′s, 14 reconnaissance aircraft and 28 F-105′s.
Two days later you would have the bulk of the U.S. strike force. This would be 28 F-105′s, 18 F-100′s and 17 F4D’s.
After seven days you will have initial combat readiness.
여기 전술항공기의 이동에 관하여 제안된 일정이 있다. 우리는 서태평양의 병력을 8일동안 사용하는 명령에 대해 이야기하고 있다. 첫 3일에 당신은 28대의 F-104와 14대의 정찰기 그리고 28대의 F-105를 갖는다. 이튿날 이후로 당신은 미국전투력의 대부분을 갖는다. 이것은 28대의 F105, 18대의 F-100, 그리고 17대의 F4D이다. 7일후 당신은 최초의 전투태세를 갖게 될 것이다.

Under Secretary Katzenbach: When will this become public knowledge?
이것은 언제 공표될 것인가

General Wheeler: As soon as the units begin to move out. These things are very easily discernible from the movement of men and equipment.
곧 부대가 움직이기 시작한다. 이것들은 사람과 장비의 이동으로 매우 쉽게 인식된다.

The President: I do not see what is wrong with sending out the 28 fighters and the 14 reconnaissance planes now.
나는 지금 28대의 전투기와 14대의 수색정찰기를 보내는 것의 잘못이 무엇인지를 모른다.

Under Secretary Katzenbach: I think that is fine.
내 생각에 그것은 좋다.

Secretary McNamara: What you want is a series of movements. I do not think we need to make a decision tonight on this. I would recommend mid-day tomorrow.
당신이 원하는 것은 이동의 시리즈이다. 나는 우리가 오늘밤 이것을 결정하는 것이 필요치 않다고 생각한다. 나는 내일 낮에 추천할 것이다.

The President: I do want to space this out (the movement of aircraft into South Korea) but I want President Park to know that we are going to do this.
나는 남측으로 비행기를 보내는 것 다음에 간격이 있길 원한다. 그러나 나는 박통이 우리가 이렇게 하는 것을 알기를 원한다.

Secretary McNamara: We can do this easily.
우린 이것을 쉽게 할 수 있다.

Clark Clifford: Mr. President, in a discussion we had yesterday at the Department of State I presented a view. Since you were not there I would like to give it here.
I do not think our case with reference to the ship is a strong one. The North Koreans have a better case on where the ship was. They were there. We weren’t.
각하, 어제 국무부에서의 토론에서 나는 관점을 제시했다. 당신이 거기에 없었기에 난 여기서 말하고 싶다. 우리 상황은 배에 대해 강하게 언급해야 한다고 생각지 않는다. 북은 배가 있는 더 좋은 상황을 가지고 있다. 그들은 거기 있고 우린 거기에 없다.
This was a “spy ship”. There is a general feeling in the world that if you catch a spy you do him in. The North Koreans can say that we invaded their waters. We do not have a clear case to support. We must not issue an ultimatum. The odds are they would tell us to go sell our papers. Like blackmail, it is no good if you publicize it. It will become public knowledge we are sending in planes. The North Koreans have indicated something more may be coming. We do want to be prepared and ready for that. I recommend that we approach the Soviets again. I recommend that we go to the United Nations. I suggest that we start a quiet build up. We should send another message to Kosygin.
이것은 간첩선이다. 만약 당신이 간첩을 잡았다면 당신은 그를 그안에 둔다는 것이 세계의일반적인 정서이다. 북은 우리가 그들의 영해를 침략했다고 말할 수 있다. 우리는 지원할 수 있는 명백한 상황에 있지 않다. 우리는 최후통첩을 발표하지 말아야 한다. 그들은 우리의 문서들을 단지 장사를 위한 것이라고 말할 가능성이 있다. 만약 당신이 그것을 공표한다면 블랙메일처럼 좋지 않다. 우리가 비행기를 보내는 것 자체가 공표가 될 것이다. 북은 더 오도록 어떤 것을 지시했다. 우리는 그것에 대한 준비가 되어 있길 원한다. 나는 소련과 다시 접촉하기를 추천한다. 나는 유엔으로 가는 것을 추천한다. 난 우리가 조용히 상황만들기를 시작할 것을 제안한다. 우리는 코시긴에게 다른 메시지를 보내야 할 것이다.
The North Koreans may conclude they have gotten as much out of this incident as they can. Frankly I can stand a minor set back to our position rather than to take action which may lead us into another war. The capture of a spy ship is not worth us going to war.
북은 이 사건 이외에 그들이 할 수 있는 더 많은 것을 얻었다고 결론 내릴 것이다. 프랭클리 나는 또다른 전쟁으로 우리를 인도할 조치를 취하는 것보다는 오히려 우리의 위치를 최소한으로 되돌려 세우는 것이 낮다. 간첩선의 나포는 우리에게 전쟁으로 가게 할 만한 가치는 아니다.

The President: Okay, let’s get a spaced-out movement.
좋다. 이동에 간격을 두자.

Secretary McNamara: I will get the orders prepared tonight. We can issue them tomorrow at mid-day.
나는 오늘밤 준비명령을 내릴 것이다. 우리는 그것들을 내일 낮에 발표할 수 있다.

The President: I ask all present to assemble again at 11:00 a.m. on Friday./2/
/2/January 26.
나는 금요일 오전 11시 다시 모이기 위해 모든 것을 제공할 것을 요청한다.

Under Secretary Katzenbach: We went to the Red Cross and asked them for the release of the ship’s crew and also for the return of the body of the dead sailor. I thought we should do this regardless of what other action we are taking.
우리는 적십자에 갔었다. 그리고 배의 선원에 대한 석방과 죽은 선원의 시신의 송환을 요청했다. 나는 우리가 하고 있는 다른 조치와 무관하게 이것을 해야 할 것이라고 생각했다.

227. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, January 26, 1968, 1150Z. (한국 27일 01:50)
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Received on January 26 at 8:46 a.m.
2585. Ref: State 104325;/2/ Moscow 2579./3/
/2/Document 224.
/3/In telegram 2579 from Moscow, January 26, Thompson informed the Department of State of his scheduled appointment with Gromyko to present the President’s message and asked that the matter not be publicized, since the Soviets were “more inclined to be helpful if they are not exposed to the charge of collusion with us or of twisting the arms of their little brothers.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US)
1. I delivered to Gromyko President’s message to Kosygin at 12:45 today. After reading message, Gromyko asked me if I had anything to say orally. I replied I had nothing to add to what I had said in my conversations with Kuznetsov, about which I assumed Gromyko was informed.
2. Gromyko said he would, of course, transmit message to addressee, and Soviet leadership and government would be informed of its contents. By way of preliminary comment, however, he said he hoped US Government would take sober position in this matter and not succumb to momentary sentiments which, as also indicated in President’s message, now evident in US. Situation, facts as well as consequences, should be weighed very carefully. He said that for obvious reasons he did not wish to discuss at this time possible Soviet answer to message.
3. Stressing that he was now speaking outside context his preliminary remarks, Gromyko expressed deep regret US vessels took such liberties. Asserted US military command apparently sees nothing wrong in US vessels coming close to shores, cities, and installations of other countries. US military command seems to be in habit of disregarding interests other states. For example, Soviets had sent numerous notes to US containing specific data about location, time, and identification numbers US aircraft which had buzzed Soviet ships but in each case US gave standard reply that Soviet information not in accordance with facts. This reduced government-to-government communications to level where they could not be regarded as serious.
4. Repeating I had little to add to what I had told Kuznetsov, I pointed out US concerned about pattern of incidents along DMZ in Korea, with latest such incident having been infiltration 31 North Korean agents into South Korea. Coming on top of this, Pueblo incident could not but add to seriousness with which we viewed situation.
5. Gromyko asserted other side had information and facts re infiltration of agents in Korea which were of entirely opposite nature, but he did not wish dwell on this. He concluded by stating President’s message would be studied and reply conveyed to us in due course.
6. In response my question when Kosygin due back from India, Gromyko said Kosygin would be in India another two or three days and might stop for day or two in Afghanistan on his way back.
Thompson
 
228. Notes of Meeting/1/ 푸에블로7차회의
Washington, January 26, 1968, 11:08 a.m.-12:02 p.m.(한국 27일 01:08-02:02)
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson’s Notes of Meetings, Pueblo VII, 11:00 a.m. Top Secret. Drafted by Tom Johnson. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room at the White House. The time of the meeting is from the President’s Daily Diary. (Ibid.)
SUBJECTNotes of President’s Friday Morning Meeting on the Pueblo Incident
THOSE IN ATTENDANCE WEREThe PresidentSecretary McNamaraUnder Secretary KatzenbachGeneral WheelerCIA Director HelmsSecretary NitzeClark CliffordDeputy Assistant Secretary Samuel D. BergerWalt RostowBromley SmithGeorge ChristianTom Johnson

Prior to the President’s arrival the following agenda was agreed upon:
1. An intelligence situation report by Richard Helms.
2. A diplomatic situation report by Under Secretary Katzenbach.
3. A summary of the military proposals on aircraft movement and other actions by Secretary McNamara and General Wheeler.
4. A discussion of the merits of a Presidential address to the Nation.
5. More discussion on Clark Clifford’s question of Thursday, “How best to secure the return of the Pueblo if diplomacy fails.”
대통령 도착전 다음의 의제들 이 합의됐다.
1. 리차드헬름스에 의한 정보상황 보고
2. 카젠바흐국무차관에 의한 외교상황보고
3. 맥나마라와 휠러에 의한 비행기이동과 다른 조치에 대한 군사적 제안 개요.
4. 국민에 대한 대통령교서의 장점 토론
5. 목요일 클리포드의 질문 “외교적으로 실패한다면 푸에블로 송환과 구조를 위한 최선의 방법은 무엇인가”에 대한 추가 토론

Secretary McNamara: We should not plan on any military action in less than seven days.
우리는 7일이외의 어떤 군사조치도 계획하지 않을 것이다.

General Wheeler: That is correct. That time will be required to get all of our units on the ground and make them combat effective.
그말이 정확하다. 그 시간은 땅위의 우리의 모든 부대와 그들의 전투효과를 만들기 위해 획득하길 요구하는 시간이다.

Secretary McNamara: We should have working sessions periodically to discuss these matters. We may do this without the President. I suggest that we ask the State Department to call these meetings. We should have one a day. Let’s work out a system like we had in the Cuban Missile Crisis./2/
우리는 이 문제를 논의하기 위한 정기적인 세션을 가져야 할 것이다. 우리는 이것을 대통령 없이 해야 할 것이다. 나는 국무부에 이들 미팅을 소집하도록 요청할 것을 제안한다. 우리는 하루를 가지고 있다. 우리가 했던 쿠바미슬위기와 같은 시스템을 운영하자.
/2/On January 26 an interagency Korean Working Group and a State Department Korean Task Force were formed and headed by Berger. (Memorandum for the Korean Working Group, January 26; ibid., National Security File, Country File, Korea–Pueblo Incident, Miscellaneous, Vol. I)
1월26일 각부서 코리아워킹그룹과 국무부테스크포스가 비거에 의해 고안되고 만들어졌다.

At 11:00 a.m. the President joined the meeting.11시 대통령이 참가한 미팅
I. Intelligence Situation Report
Director Helms: On the overflight last night, the Soviet and North Korean radar picked up this flight. There was no effort to intercept it although it made repeated photographic runs. We did get photographs. I expect a photographic report from Japan later today./3/
어젯밤 영공비행이 있었는데 이 비행이 소련과 북측 레이다에 포착됐다. 비록 사진적 직선비행을 반복했지만 도청하기 위한 노력은 없었다. 우리는 사진을 얻었다. 나는 오늘 늦게 일본으로부터 사진보고가 올 것으로 기대한다.
/3/On January 29 the Directorate of Intelligence issued a memorandum containing a preliminary assessment of information gathered by a Black Shield flight over North Korea on January 26. An analysis of the photographs showed “no unusual air or naval deployments,” but “North Korean surface-to-air missile defenses appear to be in a high state of readiness.” The overflight photographed the Pueblo in Wonsan Bay. The ship had no visible damage and was guarded by three patrol boats armed with Komar missiles. (Ibid.)
1월29일 정보이사회는 1월26일 북상공에 대한 블랙실드비행에 의해 모아진 정보의 예비평가를 포함한 메모랜덤을 발표했다. 사진 분석에 의하면 “유용한 공군, 해군배치는 없다.” 그러나 “북의 함대공미슬 방어는 높은 준비태세”를 보이는 것으로 나타났다. 영공비행은 원산만의 푸에블로를 촬영했다. 배는 눈에 띄는 손상은 없었고 코마미슬로 무장된 3척의 순시정에 의해 경계되고 있었다.
[3 paragraphs (7 lines of source text) not declassified] 7줄이 기밀해제 안됨-(*역자메모: 블랙실드의 속도를 알아볼 것. 원산과 일직선상에 있는 군사, 국가시설이 촬영되었을 가능성?)

II. Diplomatic Situation Report Deputy Secretary Berger: The Goldberg text is now being worked on (Goldberg text attached as Appendix A)./4/
비거국무부부장관의 외교상황보고: 골드버그문서는 지금 작업중이다.
/4/Not printed; the text of Goldberg’s January 26 statement is in Department of State Bulletin, February 12, 1968, pp. 194-198.
–The Japanese were contacted. They replied that this is a very grave situation./5/
/5/Document 222 discusses the approach to Japanese officials. Ambassador Johnson subsequently met with Ushiba to review Korean developments. Johnson was informed that Miki would contact the Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo to express his government’s concerns about North Korean actions. (Telegram 4998 from Tokyo, January 25; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 KOR S) In a January 30 letter Sato responded to President Johnson’s message by expressing his own fears and concerns about the situation in Korea and his commitment to cooperating with the United States to settle the Pueblo crisis and North Korean guerrilla actions. (Telegram 108777 to Tokyo, February 2; ibid.)
일본과 접촉했다. 그들은 이것이 매우 중대한 상황이라고 답변했다.
/5/문서222는 일본과의 공식접촉을 논의한다. 존슨 대사는 한국개발 검토에서 우시바를 뒤이어 만났다. 존슨은 미키가 북의 조치와 관련하여 그의 정부입장을 발표한 도쿄의 소련대사와 접촉한 것을 알려주었다. 1월30일 편지에서 사토는 존슨의 공포가 표현된 그리고 한국상황과 관련된 그리고 푸에블로위기를 진정시키기 위해 미국과 함께 협력하고 있는 그의 위원회와 북의 게릴라활동에 대한 존슨의 메시지에 대해 응답했다.
–We have no reply as yet about our notice that we would be sending additional B-52′s to Okinawa.
–The Indonesians have told their Ambassador in North Korea to urge the release of our ship and crew./6/
/6/In telegram 4279 from Djakarta, January 26, Ambassador Marshall Green informed the Department of his meeting with Indonesia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Adam Malik, who promised to contact immediately “his ambassador in Pyongyang instructing him to inform NK authorities of Indonesia’s concern and to urge immediate release of Pueblo and crew in order to prevent situation from deteriorating further.” (Ibid., POL 33-6 KOR N-US)
–우리가 추가로 오끼나와에 B-52를 보낼 것이라는 우리의 통지에 대해서는 아직 답장을 가지고 있지 않다.
–인도네시아는 북에 있는 그들의 대사에게 우리의 배와 선원의 석방을 주장하라고 말했다
/6/1월26일 자카르타에서 온 전문4279에서 마샬그린대사는 국무부에 인도네시아외무총리 아담 말리크와의 미팅을 알려주었다. 말리크는 “평양에 있는 그의 대사에게 인도네시아와 연관된 권한을 북에 알리도록 그에게 지시할 것과 앞으로 나빠질 상황을 예방하기 위하여 푸에블로와 선원을 즉시 석방할 것을 주장할 수 있도록” 즉시 접촉을 약속했다.

–The Pakistanis have assured us of their support in the U.N./7/ (The President asked if Berger is certain of this. The President said he had a different reading of the text. The President asked “Did he sign on?”) Berger said, not exactly.
/7/Reference appears to be to President Johnson’s letter to Pakistani President Ayub Khan and the reply thereto. Johnson’s letter requested that Ayub instruct his UN Ambassador, who was also President of the Security Council, to support “a simple resolution of the Security Council expressing concern about the grave situation, calling for strict observance of the Armistice Agreement, and requesting the immediate release of the United States crew and vessel.” (Telegram 104475 to Rawalpindi, January 25; ibid.) In reply, Ayub stated that “Ambassador Shahi is in touch with other members of the Security Council and we earnestly hope that consensus will emerge amongst the members of the Council on the best means to meet the situation.” (Telegram 2969 from Rawalpindi, January 26; ibid.)
–파키스탄은 유엔에서 그들의 지원을 우리에게 확신했다.(대통령은 비거에게 이것을 확실히 하도록 요청했다. 대통령은 자신은 문서를 다르게 읽었다고 말했다. 대통령은 “그가 사인했냐”라고 물었다) 비거는 반드시 그렇지는 않다고 말했다.
/7/참조에는 존슨이 파키스탄 칸에게 보낸 편지가 나타난다. 존슨의 편지는 아윱이 유엔 안보리 의장인 그의 유엔대사에게 정전협정의 엄격한 준수를 요청하는, 그리고 미국배와 선원의 즉각 석방을 요청하는 심각한 상황에 대해 안보리의 단순한 결의를 발표해 줄 것을 지원해달라고 지시할 것을 요청했다.(1월25일 라왈핀디에 보낸 전문104475) 답장에서 아윱은 사하이대사는 안보리의 다른 회원국과 접촉하고, 우리는 진심으로 상황과 만나기 위한 최상의 수단위이 안보리 회원국중에서 여론이 나올것을 희망한다고 선언했다.(1월26일 라왈핀디로부터의 전문2696)
–The tenor of most of the replies have been friendly./8/ The President asked if there was any report on the nine members of the United Nations Security Council. Mr. Berger said there had been no report on their positions.
/8/The Department of State sent telegrams to all Ambassadors informing them of the facts surrounding the Pueblo incident and Blue House raid and asking that they request their host government to express support for the United States by, but not limited to, approaching the USSR and, where appropriate, North Korea. (Telegrams 104818 and 104819, both January 26; ibid.) By the evening of January 26, when a summary of responses received thus far was given to him, the President noted “we have too few replies and our Ambassadors don’t seem to have much clout. Please follow thru for reports from all posts.” (Memorandum from Smith to the President, January 26; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea–Pueblo Incident, Vol. Ia, Part B [through January])
–대부분의 답장들의 경향은 우호적이다. 대통령은 안보리9개국에 어떤 보고가 있었는지 물었다. 비거는 그들의 입장에 대한 보고는 없었다고 말했다.
/8/ 국무부는 모든 대사에게 전문을 보냈는데 그 내용은 푸에블로사건 주변의 사실과 청와대습격, 그리고 그들의 국가정부에 미국에 대한 지원을 발표할 것에 대한 요청, 그러나 소련과 제한 없는 접촉, 북과의 적절한 접촉을 요청하는 것이었다.(둘다 1월26의 전문임. 104818,104819) 1월26일 저녁 지금까지는 그에게 제출되기만 했던 임무의 개요를 받았을때 대통령은 주목했다. “우리는 또한 몇 개의 답장을 가지고 있고 우리의 대사들은 많은 타격을 입은 것으로 보이진 않는다. 자 모든 나라들로부터의 보고를 통해 계속해나가자.”

Walt Rostow: The Security Council meets at 3:30 p.m.
안보리는 오후 3시30분에 만난다.

The President: Let me see the draft of the Goldberg statement.
골드버그성명서의 초안을 나에게 보여달라

Secretary McNamara: Has there been a response from Moscow yet?
아직 모스크바로부터 응답이 없는가?

Under Secretary Katzenbach: Yes, Gromyko was negative. They showed some concern. He was less negative than Kuznetsov. They urge restraint. They said they hope we will not over-react to this.
예. 그로미코는 부정적이었다. 그들은 어떤 연관을 보였다. 그는 쿠즈네초프보다는 덜 부정적이었다. 그들은 억제를 주장한다. 그들은 우리가 이것에 대해 지나친 대응을 하지 않을 것을 희망한다고 했다.

The President: May I see the cable on the Soviet discussion? (Ambassador Thompson’s cable is attached as Appendix B.)/9/
/9/Reference is to Document 227.
내가 해저케이블로 소련과의 토론에 대해 알아볼 수 있나?(톰슨대사와의 전화는 부록B에 첨부)

The President: Is there any chance whatever that this ship was in territorial waters?
이 배가 영해 안에 있다는 얼마간의 가능성은 있는가?

Secretary McNamara: It is possible, but the chances are less than 50-50.
가능성은 있다. 그러나 50-50보다는 적다.

General Wheeler: The ship has the best navigational gear we have. North Korea has a rugged coastline. Because of this we can get a good fix by radar. Admiral Moorer has said that it is very improbable that the vessel was even a mile from where it ought to be.
In addition, the intercepts of North Korean radio traffic confirm that the North Korean ships which intercepted the Pueblo were in the same area the Pueblo reported as its location.
배는 우리가 가진 최상의 항해장치를 가지고 있고, 북은 우둘투둘한 해안선을 가지고 있다. 때문에 우리는 레이다로 정확히 잡을 수 있다. 무어러제독은 매우 있을법하지 않게도 배는 있어야 할 곳으로부터 1마일정도에 있었다고 말했다. 추가로 북의 전파교환에 대한 도청에 의하면 북측 배는 푸에블로가 자신이 위치했다고 보고한 같은 지역에서 도청했다는 것이 확인된다.

Secretary McNamara: The only thing which would have brought the Pueblo inside of the territorial waters was the possibility that they were getting a very good intercept and needed to move closer to get a better product.
영해안쪽에서 푸에블로가 한 일은 그들이 매우 훌륭한 도청을 얻고 있었다는 것과 더 좋은 도청물을 얻기 위해 더 가깝게 접근할 필요가 있었다는 가능성이 있다.

The President: Do you have anything more to report on the men and the equipment.
대원과 장비에 대해 더 보고된 것이 있나?

Secretary McNamara: We have nothing more on this.
이외에는 아무것도 없다.

Director Helms: There is nothing either way.
어느쪽도 없다.

General Wheeler: There was a North Korean press message which said that the crew should be tried and punished as criminals.
북이 발표한 메시지는 선원들이 (범죄를) 시도했다는 것과 범죄를 응징했다는 것이다.

Under Secretary Katzenbach: We interpret this as their response to our calling up reserves.
우리는 이것이 우리의 예비군 소집에 대한 응답으로 해석한다.

The President: Do we harass Soviet ships?
우리가 소련 배를 괴롭힐 수 있나?

Secretary McNamara: Yes, they harass us too. This is almost a way of life on the high seas.
예, 그들은 또한 우리를 괴롭힌다. 이것은 해양에서 거의 일상적인 것이다.

The President: Let’s be more careful about all of this.
이 모든 것에 대해 더 주의하자.

Secretary McNamara: We will reassess the whole thing.
우리는 모든 일을 재평가 할 것이다.

Under Secretary Katzenbach: I thought there was a case of our buzzing a ship in Haiphong Harbor.
나는 하이퐁만에서 우리의 와글거리는 배의 경우를 생각했다.

Secretary McNamara: That was a photo reconnaissance mission to see if the ship was damaged as alleged.
추정되는 바로서 만약 배가 손상되었다면 그것을 알기위한 사진수색임무가 있었다.

III. Military Proposals Secretary McNamara summarized in handwriting his schedule for aircraft movements. (Attached as Appendix C.)/10/
/10/Not printed.
맥나마라가 비행기 이동을 위한 그의 일정을 손으로 써서 요약한 군사적 제안
–Sunday–13Monday–16 plus 66 from U.S.S. RangerTuesday–66Wednesday–30Thursday–24
–Two days later, we will send in 18 aircraft from Vietnam. These are 18 aircraft which are being replaced and will not be sent from Vietnam until their replacements arrive in Vietnam.
The 26 B-52′s will bring the total to 347 aircraft including those aboard the U.S.S. Enterprise. We would like a decision on this whole matter today.
This action will leak. We will try to hold it as tightly as possible, but when men and units begin to move the press gets wind of it.
–일요일에 13대, 월요일16대 + 레인저호로부터 66대, 화요일 66대, 수요일 30대, 목요일 24대,–이틀후(토요일) 우리는 비엩남으로부터 18대의 비행길르 보낼 것이다. 18대는 재배치된것이고, 그들이 비엩남에 도착하여 재배치될 때까지 비엩남에서 보내진 않을 것이다. 26대의 B-52는 엔터프라이즈항모 갑판에 소속된 총 347대의 비행기를 이끌 것이다. 우리는 오늘 이 모든 문제를 결정해야 할 것이다. 이 조치는 새나갈 것이다. 우리는 가능한한 빈틈없이 새나가지 않도록 잡고 있기 위해 노력해야 할 것이다. 그러나 사람과 부대가 움직이기 시작할 때 기자들은 그것을 냄새맡을 것이다.

Secretary McNamara reviewed with George Christian the proposed answers to questions concerning the aircraft movements. The President approved the answers. (Attached as Appendix D.)/11/
/11/Not printed.
맥나마라는 조지크리스챤과 함께 검토한 비행기이동과 연관된 질문에 대한 답변을 제시했다. 대통령은 답변을 승인했다.

Secretary McNamara: We would like to alert the units today for movement.
우리는 이동하기 위해 오늘 부대에 경계명령을 내릴 것이다.

The President: Is this what you want now General Wheeler?
휠러장군 지금 당신이 원하는 것이 있나?

General Wheeler: Yes sir.
예. 각하

The President: Does State agree with this?
이 합의를 발표할 것인가?

Under Secretary Katzenbach: Yes we do.
한다.

The President: Clark, do you agree with this?
클라크 당신은 이것에 합의 하는가?

Clark Clifford: I have no objection
나는 반대하지 않는다
.
The President: What do we say now to the Congress?
우리는 지금 의회에 말할 것인가?

Secretary McNamara: Mr. President you have before you a list of authority which we would like to require from the Congress in relation to the Pueblo incident. These are as follows:
각하, 당신은 전에 우리가 푸에블로사건과 관계되어 의회에 요구한 권한위임 목록을 가지고 있다. 그것은 다음과 같다.
1. Authorize the extension of all enlistments, appointments, periods of active duty, and other periods of obligated service of Regular and Reserve members of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force.
Reason required–Extension of tours of duty involuntarily is the quickest way to achieve any needed expansion of force strength. Such extension will add 2200 trained personnel per day. This can be authorized by Joint Resolution.
모든 모병, 임용, 임무수행기간과, 다른 육,해군,해병대와 공군의 정규군과 예비군의 부여받은 임무 기간에 대한 연장 권한.
2. Authorize the call of all individual Reservists.
Reason required–Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1967,/12/ authorizes the President to order units of the ready Reserve of an armed force to active duty. Authority to call individuals from units is required in order to fill gaps in units on active duty with personnel possessing special skills. Moreover, extension of tours of those presently on active duty would be inequitable unless individual Reservists are subject to call. This, too, can be accomplished by Joint Resolution.
/12/PL 89-687, October 15, 1966, 80 Stat. 980-998; the Appropriation Act of 1968 actually covered the fiscal year ending June 30, 1968, however. See PL 90-96, September 29, 1967, 81 Stat. 231-249.
(역자주-http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid=60547 )
2. 모든 개별적인 예비역병에 대한 소집 권한
요구 근거- 1967년 국방부충원법은 임무수행을 위하여 이미 무장된 예비역 부대에 명령하기 위하여 대통령은 권한위임 한다. 특별한 기술을 소지한 대원들에게 임무수행을 위한 부대의 갭을 충당하기 위해 요구된 부대로부터 개인적으로 소집할 수 있는 권한을 위임한다.
또한 개인적인 예비역병들이 소집에 복종하지 않으면 현재의 임무수행기간의 불공평하게 연장시킬 수 있는 권한을 위임한다. 이는 또한 합동결의에 의해 성취할 수 있다.

3. Expand South Korean military assistance program by $100,000,000.
Reason required–The MAP request for Fiscal Year 1968 was cut 40%. This made it impossible to expand the military assistance given to South Korea, although such expansion is warranted in view of their troop contribution in South Vietnam and the increased level of harassment by North Korean forces. A supplemental appropriation under the Foreign Assistance Act will permit the funding of destroyers, helicopters and artillery and facilities needed for counter-infiltration purposes, and the necessary modernization to increase the defense capabilities of ROK aircraft, vehicles, anti-aircraft equipment and patrol craft. In addition, it will fund the required increase in ammunition levels.
3. 1억 달러에 의해 남측 군사원조프로그램을 펼친다.
요구근거-1968년회계년도 동안 요청된 MAP(군사원조프로그램)는 40% 삭감되었다. 이것은 남측에 제공할 군사원조프로그램의 실행을 불가능하게 만들었으며, 비록 그같은 확장이 남베트남에서 그들 병력의 기여한다는 관점에 근거하고, 북측 병력에 의한 괴롭힘의 수준이 증가한 것에 근거한 것이라 할지라도 말이다. 외국원조법아래 보충의 충원은 상호침투목적을 위해 필요했던 구축함, 헬기, 그리고 포병과 시설등의 자금조달을 허용할 것이며, 한국의비행기와 전차, 대공장비와 정찰기등 방어능력을 증가시키기 위한 현대화의 필요성을 위한 자금조달을 인정할 것이다. 추가로 그것은 증가된 탄약수준의 증가에 자금을 조달할 것이다.

The President: How many times have we authorized the extension of enlistments and periods of active duty?
우리가 모병과 임무수행기간 연장을 권한위임하는데 얼마나 시간이 필요한가?

Secretary McNamara: Many times.
많은 시간이 필요하다.

The President: Get me the number of times we have done it해치우다 and the reasons for each.
각각의 근거와 그것을 해치우기 위한 시간을 나에게 달라.

Secretary McNamara: We will do that.
그렇게 할 것이다.

The President: We can only call units now?
지금 부대를 당장 소집 할 것인가?

Secretary McNamara: This is correct. We can only call units. This request would permit the authority to call individuals from units in order to fill any gaps in units on active duty with personnel possessing special skills.
그렇다. 우리는 부대를 당장 소집할 것이다. 이 요구는 특별한 기술을 가진 대원의 임무수행에 대해 부대의 갭을 채우기 위해 부대로부터 개별적인 소집을 할 수 있는 권한을 인정해야 할 것이다.

The President: How many men does this affect?
이것은 얼마나 많은 사람에게 영향을 미치나?

Secretary McNamara: Roughly 150,000.
대략 15만이다.

The President: How much was cut from the military assistance program?
군사원조프로그램은 얼마나 삭감됐나?

Secretary McNamara: The Fiscal Year 1968 request was cut 40%.
1968년도 요구분에서 40%삭감됐다.

The President: Nick (Under Secretary Katzenbach) how do we get an expression from the Congress on what our policy should be in regard to Korea? George (George Christian) we must make certain that in the future we notify the Congress before the press announcement is made. There are a few people who are mad because they were not advised of the call up action yesterday.
카젠바흐국무부장관 한국에 관한 우리의 정책을 의회에서 발표하도록 하기위해 우리는 어떻게 할 수 있나? 조지 크리스챤! 앞으로 우리는 보도발표 전에 의회에 확실히 통고해야만 한다. 그들에게 어제 조치소집의 조언을 하지 않은 미친 사람들이 몇 있다.

Secretary McNamara: Mendel Rivers is mad.
먼들리버스가 미쳤다.

The President: Mansfield is also bellyaching about it.
맨스필드 또한 그것을 불평한다.

Secretary McNamara: I called Mansfield.
나는 맨스필드에게 전화했다.

Under Secretary Katzenbach: If you go all the way down the road you need nothing short of a Tonkin Resolution.
만약 당신이 장래에 모든 길로 간다면 통킹만 결의의 문제점은 더 이상 나타나지 않을 것이다.

The President: The Tonkin Resolution wasn’t very effective. Fulbright is against a resolution of any kind. We should discretely show the Congress copies of the mutual security acts between North Korea and the Soviets. I thought we should have had a resolution on the Israel situation. We have a new ball game with the Foreign Relations Committee.
Let’s do what we can to bring them along a little bit.
Let’s give some thought to how we can get Congress in on it.
We need more than a toast–that is all we have on the Israel situation. If they (the Congress) murder us on Vietnam with all those facts including SEATO and the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, what are we going to do in a situation like this.
통킹만 결의는 거의 효과가 없었다. 풀브라이트는 어떤 종류의 결의안도 반대한다. 우리는
의회에 북-소상호안보조약의 복사본을 분리해서 보여주어야 할 것이다. 나는 우리가 이스라엘 상황에 대한 결의안을 채택해야 할 것으로 생각했다. 우리는 외교관계위원회와 새로운 공놀이를 해야한다. 우리가 그들에게 조금이라도 계속 가져가기 위해 할 수 있는 것이 무엇인가? 그것에 대해 의회에서 어떻게 다루게 할 수 있는지 생각한 것들을 제기해 봐라. 우리는 토스트보다 많은 것을 필요로 한다.–그것은 이스라엘 상황에 대해 알고 있는 모든 것이다. 만약 의회가 통킹만 결의와 SEATO가 포함된 사실 모두를 가지고 베트남에서 우리를 살해하려 한다면 이같은 상황에서 우리는 무엇을 할 수 있나?

Secretary McNamara: I agree. We need strong Congressional support.
나도 동의한다. 우리는 강력한 의회의 동의가 필요하다.

The President: I have always tried to put Congress in on the take-off as well as on the landing. If the Dominican Republic means nothing, if the Tonkin Gulf means nothing, what do we do here. We do not want to exercise power and authority without the support and approval of the Congress.
나는 착륙 뿐아니라 이륙을 위해서도 의회에 제출하기 위해 항상 노력해왔다. 도미니카공화국에서 아무런 수단이 없다면, 통킹만에서 아무런 수단이 없다면 우리는 여기에서 무엇을 할 수 있겠는가? 우리는 의회의 지원이나 승인없이 힘과 권력으로 연습하길 원치 않는다.
Let’s discuss with Senator Fulbright and Senator Russell what ways we should approach this matter.
At some point we are going to be called upon to put up or shut up. I want Secretary McNamara to set up a meeting with Senator Russell and take Buzz (General Wheeler) along with you. Nick (Under Secretary Katzenbach) you do the same with Senator Fulbright and Senator Mansfield. Also I want you (General Wheeler) to get General Goodpaster to go over this with President Eisenhower./13/
Get him to ask Ike what is our best constitutional way to proceed.
Paul, (Secretary Nitze) do you have any thoughts on this?
/13/See Document 239. Memoranda of other briefings as well of Rusk’s comments to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 26 are in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea–Pueblo Incident, Vol. I, Part B (through January) and ibid., Vol. Ib, Part A (beginning February). In a letter to Rusk on February 1 Fulbright posed 20 questions on the Pueblo situation. A substantive, all-encompassing series of reports replying to those questions was sent to Fulbright on March 20. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US)
풀브라이트 상원의원과 러셀 상원의원과 토론하자. 우리가 이 문제에 접근할 수 있는 방법이 무엇인지? 몇가지 점에서 우리는 돈을 내든지, 아니면 가만히 지켜보든지 부탁할 것이다. 나는 맥나마라에게 원한다. 러셀상원의원을 휠러와 당신이 함께 약속을 잡아라. 카젠바흐국무부장관은 풀브라이트와 맨스필드상원의원을 만나라. 또한 나는 휠러장군이 아이젠하워대통령과 함께 이 문제를 건너가기 위해 굿페스터장군을 만나기 바란다. 아이크에게 우리가 이것을 추진하기 위한 최상의 합법적인 방법이 무엇인지 묻기 위하여 그를 만나라.
니츠 장관은 이것에 대해 어떻게 생각했는가?
2월1일 풀브라이트는 러스크에게 한 편지에서 푸에블로에 대한 20개의 질문으로 쩔쩔매게 했다. 그들 질문에 답변하는 실질적으로 모든 것을 포위하는 보고서 시리즈가 3월20일 풀브라이트에게 보내졌다.

Secretary Nitze: The key here is Senator Fulbright. He wants to put the Executive Branch in a position where they cannot make a move without the approval of his Committee.
여기서는 풀브라이트상원의원이 열쇠이다. 그는 그의 위원회의 승인없이 움직일 수 없는 지위의 실행부서가 선택되길 원한다.

The President: Bromley, (Bromley Smith) get me the dates and exactly what we did in the situations leading up to the Dominican Republic and the Tonkin Gulf. Get them to me right away. Now let us address ourselves to the question of what we do if diplomacy fails.
브롬리스미스 도미니카와 통킹만에서 초래하고 있는 상황에서 우리가 정확히 했던 것과 데이터를 나에게 달라. 바로 나에게 가져와라. 지금 만약 외교가 실패할 때 우리가 할일이 무엇인가라는 질문에 우리 스스로 답변해보자

Walt Rostow: We really cannot do that until we see what happens in the United Nations. In addition we need to get a read-out on photo reconnaissance.
우리는 유엔에서 무슨 일이 일어나는지를 알 때까지 실제 할 수 있는 것이 없다. 추가로 사진수색에 대한 분석이 필요하다.

The President: I want you to get your very best dreamers on this right away. Are there no economic sanctions we can take?
나는 곧바로 이것에 대해 당신의 매우 최상의 공상가들을 움직이기 바란다. 우리가 할 수 있는 것으로 경제제재는 없나?

Walt Rostow: We will set up a special task force on this.
우리는 이것에 대해 특별임무팀을 꾸릴 것이다.

The President: Get your very best people working on this.
이것에 대해 당신의 최고전문가들을 움직여라.

Secretary McNamara: Mr. President, we should remind you of something we pointed out before the President entered. It would not be appropriate to take any military action in less than seven days because of the need to get our units there and get them combat effective.
각하, 우리는 대통령이 개입하기 전에 우리가 지적했던 어떤 것을 당시에게 상기시켜야 할것이다. 거기에 우리부대를 보낼 필요와 그들의 전투효과를 획득하는 것 때문에 7일이하의 군사조치 밖에 준비되지 않았다.

The President: We also should keep in close touch with the Korean Embassy. Park may be about to blow something and we would be involved.
우리는 또한 주한미대사와 함께 밀접하게 접촉을 유지해가야 할 것이다. 박통은 어떤 것에 무척 화가나 있을 것이고 우리는 그것을 포함시켜야 한다.

The President: What about a television address to the Nation?/14/
/14/See footnote 6, Document 223.
국민들에게 텔레비전 연설을 하는 것은 어떤가?

George Christian: The point of concern is that the President has said nothing publicly on this matter, although I would not recommend any television now, I would think the President might want to consider dropping something into a speech.
관련사항의 초점은 대통령이 이 문제에 대해 공적으로 아무것도 말하지 않는 것이다. 비록 지금 어떤 텔레비전을 추천할 순 없지만, 난 대통령이 연설에서 어떤 문제들이 언급되길 원한다면 생각해 볼 것이다.

Under Secretary Katzenbach: We must remember that Goldberg is coming up on television for the next two or three days, so there will be plenty of Administration talk.
우리는 기억해야 한다. 골드버그가 다음 2-3일동안 텔레비전에 나온단 것과 거기에서 정부이야기를 충분히 할 것이라는 점이다.

The President: I want you to give Rusk and Goldberg an outline of what to say in their speeches. All of you remember that we brought those Russian ships in a while back. They paid $60 fine and were freed. Our ship, the Pueblo, was not in Korean territorial waters. We had no time to do anything to prevent it from being towed in in the one- and-a-half hour period. Let’s be prepared to answer every question that is being raised by people like Time Magazine and answer them factually./15/
/15/The President met with Hugh Sidney of Time magazine and Jack Horner of the Washington Star in the Oval Office that evening from 7:30 to 8:45 p.m. for a confidential, unattributed discussion of the Pueblo crisis. (Notes of the President’s Meeting, January 26; Johnson Library, Tom Johnson’s Notes of Meetings, Pueblo Backgrounder)
난 러스크와 골드버그가 그들이 연설에서 무슨 말을 할지 윤곽을 주길 바란다. 여러분은 우리가 요전에 러시아 배를 가져왔던 것을 기억하라. 그들은 60달러의 벌금을 지급하고 풀려났다. 우리의 배, 푸에블로는 북측영해에 있지 않았다. 우리는 끌어 당겨진 1시간 반 동안에 그것을 방어하기 위해 어떤 것을 할 수 있는 시간도 없었다. 타임지 같은 사람들에 의해 제기될 수 있는 모든 질문에 답하기 위한 준비를 하자 그리고 그들에게 사실에 비추어 답하자.
/15/대통령은 푸에블로위기에 대해 원인이 귀착되지 않은, 기밀인 동안 저녁에 집무실에서 타임지의 시드니와 워싱턴스타의 아너와 만났다.

George Christian: One of the principal questions was why the ship was not protected./16/
/16/General McKee, Commander of the Fifth Air Force, stationed in Japan and responsible for responding to Pueblo’s distress calls, undertook an investigation and concluded that “no air cover and no strip alert국내방어태세 was provided because none was requested.” The Fifth Air Force was not notified of the ship’s mission at the time the mission was approved nor upon execution of the ship’s orders. Only a few intelligence and operations officers had any knowledge of the mission and they and other Fifth Air Force personnel were not prepared to respond during the seizure of the Pueblo. (Telegram from 5AF to CINCPACAF, January 25; ibid., National Security File, Country File, Korea–Pueblo Incident, Vol. I, Part A [through January])
원칙적인 질문중의 하나는 왜 배는 방어되지 않았었는가이다.
/16/ 5공군사령관 맥키는 일본에 주둔하고 있었고, 푸에블로의 비통한 호출에 응답할 의무가 있었고, 조사를 수행했으며, 그리고 결론 내렸다. “아무런 요청도 없었기 때문에 항공호위도, 국내방어태세도 제공되지 않았다.” 5공군은 배의 임무를 통지받지 못했다. 그 당시 임무는 배의 명령의 실행을 승인하지 않았다. 오직 소수의 정보, 작전장교들이 임무에 대한 약간의 정보를 가지고 있었고 그들과 다른 5공군대원들은 푸에블로가 나포되는 동안 응답할 준비가 되어 있지 않았다.(1월25일 5공군으로부터 태평양사령부로의 전문)

The President: This is simple. We cannot provide an Armada over every ship we have. The Russians do not have their ships protected.
이것은 단순하다. 우리는 우리가 가진 모든 배 위에 무적함대 아르마다를 제공할 순 없다. 러시아는 그들의 배를 방어하지 않는다.

George Christian: Another question they are raising is why there was not more air power in Korea.
그들이 제기하는 또다른 질문은 왜 남측에는 더많은 공군력이 없는가이다.

Secretary McNamara: We do not have planes assigned to protect these types of ships. This is an advantage that the initiator had. They also had MIGs overhead.
우리에겐 이런 타입의 배를 방어할 수 있도록 할당된 비행기가 없다. 이것은 창시자가 생각했던 유리한 점이다. 그들은 머리위에 미그기를 가지고 있다.

General Wheeler: We could pick up six trawlers off our shores today if we wish. They don’t protect their ships. This type of thing goes on all the time.
우리는 만약 원한다면 오늘 우리의 바다 밖에서 6대의 트롤어선을 잡아챌 수 있다. 그들은 그들의 배를 보호하지 않는다. 이런 타입의 일은 언제든 발생한다.

Clark Clifford: If these ships were covered by air, their effectiveness would be reduced substantially.
만약 이들 배를 항공호위 했다면 그들의 효과는 실질적으로 감소했을 것이다(간첩선이기에)

Walt Rostow: There are probably 50 incidents of harassment each year.
아마 매년 50건의 괴롭힘 사고가 있다.

Secretary McNamara: The Pueblo would have been much more prepared if he had been inside territorial waters. The fact that he was unprepared reinforces the fact that he was outside territorial waters in international territory.
푸에블로는 만약 그가 영해안에 있었다면 더 많이 준비했었을 것이다. 사실 그는 강화할 준비를 안했고, 또 사실 그는 영해 밖 공해에 있었다.

The President: All of you should meet regularly and get as well organized in this situation as we were in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Get your best people working on this. Let’s not have us charged with failure to deal with the situation properly.
여러분 정규적으로 만나고 쿠바미슬위기 처럼 이 상황을 잘 조직하라. 당신들의 최고전문가들을 이일에 끌어들여라. 상황을 적절히 다루기 위해 우리에게 실패의 책임을 지우지 말라.

229. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, January 26, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea–Pueblo Incident, Vol. I, Part B (through January). Secret. Attached to a January 26 memorandum from Rostow to President Johnson in which he noted that Katzenbach “seeks to convince you that things are in somewhat better shape than you may think; and–basically, he is right.” The memorandum indicates that the President saw it.
1월26일 로스토우로부터 존슨에게 간 메모랜덤에 의하면 그는 다음과 같이 적었다. 카젠바흐가“ 당신이 생각하는것 보다 어느정도 더좋게 형태가 갖추어진 일에 대해 당신을 설득시킬 수 있도록 시도하라; 그리고 기본적으로 그는 옳다” 메모랜덤은 대통령이 그것을 보았다고 했다.
SUBJECTWhat We Are Doing About the Pueblo
The following is a brief description of what we have under way on the Pueblo:
On the Diplomatic Front:
–Reactions to our representations abroad are still coming in. We are sending you our analyses of them as soon as they are prepared. (I have already sent you 15 and will send you more in the morning.)/2/
/2/Memoranda from Katzenbach to the President, undated and January 30, updating the responses to the demarches are ibid. Responses were also recorded by the Korean Task Force in daily situation reports. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US)
–The Japanese have suggested that we agree to the formation of a fact-finding commission made up of the USSR, Japan and an undetermined third country. They propose that this commission determine the facts in the Pueblo case and make recommendations for resolution. We see many flaws in the proposal (e.g. it doesn’t handle the problem of North Korean infiltration into South Korea)./3/
/3/Earlier that day the Japanese Ambassador met with Rusk and gave him a paper containing the proposal. On January 29 he discussed the proposal in a meeting with Katzenbach. The proposed approach was also the subject of discussion between Ambassador Johnson and Japanese officials in Tokyo. Memoranda of conversation, cables, briefing papers, and similar documentation on this topic, January 26 to 31, are ibid.
–We have persuaded the Swiss and the Swedes (who, along with the Czechs and the Poles, make up the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission) to make inquiries about the status of the Pueblo crew. We have gone to the Czechs and the Poles to see if they will agree to go along with the Swiss-Swedish approach.
–At our request, the International Red Cross has agreed to make inquiries about the Pueblo killed and injured. The IRC has also agreed to ask for the return of the bodies of the dead, but feels that it can’t yet ask for the return of the crew. That will be the next step./4/
/4/Documentation detailing U.S. approaches to the International Red Cross and the latter’s contacts with North Korea are ibid.
–We are examining the pros and cons of another MAC meeting. We will have a recommendation for you on this tomorrow.
–We are studying another appeal to Communist countries with diplomatic representation in North Korea. If we feel there is a chance that any of them can influence Pyongyang we will go back at them again.
–We are looking at the merits and demerits of sending a special Presidential emissary to capitals that might exercise some influence on the North Koreans. We will have a recommendation for you in a day or two.
–We are considering whether we can put indirect pressure on the North Koreans (e.g. getting others to cut their trade).
–Buzz Wheeler will report tomorrow on about a dozen possible military actions we can take directly against North Korea (none of these now look very promising).
–I have another group trying to come up with assorted proposals of a less provocative nature than air strikes, etc.
We are looking into the feasibility of some action particularly directed against North Korean units in North Viet-Nam.
In the UN:
–Goldberg will begin consultations tomorrow on a possible resolution. We can use this as a tactic–if we want to–for prolonging Security Council consideration.
–It was clear from the debate today that the Soviets have no taste for an extended debate. If we want to keep things going in the UN we will have to avoid coming to a vote on any resolution (since this would mean a Soviet veto).
My strong recommendation is that we keep the issue alive in the Security Council for a while. If the debate is closed off without a satisfactory result, it will mean heavy pressure on you to take other steps.
On the Intelligence Front:
–Dick Helms is studying possible ChiCom attitudes and reactions to various U.S. steps against North Korea. He also will report tomorrow on the location of the North Korean merchant and fishing fleets./5/
/5/The Office of National Estimates prepared two memoranda, both January 26, on the Korean situation that examined possible courses of action to end the Pueblo crisis and confront North Korean aggression. “Possible Developments in the Korean Situation” discussed three options for dealing with the situation: 1) continue exerting diplomatic pressures while advancing military preparations; 2) retaliate militarily; and 3) develop a new U.S.-ROK approach involving selective retaliation against North Korea. “Communist Reaction to Certain US Actions” noted that both the Soviet Union and Communist China had thus far refrained from direct involvement in the Korean situation. The analysis concluded that, although both nations would be alarmed by direct U.S. military activity against North Korea, neither would retaliate directly unless their territorial security were seriously threatened or breached. The paper cautioned, however, that U.S. military threats were unlikely to achieve an early resolution of the Pueblo crisis and could risk expansion of hostilities. (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History, Pueblo Crisis, 1968, Vol. III, Day-by-Day Documents, Part 3)
–The preliminary results of our intelligence collection effort over Wonsan are in. We have pictures of the Pueblo which seems to indicate that no external damage has been done to the ship. We can’t tell, however, what equipment has been removed. There is no evidence of salvage operations at the point where the Pueblo was seized.
Public and Congressional Relations:
–We are preparing additional materials for you on how best to handle our public and Congressional relations.
I also have given several groups the task of coming up with proposals on how best to influence the USSR and Eastern Europeans. There have been several indications today that the Soviets–whatever their public utterances–are beginning to take the matter seriously. We are looking for ways to keep pressure on the Soviets.
(Note: We have just received a report–on which you will get more details in the morning–that an Eastern European source here says that the North Koreans will release the Pueblo crew on Monday and then scuttle the ship. We are now assessing the reliability of this information.)
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
 

148. Telegram From the Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command and of United States Forces, Korea (Bonesteel) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)/1/
Seoul, January 27, 1968, 1025Z.(한국 28일 00:25)
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea–Pueblo Incident, Military Cables, Vol. I, January 1968. Secret; Immediate. Also sent to CINCPAC.
271025Z UK 56313. 1. General Bonesteel sends.
2. I met with the ROK JCS this morning (270200Z). I started out by saying now it more important than ever that ROK and US military work closely together with mutual trust and confidence. One objective Communist actions is to disrupt부수다 excellent US/ROK relations. I then updated them, on broad basis, of US actions within bounds of cautions contained in numerous incoming action messages. I had not received guidance regarding informing them on drone flight/2/ by time of meeting so excluded same.
나는 오늘아침(27일 2시) 한국 합참을 만났다. 나는 일찍이 상호 신용과 신뢰로 밀접하게 함께해온 한미군사동맹보다 더 중요한 지금의 상황을 말하는 것으로 시작했다. 하나. 객관적으로 공산주의자의 조치는 좋은 미한관계를 깨기 위한 것이다. 그런다음 나는 많은 도착조치메세지에 포함된 주의사항의 테두리내에서 미국조치의 넓은 기초에 대해 그 이야기들을 더 발전시켰다. 나는 같이 제외된 미팅시간에 무인비행체에 대해 그들에게 알리는 것에 관하여는 지침을 받은 적이 없다.
/2/Flights over North Korea were authorized to gather information on the whereabouts of the Pueblo and its crew. 북영공비행은 푸에블로와 선원들이 어디쯤에 있는지에 대한 정보를 모으기 위해 인가되었었다.
3. Important points made by ROKs were as follows: First, need for them to be adequately and timely informed on US intentions because they affect their mobilization planning, national emergency planning, martial law plans and numerous other vital plans conducted by ROK Government.
다음은 한국에 의해 강조된 중요촛점이다. 첫째 미국의 의지에 대한 시의적절한 정보가 그들에겐 필요하다. 왜냐하면 미국의 의지는 한국정부에 의해 만들어질 그들의 기동계획, 국가비상계획, 물자법계획 그리고 많은 다른 생명에 관한 계획에 영향을 끼치기 때문이다.

4. Second point was expression of strong feeling at all levels of the republic, that US at our governmental level had taken no adequately drastic과감한 action following attempt attack on President and Blue House. However, seizure Pueblo we had reacted drastically. They all expressed views along this line, making plain분명한 their object was not obstructive방해물 but that they were speaking as real friends of the US in whom they have great faith신념 and trust. They reiterated nevertheless that actions taken by US in and from Korea should stress point that we view attack on Blue House–”The national symbol of the republic”–equally as important as Pueblo. They said mere oral protestation to this effect would not correct Korean opinion but that we should take immediate, tangible steps such as “air lifting immediately into Korea increments of CIGCOREP equipment,” make firm announcement of commitment to deliver destroyers and other actions which can be taken within days.
(*역자주-CIGCOREP Counter Infiltration-Counter Guerrilla Concept and Requirement Plan대침투계획-대게릴라 개념과 요구)
두 번째는 미국이 정부차원에서 대통령과 총와대의 공격시도에 따른 적절하고 과감한조치를 취하지 않은 것에 대해 공화국차원의 강한 감정표현이 있다. 그러나 푸에블로나포에 대해 우리는 격렬한 대응을 했다. 그들은 분명하고 방해받지 않는 목적을 만드는데 있어서 그들모두 이선을 따라 견해를 표현했다. 그러나 그들은 커다란 신념과 신뢰를 가진 미국의 진실한 친구로서 말하고 있었다. 그들은 그럼에도불구하고 푸에블로와 동등한 중요성으로서 공화국의 국민적 상징은 청와대 습격에 대한 우리의 관점에 스트레스 받고 있는 한국과 미국에 의해 취해진 조치에 대해 되풀이해서 말했다. 그들은 이같은 결과가 한국의 정확한 여론은 아니며 단순한 구두저항이라고 말했다. 그러나 우리는 구축함수송 약속의 명확한 발표를 할 ‘한국의 대침투계획(대게릴라개념,요구)설비의 증강을 위한 즉각적인 항공수송 같은 명확한 단계와 하루내에 취할 수 있는 다른 조치를 즉시 취해야 할 것이다.

5. The third point was expressed by all in one way or another. This is importance of taking clear, punitive action to teach Kim Il-Sung a lesson. Defensive action only within ROK alone would, they said, insure continuation and increase in North Korean infiltration and raids up to 10 or 100 times current levels. Several expressed concern that US would mount massive effort until Pueblo and crew returned but then would not continue to press to insure the stop of North Korean subversive war, they feared build-up and carrier task force would be retracted from Korea and vicinity when Pueblo incident settled. This, they said, would have grave effect of ROK/US relations and only encourage Communists. I attempted allay their fears and pointed out none of resources which might be directed to Korea were being supplied from Vietnam.
세 번째는 대체로 한가지방법이나 다른 방법에 의해 표현되었다. 이것은 김일성에게 교훈을 주기 위한 징벌조치를 명백히 하는 것의 중요성이다. 한국내에서의 방위조치는 오직 스스로혼자서 하고 있다. 그들은 최근 10-100번의 북의 침입과 침략의 증가와 지속을 확인했다고 말했다. 푸에블로와 선원을 송환받을 때까지 거대한 노력을 시작할 미국에 대해서는 몇가지로 표현했다. 그러나 그다음 북의 파괴적인 전쟁의 중지와 그들이 두려워하는 군사력건설과 항모합동임무군이 푸에블로사건이 고착되었을 때 한국과 그 인접한 곳으로부터 취소되었다는 것을 확인하기 위한 발표를 계속하진 않았다. 그들은 이것이 한미관계의 근심스런 영향을 가져 올 것이며 오직 공산주의자들의 용기를 줄 것이라고 말했다. 나는 그들의 공포를 누그려뜨리고자 노력했고 비엩남으로부터 공급되고 있었던 한국이 지적한 것들이 근거없음을 지적했다.

6. All the chiefs seemed deeply to appreciate the meeting and their expressions above were obviously sincere and well-meaning. They unquestionably need more information on basic US intentions with regard both Pueblo incident and Kim Il-Sung’s subversive war activities. None seemed alarmed over imminence North Korea would take overt large-scale aggressive action unless these develop as result continuing actions.
모든 사령관들은 모임을 깊이 평가하는 것처럼 보였다. 그리고 그들의 좋은 표현은 명백히 성실하고 좋은 의미였다. 그들은 의심할 여지없이 푸에블로사건과 김일성의 파괴적인 전쟁행위 모두에 대하여 기본적인 미국의 의지에 대한 더 많은 정보를 필요로 했다. 아무도 북을 계속되는 조치의 결과로서 발전시킴이 없이 명확한 대규모 공격을 취해야 한다고 긴급히 경고하는 것처럼 보이지 않았다.

7. I would like to operate on basis of informing ROK JCS on close-hold basis of all intended moves we plan to make except those in which message traffic explicitly prohibits discussion with ROKs. I will proceed on this basis unless I hear to contrary.
나는 메시지거래에서 한국과 명백히 금지된 토론을 제외하고는 우리의 계획을 만들기 위해 모든 의도된 움직임의 기초를 밀접히 잡을 수 있는 한국합참정보의 기초에 대해 운영할 것이다. 나는 내가 반대하기 위해 듣지 않는 한 이러한 기초는 계속해 나갈 것이다.

8. I wish to emphasize, from other sources as well as ROK JCS, that concern lest US reaction is only in regard to Pueblo is widespread and serious in many circles of ROK Government and public. I concur in ROK statement at end para 4 above and recommend feasible action to this end.
미국이 만연되어 있고, 한국정부와 사회의 많은 사이클에서 심각해져 있는 푸에블로에 대해서만 대응하지 않도록 관련된 한국합참과 마찬가지로 다른 근거에 의해서도 강조되길 원한다. 나는 한국성명서의 끝 4문단 위를 시인한다. 그리고 이것의 끝에 가능한 조치를 추천한다.

230. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, January 27, 1968, 1458Z. (한국 28일 04:58)
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Top Secret; Flash, Nodis. Received on January 27 at 10:50 a.m.
2604. 1. Following is our translation of Kosygin’s reply to President’s message./2/
/2/The reply was given to Thompson by Gromyko, who dismissed the veracity of U.S. military statements declaring the Pueblo was in international waters when captured and cautioned that U.S. threats to North Korea could be counterproductive. (Telegram 2605 from Moscow, January 27; ibid.)
2. Begin text. Dear Mr. President: I have received the text of your message which was handed by Ambassador L. Thompson to our Minister of Foreign Affairs on January 26, 1968, concerning the incident involving the American naval intelligence vessel Pueblo near the shores of the Korean People’s Democratic Republic.
3. Allow me to say with the utmost directness that we cannot share the interpretation of events which is presented by the American side. Information available to us attests to the fact that the American naval intelligence vessel Pueblo was detained by Korean authorities not in international waters but in the territorial waters of the KPDR while carrying out certain intelligence operations. This is the main thing, it is here where the entire essence of the affair lies, and therefore the responsibility for the incident falls entirely on the American military command, which acted contrary to the generally accepted norms of international law protecting the inviolability of the territories of states and their territorial waters.
4. But since this is so, it is the US which must take steps to find ways of settling the incident and, in any event, not do anything that could add fuel to the fire. You yourself expressed in your message the conviction that the interests of preserving universal peace would not be served by increased tension in that area.
5. However, how can this be reconciled with the fact that during the past few days in the US the situation is being heated up, irresponsible voices calling for a “return strike” against the KPDR and calls for the use of arms and force are being heard? Those who make such statements are apparently little concerned about what all this can lead to.
6. How the American military look at the principles of international law, and in particular the principle of the freedom of navigation, is well known, if only by the fact that US military aircraft are buzzing systematically Soviet and other vessels on the high seas. We have repeatedly drawn the attention of the US Government to the fact that this is fraught with the possibility of military incidents, but the buzzing operations have continued to this day. Recently even more serious cases have taken place where American aircraft subjected Soviet merchant vessels to bombing and strafing. And, incidentally, a very calm attitude, to put it mildly was then demonstrated in the US with respect to these facts, although they involved human losses and major material damage.
7. But now, when an American naval vessel has been detained because it penetrated foreign territorial waters, a noisy campaign is being developed in the US, which, judging by everything, has the support of the American Government. Otherwise, how can one understand the report that a Seventh Fleet detachment consisting of the nuclear carrier Enterprise, destroyers and other vessels has been ordered to move in the direction of the KPDR?
8. The Soviet Government believes that in connection with the incident which has arisen near the KPDR coast, it is most important to analyze the situation soberly and not to succumb to emotions which can lead one to where perhaps he does not even intend to go.
9. You, Mr. President, have expressed a desire that the Soviet Government respond to your anxiety in connection with this incident. In our view, the shortest and the most reliable way for settling it is not to allow precipitous actions, and this would create a more favorable atmosphere.
10. We are convinced that the promptest possible settlement of the situation would be in the interest of all sides. Such settlement must be based, of course on complete respect for the sovereignty and independence of the Korean People’s Democratic Republic. Any attempts to apply methods of pressure with respect to the KPDR can only complicate the possibilities for a settlement.
11. We have informed the Government of the Korean People’s Democratic Republic of your message.
12. Respectfully, A. Kosygin. January 27, 1968. End text.
Thompson
 
231. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, January 27, 1968, 1500Z. (한국 28일 05:00)
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Received January 27 at 11:14 a.m.
2606. Ref: Moscow 2604, 2605./2/
/2/Document 230 and footnote 2 thereto.
1. I think we can take some encouragement from fact that despite Kuznetsov’s first statement to me that Soviets would not act as intermediary, Soviets in fact have transmitted two messages to Pyongyang. I am also struck by Kosygin’s statement that Soviets believe quick settlement of incident is in the interest of all sides.
2. Gromyko gave every appearance of being convinced that incident took place in territorial waters. If we could tell Soviets that we are prepared to make available to them copy of tape recording of report of Korean subchaser reporting its position this could dispose of that part of the argument, although I doubt Soviets would accept such offer and would say such tapes could easily be faked.
3. While possibilitiy exists that Soviets were party to this affair, my judgment, based on their handling of the problem up to now and the general situation, is that they were not. They are clearly concerned over the way the matter is blowing up which tends to limit their freedom of action. Their distrust of our military is certainly genuine.
4. Anything we can do to convince them that our purpose is simply to settle the incident and get our men and ship back would be helpful. For example, if we could find a way to let them know, perhaps in any reply President may make to Kosygin, that we have taken steps to calm down South Koreans, this would be useful. It would also increase Soviets possibility to pressure North Koreans if we could put Enterprise out of the area or at least from the vicinity of Wonsan. I think we must take Gromyko’s warning to me seriously.
Thompson
 
232. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/
Seoul, January 27, 1968, 1720Z. (한국 28일 07:20)
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 KOR/UN. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Repeated USUN.
3702. Ref: A. Seoul 3696;/2/ B. Seoul 3697./3/ Country Team Message.
/2/Telegram 3696 from Seoul, January 27, discussed a suggestion by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission that Admiral Smith request information about the health and welfare of the Pueblo crew through the Joint Duty Officers at Panmunjom. All NNSC members would also submit a message, sent in their capacity as “reps of countries which have traditionally dealt with victims of international conflicts,” requesting similar information. (Ibid.)
/3/In telegram 3697 from Seoul, January 27, the Embassy reported the views of the NNSC toward the potential resolution of the Pueblo crisis through negotiations with North Korea. The Swedish and Swiss members of the commission, based on a conversation with the Communist members, concluded that the North Koreans could be prepared to discuss the crisis through the UN structure at Panmunjom and appeared to expect an official apology, perhaps with the intention of humiliating the United States. (Ibid.)
1. Shortly after midnight Jan 28, Swiss member NNSC (Barbey) telephoned following information, which he had received from Communist member NNSC, to senior member UNCMAC:
Between 2000 and 2100 hours January 27 the Communist members of NNSC met with MG Pak Chung-kuk, senior member KPA/CP/side of Military Armistice Commission. Pak requested them to transmit following official and unofficial messages from him to senior member UNCMAC. The messages, in Korean, were translated into English by KPA, then taken by Polish and Czech NNSC members to Swiss and Swedish members. Official message follows:
“Govt of North Korea thinks that solving question of ship and crew is impossible when made by threatening or using force. If the United States will try to use force to free the ship, KPA will answer with the same means and it is risk that instead of freeing the crew they would get only bodies. It is quite possible to solve this problem if USA will acknowledge that the people of the ship are prisoners of war and if US will show willingness to negotiate or discuss in a normal way when one side would like to have prisoners back.”/4/
/4/When drafting a reply to Kosygin’s message, Rostow received and forwarded a copy of this cable to the President. With reference to Pak’s comments suggesting the crew be returned as prisoners of war, Rostow commented that that approach could be “the quickest track,” but would require pacification of the South Koreans by keeping some of the recently transferred aircraft in the ROK and by increasing U.S. funding of anti-infiltration measures to improve ROK security. He further advised the President: “Sir: This is the break. The problem is how to do it with maximum dignity.” (Memorandum from Rostow to the President, January 27; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea–Pueblo Incident, Vol. Ia, Part A [through January])
2. The following unofficial message was given to Pole and Czech obviously for transmission also:
“Now the Captain recognizes his criminal acts . . . /5/ The crew are in very good condition. Although they acted as enemies in our coastal waters and committed a crime, those who are wounded are under normal medical care. The body of one killed is preserved. Further details about the situation of the crew members could be obtained through direct contact between both sides.”
/5/Reference is to Bucher’s alleged confession broadcast by Radio Pyongyang on January 25.
3. Comment by Swiss member: This is interesting in that only two days ago Pak told his NNSC members “Even if not in territorial waters the ship was acting against us.”
4. Comment: Most unusual feature of foregoing is that Pak chose to use NNSC as channel. We can only surmise that Communist members NNSC had earlier passed request for info on crew members to him, despite statement to contrary to Swiss and Swede (Ref A). Experience with Pak at MAC indicates he would not have taken this action without instructions from Pyongyang.
Porter
 
233. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea/1/
Washington, January 28, 1968, 0152Z. (한국 28일 15:52)
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea–Pueblo Incident–Cactus IV, Cactus Miscellaneous Papers, February to December 1968. Secret; Flash; Nodis; Cactus. Repeated to USUN. Drafted at the White House, where it was cleared by the President; cleared by Berger and Walsh; and approved by Katzenbach.
106065. Ref: Seoul’s 3702./2/ Following is text of reply to be made by Senior MAC Member:
/2/Document 232.
“1. I have received the message which you (Major General Pak Chung-kuk, Senior North Korean Member of Military Armistice Commission) sent me through the channels of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.
2. My reply is as follows: The policy of the United States Government with respect to the S.S. Pueblo and its crew was publicly stated when the President of the United States on January 26 said, ‘We shall continue to use every means available to find a prompt and peaceful solution to the problem.’/3/
/3/The statement is from the President’s televised address to the nation; see footnote 6, Document 223.
3. The crew of the S.S. Pueblo are United States Naval personnel, acting under orders of the United States Navy. Two of them are civilian scientists, specialists in hydrographic work. You have captured these men by force of arms. At the very least, they are entitled to the protection of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, to which you subscribe.
4. I am relieved to receive information through unofficial channels that they are good condition, the wounded are receiving normal medical care, and that the body of the one who died is preserved.
5. It has been suggested that further details could be obtained through direct contact between both sides. I therefore request that the names of the injured and dead be provided us through the Joint Duty Officer, and I request an immediate meeting of the Senior Members of both sides to discuss and resolve this matter promptly. We are agreeable to either a private or open meeting.”
7. Use Nodis Cactus in this series.
Rusk
 
234. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea/1/
Washington, January 28, 1968, 0208Z. (한국 28일 16:08)
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Flash; Nodis; Cactus. Repeated to USUN. Drafted by Meeker; cleared by Berger, Rostow, and Walsh; and approved by Katzenbach.
106066. Ref: State 106065./2/ Further instructions follow:
/2/Document 233.
1. In meetings with North Korean side of MAC you should make business-like, dispassionate presentation of US positions. In answer to any North Korean harangue or propagandistic argumentation, you should give calm and factual response, setting forth US views plainly and firmly.
2. North Korean side may press argument that Pueblo was in territorial waters. You should respond with following points:
a. Pueblo under US Naval orders to stay at least 13 nautical miles from coast and thus would not enter any waters that North Korea claimed as territorial sea;
b. At time when Pueblo was hailed by North Korean submarine chaser, Pueblo radioed her position as 39-25.2 North Latitude 127-55 East Longitude–a position more than 15 nautical miles from nearest North Korean territory, Ung Do Island;
c. At exactly the same time, North Korean submarine chaser Number 35 radioed to shore its position as 39 degrees 25 minutes North Latitude 127 degrees 56 minutes East Longitude–a position approximately one mile further East and seaward from that reported by Pueblo;
d. At time of boarding, North Korean vessels reported the position as further East, at 39-26 North Latitude 128-02 East Longitude.
3. North Korean official message said, “It is quite possible to solve this problem if USA will acknowledge that the people of the ship are prisoners of war.” We are not sure what they mean. This may be intended as an admission that the Pueblo crew was engaged in warlike activity. Or it may be intended as a ploy to bargain for the return of North Koreans. Accordingly our language avoids specific reference to prisoners of war, and you should avoid phrase or acknowledgment, and try to minimize issue, simply repeating that they were taken by force and are at least entitled to the protection of Geneva Conventions of 1949. If this point proves troublesome, you should say these are highly technical and legal matters, and you would like clarification of what they mean, so as to study matter further.
4. North Korean official message refers initially to “question of ship and crew” but later to “willingness to negotiate or discuss in a normal way when one side would like to have prisoners back.” US position, of course, is that both vessel and crew are to be returned and you should seek to deal with both together. However, there is obviously a priority in physical return of crew from North Korean custody and, realistically considered, arrangements for return of crew could be more rapidly carried out than necessarily more complicated arrangements for return of vessel.
5. If North Korean side should refer to prospect of criminal trial or penalties for crew members, you should point out that no basis exists for prosecution and that any such action would be contrary to Geneva Conventions of 1949 and threats this nature not helpful in search for peaceful solution.
Rusk
 
235. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, January 28, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea–Pueblo Incident–Cactus IV, Cactus Miscellaneous Papers, February to December 1968. Secret; Nodis; Cactus. The memorandum indicates that the President saw it.
Mr. President:
The attached cable from Ambassador Porter indicates clearly his problem with our proposed procedures so far as Park is concerned.
As indicated to you yesterday we have a problem of reassuring Park and the South Koreans on the infiltration problem. By leaving some of the aircraft in Korea and increasing military aid–notably, if we are going to get our extra division for South Vietnam.
Secretaries Rusk and McNamara will have been informed and be ready to discuss a reply by 9:00 AM.
We will shortly send up to you State’s proposed reply to Porter which suggests: 1) go immediately to Park without an interim message to the North Koreans; 2) tell him our strategy is to take these issues one at a time; 3) indicate specifically our willingness for later meetings on the question of infiltration and increased military aid.
W. W. Rostow/2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
 
Attachment/3/
Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State
Seoul, January 28, 1968, 0923Z. (한국 28 23:23)
/3/Secret; Flash; Nodis; Cactus. Repeated to USUN.
3706. Country Team Message. Ref: (A) State 106065;/4/ (B) State 106066;/5/ (C) State 106070;/6/ (D) USFK Message UK-50285 DTG 261115Z./7/
/4/Document 233.
/5/Document 234.
/6/Telegram 106070 to Seoul, January 28, instructed Porter to inform the ROK Foreign Minister, or if necessary Pak himself, that ROK insistence on appearing before the Security Council could be used to divert attention from the Pueblo seizure and Blue House raid to a debate on invitations to both North and South Korea. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-7 KOR S/UN)
/7/Not found.
1. We deeply concerned over adverse impact procedure suggested Refs (A) and (B) would have on US/ROK relations. As we have reported, ROKs from President on down are convinced that our actions and statements since Pueblo incident simply do not recognize extreme gravity of threat to internal security and political position of ROKG represented by Blue House raid and North Korean determination to increase subversive effort.
2. We have not informed ROKG of exchange between ourselves and North Korea through NNSC members. Despite security precautions we cannot keep this from them for very long. We have already received anguished approach from Foreign Ministry voicing suspicion that we are attempting to contact NK directly at other locations, notably Warsaw, and that we therefore intend to confine negotiations to retrieval of Pueblo and crew. We have ample evidence that suspicions are also growing at highest levels that once we succeed in obtaining release of ship and crew, we will withdraw force augmentations and leave ROK problem in status quo ante Pueblo with no improvement in President Park’s political or security problems. We have had broad hints that ROKs are talking among themselves of possible withdrawal ROK armed forces from operational control CINCUNC and, because of concern over reopening of hostilities here, return of ROK troops from Vietnam. We do not believe they are serious, but fact that senior ROKs imply such consideration is indicative of psychological climate we must deal with here. Should ROKs learn that we have requested meeting of senior members MAC solely to discuss Pueblo incident, as suggested Refs (A) and (B), without parallel effort on intrusion problem, results could be explosive.
우리는
3. Moreover, whatever subject matter, believe it would be highly inadvisable to express willingness to hold open MAC meeting. Presence of press and other witnesses at open meeting would impel Pak to put on propaganda show and attempt to place US in most humiliating light possible.
4. Accordingly, urgently request we be authorized to follow procedure outlined below:
(A) Immediately send KPA/CPV senior member first four paras of reply contained Ref (A) plus para 5 ending after words “joint duty officers.” Such reply is currently being translated and prepositioned for immediate delivery by secure means. By limiting this reply to request for information on condition of crew members, we would also provide NNSC opportunity to follow through with letter they suggested to us yesterday (Seoul 3697)./8/
/8/In telegram 3697 from Seoul, January 27, the Embassy reported on the NNSC’s views of resolving the Pueblo crisis. Although it contained no specific reference to a letter, the telegram noted that the Communist members of the NNSC suggested negotiations could be arranged by means of “messages through Joint Duty Officers of Panmunjom” or through a private MAC meeting. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 KOR/UN)
(B) Ambassador will seek soonest possible appointment with President Park to inform him of dealings which have already taken place through NNSC and of request for information on crew by senior member UNCMAC. Ambassador will state that senior member UNCMAC is also requesting a private senior member meeting to discuss problem of obtaining release of Pueblo and crew and to impress on North Koreans in most forceful terms gravity of situation posed by continuing North Korean infiltration. If President insists that UNCMAC senior member demand guarantee from North Korea that there will be no further intrusion, Ambassador will respond that it probably impossible to obtain. However, to ease President’s very real concerns, request Ambassador be authorized if necessary to inform him that USG will do following:
(1) Retain substantial proportion of force augmentation in and near Korea until such time as developments indicate infiltration threat and its attendant political and psychological problems materially lessened.
(2) To provide tangible evidence that we are doing something directly for the ROKs, USG will airlift available CIGCOREP items as requested in Ref (D), which USFK is passing separately directly to Dept.
(3) Acknowledge firm commitment on spring delivery first destroyer, which heretofor has been tied to additional dispatch of ROK troops to Vietnam. We are under no illusions that these items, if agreed, would entirely eliminate pressures on US arising from Park’s internal political position. They may ease pressures for time being, however, if carefully publicized.
(C) Senior member UNCMAC will then send separate message to senior member KPA/CPV side requesting private senior member to senior member MAC meeting. Request update guidance contained Ref (B).
4. Ambassador will raise problem of ROK attendance at UNSC (Ref C) at time he makes approach mentioned para 4(B) above.
Porter
 
236. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg)/1/
Washington, January 28, 1968, 11:38 a.m. (한국 29일 01:38)
/1/Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Goldberg, January 28, 1968, 11:38 a.m., Tape F68.01, PNO 2. Secret. This transcript was prepared by the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.
Goldberg: [The recording of this conversation begins at this point.] which I think ought to be at night and not during the middle of the day, ’cause I think, you know, people look at it. Advance a proposition of this type, you say that–you have said to the American people that you want this settled by diplomatic means, if possible. You have also said that the ship and crew must be returned, and you adhere to that statement. Now, you are prepared, if the ship and crew are returned promptly, to then submit the–you would say, that we are satisfied on the basis of incontrovertible evidence, which has been now made public, that this ship was in international waters. Nevertheless, you are prepared to submit the entire matter, after the ship and crew are returned, to the International Court of Justice and abide by the results. If our case is not what we said it was, we would make appropriate reparations to them. If our case was as we said it was, they should make appropriate reparations to us. It would seem to me that such a statement from you–they’ll turn it down, Mr. President. Although in one instance–I’ve been researching the precedents over the weekend–there was a situation in the Corfu Channel case where Britain and Albania got into a problem about intrusion upon international waters and where the Albanians mined the Corfu Channel. And they agreed at that time it should go to the Court–the British ship was damaged–and the Court ordered the Albanians to pay damages. Now, there is great virtue–you know, our public and the world opinion believes very much in the judicial process. All fair-minded people think, “Submit matters to courts and courts decide it.” A proposition like that put by you in a solemn declaration to the American people and to world opinion would, I think, have a tremendous impact. Anybody who would then say that you were not acting with restraint, etc., could not say it. This is a far better proposal than [Senator] Mike Mansfield’s silly proposal that even though the ship was in international waterways we ought to lie to get our men back. That’s just asinine. [The President can be heard chuckling in the background.] But for you to put a proposal saying that “You return our men and the ship; however we will undertake–we will put the case to the International Court. We’re prepared to do it promptly upon the return, and we will abide the results of that decision.” Now there’s a Russian on the Court, so they can’t say the Court’s stacked against ‘em–and a Pole. But on the whole, the Court is pretty–not badly disposed.
President: How many on the Court?
Goldberg: Let me see–
President: Give me a number.
Goldberg: Fourteen, I think. I haven’t got the exact number, but I could easily get it for you. It isn’t bad from our standpoint. It’s got Latin Americans, it’s got the Australians, it’s got British judges, its got–we’ve got a good judge in Phil Jessup. I don’t think we would do badly. And our evidence, the one we have been developing, is good evidence.
President: Where does this Court sit, in Geneva?
Goldberg: In The Hague. And we would have to invoke the Court. They sit whenever their jurisdiction is invoked. And we would, you could say, we would ask the Court as a matter of urgency to make this determination.
President: Did you talk to Rusk or Nick about it?
Goldberg: No, I have not yet talked to anybody, ’cause I didn’t want to start anything without–
President: I think it’s worthy of pursuing. I wish you would talk to ‘em/2/ or I’ll talk to ‘em later in the day. I think that would be very good. I think you did well up there. Now, what do you do tomorrow?
/2/Goldberg discussed the matter with Rusk, prompting Meeker and Sisco to set forth the advantages and disadvantages of taking the matter to the Court in a memorandum to Rusk and to the President. (Memorandum from Meeker and Sisco to Rusk, January 28, with attached memorandum from Rusk to the President; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US)
Goldberg: I’m–as far as I’m concerned, if we can not get some agreement, which I doubt we can get, I’m going to kind of wind up this exercise. I’m not going to put a resolution forward, which we, you know, would be vetoed. That isn’t going to help us. And push the Russians to a veto. So that, my view would be that I would–we’ve done, I think, what we ought to do down here and that is we have stated our case and now the responsibility is on the Council to come up with a–some help.
President: What are they gonna do?
Goldberg: Not a damn thing, just between us. They’ll fiddle around. But I’ll know better today. I’ll see the Russian today and see if I can get a reading from him that’s any different from what Tommy has got in Moscow. I’ll put it straight to him, “Do you fellas want to defuse the situation? Then you ought to put your weight to a simple”–what I have in mind is to say to him, “You don’t have to have a resolution. Let’s get the President of the Council to propose that there be–the ship and so on be returned and say the Council will be prepared to carry on further to consider the matter, and so on.” But, I know as I read the telegrams I doubt that the Russians would agree to anything. And then we’d let it be known that this is the reason why they can’t do anything. I don’t want to risk a resolution. See, we got a good vote on inscription, and I think it’s much better to let it be where everybody is trying to use some–individually–some diplomatic pressure–
President: What’d you lose, three votes?
Goldberg: On the resolution itself?
President: On the inscription, yeah.
Goldberg: On the inscription we just lost three votes–Russia, Hungary, and Algeria. Now, that’s a pretty good posture to leave it in. I wouldn’t want to lose support as we go down the line. So that–but, I’ll have a better reading. I’m gonna send all the–
President: Talk to Nick or Dean. Let them get into this. We’re going to have to do something when you get through there, and we sure don’t want to be–we don’t even have our people out there. We couldn’t do anything if we wanted to militarily, so we’re gonna have to do something in between.
Goldberg: That’s right. And this would–of course, the best avenue out there–I don’t know whether you saw this–I prodded our people to respond quickly. The best avenue out there to get our boys back is this Neutral Nations Supervisory Committee.
President: Yeah, they’re working that carefully.
Goldberg: Yes. We got ‘em working now. Their–those–that consists of the Swedes, the Swiss, the Poles, and the Czechs. And we sent a wire last night to get them working. They–the–see, the–I–it’s very important if you haven’t seen the message–you might ask Walt to get it for you–to see that the North Koreans sent a message through that commission.
President: Yeah, we read it and we replied./3/
/3/See Documents 232 and 233.
Goldberg: You read it?
President: Yeah, and we replied.
Goldberg: I didn’t know. There’s so much traffic. And you saw the reply?
President: Yeah, yeah.
Goldberg: Yes. That’s the best avenue–
President: We worked on it all afternoon.
Goldberg: Yes. Well, I should have realized that you’d be on top of that.
President: Here’s one they’re just trying to get out to Seoul now in reply to some of their worries. They just sent it in while you called. [At this point, the President read the entire text of a draft telegram to Seoul.]/4/
/4/The draft consisted of paragraphs 1-12 of Document 237. The draft telegram along with a transmittal memorandum from Rostow to the President, January 28, is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea–Pueblo Incident–Cactus I, Cactus State Cables, January 28, 1968 to February 10, 1968)
Goldberg: I think that’s very good. I have–
President: I see nothing inconsistent with it–with what you suggested. Looks like its fits in pretty well.
Goldberg: It fits in very well.
President: You do that, and I’ll be back in touch with you.
Goldberg: Thank you.
President: You talk to them.
Goldberg: And I hope to see an Ambassador coming in to see me, and I’ll follow the same line.
President: Thank you. Good bye.
Goldberg: Thank you.
 
237. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea/1/
Washington, January 28, 1968, 2055Z. (한국 29일 12:55)
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Flash; Nodis; Cactus. Repeated to USUN. Drafted by Berger; cleared by Rostow, McNamara, Rusk, and Katzenbach; and approved by Walsh. A draft version was approved by the President and read by him in its entirety during a phone conversation with Goldberg, who also approved its contents; see Document 236.
106085. Ref: Seoul’s 3706./2/
/2/See the attachment to Document 235.
1. We fully understand nature of problems and believe we can meet all of them with following approach.
2. It is apparent that North Koreans now realize full possible consequences of their actions and that Soviets have almost certainly told them to defuse situation. Easiest way for them to immediately ease acute tension and anger is to return Pueblo crew, and possibly vessel. It is imperative in ROK and our interest that nothing be done to interfere with this and that we make it as easy as possible for them to get off hook. To raise assassination and raider problem as you suggest at same meeting will only complicate and delay solution to all our problems.
3. The North Koreans will probably talk tough and try to humiliate us and ROK. If they do we should let them rant and ignore it. The velvet glove approach is the best, for there is a steel fist in it, and the North Koreans know it. We should not call their attention to it or make any threats, or at this juncture even call excessive attention to the gravity of the situation. They know how grave it is. We should be business like and non-contentious.
4. We expect the first round of talks will produce the release of the crew. Admiral Smith should try obtain vessel as well. The North Koreans may ask UNCMAC to sign a receipt for the men, as they did in the helicopter case, on which is written confession of guilt that they were engaged in espionage and violated territorial waters. UNCMAC should not be drawn into polemics, and only state quietly and repeatedly that North Koreans have their view of matter and we have ours. He is not authorized to sign a statement of the kind they are asking for.
5. If they insist on apology we should reply all our data indicate no violation. If after crew is released and we talk with Bucher and other crew members we find that the vessel was within the territorial waters claimed by North Korea we will make this fact public.
6. You can say to Park that as soon as the men are released, or if the release is long-delayed, announcement will be made of our intention to keep augmented forces in the area in view of North Korean campaign against the ROK. Also you may tell Park we are considering substantial additional MAP for the ROK to strengthen their anti-infiltration and military forces. We will also announce that two destroyers will be provided Korea, with date for delivery of first. You can tell Park that we will airlift available CIGOREP items as practicable, and will give this program same priority as we give Viet-Nam.
7. Para 6 is for Park alone and must not be published in any way.
8. We would think that when these announcements are made they will give ample assurances to Park and his military leaders and people who are concerned and interested. These announcements will be accompanied by request by UNCMAC for further senior level meetings with North Koreans to press insistently for an end to the North Korean violations in the DMZ and infiltration.
9. President Park is a military man, wise and a realist, and the approach to him should be made in these terms. The enemy is about to retreat from one of its exposed positions. When we take that we will move on the next ones.
10. You should see Park soonest and outline relevant parts of above strategy emphasizing this represents President’s own views on how next moves should be made. Admiral Smith’s message should be held for time being. If meeting with Park results in his concurrence or acquiescence, Admiral Smith should proceed to deliver message to NK MAC. However, if Park strongly objects our approach you should come back with Flash message.
11. On message to be sent to NK MAC, revise para 5 as follows:
“5. It has been suggested that further details could be obtained through direct contact between both sides. I therefore request that the names of the injured and dead be provided us through the Joint Duty Officers. Further I request an immediate meeting of the Senior Members of both sides to discuss the modalities for resolving this matter promptly.”
12. We suspect that North Koreans will want private meeting initially, and perhaps throughout, and under cover of that say we insisted on private meeting where we confessed our sins. It should be made clear in initial contact that we prepared to agree to either open or closed sessions whichever they wish.
13. There are great domestic problems and interest in this situation as well as those of world-wide implication. We are sensitive to the Korean problems and have gone very far to meet them but we cannot permit ourselves become satellite of ROK./3/
/3/Printed from an unsigned copy.
 
238. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/
Washington, January 28, 1968, 2104Z. (한국 29일 11:04)
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Malcolm Toon, Country Director, Soviet Union Affairs; cleared by Helms at CIA and Read; and approved by Katzenbach.
106086. For Ambassador Only.
1. It seems obvious from your meetings with Gromyko and others that Sovs regard official contacts on Pueblo case awkward and even annoying because of inevitable attendant publicity. Same considerations would apply to contacts with charge here.
2. Nonetheless, it is essential we remain in close communication with Sovs to stress gravity of situation. While we are hopeful success diplomatic approaches, it is always possible that at later juncture we may wish to warn them of actions we may be compelled to take in order to obtain release of men and vessel. Purpose then would be to insure that Sovs understand limited objectives such action and thus avoid miscalculation by other side.
3. Hot line is, of course, secure private channel, but we believe this would be inappropriate for warnings of impending action as indicated para 2 since Sov prestige would be engaged and they would feel compelled respond. Its use subject daily inquiry here and confirmation would escalate public concern.
4. Accordingly, we now giving consideration to establishment, at appropriate time, of clandestine channel on Scali-Fomin pattern used during Cuban missile crises. Helms has proposed we use Kulebiakin, top KGB official in US as well as Dep Sov UN PermRep. Our spokesman would be reliable non-official, perhaps Wm. S. White, who would be carefully controlled and authorized inform Kulebiakin he acting on precise instructions and at specific request of Secretary on behalf of President if this deemed necessary in light existing circumstances.
5. We do not believe necessary or appropriate officially to inform Sovs in advance of establishment of contact. We can assume knowledge of contact will be relayed by Kulebiakin through his channels to top Sov officials. At some later point, it might be desirable for you to convey quietly to Gromyko your knowledge that channel exists and is operative.
6. Would appreciate your views by opening of business Monday (EST)/2/ on desirability such move and its timing, and if you concur in need, on modalities as set forth paras 4 and 5./3/
/2/By January 29 at 8 a.m. EST.
/3/Printed from an unsigned copy.
 
239. Memorandum for Record/1/
Washington, January 29, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Eisenhower, Dwight D. Secret. The memorandum indicates that President Johnson saw it.
SUBJECTTelephone conversation with General Eisenhower, 27 January 1968
As requested by General Wheeler on 26 January, I talked by telephone with General Eisenhower on the 27th. General Wheeler had asked me to raise with him, at the President’s request, several key questions concerning the North Korean seizure of the Pueblo.
The President was concerned over problems that might face him if he were impelled at the end of diplomatic efforts concerning the Pueblo to take some kind of military action. The two key questions would be: What actions could be taken; how should the Congress be associated with these actions (the experience in the Dominican Republic and in Vietnam is pertinent). In presenting these questions to General Eisenhower I stressed that the discussion was entirely confidential and that he was in no sense being put “on the spot”.
His initial comments were exploratory and tentative. Later he offered specific suggestions. He first asked if North Korea has much maritime trade. I told him it was limited but that they do a good deal of fishing. He then asked if any thought was given to a quarantine, commenting that this would be about the least provocative of any military action and that, if it did not suffice the Congress would then have to consider stronger action. He thought it was important to act “while the iron is hot” and while the Pueblo affair is fresh in peoples’ minds. He said we should be careful not to demand or threaten anything that we can’t back up. Next he raised the possibility of bombing the bridges over the Yalu. I pointed out that these lie on the border with Red China, and that this action would tend to be a challenge to the Chinese. I suggested that there might be critical points on the communications routes south of the Yalu. He commented that a key question is whether we would be prepared to use atomic weapons, particularly since these would give assurance of destruction of bridges, for example, and could be utilized in places where no civilian losses would be involved.
General Eisenhower said that if he were sitting in the President’s place he would have the staffs consider every possible thing that might be done, not excluding anything out of hand, as a basis for top level consideration and decision. He commented that he doesn’t see much danger of a nuclear holocaust arising over this affair. (I had previously mentioned to him the treaties of the USSR and the ChiComs with the North Koreans.) He thought that the Russians and the Chinese would be guided by their own interests.
After further discussion he said his idea would be to take action generally as follows and generally in the order indicated:
a. Quarantine
b. Strengthening of defense arrangements along the DMZ (possibly including some patrolling into North Korea).
c. Attack of some critical targets along the North Korean main lines of communication.
d. Movement of U.S. air reinforcements into Korea; action to bring the whole command in South Korea to a feasibly high state of readiness; ground units should be brought up to strength, but without bringing in additional major units.
He did think that the plan to take these actions should be spelled out to the Congressional leadership. It could be pointed out that some of them at least could be initiated on the President’s own authority but that, in a matter of this kind it is important to have the Congress associated with the President, and that this is why he is consulting them. The Congressmen should be asked to keep specific details confidential, although the general intentions would of course become known.
Finally, General Eisenhower said that we should do everything possible to press for action on the diplomatic front and in the U.N. Security Council, and should even ask for a special session of the General Assembly if we thought anything useful could be achieved. He would intensify the bombing in Vietnam to a maximum at this time, and let it be known that this step up was related to the North Korean incident.
He concluded by asking me to convey to the President his personal hope for the President’s success in this matter.
GLieutenant General, U.S. Army

240. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, January 29, 1968, 1045Z. (한국 30일 00:45)
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
2612. State 106090./2/
/2/In telegram 106090 to Moscow, January 28, Rusk sent a letter to Gromyko reiterating that the Pueblo was seized in international waters, outlining international law covering the treatment of warships in territorial waters, listing Soviet violations of U.S. territorial waters and the action taken in those instances, stressing U.S. intention to resolve the Pueblo crisis peacefully, and requesting Soviet intervention to achieve that end. The letter also included a detailed chronology of events leading up to the seizure of the ship and an offer to provide tapes made of North Korean and U.S. radio communications concerning the Pueblo incident. (Ibid.) According to a January 28 memorandum from Rostow to the President, Johnson saw a copy of the letter. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea–Pueblo Incident, Department of State Cables, Vol. I)
1. I delivered Secretary’s message to Gromyko twelve noon today. He read it in my presence. After I had replied negatively to Gromyko’s question if I had anything to add orally, Gromyko said message would be studied carefully and perhaps replied to thereafter. However, he said he could say today that if US interested in settlement, it should not exert pressure on North Korea, for such pressure prevents and impedes settlement. He said he would not exclude the possibility that if there were no pressure, something would be done to reach settlement. Thus, he repeated, if US wished settlement, it should abandon pressure. If US prestige involved in this matter, so is North Korean. As Soviets had said earlier, absence of pressure would improve atmosphere.
2. Gromyko then repeated point he made to me January 27 that US should not take at face value its information regarding location of vessel. Soviets knew for sure that Pueblo had violated North Korean territorial waters. There was no doubt about this in Soviet mind. Referring to Secretary’s statement in letter that vessel had not entered NK territorial waters, Gromyko said perhaps Secretary not fully informed. He asked me to inform Secretary that Soviets had no doubt whatsoever that Pueblo had entered NK territorial waters. He urged US to face facts as that would help reach solution. Once having made a statement, US should not insist on repeating it ad infinitum. Such line of argument weak and not helpful.
3. I said I did not know what Gromyko had in mind in referring to US pressure. Noting we were acting with restraint, I pointed out that other side was talking about putting crew on trial as criminals, and our public opinion was aroused. We had taken up matter through diplomatic channels and also in Security Council. As to vessel’s location, I noted we had tapes and other evidence. However, if Soviets had some different information, other than North Korean statement, we would be grateful for it.
4. Gromyko commented he did not exclude possibility of giving us copy of explanation of circumstances of incident written in captain’s own handwriting. He was not, however, sure he would get a copy, but if he did he would give it to us.
5. Gromyko then pointed out that his remarks should be understood in the context of earlier Soviet statements that USSR could not be an intermediary in this case. However, since US turned to Soviets, they told us their point of view and their estimate of situation. Soviets would not like us not to pay close attention to their views.
6. I assured Gromyko that we wanted to settle this affair peacefully and quietly. We did not want to create difficulties for other side. I assured him that we would consider his remarks very carefully. I also assumed Soviets would want to give close study to Secretary’s message.
7. Gromyko then referred to Secretary’s comments about violations of US territorial waters by Soviet ships and said he did not remember incidents cited by Secretary. However, those were different cases and it was difficult to say if there was any analogy between them and the present case.
Thompson
 
241. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
Washington, January 29, 1968, 8:41 a.m. (한국 29일 22:41)
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and McNamara, January 29, 1968, 8:41 a.m., Tape F68.01, PNO 4. Secret. This transcript was prepared by the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.
McNamara: The second problem/2/ is we’re flat on our ass with any reaction plan. There’s just no question about it. And I’ve got to accept that as a problem and be prepared to justify our position. And these are the two major matters that I’ve got the lawyers working on. I will, as you suggest, get Cy[rus Vance] further this morning to look at the detail. He’s gonna be here at least through noon, because I think he said he’s lunching with you or the group today. In any case, I fully agree with you on this. Now, as to time–how we do it and when–Buzz Wheeler and I are scheduled to appear before the Senate Armed Services Committee Thursday morning/3/ at 10 o’clock on the 1969 Defense Program and Budget. And my guess is we won’t even get a word out of our mouths before they say, “The hell with that. We want to talk Pueblo.” So I have had in mind that I would have to be prepared by Thursday morning. As a matter of fact, I was thinking of calling Russell/4/ today and asking him, without suggesting that the Pueblo would come up, asking him how we would like to handle the start of the hearing Thursday, because I’m sure they’ll want to talk Khe Sanh and Pueblo and only incidentally ’69. And I thought Buzz and I should be prepared for both Southeast Asia and Pueblo in great detail by Thursday morning.
/2/A fragment of McNamara’s comments prior to this point–”I dare you approach. That’s one problem.”–was recorded during the phone conversation.
/3/February 1.
/4/Senator Richard Russell, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee.
President: I don’t think there’s any doubt about that. [Here follows discussion of the situation in Vietnam and of arrangements for a meeting among President Johnson, McNamara, and the Joint Chiefs later that day.]
McNamara: You might talk about Khe Sanh without digging too deeply into the Pueblo, because they themselves [the Joint Chiefs], frankly, don’t know all I know about the Pueblo yet.
President: Who’s responsible for this then, the Navy? Who gives them the assignment?
McNamara: Well, let me just tell you as little as I know now, which isn’t all the story by any means. The proposal initiated with the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet around the, I think it was the 17th of December, if I recall the date correctly. Then it went into–and he, he listed what he wanted to do.
President: Is that the fella–who is that? Where’s he stationed?
McNamara: He’s stationed in Honolulu, but, in turn, that came up from a lower level to him, and I haven’t got the lower–at least I haven’t seen the lower level papers yet./5/ Then he gave it to Admiral Sharp, and Admiral Sharp turned it into the Chiefs around the 23rd of December, and the Chiefs reviewed it. These things are handled on a relatively routine basis./6/ They reviewed it, and then it became part of what’s called the Monthly Schedule of Reconnaissance Activities,/7/ and that then went, between the 23rd of December and I would guess the end of the month–I haven’t the exact date yet–to the 303 Committee, on which sits the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Nitze, Dick Helms, Walt Rostow, I think Nick–I’m not–a State Department representative, in any case. The 303 Committee has to approve every one of these actions, and it approved this one./8/ So, I, myself, I feel personally responsible for the mission, because either my deputy or I approves every one of these things. So it was approved properly,/9/ but it was a poorly conceived mission. That’s my conclusion. Now this part of it I haven’t gone all over it with the Chiefs yet, because some of this I got yesterday, and I was in here but they weren’t. I will, of course go over the whole thing and I’ll go over the whole paper with the Chiefs before Buzz and I have to testify.
/5/According to a retrospective study of the seizure of the Pueblo, the ship’s operational plan originated from the staff of Rear Admiral Frank L. Johnson, Commander, Naval Forces Japan, under whose authority the ship, being assigned permanently to Yokosuka, fell. Johnson “personally made the initial determination that risk would be minimal since Pueblo would be operating in international waters during the entire operation.” After approving the proposed mission, Johnson forwarded it to Admiral John J. Hyland of CINCPACFLT, who, in turn, approved and submitted it to Admiral Sharp, CINCPAC. Sharp also approved and sent the proposal to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on December 23, 1967. When doing so, Sharp adopted Admiral Johnson’s view that risk to the ship and mission would be minimal. (National Security Agency, The Capture of the USS Pueblo and Its Effect on SIGINT Operations, United States Cryptologic History, Special Series, Crisis Collection, Vol. 7, 1992, pp. 29 and 33-34)
푸에블로나포에 대한 회고적 연구에 의하면 배의 작전계획은 배의 권한을 요코수카에서 영구할당한 미해군사령부 프랭크.L.존슨 해군소장의 참모로부터 시작됐다. 존슨은 “개인적으로 푸에블로가 전체작전을 하는 동안 공해에서 작전한 이래 위험을 최소화한 초기 결정을 했다.” 제안된 임무를 승인한 후 존슨소장은 그것을 태평양함대사령관인 대장 존 하일랜드에게 보냈고, 그는 차례차례로 그것을 승인했고 태평양사령관 샤프대장에게 제출했다. 샤프는 또한 승인했고 1967년 12월 23일 합참의장에게 제안을 보냈다. 그렇게 하고 있을 때 샤프는 배의 위험과 임무를 최소화한 대장 존슨의 관점을 채택했다.(NSA 미국암호역사,1992)

/6/Before the JCS could take any action and before the proposal could be sent further, however, the mission required approval of the Joint Reconnaissance Center Staff, consisting of a representative from each branch of the military, the DIA, the NSA, the Department of State, and the Secretary of Defense. Neither the JRC nor JCS reviews altered the initial minimal risk assessment associated with the mission. (Ibid., pp. 33-34)
/7/The JRC prepared for submission to the JCS the monthly schedule on or about the 23d of each month. It was in book form and contained broad information about all missions scheduled for the coming month. On Wednesday, December 27, the JCS received the monthly schedule for operations slated for January 1968, as did each branch of the Armed Forces, the DIA, NSA, CIA, and Department of State. Rather than discuss the monthly schedule at a routinely held, formal Friday meeting, each Chief approved release of the schedule by his Operations Deputy. After their own meeting, the Operations Deputies on Friday, December 29, the schedule was given to and approved by Nitze. (Ibid., pp. 34-35)
/8/The 303 Committee also granted civilian approval for the monthly schedule on December 29, noting that the mission held the possibility that the ship would encounter difficulties and potentially serious harassment. (Ibid., p. 36) NSA analysts also notified the JRC and JCS on December 29 of the potential for provocation by the North Koreans, mentioning as well that they had no evidence to suggest such harassment would occur outside the 12-mile territorial boundary. (Ibid., pp. 37-39 and 177-178)
/9/Given the holiday season and the absence of key officials from Washington, deputies and substitutes handled much of the review and approval process. (Ibid., pp. 34-39)
President: Well, I would sure get my best explanation, because–Now what’s the [The tape ends abruptly at this point.]
 
242. Report on Meeting of the Advisory Group/1/
Washington, January 29, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt W. Rostow, Material re: Vietnam and Pueblo, January-February 1968. Top Secret. Prepared on February 1.
ADVISORS PRESENTMessrs. George Ball, McGeorge Bundy, Henry Cabot Lodge, Cyrus Vance, and General Maxwell D. Taylor
OTHERS PRESENTSecretary Rusk, Under Secretary Katzenbach, Joseph Sisco, Samuel Berger, Director Richard Helms, W.W. Rostow, and Bromley Smith
Having been fully briefed by the Secretaries of State and Defense yesterday, Sunday, January 28 (except for Mr. McGeorge Bundy),/2/ the group met at noon to consider the operational alternatives immediately ahead of us and, perhaps, further down the road. The meeting opened by bringing them up to date with the latest word of the Panmunjom contact and Gromyko’s reaction to Sec. Rusk’s message.
/2/Katzenbach submitted a brief memorandum to the President on the briefing, informing him that all members agreed that the course currently being followed held a possibility for success. They also felt it unwise to take “highly visible and provocative action” or to implement military operations in North Korea at this time. (Ibid., Country File, Korea–Pueblo Incident, Vol. I, Part B [through January])
It was universally agreed that we should make no further diplomatic or military moves, beyond those already undertaken and possible action under paragraph 11, until we could form a judgment as to whether the Panmunjom contact might be fruitful.
The first substantive issue addressed was whether and at what stage the President might offer arbitration via the World Court, or some other “suitable international tribunal” after the men and the ship were returned. After examining the problems posed by the World Court formula (implicit recognition of North Korea as a state) and the precedent represented by the RB-47 in 1960, it was agreed that some such offer might well be made if the Panmunjom exercise doesn’t work or is bottlenecked.
The group then examined the following 11 possible courses of action./3/
/3/A brief analysis of each option prepared by the Korean Working Group is ibid., Files of Walt W. Rostow, Pueblo and Vietnam, January-February 1968. Katzenbach also provided the President with a copy of the papers. (Memorandum from Katzenbach to the President, January 29; ibid., Country File, Korea–Pueblo Incident, Vol. Ia, Part B [through January]) Intelligence assessments of potential North Korean responses to various U.S. actions were completed as well. (CIA/DIA/State memorandum, January 28; ibid., Vol. I, Part B [through January]; INR memorandum, undated; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, NK Seizure of USS Pueblo, INR/OD, January 1968)
1. Advising Soviets of actual or possible military moves. In the light of Tommy Thompson’s cable, it was agreed we should not proceed now with an informal contact, although we might consider in the future the use of the hot line with the proviso about the press, laid down by Thompson./4/ In general, it was judged, however, that communications with the USSR were in pretty good shape.
/4/Not further identified.
2. Conduct airborne reconnaissance. It was agreed that for the next several days no recce of North Korea should be conducted; if it were judged that recce was desirable at a later time, Black Shield, rather than Drone, photography was recommended.
3. Sail USS Banner into area where Pueblo was seized. For the time being it was felt unwise to put the Banner on station./5/ When the incident has been settled, it was agreed the U.S. would wish to assert its rights in international waters off Wonsan Bay. Depending on the situation at that time, we might wish to assert our rights in that area via an armed vessel–perhaps a destroyer–rather than via a communications monitoring ship like the USS Banner.
/5/A telegram from CINCPAC to the JCS, January 28, cautioned that the proposal to station the Banner off the North Korean coast “could be considered by North Korea as threatening in nature and at a minimum, provocative.” Accordingly, CINCPAC advised postponing the operation until military reinforcements ordered to South Korea and the Sea of Japan were in place, even though deploying the Banner would be delayed until or later than February 2. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea–Pueblo Incident, Vol. I, Part A [through January])
4. Action to recover crypto material jettisoned from the Pueblo. It was agreed that the recovery of the crypto material jettisoned from the Pueblo was an almost impossible task which would put no significant pressure on the North Koreans. Therefore, it should not be undertaken.
5. Mine Wonsan Harbor. The proposal presented involved 17 sorties dropping 83 mines. The operation would have to be repeated as necessary to insure full denial of harbor use. It was agreed that the impact of this operation on the North Korean economy and on North Korean military capabilities would be minor. The prospects of recovery of the Pueblo and the crew might be impeded. Air combat over the area would be likely; and the risk of escalation would increase if mining were maintained over a protracted period.
6. Seize North Korean vessels. Although our intelligence does not yet give us a firm basis for seizing North Korean vessels on the high seas, it was pointed out that should the men and the ship–or even the ship alone–not be returned, the seizure of North Korean vessels from the high seas was a punishment that fitted the crime; that is, the North Koreans had violated the rules governing behavior in international waters and could be legitimately denied access to international waters. It was agreed to explore this suggestion with further staff work directed to establish what North Korean vessels might be accessible to seizure on the high seas.
7. Selected air strikes on North Korea. It was agreed that such strikes would be an act of retaliation; large forces required for success might give the appearance of large-scale hostilities initiated by the U.S.; it would be unpopular internationally; and would diminish the prospects for early release of the Pueblo and its crew.
8. Raid across the DMZ. As with respect to 7, above, such punitive operations were judged to be risky, capable of leading to unsought sustained hostilities, and counter-productive with respect to the return of the Pueblo and its crew.
9. Naval blockade of Wonsan. The military and economic effects would be limited; the risks of escalation would be high; once undertaken, we would be committed for an indefinite period to inconclusive, politically awkward, and potentially escalatory operations.
10. Free World economic pressures on North Korea. The Free World’s trade with North Korea is limited. And the impact of increased controls of trade and shipping with the Free World would, therefore, be small. With respect to a total embargo on trade with North Korea, we would certainly meet important opposition from France, the United Kingdom, Japan, and West Germany. Taken together, the small scale of the inconvenience involved and the political and diplomatic difficulties within the Free World make this line of action unattractive, on present evidence.
11. U.S. bombing practice in South Korea. This suggestion, from a member of the group, was examined as an additional contribution to a sense of seriousness about the U.S. military build up in the area. Although it was thought that, in general, our present build up offered a satisfactory background for diplomacy, it was agreed that the technical possibility of this line of action should be staffed out and we would take a further look at it.
At lunch today (January 29, 1968) with the President, the group examined with the President certain lines of action that might be taken up with Congress at a future time. In particular:
–Provision to the President of the right to extend the period of enlistment;
–The maintenance in the area of forces sufficient to give the South Koreans a sense of security and provision of sufficient additional military aid so that they go forward with their plan to provide an extra division to the struggle in South Vietnam.
–It was the universal judgment of the group that we should keep our eye on the major objectives in this crisis:
–Get the men of the Pueblo and, if possible, the ship itself re- turned;
–Keep the confidence of the South Koreans and, especially, their willingness to provide an increment of force in South Vietnam;
–Avoid a second front in Asia.
W. W. Rostow/6/
/6/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
 
243. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, January 29, 1968, 1:04-1:40 p.m. (한국 30일 03:04)
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson’s Notes of Meetings, Pueblo, VIII. Top Secret. Drafted by Tom Johnson. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room.
SUBJECTNotes of the President’s Meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff
[Here follows brief discussion of the situation in Vietnam.]
합참의장과 대통령의 미팅에 대한 노트[여기서는 비엩남 상황에 토론보고가 뒤따랐다)

The President: What about the charge that we called up the reserve because of Vietnam and not Korea?
우리가 비엩남과 북측 때문에 우리가 예비군 소집하는 것에 대한 지시는 어떤가?

Secretary McNamara: That is not true. We do not need the reserves for Vietnam. In fact, I believe we will demobilize the reserves after Korea.
그것은 진실이 아니다. 우리는 비엩남을 위한 예비군은 필요하지 않다. 사실은 나는 코리아 이후 예비군을 해산시켜야 할 것으로 믿는다.

The President: I sure like the way in which you announced the movement of the aircraft. (The aircraft movement announcement was kept secret in terms of numbers and in terms of the units sent.)/2/
/2/On January 28 the Department of Defense issued a statement that the United States was "taking certain precautionary measures to strengthen our forces and to reinforce our tactical air capabilities," mentioning only that "certain units" had been "alerted for possible movement." The statement was reportedly intended as a reply to an article in The Las Vegas Review-Journal that identified specific units affected by the alert. (The New York Times, January 29, 1968)
나는 당신이 비행기의 이동은 언급한 방법이 정말 좋다.(비행기 이동발표에서 숫자에 관하여, 그리고 부대를 보내는 것에 관하여 비밀이 지켜졌다.
/2/1월28일 국방부 성명 발표, 1월29일 뉴욕타임즈 보도

General McConnell: 56 land-based aircraft have already arrived in South Korea. There are 68 planes on carriers. This is roughly 125 already available in South Korea. We will move in 30 more tonight. 29 more are in route.
The President: How many aircraft do we need in South Korea to handle the situation?
General McConnell: The North Koreans have 450 planes. We need at least an equivalent number in South Korea.
The President: Well, I want all of you to know that you have had complete freedom on this matter. But you have got to be ready. I think all of you should be prepared to explain why, if the ship captain needed planes and they were not there, why it was. They were not there because it was not prudent from a military standpoint for them to be there.
General Wheeler: That is correct, Mr. President. I have General Brown sorting out all the facts. There are several reasons why no planes were sent. This includes the location of the ship, the time of day, the inclement weather and the fact that there was superior enemy air power in the area.
General McConnell: We had only 24 fighters in Japan. There are 70 enemy fighters that were in the area around Wonsan.
The President: Well, say that. (When asked or when the question is raised about why no aircraft were sent to support the ship.)
The President: How many Navy ships do we have doing intelligence work like this?
Admiral Moorer: About 30./3/
/3/In January 1968 approximately seven U.S. Navy ships were engaged in intelligence-gathering operations; cf. McNamara's comment in reply to the President's inquiry, Document 244. (NSA, The Capture of the USS Pueblo and Its Effect on SIGINT Operations, United States Cryptologic History, Special Series, Crisis Collection, Vol. 7, 1992, pp. 9-13; NSA, Technical Research Ships, 1956-1969: An Historical Study, United States Cryptologic History, Special Series, No. 2, undated, passim)
1968년 1월 약 7대의 해군배가 정보수집작전에 개입하고 있었다.
The President: What about the question, Why didn't we escort this vessel?
Admiral Moorer: It would be a provocative act. We could not accomplish the mission. It would take all the entire Navy to escort them.
The President: I think you should set up an independent board to investigate this whole matter to head off any investigations by the Congress or other groups. Have you checked this Gulf of Tonkin incident theory?
Secretary McNamara: Yes, sir.
The President: I think you should take the orders, explain them, and justify them. I do not have a log of this incident yet which is satisfactory to me. Everybody is looking for a scapegoat, and you had better get the facts.
General McConnell: Commander Bucher did not know he was in serious trouble in time to do anything anyway.
The President: Well, say it.
General Wheeler: We would have been in a fine fix if we had sent planes up there. We probably would have been in a war.
The President: You should go up to Congress with all of your guns blazing. Give them the facts before they have time to question you on them. I thought Senator Stennis handled himself very well yesterday. Did anyone talk with him before he went on the air?
General Wheeler: General Brown talked with Senator Stennis./4/
/4/A memorandum of the discussion between Brown and Stennis on January 26 is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo, Vol. Ib, Part A (beginning February).
[Here follows discussion of the situation in Vietnam.]
The President: What can we do if diplomacy fails?
만약 외교가 실패하면 우리는 어떻게 할 것인가?

Secretary McNamara: We have ten items put together by State and Defense to suggest for consideration.
우리는 국무부와 국방부에서 심사숙고를 위해 함께 제안된 10개의 아이템을 가지고 있다.

The President: What is your guess on the possibilities of the North Koreans turning our men and the ship loose?
Secretary McNamara: The odds are more like 60-40 in favor of turning them loose.
The President: I think we should look at what we have learned from this. Let’s look at what our intelligence ships are doing and determine if that is what we want them to be doing.
 
244. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, January 29, 1968, 1:40-3:25 p.m. (한국 30일 03:40-05:25)
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson’s Notes of Meetings, Pueblo, IX. Top Secret. Drafted by Tom Johnson. The meeting took place in the family dining room at the White House.
SUBJECTNotes of the President’s Luncheon Meeting With Senior American Advisors
The President: How many intelligence ships do the Soviets have compared with the U.S.?
Secretary McNamara: It depends on how you count them. The Soviets have 15 to 20. We have five./2/
/2/See footnote 3, Document 243.
The President: There should be an independent investigation of this incident and all of the complexities involved by a good panel. I would suggest Admiral McDonald, George Ball, General Ridgeway, an Army General, and a good Naval Admiral./3/
/3/On February 3 Ball reported to the President that a committee composed of himself, General Clark, and General McDonald had begun work and asked about the President’s wishes for additional members. The President explained to Ball, “I just want you and an Army man–I want an independent State Department man, a diplomat, with some international background, United Nations background, and negotiations background, and I want an Army man that’s got some background with Korea, and I want a Navy man knows something about ships, and somebody that doesn’t report to me.” Ball suggested adding “a retired Air Force General who knows something about Korea” and informed the President that General Wyland had been recommended by Wheeler. The President agreed to the addition and told Ball he would check Wyland out and get back to him. The President also told Ball, “I sure do appreciate your doing this, George.” Ball responded, “I am very happy to, Mr. President.” (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Ball, February 3, 1968, 11:14 a.m., Tape F68.02, PNO 2)
General Wheeler: I would recommend a later commander in career than General Ridgeway. I would suggest General Taylor.
The President: Before I select a lawyer I always look at the jury. We should have a man who will appeal to the various elements that will be judging us.
The GI Bill of Rights is educating 400,000 and enabling 200,000 to buy houses. (The President was reading from a proposed message to the Congress on Veterans which will be sent up on Tuesday.)
Secretary McNamara: Time Magazine said the reservists who were called up had good morale. Newsweek said many of them were grumbling.
George Ball: I have seen a cynical assertion that the reserves were called under the pretext of Korea but for actual use in Vietnam.
Secretary McNamara: That is untrue. We have 361 planes going to South Korea without pulling any away from Vietnam or Southeast Asia or Western Europe.
If we get the Pueblo and its crew back, we will de-activate the reservists in all probability. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed with this in a meeting we have just completed.
The President: There is no need to call up the reserves for Vietnam. In fact, General Westmoreland would rather go without reserves in Vietnam. We called the reserves to substitute in this country for units which are being sent to South Korea. Of course we could call up reserves at anytime without Korea if we wanted.
Walt, would you review where we stand with my outside counselors who are here today?
Walt Rostow: We have discussed three principal issues. Then we went through the ten military alternatives and added at least one suggestion.
We reported to the group that we have put our position in writing to the North Koreans at Panmunjom.
We have discussed the Rusk letter to Gromyko. In [reply to] it, Gromyko said he knew for sure that we had entered Korean territorial waters because the ship’s captain had said he had entered territorial waters in his own handwriting./4/ We do not believe he did. But we cannot deny it because we do not have the captain’s log.
/4/See Document 240.
The President: On that point, are we reasonably sure that we are right? What are my odds?
Secretary McNamara: The odds are three to one that we are right. We do not believe the commander got into territorial waters. We know both from our own messages and from the messages of the North Koreans that he was seized outside territorial waters. The captain’s orders were clear. The conditions were precise. But as Nick Katzenbach has said, even if he did go into North Korean waters the action which the North Koreans took is not a very appropriate one.
Secretary Katzenbach: The evidence is quite good and quite strong that the detention was [not] made in territorial waters. We have a fix on the Pueblo at 8:30 when he was 25 miles out. He must have been outside of that area several hours before.
Secretary Rusk: The ship was on radio silence. We do not have the log. The captain broke radio silence the day before and broke it when accosted by the North Koreans.
Secretary Katzenbach: We still would not know for sure if the ship had gone into territorial waters. We do not believe that it did. It would not show on the ship’s log unless the captain had something special to report. Otherwise he would log items as he regularly does three times a day.
Walt Rostow: What Gromyko has said is that the North Koreans have it in the captain’s own handwriting that he did violate territorial waters.
The President: We do know at the times he gave fixes that he was not in territorial waters and could not have gotten there.
We should leave ourselves a loophole until we know precisely what happened. We do know what his orders were.
Clark Clifford: If we see something down the road which is attractive, we may want to leave ourselves a little room for a minor admission if that is what they want for return of the ship and the men.
Secretary Rusk: We gave him instructions not to go inside of the 13 mile limit. We must keep in mind there might have been a navigational error of one mile on our side and one mile on the North Korean side. If you assume for a moment that both made errors, that could place the ship 11 miles from shore. We still could not accept their claim of being only 7 miles away.
The President: All of you should get together and have your very best legal minds work out what we should say.
Secretary McNamara: I have five lawyers working on this now. We should have a defense briefing by tomorrow night.
The President: Let’s make our own study to review the facts, ask all the questions and then present this information to the committee./5/ We must make sure we don’t do more damage with our own speeches.
/5/Reference is probably to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to which a lengthy, substantive report was sent on March 20; see footnote 13, Document 228.
Secretary Rusk: A public announcement of our own investigation would throw doubt on our own position.
The President: What about a private investigation?
Secretary Rusk: That is fine.
Secretary Katzenbach: This would be a broad investigation, not just limited to the position of the ship.
The President: Yes, that is right. It would answer all the questions which are being raised. I suggest all of you get together and decide on an impartial board. I would put on it Admiral McDonald, George Ball and General Mark Clark.
Secretary Rusk: Mundt said you had no business having the ship there anyway.
Walt Rostow: What about the questions of putting the problem before the World Court. Each side could select an arbitrator and let the President of the World Court select a third name.
There are ten items for possible military action:
1. Airborne reconnaissance.
The group is against this. The photographic coverage has been excellent from the Oxcart and Black Shield missions.
For the moment we do not need it. The group is against the use of drones. To have one shot down would be very bad.
2. The build-up of aircraft in South Korea.
The group thinks this action is good and that we need it to back up our diplomatic efforts.
3. Replacing the Pueblo with the U.S.S. Banner.
The group feels we should not carry this out now. After the matter settles we may want to re-establish our position under international law and replace the Pueblo with an armed vessel.
4. Send divers to get the crypto gear.
The group felt this was a fruitless effort which would not pay off. To do this would require armed escorts and risk a possible confrontation.
5. Mining Wonsan Harbor.
This would require 17 sorties. It might lead to more trouble. It would not hurt them much.
Secretary Rusk interrupted to say that many of these alternatives had been deferred pending contacts with the North Koreans and contacts through the United Nations. The Secretary predicted there would be a meeting.
6. Seizure of North Korean vessels.
This action would be taken only if we were to determine that the men and the ships would not be returned promptly. This idea has certain appeal. McGeorge Bundy liked this as a sanction for them and to encourage them to let this ship and men go.
There is a difficulty on this, since it is unclear which ships to pick up and their value.
7. Selected air strikes over North Korea.
This was felt to be excessive. This would require a very substantial air engagement and would heighten the conflict.
8. Raids across the DMZ.
The group felt this to be too risky.
9. A naval blockade.
The group felt this to run a high risk of retaliatory action and we do not know when the blockade would end.
10. Application of free world economic pressure.
Korean trade is not great with the free world. We would have trouble getting many of the countries such as Japan aboard.
 ①소련에 실질적 또는 잠재적 군사조치 가능성 통보〓소련의 개입을 막기 위해 소련에 대북 군사력 증강조치를 통보한다. 군사행동을 취할 필요가 있을 경우 소련에 대한 통보는 비공식채널을 이용한다. 공식통보할 경우 소련의 국가적 위신이 걸려 있기 때문에 그들을 자극할 우려가 있다.
②공중 정찰 실시〓미군과 한국군이 군사행동을 준비하고 있다는 분위기를 조성한다.
비무장지대(DMZ) 이북과 (북) 내륙 80㎞ 지점까지 정찰을 실시한다. 북은 정찰기 격추를 시도할 것이나 사태가 악화될 가능성은 적다.
③정보수집함 배너호를 푸에블로호 납치해역에 투입〓배너호는 북 영해 12해리 밖에서 활동하되 구축함과 순양함 그리고 남측함정도 호위토록 한다. 전투기도 출격, 공중순찰을 실시한다. 위험성은 양측 공중전력의 충돌 가능성. 그 경우 국제적 비난을 받거나 송환협상에 지장을 줄 우려가 있다. 북이 배너호를 격침할 가능성도 있다.
④푸에블로호에서 버린 암호관련 장비 수거〓소해정과 소형 잠수함 등을 동원한다. 북의 공격가능성은 낮다. 장비를 수거할 경우 푸에블로호가 북 영해에 들어가지 않았다는 증거로 이용할 수 있다.
⑤원산항에 기뢰부설〓북에 어떤 도발도 묵과할 수 없다는 신호를 보내기 위한 조치. 항공모함 엔터프라이즈에서 발진하는 A6 항공기가 17번 비행해 83개의 기뢰를 투하하는 것만으로 충분하다. 아측 전력의 손실은 거의 없을 것이나 유엔에서 반대가 심할 것이다.
*기뢰전-항만봉쇄-상징조치일 뿐
⑥북한 함정 나포〓푸에블로호 승무원과 맞바꾸기 위해 북 선박을 나포한다. 북은 이를 거래수단으로 인정하지 않을 것이다. – *아미티지보고서와 비교
⑦제한적 대북 공습〓원산 공군기지와 문평리 해군기지를 대상으로 92 대의 전폭기를 동원한다(합참은 북의 모든 군사공항을 상대로 한 공습을 선호한다).-*제한적공습의 실패역사
소련과 중국의 군사개입 가능성은 약하다. 승무원 귀환가능성은 약해지고 북한의 보복가능성도 크다. 너무 위험한 방안이다.
⑧DMZ를 월경한 기습〓미군과 한국군을 동원, 예컨대 DMZ에서 10㎞ 이북에 있는 북 6사단의 지휘부를 점령해 파괴한다. 공격에서 철수까지 24시간 내에 끝내는 기습공격이다. 소련과 중국의 개입가능성은 적다. 아측 피해도 클 것이다. 확전 위험이 있다.-*특수전
⑨원산항 해상봉쇄〓미군과 한국군 함정과 항공기를 동원, 원산항 12해리 이내에서 해상봉쇄를 실시한다.
⑩북한 경제봉쇄〓자유진영의 대북 경제거래, 특히 곡물수출을 차단한다. 일본이 불참할 가능성이 크다. 공산권이 북한을 지원할 가능성도 있어 효과가 크지 않다.
Walt Rostow said consideration was being given to advising the Soviets of actual or possible retaliatory action. Ambassador Thompson recommended against this.
It was generally agreed that no further reference to any use or non-use of the hot line should be made by George Christian or any other briefing officers.
Walt Rostow said that Ambassador Lodge had raised the question of having bombing practice in South Korea using bombing ranges there.
Rostow said the build-up that we are undertaking there now is impressive both to North Koreans and to the other countries involved.
Cyrus Vance: I would recommend further reconnaissance flights, particularly more Oxcart missions over the DMZ to determine any possible build-up of North Korean forces.
Walt Rostow: The group also considered the type of statement the President might want to make. We will have a draft by the end of the day.
The President: I want to say as little as I can. That three-minute statement last week was re-assuring.
Goldberg thinks that the U.S. people and the world believe in a decision by a court.
After we run out all of our moves in the United Nations, we must consider if we are willing to go into an international world court. There, we could submit all of our evidence. They could submit theirs. Goldberg thinks we should [be] prepared to do that.
George Ball: There are problems with a world court. It recognizes North Korea as a state. But we should consider the use of an impartial tribunal.
The President: Shouldn’t we answer all these questions about our being spread too thin?
George Ball: I think Admiral McDonald can do this.
Cyrus Vance: You cannot submit this matter to a tribunal until you see what happens at the meeting in Panmunjom.
The President: I want you (Vance), and Mac Bundy to give me a statement to make in case there is one which should be made.
Secretary Rusk: This group is paralyzed because of the Panmonjom conference. They needed to know what will come out of that before they can make any kind of statement.
The President: I still want Bundy, George Ball and Cyrus Vance to get me a statement on what I might say, if anything.
McGeorge Bundy: You have a promising pair of contacts in the Soviets and in North Korea. I would say that my diplomats are at work and I am not going to say anything right now.
If you look at the courses available they are very unattractive. No one ever thought a small power such as North Korea would take offensive action against a major power in a situation such as this.
Any warfare will pin these boys in rather than get them out. We are too big a power to start a war over this. The punishment of picking up their ships fits the crime.
You do not know what happened precisely in the ten days the Pueblo was on station. As long as the commander is in hock you will not know. I would not be making any statements about the number of planes which we have moved to South Korea. Somebody will ask, O.K., what are you going to do now that you have them here?
Secretary Rusk: In terms of parallels the shooting down of the RB-47 in 1960 is the closest. It took seven months to get those two fliers back.
General Taylor: You never know exactly what the motives of the North Koreans are in this matter. If it was to embarrass us, they have done that. If it was to inflict a loss on our intelligence, they have done that.
They may be seeking to cause trouble with our allies. They may want to interrupt the flow of Korean aid to Vietnam.
We should make every effort to keep South Korean plans going as scheduled in sending supplies to Vietnam.
The President then read a memo from a distinguished American. (The President later identified this as General Eisenhower.) This memo outlined what courses this “distinguished American thought were offered to us.” (That memo is attached as appendix A.)/6/
/6/See Document 239.
Clark Clifford: Any way you look at it this incident is a loser. We cannot come out even. We must cut our losses. I doubt we will ever want to use any one of the ten military alternatives. Of course one can never know what the exact situation was unless we talk with the captain. We must make some kind of disposition of the matter.
I believe consideration should be given to the idea of going to the world court. There are nine members on it, and they have some members friendly to them. In conclusion we end up having taken some sort of a bump. The next time they try it, let’s be ready to give it back to them.
Secretary Rusk: Let’s look at how we formulate this court matter.
Secretary Katzenbach: I am inclined to think the President should have the Leadership in.
The President: I am having the Leadership in for breakfast tomorrow.
Secretary Katzenbach: I do not think we should ask Congress for anything before we get all the facts.
Secretary McNamara: Within the next 72 hours we will announce an increase in our military aid to South Korea. This will show the North Koreans the price they will pay for this incident is heavy.
The President: Walt, will you take the questions we are getting asked most often and have them answered for me? We will tell them that we are still exploring the diplomatic alternatives; we do not want to add to our problems. We will have General Wheeler explain the military pitch. Secretary Rusk will discuss the diplomatic moves.
Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge: This situation has a lot of qualities of a kidnapping case. If you use force you kill the victim. We do not want to kill the boys or open up a second front. The reason I talked about bombing maneuvers in South Korea was to raise the feeling of awe.
 
245. Editorial Note
On January 29, 1968, Director of Intelligence and Research Thomas L. Hughes sent to Secretary Rusk intelligence reports analyzing the Soviet, Communist Chinese, and world reaction to the seizure of the Pueblo. “The Emerging Soviet Line on the Pueblo Incident,” Intelligence Note No. 75, concluded that Moscow adopted a public posture of noninvolvement, but also sought to diffuse the issue and prevent tensions from escalating. (Attached to a memorandum from Rostow to the President, January 30; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea–Pueblo Incident, Vol. I, Part B [through January]) The analysis of Communist China’s response, “Peking on Pueblo: Relatively Cool,” concluded that, since relations between China and North Korea were strained, the Chinese had remained detached from and had adopted a low profile toward the crisis. “Initial World Reaction to the Pueblo Incident,” presented the Communist and non-Communist reactions and briefly summarized the country-by-country response of the nations within each ideological orbit. (Intelligence Notes No. 78 and No. 76 respectively, both January 29; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US)

183. Telegram From the Commander of United States Forces, Korea (Bonesteel) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp)/1/
Seoul, February 29, 1968, 1028Z. (한국 30일 00:28)
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Cables, Vol. V. Confidential; Eyes Only. Repeated to Wheeler and to CINCUSARPAC, Hawaii. Passed by Wheeler to Rostow, Clifford, Rusk, and to each of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
KRA 745. Subject: ROK Concepts for Home Defense Militia.
1. The rapid development over the past week or ten days of the emphasis being placed on the homeland reserve by President Park is both interesting and significant./2/
/2/On February 20 the Korean Cabinet passed a decree implementing a 1961 law permitting establishment of a local reserve corps. The homeland reserve force was to be supervised by the Minister of National Defense, who could delegate authority to local police officials for use against armed infiltrators at the local level. (Airgram A-406 from Seoul, February 26; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-3 KOR S)
2. Beginnings of this emphasis appear to stem from events and discussions during Vance visit. Park’s and ROKG total emphasis then was on retaliation and on need for vastly increased MAP, costing over a billion dollars. At that time we repeatedly pointed out there was a third area which needed attention and this was ROK self-help and immediate improvement, using what they had now, of counter-infiltration resources (military and police) and internal security organization, augmented as feasible by incoming CIGCOREP and USOM aid. I pounded this theme also with ROK JCS, MND and PM. We pointed out that ROK with population of 30 million, very large armed forces and rapidly expanding national police was not exactly helpless in face of NK subversive threat. At same time ROKs got some clear warnings that US was not going to be dragged into war precipitated by unilateral ROK “retaliation.”
3. For a long time ROKs have been greatly interested in Israel’s defense organization, reserve forces, kibbutz, etc./3/ In last several weeks Israeli MA and several other Israelis have been seeing a lot of senior ROKs.
/3/Pak’s first public statements addressing these themes came on February 7, when he announced plans to arm the nation’s veterans and older reservists to always carry a rifle. The Embassy viewed Pak’s comments skeptically, given the government’s weapons-control policy and fear of assassination. (Telegram 4085 from Seoul, February 8; ibid., POL 23-7 KOR S) A few days later the Defense Ministry announced an extension of the length of active service from 30 to 36 months in the army and marines and from 36 to 42 months for the Navy and Air Force to meet internal security needs. (Telegram 4227 from Seoul, February 14; ibid.)
4. Whatever is genesis of emphasis on using reserves or militia for internal security, President Park began to use the theme in speeches and press pronouncements beginning about ten days ago./4/ Precise theme has varied in details but generally stresses need for ROKs to build more self-reliant defenses, need for moral or “spiritual” reorientation of all citizens to realize defense of ROK, particularly against subversive and terrorist operations, is responsibility of all citizens and that they cannot ask allies to take care for them of this most elemental aspect of national existence. He has used “need for a more independent national defense” in some speeches, but at least for now, we do not interpret this to mean disengagement from UNC OPCON or any less dependence on US for help in defense of Korea against overt, large scale Communist aggression. (*역자주 OPCON:작전통제권)
/4/In a February 16 meeting between U.S. and Korean military authorities the Minister of National Defense expressed a similar interest in the Israeli approach of training and equipping its population to supplement regular armed forces and enhance its defenses. (Telegram 4311 from Seoul, February 17; ibid., POL 7 US/VANCE)
2월16일의 미국과 한국 군책임자 만남에서 국방장관은 정규군을보충하고 방위력을 강화하기 위한 인구를 장비하고 훈련하는데 대해 이스라엘식 접근에 관심을 보이는 것처럼 표현했다.
5. In terms of potential NK threats against ROK both from overt and from unconventional forces, I believe Park’s approach makes sense. He is not, we think, derogating from US/ROK alliance and clearly hopes for continued MAP support for modernization at about current levels to face overt threat, which he does not believe to be so imminent as subversive threat. At same time, however, he is now plugging to fight the subversive threat on maximum ROK self-help. He seems to be trying to tighten the internal defenses and give them a greater and more cohesive capability to handle the many thousands of trained raiders and guerrilla teams which NK has built up. He obviously does not want to risk NK possible effort to harass interior of ROK along lines North Vietnamese are trying in Vietnam.
6. In view of magnitude of dual threat–overt and covert–being built up by North Koreans and in light of great economic progress in ROK, not to mention huge investments of US in ROK in war and peace, I think President Park’s new approach makes sense and is in US national interest as well as ROKs./5/
/5/The Embassy also urged policymakers in Washington to fund the program. Porter argued that Pak’s commitment to the homeland reserve force represented a significant shift in his approach to the North Korean threat from retaliation to self-defense. (Telegram 4634 from Seoul, March 3; ibid., DEF 19-8 US-KOR S)
 

246. Information Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, January 29, 1968, 6:30 p.m. (한국 30일 08:30)
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea–Pueblo Incident, Vol. I, Part B (through January). Confidential.
Mr. President:
Secretary Rusk asked Joe Sisco to come and talk to me about the following:
1. The Secretary General, through Ralph Bunche, has suggested that the Security Council, by means of SC “consensus,” call on Thant to provide good offices. This same proposal has been transmitted by the Secretary General to the USSR simultaneously through Nesterenko. Goldberg is unaware how much prior discussion, if any, the Secretary General has had with the Soviets.
2. Thant proposes that the attached “consensus”/2/ be adopted by the Security Council. As you note, the Secretary General would “be invited to take the initiative and offer his good offices in whatever manner he may consider appropriate and helpful.” This would be said in the context of reducing the prevailing tension and finding an acceptable solution. If the consensus is adopted, the Secretary General would send Deputy Foreign Minister of Rumania, Mircea Malitza, to Pyongyang. Thant has already discussed this proposal with the Rumanians who are agreeable to sending Malitza on this mission.
/2/Not printed.
3. Secretary Rusk has already told Arthur Goldberg that:
–he agrees that we could not oppose this kind of a proposal if it develops in the context of the Security Council discussions;
–however, we need time to see how the direct contacts at Panmunjom go to assure that such an initiative at the UN not cross with our efforts at Panmunjom;
–he react positively to the Secretary General, but tell him candidly that we do need time and that we do want to see how the bilateral contact progresses before making any final determination on the desirability of a UN intermediary going forward;
–if the UN intermediary is sent to Pyongyang, he should discuss with the Secretary General the possibility of sending someone else to the Republic of Korea and to the United States to also discuss this matter.
You may wish to discuss this matter with Secretary Rusk on the telephone and consider it further at tomorrow’s lunch.
 
247. Editorial Note
Between January 29 and January 31, 1968, the United States and North Korea established the foundation for face-to-face discussions on the fate of the U.S.S. Pueblo and its crew, after the UN Senior Member of the Military Armistice Commission submitted two messages from the U.S. Government to the North Korean Senior Member. The first message responded to information received from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and the second requested an immediate private meeting between the Senior Members of each side. (Telegram 3755 from Seoul, January 30; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US)
1월29일과 31일 사이 군정위 유엔수석대표가 미국정부로부터 북측군정위 수석대표에게 두개의 메시지를 제출한 후 미국과 북측사이에 푸에블로호와 선원의 운명에 대한 정면토론을 위한 기초가 마련되었다. 첫 번째 메시지는 중립국감독위원회로부터 받은 정보에 대해 응답한 것이었고, 두 번째 메시지는 각측수석대표사이의 즉각적인 사적 만남을 요청한 것이었다.

In response the North Koreans agreed to private meetings between the two principals and proposed that each side be assisted by an official translator and a liaison officer. By mutual agreement the meetings were held in the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in the Joint Security Area at Panmunjom. (Telegrams 3744 from Seoul, January 29, and 3794 from Seoul, January 31; both ibid.)
북은 이에 응하여 둘사이의 만남에 원칙적으로 동의했고 각측에서 공식통역과 연락장교의 출석을 제안했다. 만남에 대한 상호합의에 의하여 판문점내 공동경비구역의 중립국감독위원회 회의실에서 열렸다.

After receiving a message from Rear Admiral Smith suggesting a meeting of the two Senior Members on February 1, the North Koreans countered with a proposal offering to meet on February 2 at 11 a.m. local time. Since a “delay of at least one day is customary communist tactic,” Rear Admiral Smith accepted the alternate date. (Telegram 3826 from Seoul, February 1; ibid.) The closed meeting convened in the Neutral Nations conference room and was limited to four persons on each side: the senior member, an interpreter, an assistant, and a junior liaison officer. (Telegram 3856 from Seoul, February 1; ibid.) The Department of State notified Ambassador Thompson in Moscow and Ambassador Johnson in Tokyo of the details of the meeting and transmitted the text of a statement indicating that, since North Korea had rejected working through the United Nations to resolve the Pueblo crisis, the United States was prepared to handle the issue through the Military Armistice Commission at Panmunjom. (Telegram 108288 to Moscow and Tokyo, February 1; ibid.) Ambassador Porter notified the Department of State of his intention to inform President Pak of the upcoming meeting. (Telegram 3832 from Seoul, February 1; ibid.)

 160. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, United States Forces, Korea (Bonesteel) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp)/1/
Seoul, February 7, 1968, 0945Z. (한국 2월7일 23:45)
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea–Pueblo Incident, Military Cables, Vol. II, February 1968 to March 1968. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Repeated to Wheeler who forwarded it to Rostow, Rusk, and to each of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
KRA 474. Further to my report on ROK attitudes태도 by KRA 0452,/2/ following is gist요점 of private meeting requested by Gen Chang, CS, ROK- AF with Gen Friedman. As expressed by Gen Chang he fears that speculation숙고 in press leading ROK people to demand punitive action against NK for recent transgressions.
KRA0452에 한국의 태도에 대한 나의 보고서에 덧붙여 말하자면 다음은 장지량 한국공군참모총장과 프리드만장군에 의해 요청된 사적 모임의 요점이다. 장총장에 의해 표현된 바에 의하면 그는 최근 위법을 저지른 북에 대항하여 징벌조치를 요구하는 지도적인 한국인들의 신문에서의 공론이 두렵다는 것이다.
USG silence on actions and intentions causing unrest and loss of confidence on part of Korean people. ROK people harbor no anti-American sentiment; however, Chang fears that public pressures may cause “certain persons in high positions” to accede to popular demand.
미국정부의 침묵으로 일관하는 행동과 의지에 일부 한국인들의 신뢰의 상실과 불안의 근거가 되고 있다. 한국국민들은 반미감정이 없음을 숨기고 있다. 그러나 장총장은 대중적인 압력 민중의 요구에 동의하는 ‘어떤 고위층 사람들’이 원인이 된 대중적인 압력을 두려워 한다.
Chang concedes that punitive action taken unilaterally could spell military disaster for ROK.
장은 일방적인 응징조치가 한국에 군사적 재앙을 초래할 것이라는 점을 인정한다.
He told Friedman he has made this point with higher authorities on many occasions but was not sure that he could continue to hold the line too much longer. He fears he may be directed to direct airstrikes against NK unilaterally. He urgently requested Friedman make known his concern with view to urging USG to clearly establish its position versus further NK Armistice violations and thereby relieve unrest. Friedman commended Chang on position taken and assured his concern would be voiced through proper channels.
/2/In telegram KRA 0452, February 6, Bonesteel warned against keeping Korean officials, other than Pak, unaware of U.S. intentions toward the crises in Korea. He also reported having obliquely reminded the South Koreans that the U.S. was not obligated to defend the ROK, should the latter deliberately provoke war. Bonesteel described the atmosphere in South Korea as an “orgy of emotionalism,” in part deliberately incited by the government. He noted that a situation was rapidly developing “which NK commies could exploit with explosive results. If they should make one or two big raids with some success, it is highly probable ROKs would retaliate instantly and that would really put the fat in the fire.” (Ibid.)
Comment: Above appears to be sincere expression Gen Chang’s views but should be read in overall context of some ROKG stage-managing of incitement of ROK “public opinion.” However there is some danger that original impetus from ROKG will to a degree get out of hand just as did the election-rigging before National Assembly elections last year.
 
165. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)/1/
Honolulu, February 9, 1968, 0405Z. (한국 2월 9일 18:05)
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea–Pueblo Incident, Vance Mission to Korea (B), February 9 to 15, 1968. Top Secret; Priority; Noforn; Specat Exclusive. Repeated to COMUSKOREA, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, and CINCPACAF.
090405Z/RUHKA 1165. Joint ROK-US UW Group.
A. COMUSKOREA 010655Z Feb 68 (PASEP)./2/
/2/Not found.
1. With regard to the development of a joint ROK-US UW Group, as recommended in ref A, I asked Gen Beach for his comments. He has submitted the following analysis in which I concur.
2. The growing impatience of the South Koreans with lack of US direct action and our declining prestige as a result thereof are recognized. The question to be addressed is whether a combined ROK-US unconventional warfare (UW) planning staff and the conduct of black operations will effectively stem this criticism without engendering more serious problems for the United States. This question must be reviewed in light of other significant measures being undertaken, including the major increase in MAP, the air movement of CIGCOREP equipment, and the permanent stationing of additional US forces in the ROK.
말을 걸기위한 질문은 연합한미비정규전계획참모와 검은작전의 생산 미국에 더 심각한 문제를 발생시키지 않고 이같은 비판의 줄기를 효과적으로 떼어낼 수 있을 것 인지이다. 이 질문은 군사지원프로그램의 주요한 증가와 게릴라개념과요구에 의한 대침투작전 장비의 항공이동, 주한미군의 영구적인 추가주둔을 포함하여 현재 진행되고 있는 다른 특별한 척도에 비추어서 검토되어야만 한다.
3. Is the US willing to collaborate in deliberate violations of the Armistice Agreement of 1953, and if so, will UW operations against North Korea (NK) have any reasonable prospects for success?
1953년 정전협정의 신중한 위반에 미국이 기꺼이 협력해야 하는가와 만약 그래야 한다면 북에 대한 비정규전작전 성공하기 위해 어떤 근거있는 전망을 가질 수 있는가?
The advantages-disadvantages of the establishment of a ROK-US UW planning group are as follows:한미비정규전계획그룹 설립의 유,불리는 다음과 같다.
Advantages:
A. The ROKs have a capability in UW already developed and may employ it unilaterally. A combined UW planning staff may bring operations more under US control.
B. UW operations are less expensive in personnel, equipment, and funds (gold flow) than purely defensive measures. They are, however, no substitute for such defensive measures.
C. North Koreans understand retaliation and may slow down their incursions if successful UW operations can be conducted.
D. The establishment of a combined planning group may help convince the ROK top level that the US will not tolerate NK provocations and it may raise US prestige with ROK leaders. It may temporarily pacify them.
E. If the ROK leaders are convinced, some controlled and favorable public reaction in the ROK is possible.
F. Controlled black raids are not likely to provoke initiation of hostilities and they might forestall ill-conceived ROK retaliation efforts.
G. Possible training advantages could accrue for US UW personnel.
H. If successful, UW operations may increase our intelligence holdings on NK.
I. The probability of success, although low, would be improved with US participation in planning.
Disadvantages:
A. Establishment of a combined UW planning group effectively commits the US to eventual conduct of UW operations. To plan but never implement such operations would further lower ROK leaders’ opinion of US resolve. It would convince the ROKs that unilateral action is the only answer.
B. Conduct of black operations would violate the Armistice and, if exposed, would subject the US and ROKs to violent NK propaganda attacks in international media and forums.
C. Types of UW operations of most impact would require deep penetrations. The NK security environment, unlike that in the ROK, makes prospects for success very remote.
(1) Experience with pure intelligence operations, which run less risk of exposure than UW, has demonstrated the difficulty of penetration and travel in NK. In 1963 all US intelligence penetration operations and support to ROK operations were cancelled because agent loss rates exceeded 50 pct. Resumption of combined-intelligence operations in late 1964 reduced the loss rate but only one successful deep penetration has been conducted in past three years.
(2) Results of six known retaliatory piston-type operations conducted unilaterally by ROK agencies since October 1966 are not known but they have failed to dissuade NK from its aggressive infiltration program. D. Because of necessary close hold on UW planning and operations, the ROK public would not be influenced favorably toward the US. Unsuccessful operations would be exposed publicly by NK and ROK public opinion would be adversely affected. Overt strengthening of US-ROK defense forces would better serve to influence ROK public opinion.
E. US operations are unlikely to dissuade NK from its program of aggressive infiltration. Agents have been trained, plans and reconnaissance have been made and the NK leadership is callous toward its losses and lack of success in 1967-68. NK will continue and possibly step up its activities. ROK-US UW operations essentially would become revenge motivated.
F. UW forays across the DMZ would cause a tightening of NK security efforts to the detriment of 손상시켜US-ROK intelligence operations.
G. UW operations are counter to US policy and to the current JCS and CINCPAC policy of the “iron hand in the velvet glove.”
H. ROK-US UW operations that are compromised and exposed would have very adverse political repercussions in the United States and the free world.
I. Guerrilla, subversive and their counter-type training have been in progress in Communist countries for more than a decade. Under the current situation in NK, it is unlikely that ROK-US efforts in this field could achieve any measurable success.
J. US collaboration in planning joint UW operations but without implementation would strengthen the ROKs present conviction that their dissatisfaction with the US is justified.
K. Exposure of UW operations will further adversely affect relations with the USSR and will prejudice relations with our allies and neutral nations.
L. UW operations will divert ROK-US efforts to an area which even if successful has very little prospects of calming situation. In fact, such operations may well aggravate the tension which now exists.
4. Conclusions: A. The benefits to be derived from US participation in a combined ROK-US UW planning group are likely to be of limited value in satisfying ROK leadership and public of [1 or more lines of text missing on the source text].
[B.] tion of other overt measures being taken to enhance the ROK- US defense posture will be more effective in restoring confidence in US determination.
C. There is very little prospect that meaningful UW operations can be successfully conducted in the tight security environment of North Korea.
D. Participation by US in the planning and conduct of UW operations against NK entails a major reversal of US policy without the promise of commensurate returns.
E. Our US-ROK policy, patience and steadfast determination over the past 15 years have been instrumental in preventing the reopening of hostilities in Korea and reducing the possibility of WW III. Emotional retaliatory actions will risk deterioration of present US discussions and may negate the gains achieved in the ROK over this long period.
5. Continued emphasis should be placed on keeping key military leaders advised of measures that the US is taking to strengthen the US-ROK defense posture.
6. Concurrently, ROK leaders should be warned of where the ROK stands without US backing. It should be made clear that the US will not start WW III on the basis of NK provocations of the present scale. They should be reminded that the ROK itself has much to suffer if hostilities are renewed.
7. Efforts must be continued to convince the ROKs of the benefits of enlisting world opinion against the illegal aggressive actions of the Kim Il Sung regime. ROK-US launched UW operations would risk forfeiture of the advantageous reputation that the ROK now enjoys.
8. CINCPAC recommends that development of a joint US-ROK unconventional warfare group to conduct operations in and against North Korea be held in abeyance and not approved at this time.
 

2.Pueblo Crisis 외교문서(68.1.23~2.29)
 
144. Editorial Note
In the late evening hours of January 21, 1968, approximately 30 well-trained and well-armed North Korean infiltrators perpetrated an attack on the Blue House, killing several South Koreans civilians and members of the Korean National Police. At least five North Koreans were killed by defensive gunfire, and at least two were captured and taken into custody. (Telegram 3532 from Seoul, January 22; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-7 KOR S) According to an excerpt of the interrogation of one of the infiltrators, the mission was to enter the Blue House, to kill the security forces encountered, “to chop off President Pak Chung Hee’s head and to shoot to death his key subordinates in that building.” (Telegram 3649 from Seoul, January 26; ibid.) The United Nations Command responded by immediately calling for a meeting of the Military Armistice Commission to protest the action. That meeting was scheduled for January 23. (Telegram 3532 from Seoul, January 22; ibid.) Hostile encounters between North Koreans and combined United Nations and Republic of Korea forces continued for several days after the incident at points along the Demilitarized Zone. Documentation concerning those encounters is ibid.
Less than 48 hours after the raid on the Blue House, North Korean forces seized the U.S. intelligence-gathering vessel USS Pueblo on January 23 and arrested its crew. The United States protested the incidents at the UN Security Council and met with North Korean representatives대리인 at the Military Armistice Commission in Panmunjom in an attempt to gain얻다 release석방 of the ship and crew. Documentation focusing on the interaction between the United States and the Republic of Korea concerning involvement연루 of the Security Council and the United Nations in the Korean situation and the role역할 of North Korea in that forum is ibid., POL 27-14 KOR/UN; POL 23-7 KOR S/UN; and POL 33-6 KOR N-US. For documentation pertaining to the seizure of the Pueblo and the detainment of its crew, see Documents 212 ff.
In addition to bringing both incidents before the UN Security Council, the South Koreans requested that the United States and the 15 other military participants in the Korean War reaffirm재확인 their commitment to the defense of the Republic of Korea as set forth in the 1953 Armistice Declaration. Although the United States willingly declared its commitment to the Republic of Korea, it opposed pressing the other nations to do so. The United States believed, since the international situation had changed during the intervening years, that a unanimous declaration of support reaffirming the Declaration was unlikely, undesirable, and could only demonstrate to the North Koreans and other Communist countries a deficiency in international support for positions advanced by the United States and Republic of Korea within the United Nations. (Telegram 113543 to Seoul, February 10; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 KOR/UN) Subsequent discussions between the United States and the 15 countries demonstrated the general reluctance꺼림 of those nations to reaffirm the Declaration. (Telegram 120026 to Seoul, February 23; ibid.) Although apprised통지 of that situation, South Korean representatives continued to discuss their request with the countries in question. Although many were sympathetic동정 to Korea’s plight,곤경 few were prepared to satisfy South Korea’s wish. Documentation detailing Korean efforts and U.S. responses to that request are ibid., POL 33-6 KOR N-US; POL 27-14 KOR/UN; POL 17 KOR S-US; and POL 27-3 KOR S.

149. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis (Enthoven) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
Washington, January 31, 1968.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/OASD/ISA Files: FRC 73 A 1250, Korea 370. Secret.
SUBJECTService Proposals to Increase U.S. Army Strength in Korea (U)
There are three Service requests now pending which deal with increasing U.S. Army strength in Korea:
1. General Bonesteel has asked CINCUSARPAC for an increase of 5161 in the U.S. Army Korea ceiling. His message of January 21/2/ cites two reasons:
/2/Not further identified but summarized below.
a. “To improve our capability to cope with the expected increase this spring in enemy infiltration and sabotage tactics”;
b. “To improve and maintain a credible deterrent posture to cope with the enemy’s increasing improvement in conventional war capability.”
2. On January 25 the JCS/3/ recommended that you increase Army strength in Korea by 8,500 to raise operating strength from 79 percent to 90 percent of TO/TD. (The 11,000 KATUSA are not counted.)
/3/Reference is to JCSM-53-68 to McNamara. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/OASD/ISA Files: FRC 73 A 1250, Korea 370)
Note: Their calculations are wrong, as will be made clear below.
3. On January 29 the Secretary of the Army/4/ presented four alternatives to you for increasing strength in Korea, ranging from 5,200 to 18,500. The first coincides with General Bonesteel’s request. The others are based on the JCS “manning level increase” concept. The Secretary of the Army recommended that any increase approved for Korea be matched by an increase in Army end-strength.
/4/Not further identified.
Comments
1. “Manning Level” Increases. (Please see the attached chart.)/5/ Keying a Korean augmentation to an increase in manning level of the aggregated TO/TD structure spaces is not sound. Last year we thought we had about 65,000 TO/TD in Korea. As the result of the Army’s efforts to account for all of its TO/TD structure, about 6,000 more TO/TD structure spaces have been found in Korea. (This did not result in an increase in the total structure for which we are buying equipment. Compensating reductions were made elsewhere to assure consistency with our division force planning factor and the DPM control figures.) The Army commander in Korea is probably not even aware of the total TO/TD strength which he has. He simply uses the people he has and makes adjustments in his force structure to maintain his principal combat units at a reasonable manning level. Some low priority structure is undoubtedly “deactivated” or kept at very low manning, perhaps even cadre status.
/5/None of the attachments is printed.
The sensible questions to ask here are: (1) What are the jobs that the Army in Korea must do that it’s not doing now? and (2) How many more people (if any) does it take to do them? To answer these questions requires a careful audit of the status of each unit and a description of its job. Manning level increases might be justified on an individual unit basis, but certainly not across the board.
2. Army End-Strength Increases. There are several points to be noted.
a. We don’t know how much the transient population can be reduced from current Army projections through control of leave taken during PCS moves. There are different levels possible, depending on the degree of national emergency and the inconvenience to which we are willing to subject personnel.
b. We believe that the training establishment is larger than necessary, but we don’t know how much.
c. An increase in end strength would not help to provide an immediate augmentation in Korea, owing to the lead time in generating trained strength. However, steps that could be taken are: (1) an arbitrary contraction of the transient population; (2) extension of tours in Korea (4,000 men leave there each month); and (3) diversion of planned SEA deployments temporarily to Korea.
3. Whether to Increase Korea. General Bonesteel says that the enemy is getting stronger and is planning to step-up infiltration and sabotage. He says nothing about how much the ROK Army has improved. It seems inconceivable that the ROKs can’t take care of themselves, at least against the North Koreans. It also seems inconceivable that 52,000 U.S. troops can’t protect themselves and their equipment.
Recommendations
There are two courses of action: (1) deny the JCS request on the assumption that the U.S. and ROK forces now in Korea should be able to handle the situation; (2) defer the JCS request pending their analysis of the force structure and presentation of a unit-by-unit justification of increases./6/ Enclosed are alternative memoranda for you to send to the JCS and the Army.
/6/McNamara supported the second option and notified the appropriate military officials of his decision in a February 1 memorandum. The JCS submitted their analysis of the requested increases to McNamara on February 21. The request was repeated in November, but on November 30 Nitze informed the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the decision would be deferred because of on-going studies of the issue. (All in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSA/OASD/ISA Files: FRC 73 A 1250, Korea 370)
You asked about the possibility of earmarking a specific group of forces in CONUS for quick deployment to Korea, but holding them here until the need was clear to send them. I believe this solution would not meet General Bonesteel’s request head on. He characterizes his need (or at least the part that deals with sabotage and infiltration) as a gradually increasing one, rather than one which would develop suddenly. Nevertheless, such a force certainly could be organized and quick-deployment plans developed.
Alain Enthoven
 
150. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/
Seoul, February 3, 1968, 0245Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cactus.
3901. Ref: State 106085./2/
/2/Document 237.
1. Principal item discussed by President Park during my call on him (at his request) yesterday evening was along lines previously conveyed to you, i.e. their pessimistic view of likelihood that they, and perhaps U.S. as well, will get no satisfaction from North Koreans. This time, however, something new was added: He said that if ROKG does not get guarantee that NKs will desist from their aggressive activities, and there is another incident, ROKG will take retaliatory measures.
2. Park said he knew that the Communist side is hoping to bring about a split between US-ROKG cooperation, and that uncoordinated measures would make American Congress and people unhappy, but basic fact of matter is that unless and until North Koreans are hit sharply they will continue to create disturbed conditions and kill his people.
3. I said he knows my government is taking many steps to strengthen the position here. Whatever circumstances may prevail, and regardless of very real provocation to which ROKG has been and may yet be subjected, we are counting on full and complete consultation with him and his government prior to any action they might be considering. This was what we had been careful to do with them in the present crisis and we expect no less from them. The seriousness of uncoordinated action lay in fact that it would undermine mutual confidence and its bad effects could outlast that of any particular incident. (President Johnson’s statement on Park to press yesterday just received. It is most useful at this point and is being taken to Park immediately.)/3/
/3/These comments were made during a news conference on February 2. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book I, pp. 155-163.)
4. Park said he did not mean to impart doubt of his closest ally in any way, but he does have worries as to the position ROKG will be in, particularly if Pueblo and crew returned and North Koreans continue their raids on the South. I reminded him of statement I had made to him (which was based on para six of reftel), NKs will clearly understand that Pueblo and crew are not end of problem and that we will remain equally concerned about gravity of armistice violations. I said I hoped his army had been instructed to avoid incidents along DMZ. He said that army has strict instructions in that sense and that we have his assurance that there will be no ROK unilateral action in present circumstances. The remarks he had just made apply to the future position, I said I had made our position as clear as I possibly could.
5. Comment: This exchange was very firm, but without heat. He was telling me and I was telling him. His remarks reflect hard line of many of his ministers, party elements and the generals. We are the counterweight to the type of pressure they are exerting. I expect our views will continue to prevail unless there is another severe raid though there is always danger that ROK unit will make unauthorized thrust across DMZ. There may be a certain amount of bad humor and discontent here later, but that should pass as we implement MAP and other programs already under way.
Porter
 
151. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea/1/
Washington, February 4, 1968, 0006Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Park Correspondence, Vol. I. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by the Korean Task Force, cleared by Read and Rostow, and approved by Rusk.
109821. Please deliver following message dated February 3, 1968, from President Johnson to President Park:
Begin text:
Dear Mr. President: The attempt to assassinate you and your family and our Ambassador is the latest and most shocking act against your country by the North Korean communists. I thank God that this unspeakable attempt has failed.
That the leaders in Pyongyang would order such a desperate measure shows their awareness of what your courageous leadership has meant to your country. I doubt that their failure will bring any respite in their efforts to introduce armed agents into your Republic, and to cause as much trouble as possible.
These attacks on your country have greatly increased during the past year, and you and I have done a lot to improve your ability to deal with them. I know you have given much thought to new ways in which this infiltration can best be met, and I, too, have been thinking of more ways to help you. Several of my top advisors have been working on this matter with even greater urgency than before, and I hope to be able to share our specific ideas with you at an early date.
I want you to know that we are urgently considering how to strengthen the equipment of your forces to meet this increased campaign from the North. I am giving this my personal attention and expect to be in touch with you soon about this matter.
You have been kept fully informed of the details of the recent seizure by the North Koreans of our naval ship, the Pueblo, and its crew. I know you share our concern. We shall continue to press hard for the earliest possible release of these men and their vessel. If progress toward this end is not soon forthcoming, we shall have to consider what additional measures will be necessary and appropriate.
I have no doubt that the increased incidents along the Demilitarized Zone, the seizure of our ship and the recent effort to attack you, are part of North Korea’s program to create maximum tension in the area. They may hope, thereby, to help their friends in Hanoi. They may think that by raising tension in Korea they can force us to divert our attention from the campaign of aggression against South Viet-Nam. They will not succeed in that effort. The movements of planes and ships to the Republic of Korea in these last days have been from our active forces in the United States and in the Pacific. None has been taken from Viet-Nam.
The events of this past week in Viet-Nam have demonstrated anew how important it is for us all to remain strong there and to stand fast. I have no doubt we shall continue to do so. And we shall continue to stand strong and together in your country against any efforts, however desperate, by the regime in the North.
Our mutual objectives of peace, security and progress in Asia require us to make it entirely clear to the men in Pyongyang and in Hanoi that terror and lawlessness will not succeed and that their diversionary tactics will have no effect.
I am particularly grateful that we have been able to keep in such close contact through Ambassador Porter, who has been able to keep me current with your views. In these difficult days for both our countries, it is good to be able to share one’s thoughts with a trusted friend and ally. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson
End text.
Rusk
 
152. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/
Seoul, February 4, 1968, 1344Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea–Pueblo Incident–Cactus II, Cactus Seoul Cables, January 29 to February 9, 1968. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cactus. Attached to a February 4 memorandum from Rostow to President Johnson, that indicates the President saw it.
3935. Ref: State 109821./2/
/2/Document 151.
1. President Park was clearly moved by message contained reftel. I have not seen him affected in this way before now and he made no effort to hide his feelings as he heard President Johnson’s solicitude for him and his family, lengthy discussion of mutual problems and finally the warm reference to him as trusted friend and ally. One may occasionally make him smile and even laugh, but it is a very rare thing to see his emotions stirred as they were by the President’s message.
2. He kept me for almost two hours, during which I took occasion to brief him on the US/NK meeting this morning./3/ He was greatly interested in fact that NK rep put questions to US concerning augmentation of our air and naval forces, and troop alert. He said this another indication of their preoccupation with strength and their need to ascertain whether it might be used against them. He feels they will probe to determine our intentions and if and when they believe we have additional measures in mind, they will meet our demands for return of Pueblo and crew. They will not alter their policy of deliberate humiliation of US, he said, if they do not sense determination on our side.
/3/Admiral Smith, representing the UN Command, and General Pak, head of the North Korean delegation, met in closed meetings at the Military Armistice Commission to discuss issues relative to the Pueblo and the release of its crew.
3. He asked me what I thought. I said it looked to me as though the NKs may be approaching something like the North Vietnamese “you-stop-the-bombing-and-we’ll-talk” ploy. In their case the NKs may tell us “you-withdraw-your-naval-and-air-strength-from-ROK- and-we’ll-talk-about-your-ship-and-crew.” In neither case, of course, was there much prospect of anything substantial. I said this was my off-the-cuff reaction and was not an official estimate, as I had not yet heard from you on the subject.
4. Park said we must be careful, that they had proved time and again that they cannot be trusted. Humiliation of the US is their goal, he said, and “your prestige is ROK prestige.”
5. He then took up matter of public opinion, and the National Assembly view of the situation, all of this along lines known to you, but with certain ideas added. He remarked that the NK/US private meetings are stirring up adverse comment here and expressed a preference (I would not say it was stronger than that) for future meetings in public, or, if closed meetings continue to be necessary, a ROK representative should be present. Public meetings, or closed meetings with a ROK officer present, would do much to reassure the public. Fact of matter, he said, is that ROK side of problem, i.e. DMZ violations and raids by NK, not being discussed in any forum at present.
6. I said that he knew we deeply appreciated his patience in all these matters, and his concurrence in meetings we found it desirable to have. He can see key position occupied by men of Pueblo in this problem and his understanding of that enabled us to sound out the adversary when other channels had failed. It is sometimes necessary, I went on, for Presidents to withhold information temporarily in the public interest, to face press and public criticism while they are doing so, and this seemed to be one such case. I would of course transmit his comments and, as he knew, they would command attention at our highest levels.
7. I said I would comment now, however, on the matter of a public MAC meeting. These usually turn into propaganda displays and as such cause important matters to be drawn out for weeks and months longer than might be necessary were they dealt with in closed session. True, as he said, the correspondents could be present and could at least publicize our statements. Trouble is, they usually give as much time and space to the propaganda of the adversary and we end up no better off. I would sound out my people on this general subject and would come back to him. (See comment below on advisability of trying to set up open MAC meeting to discuss DMZ violations only.)
8. I did not comment on suggestion that ROK might be present at closed meetings. We are likely to make more progress with NKs if there is no ROK presence at these meetings.
9. Comment: Please give me your views on desirability of another open MAC meeting on DMZ violations only. It is possible that such a meeting would evoke NK riposte with Pueblo statement, but also possible, if we made no mention of Pueblo, that they would take that as indication we wish continue private talks with them on that subject. What I am trying to do is find device which will meet Park’s public opinion (Assembly, party, intellectuals, military) problem here without interfering with our NK contact on Pueblo.
10. It would also help us greatly if you could arrange early delivery to Kimpo Airport by largest airplanes available of substantial amount of counterinsurgency items already promised ROK, if they are presently available. We would take care to have adequate presence of elements mentioned above, as well as all elements of local and foreign press. This kind of thing, if properly handled, might also aid us in our palaver with the NKs. Please comment soonest on this possibility.
11. The excellent support you have given me has made all the difference at this end.
Porter

153. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis (Enthoven) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
Washington, February 5, 1968.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSA/OASD/ISA Files: FRC 73 A 1250, Korea 370. Secret.
SUBJECTDeployments to Korea (U)
This morning the Joint Staff requested my staff to coordinate on the movement of a Tactical Air Control Center (197 personnel) from CONUS to Korea. Thus far you have only approved deployment of 162/2/ Air Force tactical aircraft and 13 search and rescue aircraft or about 4600 personnel. To support these forces, CINCPAC and PACAF are deploying substantial numbers of TDY support personnel. In total, the Air Staff estimates that approximately 9000 Air Force personnel have been ordered to Korea. Neither the Air Staff nor the Joint Staff know how accurate this figure is or what support units are included.
/2/A handwritten note on the memorandum reads: “Excluding 14 recce and 6 ECW aircraft.”
It is possible that CINCPAC is also deploying Army and Navy units and personnel that we are unaware of. It is unlikely that the numbers involved are large, but they may be difficult to withdraw when the Pueblo crisis is resolved.
I believe we should keep close rein on any additional deployments. The enclosed memorandum for the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff states that no more personnel or units are to be deployed to Korea without your prior approval./3/ This memorandum may cause some delays in deploying support units, but it is unlikely to have a serious impact on readiness. It will permit us to control the size of the buildup, preventing any unwarranted increase in deployed forces.
/3/Attached but not printed; McNamara signed the memorandum.
I recommend signature. OASD/ISA Mr. Steadman concurs.
Alain Enthoven
 
154. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, February 5, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea–Pueblo Incident, Vol. Ib, Part. A. Secret. Attached to a February 5 memorandum from Rostow to President Johnson, transmitting this memorandum as well as a February 5 letter from Warnke to Rostow on the same topic. Rostow’s memorandum indicates the President saw it.
SUBJECTAirlift of Counterinsurgency Equipment
General Bonesteel requested that certain priority items contained in the “counter-infiltration package” developed by his command in coordination with the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff be airlifted to Korea. Ambassador Porter endorsed this recommendation, and Secretary McNamara has authorized this air delivery on a priority basis equal to that of shipments to Viet-Nam. The Services are working on this requirement on a priority basis. The majority of this equipment will arrive in Korea by February 15, or by the date on which later delivery was requested.
In addition, procurement and delivery actions are underway for the following items of equipment for ROK forces. (These items were discussed with President Pak and MND Kim in relation to discussions regarding additional ROK deployments to Viet-Nam.)/2/
/2/This and the following paragraphs are virtually identical to the text of the February 5 letter from Warnke to Rostow cited in footnote 1.
1. A $32.3 million “counter-infiltration package.” General Bone- steel requested, and Secretary McNamara authorized, air shipment of certain items in this package on a priority equal to that of equipment going to Viet-Nam. The Services are working on this requirement on a priority basis. The majority of this equipment will arrive in Korea by 15 February or by the date on which delivery was requested.
2. Two destroyers for the ROK Navy. One destroyer from the Naval Reserve Fleet is being readied for delivery to the ROKs by 30 April. A second destroyer from the “mothball fleet” will be delivered to the ROKs in not more than 12 months.
3. An 8mm Howitzer battalion, to be delivered this spring.
4. Equipment and ongoing support for the “CI” battalion the ROKs intend to activate.
In addition, consideration is being given to the following actions to strengthen the military posture of allied forces in Korea:
1. Provide the ROK Army with full authorized equipment and ammunition (probably full cost of $200 million of which roughly $130 million might be a MAP supplemental).
2. Increase the effectiveness of the land barrier across the demilitarized zone in Korea and its seaward extension (could cost up to $150 million depending on the extent, density, and sophistication of the barrier).
3. Improve roads, railroads and other lines of communication, and munitions and material depots in South Korea ($50 million could be usefully spent).
4. Reduce vulnerability of aircraft and airbases in Korea (shelter 180 U.S. and 180 Korean aircraft for $50 million).
5. Give South Korea 25-50 F-4 fighters for air defense at a cost of $75-150 million.
6. Deploy 5,000 U.S. soldiers in addition to the approximately 520,000 Korean and 50,000 U.S. soldiers there now.
7. Increase ammunition immediately available to land and air forces in Korea (about $250 million).
Nicholas deB Katzenbach
 
155. Letter From President Pak to President Johnson/1/
Seoul, February 5, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Korea, Park Correspondence, Vol. I. Secret. The source text, which is on Pak’s letterhead, is a translation. Porter acquired an advance copy of this letter, which he transmitted to the Department in telegram 3976 from Seoul, February 5. Rostow forwarded the telegram to the President with a note commenting on the “great courtesy” contained in Pak’s reply and pointing out that the letter made “a strong plea탄원 for retaliatory action against North Korean incursions into South Korea.”
로스토우는 코멘트를 적어 대통령에게 전문을 전달했는데 그것은 박대통령의 답장에 포함된 “대단히 예의”와 “남을 기습공격한 북에 대해 보복조치를 취할 것을 강력히 탄원”하는 편지라고 지적했다.
(Ibid., Country File, Korea–Pueblo Incident–Cactus II, Cactus Seoul Cables, January 29 to February 9, 1968)
Dear Mr. President:
I received an advance copy of your letter of February 3/2/ through Ambassador Porter yesterday and I thank you sincerely for your keeping me informed of your views through your Ambassador here.
/2/See Document 151.
The recent seizure by the north Korea of the USS Pueblo and the infiltration of the armed Communist raiders into Seoul have demonstrated to the world anew the aggressiveness and lawlessness of the Communists. These acts have also arisen a serious problem to our prestige and a grave threat to our security.
I would like to take this opportunity to extend once again my expressions of sincere sympathy to Your Excellency, the people of the United States and the families of the crew of the Pueblo.
Also, I would like to express my great admiration and deep respect for your perseverance shown in seeking diplomatic solution to the problem and for your resolute determination as evident in your outright action taken in the movements of the United States forces.
I am very grateful that you are urgently considering measures to strengthen the defense capabilities of the Republic of Korea.
Mr. President,
In the wake of these incidents, we have made our views known to each other through Ambassador Porter.
And I quite agree with you that our two countries, at these difficult hours, should stand in closer unity and deal with the situation with concerted might. The traditional friendship between our two countries and the unchangeable, particular relations between our two peoples should bid us to do so.
What we should do first will be to have the vessel and the crew back and to seek a guarantee that the north Koreans cease their aggressive acts against the Republic of Korea.
These, if devoid of one of the two, will not be complete in attaining our common goal.
How long our efforts for peaceful and diplomatic settlement should be kept going will, as you have pointed out, be our problem.
However, I sincerely hope that you understand my conviction that the problems should be solved by all means before the public opinions of the world which have stood with us may cool down.
It has been fifteen years since the Armistice Agreement was concluded and during this span of time, the north Koreans have constantly threatened us, their violation of the Agreement totalling some 5,000 cases. The threat has become even more serious during the past sixteen months, culminating in the aggressive intrusion into Seoul on January 21.
I should mention that in dealing with the Communists, indefinite efforts for peaceful solution will only bring advantages to them rather than to us. I can say through our own experiences that the Communists should be taught a lesson that any aggressive action cannot escape due punitive action.
If we had taken any punitive action whenever the north Koreans violated the Armistice Agreement in the past, we could have forestalled the situation which has ensued on these breaches.
In other words, I think the situation which we are facing today has resulted from our inaction to meet effectively the violation of the Agreement by the north Koreans.
To the north Koreans, therefore, we should show our resolute stand and determination that they cannot commit an aggressive act free of punishment. It should be remembered this alone will provide a corrective measure for the habitual aggressiveness of the north Koreans.
I have already made my views known to you on the secret negotiations between the United States and north Korea through Ambassador Porter and I am not repeating them here.
나는 이미 포터대사를 통해 미국과 북 사이의 비밀협상에 대해 당신에게 알린바대로 나의 관점을 만들었다. 그리고 나는 여기에서 그것을 반복해서 말하진 않겠다.
Please accept, Your Excellency, my best wishes for a full measure of success in your endeavors.
With my kindest personal regards,
Sincerely,
Park Chung Hee/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that indicates Pak signed the original.
 
156. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/
Seoul, February 6, 1968, 0850Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
4008. 1. Bonesteel and I were called to meet with Prime Minister, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Information and Chief of JCS this morning. Meeting lasted approximately one hour twenty minutes.
2. PriMin opened by saying he wanted to make clear the attitude of ROK Government, that this was the time to think calmly and consider all the facts. At present time feelings of population quite different from periods of normalization of relations with Japan or when troops for Vietnam matter being considered. The government had adopted a cautious attitude to avoid helping the enemy or exciting the people. They had let no one know meeting with US being held. (When we arrived there were at least 100 correspondents in anteroom outside PriMin’s office.)
3. PriMin said closed or secret meetings at Panmunjom have been taking place. He is aware that Ambassador has been reporting to President Park on all these matters. Public understanding, however, was lacking. People believed that United Nations would continue to protect sovereignty and security of ROK. NK had sent raiders trying to overthrow ROK Government. Nevertheless meetings were going on between United States and North Korea at Panmunjom which is ROK territory.
그럼에도 불구하고 한국영토인 판문점에서 북미사이에 미팅이 진행되고 있다.
Is it reasonable that talks should be held in such a place between US and NK? Parties must abide by agreements where international law is nonexistent.
4. There had been innumerable무수한 violations by NK and only ROK is abiding by international agreements, as all the world knows. But ROK has no means of retaliation because UN Command ties ROK Government’s hands and ROK troops cannot retaliate. This is far from ideal situation, PriMin said.
북에 의한 무수한 위반이 있었고, 오직 한국만이 모든 세계가 알고 있듣이 국제협정에 의해 영속적이다. 그러나 한국은 보복수단이 없다. 유엔사가 한국정부의 손을 묶고 있기 때문에 한국군대는 보복할 수가 없다. 이것은 이상적인 상황에서 멀다. 총리가 말했다.
5. Meetings between US and NK create public suspicion. Public feels that ROK sovereignty is being discussed without ROK’s presence. So far the government has been quiet in order not to arouse public on this score. If Cuba raided Washington and attacked White House and ROK then began separate talks with Cuba, what would be the US attitude in such circumstances?
6. Ambassador Porter got permission of President Park for the talks and has reported regularly to the President on them. President’s agreement was only in principle for humanitarian purposes, and even though President consented in principle, close cooperation is necessary. PriMin would like to make recommendations.
7. Chong then said that if one or two more closed meetings are necessary US should try to include ROK representatives, even though ROK is not signatory to Armistice Agreement. There should at least be consultation with ROK representative after which US representative should act accordingly. If secret meetings continue and suspicion continues that matters pertaining to ROK sovereignty are discussed, there will be complications in our relationships. Ambassador and General Bonesteel should be reporting in strongest possible terms of real feelings of ROK public. Any Korean questioned about meetings at Panmunjom will give one answer only and it will be against such negotiations. Instead of closed or secret meetings ROK Government feels open meeting should be held. It is true that both sides would be militant in such meetings but people would know what was happening. They support their government in this most critical problem since the armistice. Even if closed meetings succeed in bringing about return of Pueblo and crew, there may be bad after effect. Much ill feeling had been created by division of the country years ago and current US talks with NK touching on sovereignty of the country make it impossible to predict how ROK people will react. PriMin wanted to be frank about all this. If US is forced to bow to North Korea to save our soldiers, NK would continue to try to decrease US influence and prestige.
8. United Nations has condemned NK, PriMin continued, and UN forces are here to act as police men, but if they fail to do job, what will be result? PriMin was not saying that there should be closed or open meetings or that joint meetings should not go on. The government’s preference was for open meeting but if it essential to have closed meetings they should be in cooperation with ROK representatives. Topics of discussion should not be limited to Pueblo but also to raid on Blue House which happened prior to Pueblo and should be given priority in discussion. President Park has asked about guarantees for the future. Americans should know that if President had not given order against it, ROK forces would have retaliated on limited basis. If North Koreans had succeeded in hitting Blue House there would have been all-out war. UN operational control is for purpose of protecting ROK security. If UN remains passive, PriMin asked, is this the wisest course? All ROK Ministers present had strong impulse after raid to bomb Kim Il-Sung where he stood. Without guarantee of security should the ROKs simply try to prolong연장 their existence or face up to a showdown파국? They have considered this more seriously than anyone else. If there is another incident should they stand still?
9. Considering relationships between US [and ROK?] basic policy remained unchanged. If there is another incident, however, ROK will have to act. They are preparing limited retaliation measures.
만약 다른 사건이 생긴다면 한국은 행동할 것이다. 그들은 제한된 보복수단을 준비하고 있다.
10. I then replied by saying that we will discuss carefully with our people ideas which PriMin put forth concerning meetings at Panmunjom and I would hope to come back to him with some comment on them in near future. He was entirely correct in saying that I have reported fully both in advance and after the fact on the meetings. I recognize that because of unusual aspects of this problem the ministers are having a difficult time with Assembly and the press, and we are searching for ways to help them. However, it was not within my authority to carry on ordinary type discussions, though I wish to be of help and do everything I could to ease the ministers’ situation.
그러나 비록 내가 도움이 되길 바라고 장관들의 상황을 편하게하기 위해 모든 것을 하길 원해도 그것은 일상적인 토의를 수행하는 나의 권한범위 내에 있지 않다.
With regard to feeling that only Pueblo has been discussed at the meetings, this is not correct. As recently as yesterday we had mentioned first aggressive North Korean actions against the Republic of Korea as being responsible for situation that had been created.
11. Finally, in my comment, I said that we recognize that they are under great provocation. We have expressed complete solidarity with them in current situation. Regardless of nature of any provocation which they may yet experience, I wanted to make it clear that we expect complete consultation in advance of any action they may contemplate. This is what we had given and this is what we expect. The adverse effect of uncoordinated action could far outlast that of any incident and it is absolutely necessary for us to remain in full consultation regardless of type of provocation to which they might be subjected.
12. PriMin then said that two weeks have passed since raid on Seoul. Because of their dependence and trust he would request General Bonesteel to take up protection of the country. However, it looked to PriMin that US is so involved with Pueblo as not to be concerned with ROK security.
13. Gen Bonesteel recounted자세히설명 at length충분히 (see Bonesteel’s message KRA 0451 to Sharp and Wheeler)/2/ measures방책 taken by UNC in cooperation with Ministry of Defense against infiltration and to protect country. There are many matters under consideration he said which would reassure재보증 them although it is still premature시기상조 to get into detail until they fully considered. Bonesteel also laid great emphasis on requirement for complete consultation with us on their plans and intentions.
본스틸은 장군은 보복에 대항하기 위해 그리고 국가를 방어하기 위해 국방장관과 협조된 기초위에 유엔사에 의해 취해진 방책을 충분히 자세히 설명했다. 거기엔 고려중인 많은 문제들이 있었다. 그는 그는 그것들을 재보증한다고 말했다. 비록 그들이 충분히 고려될때까지 상세하게 들어가기엔 시기상조임에도 불구하고… 본스틸은 또한 그들의 계획과 의지에 대해 우리와 충분히 협조하기 위한 요구에 대해 대단히 강조했다.
신중하/2/In KRA 0451, February 6, Bonesteel reported that the “UNC would maintain mission and operational control to stop, the highest extent넓은 feasible실행가능한, infiltration through front line divisions or through sea frontier국경,” and would to the greatest extent possible maintain the ROK’s internal security plans by providing all possible support and equipment. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea–Pueblo Incident, Military Cables, Vol. II, February 1968 to March 1968)
2월6일 본스틸은 보고했다.“유엔사는 임무를 유지할 것이며, 작전통제를 중지하고, 전선사단이나 바다접경을 통해 최상의 넓은 실행가능한 보복을 할 것이며, 모든 가능한 지원과 설비가 제공되는 한국의 국내안보계획을 최대한 넓고 가능하게 유지할 것이다.
14. Foreign Minister then made brief statement to effect problem is to avoid public suspicion of what is going on, that open meetings at Panmunjom were the answer. Until now he did not know that there was any discussion of NK violations of Armistice and public believes there is none. I commented that in addition to assurance I had just given him that matter was mentioned yesterday at Panmunjom by US, there was substantial history of our statements giving proper emphasis to raid on Seoul and NK violation of DMZ, which if properly used in dealing with public and Assembly would do much to correct impressions and allay suspicions he mentioned. I cited statements in US, President Johnson’s statement on television on this subject, and said there was much additional material if they would but use it.
15. PriMin then said they would say to press and Assembly only that meeting had been held and that they had made their viewpoint clear to us. We then adjourned from this “secret meeting” and departed through most disorderly press gathering I have seen here, which is saying a lot.
16. Comment: Meeting was of course stated in part to show Assembly, press and military that government telling us the score. Despite threats of unilateral retaliatory action it does not change my opinion that at this point Park and closest advisors, despite their natural inclination, recognize need to restrain hotheads, among whom I include MND. They have permitted, and probably encouraged, some turbulence in Assembly and among public, however, which may sweep them along toward retaliatory action if another incident occurs. Underlying fact that they have not used material we have provided to save their face in connection with Panmunjom meetings is, we believe, deep down feeling that this may be moment to reunify the country and that if opportunity is lost, it may not come again. President Park’s personal regard for President Johnson, restraints we have built into system of command control here, as well as those we are exerting currently, have thus far paid off, but at this point ROKs need carefully watching.
17. Within day or two, or sooner, depending on how matters develop, I may give you some comment concerning desirability of special envoy.
Porter
 
157. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea/1/
Washington, February 6, 1968, 2151Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Rusk, cleared by Read, and approved by Rusk.
110828. Personal and Eyes Only for the Ambassador from the Secretary. As one who has been intimately involved with Korea since the drafting of Japanese surrender terms, I am deeply disturbed by the present atmosphere of our relations. I know that we are dealing with an especially sensitive people, sometimes called the “Irish of the Far East.” I also am aware of other moments of tension even worse than the one we have today, particularly when I think back to the Syngman Rhee period. I think I understand fully the genuine concerns of the South Koreans even though I get impatient about their super sensitivity.
The one thing which is not tolerable back here is their suspicion about our basic motives and purposes. We have invested over 33,000 battle deaths, 20,000 non-battle deaths, and over 100,000 wounded in the security of an independent Republic of Korea. We have maintained large forces in that country for 17 years. We have invested over six billion dollars (almost half the total Marshall Plan) in economic and military assistance. We have recently massively reinforced our air power in Korea and the immediate adjoining areas. We have carried the banner for Korea in the UN over and over again. You should find ways to make it clear that Korean suspicion against this record is simply incomprehensible to the American people. The danger is that it will be deeply resented back here with potentially disastrous results for both countries./2/
/2/On March 7 Rusk reiterated this message to Ambassador Kim when responding to Korean efforts to amend the U.S.-ROK Mutual Security Treaty. (Telegram 4596 from Seoul, February 29, airgram A-431 from Seoul, March 7, and memorandum of conversation, March 7; all ibid., DEF 4 KOR S-US)
We do not expect the Republic of Korea to be a satellite of the United States nor do we expect the United States to be a satellite of Korea. We have elementary and basic common interests and the United States has done its full share in supporting these common interests. We expect no less from the Koreans.
I assume that the South Korean press has had its attention called to everything I have said about Korea in my “Meet the Press” interview./3/ If they got mad because I could not swear in blood what happened to the Pueblo during a ten-day period of radio silence, they must not be angry because I cannot pledge in advance to be a liar. I have no doubt that they have been misled by some of the excessive speculation by some American reporters on that particular point. But I thought I hit hard on those subjects of direct interest to the Republic of Korea, including the infiltration and other threats by North Korea, during recent weeks and months.
/3/On February 4 Rusk and McNamara appeared on the television news program “Meet the Press.” A transcript of the broadcast is in Department of State Bulletin, February 26, 1968, pp. 261-272.
By separate cables we are sending you another letter from the President to Park and answers to other specific questions you have raised./4/
/4/See Documents 158 and 159.
I would appreciate any further suggestions you have as to what can be done to clarify these matters with key Korean leaders./5/ I have just seen tickers of a backgrounder someone out there apparently held which was helpful. Keep giving us your best judgment and we will give you our best from this end. With warm regards.
/5/Porter responded by stating that the Embassy continued “to hammer home thoughts you expressed,” but was handicapped because South Korean “leaders do not yet display much political sophistication and allow themselves to be whipsawed even by elements in their own party and of course by the press.” Porter further noted that distorted or erroneous press reports coming from the United States merely compounded the problem. (Telegram 4034 from Seoul, February 7; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US)
Rusk
 
158. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea/1/
Washington, February 7, 1968, 0603Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cactus. Also sent to CINCPAC and repeated to COMUS/K. Drafted by Doherty, cleared by Warnke and Bromley Smith, and approved by Walsh. Smith submitted drafts of this telegram and Document 159 to the President, who approved both drafts. Smith recorded the President’s reservation to this telegram: “President asked that Porter make clear to Park that arms package et al. is linked to keeping Korean contribution to South Vietnam effort unchanged. Berger informed and will revise second cable–i.e., instructions to Porter. With this change, both cables cleared. BKS” (Memorandum from Smith to Johnson, February 6; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea–Pueblo Incident, Miscellaneous, Vol. I. Secret)
111263. Joint State-Defense Message. Ref: A. Seoul 3976;/2/ B. Seoul 3971./3/
/2/See footnote 1, Document 155.
/3/In telegram 3971 from Seoul, February 5, Porter discussed the apprehension in Korea about the U.S. approach to North Korea in an attempt to gain the release of the Pueblo crew and the fear that the United States would withdraw the augmented forces once that issue was resolved. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US)
1. Ref. B and similar messages from General Bonesteel leave little room for doubt that prompt and effective measures must be taken to allay public and official ROK suspicions that US engaged in double dealing with North Korea.
2. We must convince ROKG officials that Pueblo seizure and North Korean raids against ROK, while part of one overall problem, must be dealt with by different measures. Possibility that immediate problem of release of Pueblo and crew can be obtained through private negotiations must be exhaustively explored. On the other hand, we cannot reasonably expect North Korean acts of aggression against ROK to be deterred either by private negotiations or by public harangues in MAC. The appropriate measures for this purpose are those which will visibly strengthen ROK military posture and ability to repel and punish infiltrators.
3. To get this distinction across to Park we are transmitting septel text of another personal letter from President Johnson. This letter, in addition to summarizing previous offers of additional military equipment made in connection with the possible deployment of additional ROK forces to Vietnam, informs Park of President Johnson’s decision on the general magnitude of MAP augmentation.
4. FYI. We want this new $100 million package to consist of items which will have the greatest psychological and political impact on ROKG and its public (as well as on North Koreans). General Bonesteel is requested to consider whether a squadron of eighteen F-4′s would be an effective way to accomplish this objective. Such squadron, with ground equipment, spares and pilot training, would cost about $60 million. Other items we have in mind include additional F-5′s, SAM missile equipment, patrol and swift craft naval vessels, combat and other vehicles and self-propelled artillery. The availability of equipment should be kept in mind in the preparation of this list. We do not propose to divert any significant amounts from Viet-Nam. This submission should be coordinated with the Embassy. [End FYI.]
5. In presenting text of letter to Park you should also say that if he wishes you and General Bonesteel will be glad to discuss with key ROK officials, employing general line of argument set forth in para. two above, and stressing significance of additional military assistance offered in President Johnson’s letter.
6. It seems from here that for maximum political benefit this info should be announced in ROK. The announcement could be made by Park himself in a statement, or jointly by USG and ROKG in Seoul. We leave this to you to work out, but we would like to clear text of any joint announcement here and in any event arrange coordinated release times.
7. New subject. Enterprise task group has been ordered and is moving southward through Korea Straits to area only 12 hours sailing time from former position. USSR will presumably report this movement to Pyongyang. Timing of this movement is calculated to give impression to North Korea that US prepared to ease off some pressure even while talks in progress. You should inform Park of this negotiating gambit.
8. Final Caveat: You should convey to Park in whatever words you find appropriate that loose talk in Korea about pulling back some forces from Vietnam has not been well received here. We cannot believe that any serious consideration is being given to such a move by responsible officials, especially in the face of this new grant of aid and our augmented presence in Korea, and we want Park’s reassurance that there will be no such move./4/
/4/This paragraph was added to satisfy the President’s instructions. Porter broached the subject during a meeting with Pak on February 8, but failed to receive reassurances from him that talk of a troop withdrawal would be rebutted by high ROK officials. The Prime Minister later informed Porter of his statement to the National Assembly that such a step was not government policy and assured Porter that the government had no intention of taking such action. (Telegram 4088 from Seoul, February 8; Ibid.)
Printed from an unsigned copy.
 
159. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea/1/
Washington, February 7, 1968, 0619Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cactus. Text received from the White House, cleared by Smith and approved by Walsh.
111264. You are authorized convey following message from President Johnson to President Park: “Dear Mr. President:
Ambassador Porter has transmitted to me the text of your thoughtful letter of February 5./2/
/2/Document 155.
He has also given me your views, expressed orally to him, on the conduct of the negotiations between the United Nations Command and the North Korean Senior Members of the Military Armistice Commission.
I am keenly aware of your desire that the Pueblo seizure and ROK complaints against North Korea not be treated as unrelated matters. I agree fully that a solution of the one without a solution of the other would be incomplete. I would like, therefore, to give you my further views as to how the two problems should be related. I believe that we can separate the short question of negotiating tactics from the longer run and continuing problem of ensuring the security of the Republic of Korea against attack from the north.
First, let me refer to the negotiating problem. Delicate negotiations of this kind cannot hope to succeed if conducted in public; they would degenerate to the level of propaganda exchanges characteristic of Military Armistice Commission meetings in the past.
We do not object in principle to your other suggestion, that the UNC Senior Member be joined by a ROK member in future meetings with the North Korean Senior Member; however, we doubt very much that the North Korean side would agree, and we do not wish to risk a breakdown in these discussions.
At the same time, I realize that the method of private discussions between the UNC and the North Korean Senior Members has created a political and public relations problem for you. The Korean public, the press, government officials, military officers and even members of your cabinet, have concluded that the US is engaging in those private discussions in order to reach an agreement on the problem of the Pueblo seizure separately and to neglect the broader range of problems posed for the Republic of Korea by North Korean violations of the Armistice Agreement.
Our reasons for wanting private discussions, moreover, are not easy to explain to the Korean public, and they do not suffice to allay the suspicions that are mounting and that threaten to impair our usually close and friendly cooperation. It is clearly not enough for your government and mine to explain that the success of the current negotiations for the release of the Pueblo and crew will depend on secrecy. It is important that the immediate problem of the Pueblo seizure and the longer-run problem of ensuring the security of the Republic of Korea against attack from the north be presented in somewhat different perspectives.
The seizure of the Pueblo presents an immediate challenge to the United States which must be dealt with promptly and decisively. The measures to deal with this problem are not necessarily the same as the measures to deal with North Korean aggressive actions against the Republic of Korea. The United States will not, I assure you, humiliate itself or the ROKG to obtain redress. But we cannot leave unexplored the possibility that secret negotiations, against the backdrop of increased military strength in the area, will achieve our immediate goal.
Unlike the Pueblo problem, for which we must have an immediate solution, the security of the Republic of Korea against attack is a continuing problem. It will still exist after the Pueblo and its crew have been released. It will not be solved by angry words uttered in the Military Armistice Commission, or by negotiations. It will require tangible and continuing measures to strengthen the Republic of Korea militarily. And if the Republic of Korea, as a result of North Korean threats against it, is visibly strengthened in its military stance, by the kind of measures I have already indicated to you, and which I shall outline in detail below, the North Koreans will have suffered a moral and psychological defeat in the current crisis.
If we succeed both in obtaining redress in the Pueblo seizure and in strengthening the security of the Republic of Korea, then we will indeed, in your words, have completely attained our common goal.
I am confident that you will see that the long run interest of your country in strengthening itself against possible attack is more important to you than the immediate problems of negotiating tactics and propaganda. I therefore want to give you more complete information on the measures I am proposing for the permanent strengthening of your military posture.
Ambassador Porter already has discussed with you our willingness to provide certain equipment to ROK forces in Korea in conjunction with the deployment to Viet-Nam of additional ROK forces. The equipment includes.
1. A $32 million counterinfiltration `package’ which was jointly devised by your Chiefs of Staff and General Bonesteel. Certain key items in this counterinfiltration package have been authorized for air delivery and many of these items will arrive in Korea within the next 15 days.
2. Two additional destroyers for the ROK Navy, one of which will come from the active US Navy fleet. This destroyer is now undergoing overhaul, and will be delivered to the ROK Navy no later than April 30. The other is being activated from the US Navy reserve fleet and will be delivered after overhaul in 12 months or less.
3. A self-propelled 8 in. Howitzer artillery battalion.
4. A company of 12 UH-1-D helicopters.
In order to provide new programs of help, I have decided to increase military assistance to your forces in the current fiscal year by an additional $100 million./3/ This further amount will fund other items of equipment which should leave no doubt either in the minds of your people or in those of the North Koreans of our determination to see that you are in an even stronger position to withstand and repel further aggressive acts they might contemplate.
/3/On February 8 President Johnson requested Congress approve the additional funds as part of his foreign aid program for FY 1969; see Department of State Bulletin, March 4, 1968, pp. 322-329.
I trust, Mr. President, that the foregoing will amplify and support my previous assurances to you that my government’s vital concern for the security of your country is undiminished. I hope that with this tangible evidence of support you will redouble your efforts to allay the suspicions of some of your countrymen that in the current crisis the United States is selfishly pursuing its own ends and neglecting its long standing commitments to the people and the government of the Republic of Korea.
Ambassador Porter and General Bonesteel stand ready, I am sure, to assist in this effort through their normal channels to the appropriate officials of your government.
With my warmest personal regards,
Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson”/4/
/4/Printed from an unsigned copy.
 

161. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/
Seoul, February 8, 1968, 0905Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Flash; Nodis; Cactus. President Johnson was given a typed copy of this telegram along with a February 8 memorandum from Rostow, who noted that the message “indicates the depth of our problem with the South Koreans.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea–Pueblo Incident–Cactus II, Cactus Seoul Cables, January 29 to February 9, 1968)
4083. Ref: A. State 111264; B. State 111263./2/
/2/Documents 159 and 158.
1. I conveyed message contained Ref A to President Park this morning. He expressed appreciation for the increased military aid which he said would be useful in present situation. He is convinced that military buildup alone, however, is useless when dealing with person like Kim Il-Sung. He said American policy seemed to consist of efforts to extract Pueblo and crew and buildup on ROK side, which means ROKs must remain passive here in face of continual provocation. So far the anger of the ROK people has been contained because his government does not want war, but it will be impossible to remain passive when another incident occurs and he feels this is most likely./3/ That will start a war in Korea again.
/3/General Bonesteel reported on his seemingly effective efforts to persuade the ROK Joint Chiefs of the “unwisdom of a unilateral, uncoordinated, rash action taken in anger by ROKs alone,” but added that he remained unconvinced that the “emotional reaction from top ROKs can entirely be controlled.” (Telegram KRA 0490 from Seoul, February 8; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea–Pueblo Incident, Military Cables, Vol. II, February 1968 to March 1968)
2. He had examined closely military posture and readiness of ROK and UN forces and they are certainly not ready for war as compared to North Koreans. This means they would perhaps suffer heavy damage initially but they would suffer even more if they await attack and do not take preventive measures. He has given US assurance that he would not take unilateral action and he wants prior consultation with the United States. He also has faith in competence and authority of UN Command, but lack of combat readiness disturbs him. He realizes that General Bonesteel has not been given a war mission but fact remains that entire position on our side now is such as to encourage Kim Il-Sung./4/ He said an example of our unpreparedness is that approximately 200 US military aircraft had come into country and cannot be accommodated. There is even a problem of takeoff, and ROKAF planes were inferior to NK planes. A MIG-21 needs only to have a button pushed to take off, whereas the F-5 cannot start without auxiliary assistance. It is bad thing to have to sit and await attack. What would United States have done if he and his family had been assassinated? Would we have proceeded to negotiate?
/4/Bonesteel recommended that U.S. and ROK military forces begin considering ways to improve vulnerabilities, such as constructing additional airfields in more secure locations, and examining ways “to insure North Korea cannot continue to enjoy complete sanctuary in its territory if it engages further in suicide-team raids against ROK.” He commented that “if we can develop a ROK `porous war’ totally black method of insuring no sanctuary for NK held under joint US/ROK control, this would really face up to gut problem remaining between U.S. and ROK has many things to recommend it.” (Ibid.)
3. Foregoing indicates pent-up emotions of ROK President at this point and he gave me two-and-a-half hours of it. I replied to his various points, emphasizing as I had done twice before that we depended on his leadership, restraint of hotheads and undertaking consultations in advance with us regardless of circumstances. On question on Kim Il-Sung I gave him report of recent developments to be reported separately./5/
/5/Not further identified.
4. Before I got to subject he launched into strong denunciation of our move of Enterprise southward. Enterprise should have been moved northward, he said, with other carriers and placed off port of Wonsan. We should have announced port was closed until we got men and ship back. If this brought no action we should go in and take ship, and neither Russians nor ChiComs would interfere.
5. When he finished this aspect of his statement I gave him para seven of Ref B. He brushed this aside, saying that ROK closest ally of United States but our recent negotiating tactics are only encouraging Kim Il-Sung and creating distress among Korean people. Kim Il-Sung is a pirate and a thief, and he took a ship and raided Seoul in a criminal manner, and now the US expects to get results by talking to him. What makes US think such tactics will work?
6. I said I know he understands that our commitment in ROK is to protect the integrity and security of South Korea. That we are intent on doing, as he could see from the very generous measures being taken, but we are not going to give up possibility of achieving settlement of Pueblo incident through peaceful means. If population here is disturbed it is, as I told Prime Minister and other ministers, because proper use had not been made of all of the statements of solidarity and support and all of the evidence of it provided by United States since this crisis developed.
7. There was a great deal of repetitive material of similar nature in his remarks, and he made a special point of asking that they be transmitted to President Johnson. I said the President had made it clear in public announcements that President Park’s views are heard and considered and acted upon on a daily basis. And he could rest assured that this would continue to be the case. However we do expect him to understand, as the message said, that the two matters of DMZ violations and the Pueblo have to be handled separately. We are convinced that this is only rational way to go about it.
8. Interview terminated and I left President’s office to find that Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs had been sitting outside with rather obvious ill humor for an hour. Shortly thereafter I received phone call from confidential interpreter Cho who stated that President, after rereading President Johnson’s letter, wished to make it clear that he is against closed meetings at Panmunjom. I said I took note of this.
9. He had made no mention of this except in general terms of meetings at Panmunjom and did not voice to me his opposition to closed meetings. I did say to him at beginning of our interview that there would be mention of Panmunjom in message from President but, as he knew, I would be discussing this matter as necessary with Prime Minister and did not intend to get into it unless he wished to do so himself. Of course during message itself and subsequent conversation dealing with our general negotiating tactics he made frequent reference to Panmunjom and, as he put it, the distrust aroused locally by our tactics.
10. I am seeing Prime Minister shortly, who will probably reiterate their opposition to closed meetings. I intend to make it clear that we cannot see our only line of contact cut on this subject. Comment: We have had suggestions from various quarters that if we could accept ROK officer at Panmunjom, not to participate but for show purposes, this would do much to allay their suspicions and would help with public. I am not certain of value of this argument because underlying all the heaving about is something else which we have described to you, which is their hungering desire, which Park shares, to close with the North Koreans. However, if you feel you can authorize this on an absolutely non-veto, non-delay basis, I would like to offer it to them.
11. Your Ref B suggests meeting be set up tomorrow. We can do this but I would like your comments on this message if possible before proceeding because it is quite possible that we may be approaching showdown stage with ROKs on issue of closed meetings at Panmunjom.
12. On most important matter of restraining ROKs, we may well be at point where we should repeat injunction to Syngman Rhee who at one time also felt need to go north. There is enough danger now without more provocation from NKs but situation will become very much worse if that happens.
Porter
 
162. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/
Seoul, February 8, 1968, 1114Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cactus.
4087. Ref: Seoul 4083./2/
/2/Document 161.
1. Prime Minister requested me to call this afternoon. Foreign Minister and PriMin’s Principal Secretary Hong also present. This meeting revolved almost entirely around their pleas to save their face through some kind of arrangement assuring ROK presence at Panmunjom private meetings. I told them that we cannot risk having this channel cut off, and we felt quite certain that NK’s would refuse to participate if we insisted on ROK presence. Instead of urging something of this kind they should be taking lead with all the material we had furnished to face their Assembly and form press opinion. It seemed incredible that fact that we wished to use only channel available to us to try to get release of crew and Pueblo should cause such a stir in ROK and I told Chong we looking directly to him and his colleagues to get matters back in hand. We would all find ourselves in much worse condition if we tried to introduce ROK representative into closed meetings there and encountered as a result NK refusal to meet./3/
/3/The evening of February 8 the Presidential Secretary phoned the Embassy and “indicated reluctant recognition of fact that closed meetings at Panmunjom must go on.” Porter thought the call, coupled with his meetings, indicated that the Koreans were ready to accept the situation. (Telegram 4090 from Seoul, February 8; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US)
2. They inquired about Secretaries meetings and I said these are called as they seem necessary. Could we call one? I said I would look into it. They apparently draw some comfort from fact that ROK representative is present at such meetings.
3. Prime Minister said that we could really turn heat off of this issue here if we would consider distinguished special envoy coming directly from President Johnson. I knew they were thinking in this vein, which was reason I mentioned subject in my 4008 (not Cactus)./4/ I said I did not like the atmosphere here at this point and there would be little purpose in having such a visitor encounter demonstrations, hostile press comment and the like. Chong was most vehement in his assurance that there would be no problem of this nature, he and Foreign Minister reiterating time and again that a high-level visitor would solve the problem.
/4/Document 156.
4. These ministers displayed none of the tough attitude I encountered in President Park earlier in day. They did not touch on any aspect of need for military measures against the North, being solely concerned with drubbing they are receiving from Assembly and press.
5. It is true that announcement of high-level visitor would preoccupy Assembly and press as we proceed with our closed meetings at Panmunjom during next few days. I am unable to assess at this point what lasting value it might have. If things worsen here, it could very well be of great assistance to us to have President Park and his friends told what consequences of any uncoordinated action against the north would be. On balance I favor such a visit provided a prestigious public figure would be available to make it.
Porter
 
163. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)
Washington, February 8, 1968.
[Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/OASD/ISA Files: FRC 73 A 1304, Korea 471.61. Top Secret. 1 page of source text not declassified.]

164. Editorial Note
On February 8, 1968, Ambassador Porter received instructions from the Department of State to “inform President Pak in confidence that we are giving urgent consideration to sending an envoy to talk with him.” (Telegram 112452 to Seoul, February 8; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea–Pueblo Incident–Cactus IIa, Cactus Seoul Cables, February 10 to February 28, 1968) The action was in response to a request made by Korean Foreign Minister Choi through Ambassador Kim to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Berger on January 31. The Foreign Minister believed that by sending a special presidential envoy to Korea to address the crises brought on by the Blue House raid and the seizure of the USS Pueblo the United States would demonstrate its commitment to South Korea and affirm the strength of the bilateral relationship. (Memorandum of conversation, January 31; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US) When informing the United States Embassy in Seoul of this conversation, Deputy Assistant Secretary Berger noted the Department of State’s initial reluctance to send an envoy out of concern that the move “would arouse wide speculation as to why he was sent and why normal channels were to be reinforced, and even rumors that we contemplating military action.” (Telegram 109068 to Seoul, February 2; ibid., POL 7 US) Ambassador Porter also expressed reservations, noting that sending an envoy to Korea presented no clear advantage to the United States. (Telegram 3902 from Seoul, February 3; ibid., POL 7 US)
Although the South Korean request initially received a cool reception, the Department of State and the White House continued to consider the request as events unfolded within Korea. In telegram 120315 to Tokyo, February 24, briefing the Ambassador on a possible mission, the Department noted that the raid on the Blue House followed by the Pueblo incident had “caused consternation within the ROK and emotional fury on the part of the ROKG leadership, particularly President Park, who became increasingly obsessed with the desire to strike back across the DMZ.” U.S. diplomatic efforts to address the crises in the United Nations and through the Military Armistice Commission caused the South Korean leaders to view U.S. intentions with increasing suspicion. Within a short period of time relations between the United States and the Republic of Korea had seriously deteriorated. In light of those developments, President Johnson decided to send a special envoy to South Korea. (Ibid., POL 7 US/VANCE)
On February 9 President Johnson wrote to President Pak confirming the appointment of Cyrus R. Vance as special envoy. Vance’s instructions from the President were to discuss “current common problems, to inform himself on the current critical situation, and to report back to me his findings and recommendations.” (Letter from President Johnson to President Pak, February 9; Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Korea, Park Correspondence, Vol. I) Immediately after release of a White House announcement of the appointment, Vance left for Korea. He was accompanied by Colonel Abbott C. Greenleaf, Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and by John P. Walsh, Deputy Executive Secretary, Daniel A. O’Donohue, Foreign Affairs Officer, and Maria E. Gardosik, Secretariat Assistant from the Department of State. The Vance mission arrived in Seoul on February 11 and departed on February 15. (Vance Mission to Korea, Chronology, February 8-15; ibid., Country File, Korea–Pueblo Incident, Vance Mission to Korea (A), February 9 to 15, 1968)
The importance of and the delicacy surrounding the Vance mission’s objectives of easing tensions and buttressing U.S. relations with the Republic of Korea was underscored by the Department of State’s rejection of the request by the Embassy in Japan for Vance to return to the United States via Tokyo to brief the Japanese on his findings in Korea. (Telegrams 5513 from Tokyo, February 10, and 113554 to Seoul and Tokyo, February 11; both National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 US/VANCE) In addition, Ambassador Porter, General Bonesteel, and Vance agreed that the latter should travel directly from Seoul to Washington, rather than proceeding to Saigon as President Johnson wished, so that the purpose of the mission was not diluted by other stops and issues. Because of the “depth of emotions in Seoul” and to eliminate any risk of affronting President Pak and other Korean leaders, Vance was to report the findings of his mission personally to President Johnson immediately upon his return to the United States. (Message from Rostow to Vance, February 13; ibid.; and telegram from Vance to Rostow, February 14; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea–Pueblo Incident, Miscellaneous, Vol. I)
 

166. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/
Seoul, February 9, 1968, 0955Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cactus.
4121. Ref: State 112452./2/
/2/See Document 164.
1. I called on PriMin this morning to discuss with him our plans for open and closed meetings. Foreign Minister also present.
2. Chong was obviously pleased at thought we would have open meeting, which might provide photographs and new comment sufficient to obscure in part at least fact of closed meeting. Foreign Minister again declared ROKG opposition to closed meetings which I countered with statement of our need keep this channel open.
3. They pressed me hard on question of envoy, saying his early arrival crucial in present situation. For first time they seemed as much concerned about President Park’s state of mind as with Assembly and public opinion. I told them that matter of envoy being considered and I might have something to say to them in near future. They then went off to see the President.
4. After their interview with him, Foreign Minister asked me to come very urgently to his office. He was alone and obviously in very agitated state of mind. He was still concerned about closed meetings and read me statement which he said he had written down at President’s request and which expressed ROK insistence that we hold only open sessions of MAC at Panmunjom. If open sessions are inconvenient in our effort for regaining wounded and crew of Pueblo and U.S. Government needs to continue closed meetings, ROK Government insists that ROK officer should accompany UNC representative to closed meeting. Their position has not changed on this. The Foreign Minister said he did his best but President used “very strong words” and position remained unchanged.
5. I said it was incomprehensible to us how ROK friends could insist on a move which would close the only channel available to us. Their alternative to this, as he knew, was to face their public opinion in Assembly, announce the full consultation we had had on this subject and state their agreement with us. He pleaded that at least we postpone the next closed meeting until after the envoy’s arrival. (Comment: On this last point I need to know your wishes soonest for we are withholding request for both open and closed meetings until hearing from you.)/3/
/3/The Department of State rejected the request, emphasizing that it was imperative that the United States “proceed with private seniors meeting as often as necessary to keep heat on North Koreans.” (Telegram 112650 to Seoul, February 9; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US)
6. Choi then made lengthy statement on very frustrating position that ROK Government finds itself in. “We have six hundred thousand men and we are not doing anything,” he declared, obviously reciting President’s line. (This was new for him. Hitherto he has been concerned only about Panmunjom meetings.) He declared President’s position is intolerable and that President does not know what United States will do if another NK raid takes place. Choi declared that we should quickly “negotiate pieces of paper” which will state exactly what would happen in way of retaliation in such circumstance. He said there should also be a direct joint public warning to NK stating clearly what would happen if there is another incident. This man was so distraught after his visit with President that I merely commented mildly that if we did what he said we would be signaling our intentions in a way which could benefit only the adversary. He said he could resign but that would not solve anything and he wanted to impress upon me that the things he was saying to me might be a “last warning.”
7. Here I recalled to him my statement to the President, to the Prime Minister and to the Foreign Minister earlier that in any circumstances regardless of provocation we expect full advance consultation on any measures they might envisage. He said that President Park kept repeating that every time he mentions need for retaliation I talk about advance consultation and the President feels very frustrated. I said that might be true but we have obligations to each other which we must not forget.
Porter
 
167. Paper Prepared in the Department of State/1/
Washington, undated.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea–Pueblo Incident, Vance Mission to Korea (B), February 9 to 15, 1968. Top Secret. Attached to a February 9 memorandum from Rostow to President Johnson. Rostow’s memorandum indicates that the President approved the instructions for Vance, which had also been approved by Rusk.
MISSION OF CYRUS R. VANCE
Special Instruction
You should arrange for a secret conversation with President Park with only his interpreter and/or personal assistant, Yi Hu-rak present. You should decide who should accompany you. You are to convey the following in any manner and with any elaboration you deem desirable.
1. The immediate release of the USS Pueblo and its crew is required to reduce quickly the tension in the area and the danger of war. This is of transcendent importance. But there is another aspect that is extremely important to President Johnson.
2. The country and the Congress have welcomed the President’s restraint in the face of this great provocation, just as it has welcomed President Park’s restraint in the face of the Blue House raid. If the crew and the vessel are not returned quickly, this will not only become a very serious matter between the U.S. and the North Koreans, but it can become a very serious matter on the American political scene. President Park knows the problem of free elections. This is an election year in the U.S., and the issue could become a major one in the campaign in such a way as to affect U.S.-ROK relations and our position in Southeast Asia. This is the second reason why the U.S. must do its utmost and use every possible means to obtain the immediate release of the crew and the vessel. The private meetings channel is at present the only one which offers any prospect of obtaining release and we must give it every opportunity to show whether it will produce results. We cannot throw this matter into open meetings of the Military Armistice Commission, or insist on a Republic of Korea representative attending the public meetings, which would certainly produce a breakdown of these talks.
3. The President is deeply appreciative of the closeness of the exchanges which have been taking place in this very grave situation. It reminds him of the close and continuing contacts between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill during World War II and he wants to keep it that way. The President understands President Park’s domestic problems and he wants President Park to understand his. There is no substitute for this personal trust and confidence at a time like this.
4. We are not going to abandon the Republic of Korea when the USS Pueblo and its crew are returned, but we will remain in Korea in even stronger force than before. President Johnson urges President Park to be calm and patient, not to permit any of his officers to engage in rash acts which might lead to fighting on the DMZ, which would create a wholly new set of problems and dangers and strains on our alliance, as well as interrupt the great progress that the Republic of Korea has been making under President Park.
 
168. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, United States Forces, Korea (Bonesteel) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp)/1/
Seoul, February 9, 1968, 1337Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea–Pueblo Incident, Vance Mission to Korea (B), February 9 to 15, 1968. Top Secret; Noforn; Eyes Only. Repeated to Wheeler who passed it to Rostow, Rusk, Helms, and each of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Attached to a February 9 memorandum from Rostow to President Johnson.
KRA 0513. 1. I have been deeply disturbed over last several days at growing irrationality in certain areas ROKG, most especially in President Park himself. Inputs in last day have confirmed that Park is almost irrationally obsessed with need to strike now at North Koreans, with sort of “apres moi le deluge” philosophy accentuated by our secret talks with NK at Panmunjom. You will see, I trust, AmEmb’s and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] reports on today’s developments/2/ but these are confirmed to some degree by inputs from MI sources indicating directives for planning for immediate retaliation in event NK raids, and info from CS/ROKAF that he fears he may receive orders from Blue House for unilateral air strikes, which he knows would be suicidal. We are taking all feasible preventive measures, which cannot be 100 percent, and I feel, or at least hope, ROK Chiefs of Staff would disobey such orders, due to numerous talks with them, except after violent NK provocation.
/2/See Documents 166 and 170.
2. However unreasonable Pres. Park’s obsessive drive may appear to Washington, I wish to state frankly that we have given him no real idea of what we intend to do or alternative courses, and so I believe we have brought large part of it on ourselves. It is absolutely essential, to my mind, that we give certain ROKs, including chiefs of services, some concept or strategy as to what we intend to do. They know we are making contingency plans, but they do not know what, where, when or why and in meantime our actions are highly confusing to them. Responsible ROKs, and I include military chiefs among these, are scared at recent turn of emotions in Pres. Park’s and a few others’ minds. They know full well that ROK cannot survive without genuine US support.
But they have no clear idea what we mean to do, and suspect we do not either, on next phases of action. This is not fear only of US compromise but equally that we might take some militarily provocative action that would precipitate war without their having taken even most elemental steps to safeguard their population or to mobilize their military strength. The only plan that we advance to ROKs is first a peaceful try to get back Pueblo crew (which does not impress anyone here as moving very fast especially since we seem to be withdrawing military power) while we build military power, then second, if Pueblo crew not returned some sort of action.
3. One Korean wag characterizes our concept of “the steel fist in the velvet glove,” as “the silken fist in silken glove.”/3/
/3/Reference is to the U.S. policy adopted toward the North Koreans in the wake of the seizure of the Pueblo; see Document 237.
4. Our inscrutable policy combined with Kim Il-Song’s speech last night on 20th anniversary of Korean Peoples Army (reported by FBIS and on news service broadcasts) in which he says, among other things, that “situation shows war can be touched off by US imperialists any moment”–these two factors do not help ROK sanity at moment. (We can see effective psywar of nerves in Kim’s speech, but not all ROKs are so “sophisticated.”)
5. UNC/USFK have studied CINCPAC TS Noforn message 030154Z Feb 68/4/ and believe US military contingency planning is fine but can find in it no inkling of strategic concept we could express to ROKs which would enable them to know what mobilization or civil defense planning or implementation steps to take [garble] when to take care of their 30 million people, their homes or their industry. Only guidance I have is State message saying do not let them mobilize their reserve divisions at this time. I fully agree with guidance, but would like to be able to give ROKs some rationale.
/4/Not found.
6. Noforn messages we get do not seem to appreciate there are at least three, not one, unknowns in situation here. Most seem oriented primarily on what would happen if NKs took certain overt initiatives. We in USFK are not flapping here, but we would like some greater consideration of, first, what if ROKs take unilateral initiatives. Second, what if NKs deliberately provoke ROK unilateral initiative, and third, what if US actions, which we have not conveyed to ROKs in sufficiently timely fashion, provoke unexpected NK reaction. ROKs are most scared of possible NK unconventional guerrilla raid offensive and believe this inevitable if US does not take strong stand soon.
7. I have tried for some days now to express in more formal language the Mad Hatter’s tea party atmosphere among high-level ROKs here. Forgive my reverting to the vernacular, but most seriously it will be very important that Cy Vance come here prepared to answer in some way the questions of what the US is prepared to do, particularly re stopping NK infiltration threat by threat of force if necessary, and the what, when, where and why type of questions including some of ROK mobilization and civil defense. He should also be prepared, if necessary, to talk turkey re unilateral ROK retaliation at this time. Finally, if we could turn the visit into a sort of a minor session like Roosevelt-Churchill strategy talks at Argentina early in WWII some constructive results may be obtained. What is happening in Saigon is not making Pres. Park any more calm.
8. I have not shown this message to Amb Porter tonight but will show him first thing tomorrow.
 
169. Memorandum Prepared by the Department of State/1/
Washington, February 9, 1968.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret. A handwritten note on the memorandum reads: “Pres. approved &added points directly to Vance 2/10. BHR [Read] from WWR [Rostow]” A typed note on the memorandum indicates it was approved by Rusk.
SUBJECTThemes for the Mission of Cyrus Vance
1. To persuade President Park that we attach as much importance to the North Korean provocations against South Korea as we do to the return of the USS Pueblo and crew.
2. To make Park understand we do not see the issue in Korea as a double problem, one involving the U.S. in its attempts to obtain the release of the USS Pueblo and its crew, and one involving the Republic of Korea in the face of North Korean provocations. The provocations against the Republic of Korea are a problem for both countries, not just the Republic of Korea, and the USS Pueblo is not just our problem but requires South Korean cooperation to be resolved.
3. To explain to Park that we are committed to using peaceful means to resolve both sets of problems and until we have clearly abandoned hope for a peaceful settlement we must reserve judgment as to further courses of action.
4. To ask Park publicly and privately to associate himself with our view that he too seeks a peaceful solution.
5. To obtain a reaffirmation that the authority of General Bonesteel and the chain of command will be absolutely observed.
6. To impress on Park that just as we will not take unilateral reprisal actions against the North Koreans in the present, tense situation without full advance consultation with him, we expect that no unilateral reprisal actions will be taken by the Republic of Korea, organized or spontaneous, without full advance consultation with us, and to inform him that such ROK actions could well alienate American and world opinion and destroy the very foundation of both the ROK case and our case and endanger support for our alliance.
7. To convince Park that we must pursue private meetings with the North Koreans to obtain release of crew and vessel, until we are convinced that further talks of this kind are fruitless and we must look to other courses of action.
8. To make Park understand that the attachment of a South Korean to the private meetings is impossible because the North Koreans will not accept it and if we make an issue of this it will terminate the private meetings.
9. To make Park understand that open meetings of the Military Armistice Commission will not solve either the provocation problem or the Pueblo. It is a propaganda forum.
10. To make Park understand that when the Pueblo Case is settled we will not return to the status quo but by our actions in providing additional military and counter-infiltration assistance and by keeping augmented forces in and around South Korea we will display our determination to stand with the ROKs.
11. To stress to President Park that the continuing public evidence of differences between us, any threat to return units from Viet-Nam, any indication of unilateral action by South Korea against the North will only play into the hands of the North Koreans.
12. To show Park that we have played the game with him in full trust and confidence and we expect full trust and confidence from him.
 
170. Message From the Central Intelligence Agency
Seoul, February 9, 1968.
[Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/OASD/ISA Files: FRC 91-0017, Korea 092 (Sensitive). Secret; Eyes Only. 3 pages of source text not declassified.]
 
171. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/
Seoul, February 10, 1968, 0350Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Flash; Nodis; Cactus.
4129. Ref: State 111264./2/
/2/Document 159.
1. I went to Blue House this morning to receive letter which President Park proposed to send to President Johnson in reply to message contained reftel. After reading text I said that as friend I wanted to make some comments to him and particularly with regard to phrases demanding immediate retaliatory action and warning of punitive action by UN forces if NKs do not acknowledge their aggression, apologize and give guarantees for future. I said such phraseology was not well designed to meet problems of my President and I had suggestions to offer. (These suggestions of course involved considerable toning down and elimination of phraseology, and after hour and half of wrangling I finally induced him to hold letter and reconsider entire approach.)
2. He burst out on several occasions declaring that I was emasculating all of his ideas. I said all of his ideas expressed orally had been transmitted and were receiving attention highest levels in Washington, but I had to emphasize to him that it was a mistake to put these things in writing. To mention but one complication reference to the UNC automatically involved many friendly nations and this had to be considered very carefully. I left them (President and SecGen) with understanding they would redraft letter but I am not sure that Park will not reinsert phraseology which he personally inserted in first place. It may be that they will hold the letter until after Vance visit or may even try to hand it to Vance to carry to the President.
3. He expressed appreciation President Johnson sending Mr. Vance here but made it clear that he is hoping for some indications of decisive course of action.
4. We will transmit text of draft letter separately for your information. I repeat it was to be redrafted and was not signed when I was at Blue House.
5. To enable CINCPAC to properly estimate atmosphere suggest, if you perceive no objection, that it be re-transmitted to him./3/
/3/Transmitted in telegram 113573 to CINCPAC, February 10. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US)
Porter
 
172. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Commander of United States Forces, Korea (Bonesteel)/1/
Honolulu, February 10, 1968, 0400Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea–Pueblo Incident, Military Cables, Vol. II, February 1968 to March 1968. Top Secret; Noforn; Eyes Only. Repeated to Wheeler who passed it to Rostow, Rusk, Helms, and to each of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
100400Z. A. COMUSKOREA KRA 0513/091337Z Feb 68;//2/ B. CINCPAC 030154Z Feb 68 (Genser)./3/
/2/Document 168.
/3/Not found.
1. In various dispatches, the latest of which is Ref A, you have expressed a need to inform the ROKs of our strategy in the present situation. In paragraph 5 of Ref A you indicate that you believe US military contingency planning as expressed by CINCPAC in Ref B is fine but can find in it no inkling of a strategic concept you could express to ROKs.
2. In the wealth of dispatches regarding the current situation, which are too numerous to tabulate, it would seem to me that our strategy is clear. I will give it to you briefly as I see it. The United States intends to accomplish the return of the Pueblo crew by diplomatic means without becoming embroiled in a second front war in Korea. We also hope to have the Pueblo itself returned through diplomatic means, although return of the ship is less important than return of the crew. We do not intend to take any military course of action for return of the Pueblo crew because we know of no action that offers any promise of getting the Pueblo crew back alive. The buildup of air and naval units is designed to support our diplomatic efforts while at the same time increasing our readiness.
3. You have not been permitted to discuss our strategy with the ROKs because such discussion would run the risk of upsetting our careful and deliberate course of action. When the United States decides to use its military force, if it does, you will be notified in time that you may further notify the ROKs. Until that time you will need to keep higher levels of the ROK Government calmed down to the best of your ability.
4. The United States does not want any unilateral action by the ROKs which would upset negotiations for return of the Pueblo crew or involve the United States in armed action in Korea. It should be further apparent that United States Armed Forces are fully employed in Vietnam and that people of the United States are not prepared to see their country involved in a second war.
5. I am sure you realize as I do that we have no intention of allowing the ROKs to get us involved in a war of their choosing, and we expect to control the situation to insure that they don’t. Our participation in any armed action that they start is not automatic. One of your greatest chores at the moment is to keep things calmed down and under control and I realize perfectly that you are not able to convey much information to the ROKs that will assist you in satisfying them.
6. US strategy as I have outlined it to you in the paragraphs above is not the result of any specific guidance from the JCS but rather my own estimate.
 
173. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/
Seoul, February 10, 1968, 0410Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Flash; Nodis; Cactus. A retyped copy of this telegram was given to President Johnson under a February 10 covering memorandum from Rostow that indicates the President saw the telegram. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea–Pueblo Incident–Cactus IV, Cactus Miscellaneous Papers, February to December 1968)
4131. Refs: A) State 111264 B) Seoul 4129./2/
/2/Documents 159 and 171.
1. Following is text of letter which President Park proposed to send President Johnson in response to latter’s letter (reftel). Ambassador’s comments on letter and his meeting with President contained Ref B. Following text is provided on FYI basis only. Letter was not signed by Park and although Yi Hu-rak may anticipate that we will transmit it, it has no official standing./3/
/3/The letter, February 9, sent to President Johnson contained minor differences from this text. A translation of the official, signed letter is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Korea, Park Correspondence, Vol. I.
2. Begin text. Dear Mr. President:
Yesterday, I received your kind letter which has given details of your views again through Ambassador Porter.
I understand your view that the Pueblo incident, a question of immediate concern to you, should be dealt with separately “in somewhat different perspectives” and with differing tactics from the longer run question of ensuring the security of the Republic of Korea as you have termed.
However, the North Korean commandos’ intrusion into Seoul has given such a particular and serious impact upon my people that an alien would find it hard to grasp it fully and the indignant feelings of my people against the North Korean Communists seem to have reached the apex.
Although it is understandable to me that you are seeking an earliest possible solution to the question of the Pueblo, you will no doubt know that my personal understanding cannot be equated with that of my fellow countrymen as you may have experienced yourself in dealing with various problems such as the Vietnam war. If Your Excellency considers it absolutely necessary to have further closed meetings with the North Koreans in order to have the crew of the Pueblo back, it is likewise necessary for us to have your assurances on the following points:
1. The problem of the North Korean raiders’ incursion on Seoul, as separate from the question of the Pueblo, will be brought before the Military Armistice Commission meetings in the immediately near future.
2. And we lodge a protest with the North Koreans; press them to admit the aggressive act, apologize for it and pledge that such an act will not be repeated in the future.
3. In case the North Koreans refuse to accept this:/4/
/4/The final version contained the added phrase “and change their attitude.”
A. The United Nations forces take an immediate retaliatory action;/5/
/5/This paragraph was changed to read: “The Republic of Korea and the United States Forces take an immediate retaliatory action in accordance with the provisions of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the two countries.”
B. And at the same time, issue a formal warning to them that the United Nations forces will take immediate punitive action should they continue to make resort to such actions in the future./6/
/6/This paragraph was revised to read: “And at the same time, issue a formal warning to them that the Republic of Korea and the United States Forces will take immediate punitive action, if the North Koreans make resort to such actions again in the future.”
These, I believe, are the minimum measures/7/ for ensuring the security of the Republic of Korea.
/7/In the final version the word “required” was inserted here.
I know Your Excellency is concerned with the security of our country more greatly than anyone else and are taking measures/8/ to strengthen our national defense. This I appreciate always.
/8/This phrase was changed to read “and have taken measures.”
But a fact remains that the infiltrations by the North Koreans into the South have increased, not decreased, since the Armistice although we have done our utmost to strengthen our defense capability. Therefore, I want you to understand the increasingly keener awareness among my people that increased defense capability alone will not/9/ be complete in solving the problem of our security.
/9/This section was modified to read “that strengthened defense alone will not.”
If we are to dissuade the North Koreans from their aggressive acts, simultaneously assuaging the wrath of my people, we should make the North Koreans fully recognize our resolute determination that we will not allow them to commit an aggressive act without subjecting themselves to/10/ immediate punitive action.
/10/In the final letter the word “our” was inserted at this point.
What I have so far outlined above is related to the measures for ensuring the security of my country, for which you have shown such a great concern, and I do not think that there may be any point of disagreement with you.
In summation, I am sure, that the security of the Republic of Korea rests on:
1. Strengthening/11/ our defense capability to such an extent where we maintain an absolute supremacy over the North, and
/11/At this point in the final letter the word “of” was inserted.
2. Driving it home to the North Koreans that an aggressive act will be met with immediate, stern punitive action.
If the North Koreans feel free that they can act on a premise that aggression against the South can be committed with impunity, no increase in our defense capability will give complete solution to our cardinal problem, an effective guarantee against any re-invasion by the North./12/
/12/President Johnson responded to this letter on February 28 in the aftermath of the Vance visit to Seoul. The President wrote that Vance had thoroughly discussed the issues contained in this letter while in Seoul and immediately upon his return had made recommendations for the President to consider. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Korea, Park Correspondence, Vol. I)
With my warmest good wishes,
Sincerely, /s/Park Chung Hee. End text.
Porter
 
174. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/
Seoul, February 10, 1968, 1110Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cactus. A typed copy of this telegram was given to President Johnson under a February 10 covering memorandum from Rostow that indicates that the President saw the telegram. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea–Pueblo Incident–Cactus IV, Cactus Miscellaneous Papers, February to December 1968)
4142. Subject: ROKG Plans for Vance Visit.
1. Stating he acting on instructions from FonMin, MOFA International Affairs Bureau Director called Pol Counselor to his office to discuss subjects ROKs will wish to raise with Vance.
2. He led into this subject by stating that ROKG is placing great expectations on Vance’s visit, which could be real turning point in ROK/US relations. He said ROKG and entire Korean people hoped that Vance, a special emissary of President Johnson, would not let ROK down, and in this context he referred to “failure” of 1953 visit under similar tense circumstances by Asst Secty Walter Robertson.
3. He then alluded to the fact that MOFA had been instructed by Blue House to prepare position paper for Vance and general outline of joint Park/Vance communique and USG/ROK joint declaration. He said that latter two should deal with three major points: 다음 그는 벤스를 위한 지위문서를 준비하기 위해 청와대에 의해 지시된 모파와 박/벤스공동커뮤니케의 일반윤곽과 미한공동선언에 대한 사실을 언급했다. 그는 나중에 두가지는 3가지 주요사안과 함께다루자고 말했다.
A. The question of Operational Control: He said that ROKs understood need to have CINCUNC retain operational control of ROK forces but that there should be some change in rules of game. It seemed strange, he said, to ROK that when intruders penetrated deep into ROK territory, ROK military commanders should have to seek CINC’s permission to use ROK combat troops to destroy intruding forces. System should be changed to permit ROK commanders immediately to deploy against intruders, perhaps notifying CINCUNC that ROK forces had been withdrawn from his operational control for such purposes. Furthermore, when intruders ventured into ROK territory and were engaged by ROK and US forces, rules of game should permit application of principle of hot pursuit; ROKs should not have to stop south of MDL.
작통권에 대한 질문: 그는 말했다. 한국정부는 유엔사령관이 한국군에 대한 작전통제권을 가질 필요가 있다고 이해하고 있다. 그러나 게임의 룰을 약간 바꿔야 할것이다. 한국영토안 으로 깊이 침입자들이 공격했을 때 한국군사령부는 침략세력파괴을 위한 한국전투부대사용을 위해 총사령관의 허가를 구해야하는 한국에 대한 그의 설명은 기묘하게 보였다. 침입자에 대항한 즉각적인 배치에 대해 한국사령관을 허가하기 위해 시스템을 바꿔야 할 것이다. 아마도 그같은 목적을 위해 한국군은 그의 작통권으로부터 벗어나 있었던 것을 유엔사령관에 통지하는 것으로, 또한 침입자들이 한국영토안으로 모험을 해왔을 때나 한국군과 미군에 의해 개입될 때 게임의 룰은 맹렬한 추적의 원칙을 적용하도록 허락해야 할 것이다.: 한국은 군사분계선 남측에서 정지하지 않을 것이다.

B. Punitive Measures: US and ROK should make it clear to enemy and to rest of world that they will not permit North Korea conduct aggressive acts against ROK without fear of retaliation. US and ROK should announce that if intrusions continue, they will physically punish NK by striking at root source of NK aggression. Not only should this warning be made unequivocally clear in words of the governments, but some punitive action must be taken next time North Koreans strike. He suggested that NK guerrilla training camps might make suitable targets and said that if they were wiped out it would not mean local much less general war.
C. US Commitment: He said that most sophisticated Koreans are aware that President Johnson has authority to order US forces into combat without explicit Congressional approval and that ROK and RVN would not exist today were this not so. ROK populace, however, suffers from trauma from Korean War which has been reopened by US unwillingness to take military action following Blue House raid and Pueblo incident. People doubt that US will actually commit its forces to defend them in case NK aggression continues and are especially concerned over language in Mutual Defense Treaty which says that each party will act in “accordance to its constitutional process.” What is needed, he said, is some flat statement in document to which USG is party which spells out fact that President Johnson can commit US forces without time-consuming Congressional debate and approval./2/
/2/In a later discussion with Porter the Foreign Minister referred to a 1953 secret agreement between the United States and Korea of which Porter had no knowledge. (Telegram 4177 from Seoul, February 12; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US) Other ROKG officials and the Korean media made reference to a U.S. arrangement with the Philippines as well as to the NATO agreement, both of which committed the United States to respond automatically to any acts of aggression against those partners. The Koreans wanted the same type of unequivocal statement in their defense agreement with the United States. (Telegram 4159 from Seoul, February 12; ibid.) The Department of State responded that the U.S. Government had “made no secret defense commitments to either Korea or Philippines” quoting official statements that an armed attack against the Philippines would be considered an armed attack against the United States, which it believed the Koreans may have had in mind when making their demands. (Telegram 113906 to Seoul, February 12; ibid.) The issue continued to be raised by Korean officials. (Telegram 4596 from Seoul, February 29, and airgram A-431 from Seoul, March 7; both ibid., DEF 4 KOR S-US)
4. Pol Counselor led him carefully through all the difficulties which surround each of propositions. Director agreed that ROKG was aiming겨냥 high, but held firmly단호히 to position that something dramatic of nature he had described must come out of Vance’s visit.
Porter
 
175. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea/1/
Washington, February 11, 1968, 2335Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cactus. Drafted by Rusk, cleared by Rostow and Houdek (S/S), and approved by Rusk. The TOVAN and VANTO designator was used to identify확인,인지 cable traffic to and from Vance in Seoul.
113671. TOVAN 12. Eyes only for Vance from Rusk.
1. Please ask Ambassador Porter to show you my Nodis 110828/2/ as background for your talk with President Park.
/2/Document 157.
2. The views contained therein are a fair reflection of the problems of public and Congressional opinion toward Korea which we would have here if the Koreans themselves are not careful. This type of material should not be used by you as a direct threat from one President to another but it should be used with great force to expose the kinds of problems which our President will face in trying to maintain our support for the Republic of Korea. On that basis, you can be very tough indeed because the problems are real.
3. If the matter of reduced ROK participation in Viet-Nam comes up, you should not hesitate to point out that that would require a reduced US participation in Korea. A ROK division in Viet-Nam can only be replaced by a US division now in Korea. Further, Viet-Nam is where the battle is, and from a military point of view the problem of infiltration can be handled by the large forces present in South Korea. Of course, if North Korea launches an all-out invasion, that is another ballgame. But it is not in our interest, or in the interest of the Republic of Korea, to have another all-out war in Korea. Hence, it is folly for the South Koreans to take steps which would translate an infiltration problem into general hostilities. It’s easy to get into such hostilities but very hard to bring them to a successful conclusion./3/
/3/President Johnson also wanted to instruct Vance to “request Korean permission for Westy [Westmoreland] to redeploy Korean forces if necessary; and indicate urgency of requirement for extra Korean division in Viet Nam.” (Memoranda from Rostow to President Johnson, February 12; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea–Pueblo Incident, Vance Mission to Korea(B), February 9 to 15, 1968) Rusk opposed adding the issue to those already to be raised by Vance. The President agreed “most reluctantly” to send this cable without an instruction to raise the question of the additional division. (Memoranda and draft telegram, February 12; ibid., State Department Cables, Vol. II, February 1968)
4. If President Park attempts to extract commitments which go beyond the terms of our Treaty of Alliance, you should state quite simply that no alteration of that treaty lies within the constitutional power of our President. The treaty stands as agreed and is the primary source of the Republic of Korea’s ability to maintain itself as a secure and independent nation. It is elementary, for example, that our President cannot remove the phrase “in accordance with its constitutional processes” from a Treaty of Alliance. We cannot entertain suspicions about the loyalty of the United States to its alliances at a time when we have just lost 900 killed in a ten-day period in Viet-Nam in the course of demonstrating our fidelity.
5. Your object is to combine an assurance to President Park of our steadiness and seriousness of purpose with an understanding on his side that we, too, have national interests engaged in the safety of his country and in peace in Northeast Asia. We expect from him the same degree of cooperation that he expects from us. If we each have internal public problems, which differ somewhat, the point is that our two Presidents should in consultation decide how to proceed in a way to deal with both sets of problems. We cannot give overriding priority to his problems if, by doing so, we undermine the very basis of US support to the Republic of Korea.
6. All this means (a) we must maintain our war effort in Viet-Nam (b) we must use available channels at Panmunjom to free Pueblo and crew (c) we must act together to insure security of Korea (d) we must not take action on our side to convert infiltration problem into a major war if it can be avoided and (e) we must each give leadership in our own countries to press and public opinion in the interest of our common purposes.
Rusk

176. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/
Seoul, February 12, 1968, 1147Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea–Pueblo Incident–Cactus IIa, Cactus Seoul Cables, February 10 to February 28, 1968. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cactus. Attached to a February 12 memorandum from Rostow to President Johnson, that indicates the President saw the telegram. Telegram 4178 from Seoul, February 12, also attached to Rostow’s memorandum is discussed below.
4176. VANTO 5. Cyrus Vance, accompanied by Ambassador Porter, General Bonesteel, and John Walsh, conferred with President Park for 5-1/2 hours today. Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Defense Minister and CIA Director also participated./2/
/2/Telegram 117405 to Seoul, February 18, and telegrams 117522, 117523, and 117531 to Seoul, all February 19, contain a detailed, five-part report of this meeting. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 US/VANCE)
Lengthy session provided useful relief value for ROK emotions. Tensions gradually eased as dialogue was established. Park reiterated at length themes made familiar by reports of Ambassador Porter and General Bonesteel in fatalistic and simplistic terms. While the President’s sincerity was not in doubt it was evident that his specific proposals were the product of emotion rather than finished staff work.
Park charged with deep conviction that Kim Il-Sung is on path of war. The rate of violation of the Armistice Agreement has increased markedly. The attack on the Blue House designed to kill him and his family and the seizure of the Pueblo were acts of war. The North Koreans have thousands of trained infiltrators and further serious penetrations are inevitable in the spring. They intend to harass the South Korean people, disrupt the economy and, when the country is sufficiently weakened, resort to all out war. They will only respect counterforce. They should be warned of the consequences of further violations, asked to apologize for past actions, and requested to promise not to violate the armistice agreement in the future. In addition we should publicly state that any future violations will be met by immediate retaliation. All courses of action in the present situation are dangerous but Park did not believe that retaliation would provoke the DRNK to war. Firmness and resolution are imperative in the present situation. The US world position depends upon firmness in face of Communist pressure. If we are weak here we will pay for it in the form of Communist aggression elsewhere.
On the Panmunjom issue, Park feared Kim Il-Sung would delay and stall the negotiations in order to humiliate the US and therefore ROK. He wished to know what the US would do under those circumstances in order to calm his people. He was worried and displeased by the indications by high officials that the Pueblo could have been in North Korean territorial waters and by Senator Mansfield’s recommendations that the issue be submitted to the ICJ. These statements and the absence of ROK participation at Panmunjom aroused ROK suspicions about the negotiations. Nevertheless, he would not oppose the continuation of secret talks providing he had an assurance that infiltration would stop.
Throughout the lengthy discussion Vance calmly and sympathetically strove for a dialogue with the President, probed for specificity, pointed out the weakness and dangers of Park’s options, explained US policy, reiterated the commonality of US-ROK interests, warned of the dangers of precipitate and unilateral action, and sought for a common, satisfactory course of action.
While the jury remained out at the end of the session, the atmosphere was friendly and the ROKs appeared to recognize that we would not agree to a policy of retaliation. Despite press reports to the contrary, the ROKs did not raise issue of revision of Mutual Defense Treaty or of seeking to disengage from the operational control of CINCUNC.
반대보고서를 발표했음에도 불구하고 한국은 상호방위조약개정 또는 유엔사령관의 작통권으로부터 벗어나는 시도하는 이슈를 제기하지 않았다.
Clearly, however, we have much serious talk ahead of us before we will know the outcome of this mission. We will submit a draft communique tonight./3/ Tomorrow morning we will meet with the Foreign and other Ministers and probably in the late afternoon with the President.
/3/Telegram 4178 (VANTO 7) from Seoul, February 12, stated that the draft communique “will fall far short of ROK ambitions and a substantial wrangle is in the offing.” In telegram 114006 to Seoul (TOVAN 20), February 12, the Department of State forwarded cleared language for use in the communique. (Ibid., POL 33-6 KOR N-US) The Embassy later reported that “ten hours of exhausting exchanges were required” to agree on the wording of the communique, with which neither side was fully satisfied. (Telegram 4242 from Seoul, February 15, also telegram 4229 from Seoul, February 14; both ibid., POL 7 US/VANCE) The joint communique issued on February 15 is in Department of State Bulletin, March 11, 1968, pp. 344-345.
Porter
 
177. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea/1/
Washington, February 12, 1968, 2029Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 US/VANCE. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cactus. Drafted by Berger, cleared by Read and Steadman, and approved by Katzenbach.
113833. TOVAN 19.
1. We assume that major North Korean purposes in stepping up DMZ incidents, infiltration and sabotage, and staging Blue House raid were to unnerve South Koreans, get them to return their forces, or some of them, from Viet-Nam or inhibit them from sending additional forces.
2. If these assumptions correct, North Koreans would crow with victory if South Koreans fell into this trap. North Koreans would propagandize that rising popular dissension in South Korea forced the Pak government to give up plans to send more troops to Viet-Nam and even forced them to bring back South Korean forces to put down a popular uprising.
3. It follows from this thread of argument that when things settle down in South Korea, Pak could win a moral and psychological victory over Kim Il-Sung, show his contempt for Kim, and confidence in himself and his country, if he could announce that additional forces will be sent to Viet-Nam. If Pak stands firm in Viet-Nam, and avoids precipitate action in Korea all that North Koreans will have achieved will be greatly heightened worldwide understanding of North Korean harassment of ROK, large increase in US military assistance to ROK with resultant strengthening of ROK military and anti-infiltration forces, and augmentation of US deterrent forces in South Korea.
4. A second purpose of Kim Il-Sung in stepping up violence against North [South] Korea was to interrupt its social and economic progress. Since South Korean people support Park and are active in informing police and military of presence of strangers, the North Koreans have no chance of successfully establishing guerrilla units in the south. Raiders are nasty business, but no real threat to the stability of South Korea, since most of them are killed or captured.
5. The temptation to strike back in reprisal is understandable,/2/ but it will produce no decisive outcome. The danger in retaliatory or punitive air attacks against North Korea is that they could invite air attacks against the South. If Pyongyang or other NK site is hit, what is to prevent an attack against Seoul or some other site? Action and counter-action could lead to resumed fighting along the DMZ, but both sides are too strong to move successfully against each other in this area. The end result would be to call off the reprisal policy, after physical damage had been done to both sides and a period of fighting in the DMZ with no decisive result (it would not end infiltration), or move to full scale war. None of these outcomes is in the South Korean or our interest.
/2/During a February 12 meeting the Prime Minister told Vance that “the real issue is to determine what lies behind these two North Korean actions” and raised the question of “whether the ROKG should delay making an appropriate response or whether it should `strike now at the source of the problem.’” (Telegram 4170 from Seoul, February 12; ibid.) Similarly, the Foreign Minister stated that the two incidents were of such seriousness as to be “`tantamount to invoking the Mutual Defense Treaty.’” (Telegram 4171 from Seoul, February 12; ibid.) Vance made no direct response to those comments.
6. We may in the end be forced to take reprisal actions, but they should be deliberate not hasty, and South Korea’s defenses and cities should be prepared for the possible consequences.
7. South Korea has made magnificent economic, social and political progress in these last years. All this would be interrupted and endangered by an escalation of violence due to reprisals or limited war. Private American investors are already hesitating to move into South Korea until the situation clarifies. Is not the best course, therefore, to return to the uneasy situation that existed prior to the seizure of the Pueblo and the Blue House raid, strengthen further the ROK capacity to deal with raiders, and make it even more costly to the North, strengthen the military arm of the ROK, keep a stronger US force in the area if tension persists as an additional warning and deterrent, send the new Korean forces into Viet-Nam, and continue with South Korea’s economic and social progress.
8. Assume you are thinking along the same lines, but we pass them to you for your consideration.
Rusk
 
178. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/
Seoul, February 13, 1968, 1316Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 US/VANCE. Secret; Flash; Nodis; Cactus.
4207. VANTO 8. Cyrus Vance, accompanied by Ambassador Porter, General Bonesteel, John Walsh and Colonel Greenleaf met for 2 and 1/2 hours this morning with the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Defense Minister, Information Minister, CIA Director, and Chief JCS. Session was intense, frank, spirited, and we believe helpful to both sides. Under existing circumstances each side felt constrained to get certain issues out on the table. This was done without excessive rancor.
The discussion, which was identified by the Ministers as consultations under our joint mutual security treaty, ranged widely over varied aspects of US commitments and performance in the postwar world, the origins of the Korean War, US-Korean relations, US assistance to Korea, Korean participation in the Vietnam struggle, problems of Korean public opinion, Panmunjom Communist objectives, overt and covert Communist threats to Korea, and the tactics of dealing with indirect North Korean aggression. After several hours of give-and-take, the ROKs expressed full confidence that the US would respond in the event of overt aggression and that further discussions would be limited to the problem of indirect aggression and the method of dealing with it.
Vance at this point said the next question to be addressed was whether it was possible to define in advance what degree of indirect aggression required counter reaction which of course carries with it the risk of war. Vance said he had long reflected on this problem and had concluded that it was impossible to do so. He had therefore concluded that the best course to pursue in the event of further incidents of indirect aggression is to consult and then jointly determine what action should be taken in light of all existing circumstances. Furthermore, he said, in our democracy we must operate under the Mutual Defense Treaty ratified by Congress. President can only take action under this treaty. For the moment, at least, the Koreans seemed to agree.
At the end of the meeting the Foreign Minister presented two documents to Vance, an “agreed minutes” and a “joint defense declaration.” These documents which are transmitted in septel raise most serious legal and funding issues./2/ After pointing out the serious legal problems embodied in these documents, Vance agreed to study them and discuss them in a meeting scheduled for tomorrow. We intend reject these documents for the reasons cited and endeavor reach agreement on the draft communique contained State’s 114006–VANTO 7./3/ We would like your views by 0900 local tomorrow whether, if necessary for reaching agreement on our communique, we could agree to an annual defense meeting at the ministerial level with first meeting beginning 1969./4/
/2/The texts of the documents were transmitted in telegram 4208 from Seoul, February 13. (Ibid.)
/3/See footnote 3, Document 176.
/4/The Department of State rejected the proposed Joint Defense Declaration and approved the inclusion in the joint communique of references to consultations between the Secretary of Defense and the Minister of National Defense. The response also noted that the communique “might usefully include” a bilateral reaffirmation of both countries’ commitment to Vietnam. (Telegram 114713, February 13; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US)
A detailed report on this meeting will be submitted separately./5/
/5/Telegrams 116984, 117381, and 117382 to Seoul, all February 17, transmitted a detailed, three-part report of Vance’s meeting with the Korean Cabinet. (Ibid., POL 7 US/VANCE) On February 13 Vance also met briefly with majority and minority leaders of the National Assembly. (Telegram 4209 from Seoul, February 13; ibid.)
Porter
 
179. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/
Seoul, February 14, 1968, 0603Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea–Pueblo Incident–Cactus IIa, Cactus Seoul Cables, February 10 to February 28, 1968. Secret; Flash; Nodis; Cactus. Attached to a February 14 memorandum from Rostow to President Johnson, that indicates the President saw the telegram.
4215. VANTO 12. Ref: Seoul 4207/2/ and 4208,/3/ VANTO 8 and 9. Subject: Vance Meeting with Korean Cabinet: 1000, February 14, 1968.
/2/Document 178.
/3/See footnote 2, Document 178.
Cyrus Vance, accompanied by Ambassador Porter, General Bone- steel, John Walsh, and Colonel Greenleaf met this morning for 1-1/2 hours with Prime Minister Chung, Foreign Minister Choi, Defense Minister Kim, Information Minister Hong, Principal Presidential Secretary Yi Hu-rak, Director ROK CIA Kim, General Im, CJCS, and several of their staff assistants. The meeting, which was again frank and candid, seemed to result in tacit agreement by the Koreans that the “joint defense statement” and “agreed minutes” which they tabled yesterday were not negotiable (see Seoul 4208). Although their reaction was subdued when Vance tabled our draft communique (State 114006),/4/ they did not take issue with its substance in part because the Prime Minister clearly intends to submit it to President Park.
/4/See footnote 3, Document 176.
The most significant exchanges took place in a short private session between Vance, Porter, Prime Minister and principal Presidential Secretary Yi Hu-rak. At this session, Prime Minister recommended that Vance meet alone with President Park and explain to him that President Johnson has grave domestic problems, similar to Park’s and two President’s should stand together at this time. Yi Hu-rak and Chung urged Vance to make clear to Park that he must not take unilateral action against North Korea. Such action would only destroy the economy and hopes of Korea. Furthermore, Vance should emphasize to Park that unilateral action would seriously endanger continuing US support.
When Chung stated that National Assembly pressure might force his government to withdraw their troops from Vietnam, Vance told him flatly we would reciprocate by withdrawing our troops from Korea. He gasped, sputtered and immediately went out and brought Yi Hu-rak into the meeting. Vance also made it quite clear to the Prime Minister that, if we fail to reach agreement on the issues before us, there would be serious US domestic reactions in respect to Korea.
After returning to the full session, it was agreed that the Foreign Minister would convey this afternoon to the Mission the Cabinet’s reaction to the communique. It was also agreed that Vance, accompanied by Porter, would meet with President Park tomorrow morning, hopefully at 1000 hours.
A detailed report follows septel./5/
/5/See footnote 5, Document 178.
Porter
 
180. Notes of the President’s Meeting With Cyrus R. Vance/1/
Washington, February 15, 1968, 6:06-7 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson Meeting Notes, Cyrus Vance Meeting. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House.
The President: All of us are deeply grateful to you, Cy, for all you have done.
Mr. Vance: The Joint Communique was issued at 1 o’clock today Seoul time. In the meeting this morning, I had difficulty with President Pak about issuing a joint communique. He was against a communique.
Meeting with President Pak, the Prime Minister and others this morning/2/ was in dramatic contrast with the meeting I had with Pak and the Cabinet when I arrived in Seoul. Tensions were high when I arrived. When I left, Pak put his arm around me and thanked me for coming. In terms of the basic objectives of easing tension and getting a friendly relationship re-established, the mission was a success. This was in evidence even with the press at the airport when I left.
/2/Telegram 4315 from Seoul, February 17, contains a detailed report of that meeting. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 US/VANCE)
In the long run, however, the picture is very dangerous.
The President: Before we get any further, what did we do to provoke the anger and hostility?
Mr. Vance: Because we did not permit any retaliatory action on the attack on Blue House. The depth of feeling over that is very deep. It was considered a personal affront and a loss of face. They considered it very serious that the raiders got within 300 yards of Blue House bent upon killing the President and his family.
The President: Does Pak blame us for that?
Mr. Vance: Yes, to some extent, because they got through the guards.
Pak wanted to react violently against North Korea. Ambassador Porter prevented this.
Blue House is now covered with guards and there are strict orders that any plane, no matter what its designation, will be shot down if it flies anywhere over or around Blue House.
They are also angry about the Pueblo. They wanted us to take out Wonsan and not doing so was in their opinion a loss of face.
One of their guys, the Defense Minister, is an absolute menace. He has organized a very elite anti-infiltration unit under his command which has been conducting raids across the border against North Korea.
So there is blame on all sides.
There is a very strong danger of unilateral action by Pak.
Pak controls the whole country. Nobody will tell him what he does not want to hear. He is moody, volatile and has been drinking heavily. He is a danger and rather unsafe.
The Prime Minister is a force for restraint. General Bonesteel called in the ROK Joint Chiefs and made it completely clear to them that if any unilateral action is taken that it would necessitate him recommending that U.S. troops be withdrawn./3/ The Chiefs took this very calmly. The Prime Minister told me to make it clear to President Pak that he can’t take unilateral action. There are a few men at the top who are aware of this danger.
/3/Bonesteel’s report of the meeting is in telegram KRA 0596 from Seoul, February 15. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea–Pueblo Incident, Military Cables, Vol. II, February 1968 to March 1968)
Pak presents us with some problems. I do not know whether he will stand still. We went into some gut issues in our meeting with Porter and Pak. We got some commitments:
1. That they will take action to quiet their people.
2. They will stand by during the closed door sessions with North Korea as long as it doesn’t go on for a long period of time.
3. There will be no reprisals for the Blue House or Pueblo.
4. There will be no reprisals in the future without consulting us if they are significant.
5. The most serious thing was this. They said they will go through the formality if another serious act occurs, but the consultations will be only formalities. They will act if another serious act occurs.
There was an understanding that they would keep their troops in South Vietnam. I did not raise the question of the committed troops since General Westmoreland’s cable did not reach me until after my meeting had ended./4/
/4/In telegram 114293 to Seoul, February 13, the Department instructed Vance to ask Pak to permit the redeployment of Korean troops in Vietnam. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 US/VANCE) Vance raised several questions that the Department referred to Westmoreland for response. Vance met with Pak prior to receiving answers from Westmoreland and therefore did not discuss the redeployment of Korean troops in Vietnam while he was in Seoul. (Telegrams 4210 from Seoul, February 13, and 114980 to Seoul, February 14; both ibid.)
I made it very clear to Pak that were they even to consider removing troops from South Vietnam we would pull ours out of Korea.
In summary, the prospects for the future are not good.
–North Korea may try to get South Korea to take some unilateral action against the North to further divide us.
–There is an unstable political situation with Pak’s mood and attitude as it is.
–There could be a serious problem raised with the possibility of unilateral action.
–I do not know if Pak will last. In the past, South Korea has been a showcase for the United States, but we must look at the cold hard facts. There is no longer a perfect showcase.
I would recommend that a good, small group be put together to determine how we proceed in the days ahead.
That is my report in capsule form.
The President: Is Pak’s drinking irrationally something new?
Mr. Vance: No, this has been going on for some time. He hit his wife with an ash tray. He has thrown ash trays at several of his assistants and I was fully prepared for that.
The President: What does he want us to give him?
Mr. Vance: He has a large shopping list. He wants:
–Six squadrons of F-4s.
–One million dollars to augment his anti-guerrilla forces.
–Four new air fields.
–Expansion of existing air bases.
–A large increase in the amount of aid.
–A promise to remove none of the air craft now in South Korea until the new ones he has requested are in place.
I told him I would pass this on to you./5/ The amount comes to about $1-1/2 billion.
/5/Although Pak had insisted on official recognition of these requests, Vance and the Foreign Minister agreed merely to exchange letters noting the requests had been made. (Telegram 4243 from Seoul, February 15; ibid.)
The President: What do you think the consequences are of the 600 raids that have taken place this year? Have they hurt the South Koreans much?
Mr. Vance: No, not except for the Blue House raid.
The President: Was the Blue House raid intended for our Ambassador too?
Mr. Vance: No. The one infiltrator who was captured was told to say that he was after Ambassador Porter. But he really wasn’t. He was told that before CIA and our interrogators got to him in order to put a little more political pressure on us to act.
The President: Did the South Koreans say what brought the Pueblo attack on?
Mr. Vance: Nothing more than they thought this was part of a North Korean political plan to destroy morale and to harm us and the South Koreans.
The President: Have they asked for any more U.S. troops?
Mr. Vance: No.
The President: Did they say anything about Vietnam?
Mr. Vance: No, they did not.
The President: Was there any criticism about Vietnam?
Mr. Vance: No, they said their resolve was the same as it had always been.
Secretary Rusk: Did Ambassador Porter say we would pull out our troops in South Korea if they pull out their troops from Vietnam?
Mr. Vance: No, I do not know if Porter said that. I made it clear to Pak that he should not persist in that attitude. I told him that any talk of that would have grave impact on the future of relations of our two countries.
Secretary Rusk: If we had started this consultation earlier, would we have had all these problems? Or were they inherent in Pak before this happened?
Mr. Vance: They were inherent in the situation with Pak.
Under Secretary Katzenbach: Do they continue to think we should take Wonsan?
Mr. Vance: Yes, they went through a list of things with me that they would do if certain events were to happen.
The President: Doesn’t Pak worry about what the Soviets or the Chinese might do?
Mr. Vance: Pak thinks the Soviets and the Chinese will stand aside. I told him that our judgment and his judgment on this matter were vastly different.
Pak is convinced that the North Koreans are going to try to take over South Korea by 1970. He said that if they tried to attack Blue House again that he would retaliate and that much blood would be shed and that there would be much pain and suffering.
Secretary McNamara: How about our [their?] raids into the North?
Mr. Vance: They are conducting about two a month.
The President: Do we have a clear idea of what they have done?
Mr. Vance: They have been operating two a month raids recently. The anti-infiltration units are under the command of the Defense Minister. They took out a division headquarters in recent attacks. An attack no later than March is planned across the DMZ again.
There is much talk in military circles about this.
The numbers are not clear. They have about 200 anti-infiltration troops trained with each division upon the DMZ and have an additional group being trained by these men now.
On the other side, there are some highly trained guerrilla units. They estimate there are 2400 of these in 30 man teams. They are well trained and tough, but they have been chopped up in the past. 80 to 90% of them have been eliminated, since the South Koreans turned them in quickly.
They have excellent cooperation from the people in turning these guerrillas in. The exact number of South Koreans trained is a very closely held secret.
The President: Is there any connection in your mind between the Pueblo and the attacks in Vietnam? Is there one man calling the dance?
Mr. Vance: I am not clear as to the case.
Secretary Rusk: Now that we have made a case of the 570 raids across the DMZ aren’t we in a difficult position if any of this information comes to light about South Korean raids into the North?
Secretary McNamara: We do not have adequate knowledge of this.
Mr. Vance: Here is a list of items right here. There have been eleven raids between 26 October and December.
The Vice President: When did they start?
Mr. Vance: I do not know, although I think it has been at least a year.
General Wheeler: General Bonesteel had rumors of this from his advisors who are with the Korean units. Hard information is difficult to get.
The President: What is the purpose of these raids?
General Wheeler: They are punitive.
The President: Are any of our soldiers doing any of this?
General Wheeler: No, sir. It is routine that battalions go into the DMZ and behind the DMZ under the Armistice Agreement. General Bonesteel has talked to the Senior ROK Commanders about the dangers of this action.
We could not even prove these raids have taken place.
The President: I would just as soon not prove it.
Mr. Vance: There are going to be some problems. Only recently a unit took an M-79 grenade launcher with them. If the North Koreans have it, they may make some propaganda out of it.
The President: Have there been any complaints from the North Koreans?
Secretary Rusk: There have been some on the radio and at the meetings at Panmunjom.
General Wheeler: What about the public unrest?
Mr. Vance: The unrest is deep and real.
The people are personally offended. In the South Korean General Assembly, there is talk that we do not have as strong a mutual security pact with South Korea as we do with the Philippines. This particularly relates to incident response. They wanted a commitment from me on that. They feel like they have a second class arrangement. The ROKs also feel their hands are tied since they are under the UN Command.
I met with the Speaker and the leaders of their Congress. They brought this up. There is some feeling in the populace about this issue.
The President: Is there any estimate of what you would recommend in the additional assistance?
Mr. Vance: For next year, I would think about $200 million would be required. They need to increase their capability to take care of guerrilla-type raids in order to contain things rapidly.
General Bonesteel believes more can be done. In addition, we have to give them some F-4s. They must have this for public consumption.
But I made it clear that there was nothing in the woods beyond the $100 million this year.
They do need strengthening in a number of areas. The dilemma we face is how much we build them up, how much we build up their strike capacity.
Secretary Rusk: We had the same problem with Syngman Rhee 20 years ago. How much do we give him when he is having to strike the North?
Clark Clifford: I am most distressed about President Pak’s instability. Does he have power to start major action on his own?
Mr. Vance: The generals would let us know and would drag their feet. But if he said go, they would have to go.
One general told General Bonesteel that he was terrified of the possibility of unilateral action, but he said that if he is given the order, they will have to respond.
Clark Clifford: This is a weak reed we are leaning on. We must watch this with the greatest care. We have got to find a means to disengage ourselves from any possibility of unilateral action.
Mr. Vance: President Pak will issue all sorts of orders when he begins drinking. His generals will delay any action on them until the next morning. If he says nothing about those orders the following morning then they just forget what he had told them the night before.
The President: Where do we get this information from?
Mr. Vance: General Bonesteel gets it. The military have the greatest amount of respect for the UN Commander and for his position.
Clark Clifford: Is there any quarrel between Pak and his Congress?
Mr. Vance: Not that I know of.
Mr. Clifford: Are the South Koreans developing their own teams?
Mr. Vance: They are called AIUs (anti-infiltration units). They have 2400 men. Beyond that, they have one airborne battalion with jump capability. They could be dropped in for guerrilla activity. If a war starts, they would be parachuted in to harass the movement of supplies and munitions.
They have teams for each Province.
Clark Clifford: Did you get any threat at all, even a veiled threat, about withdrawing troops from South Vietnam?
Mr. Vance: The Prime Minister mentioned that the legislature might ask for that. I told him very bluntly that we would remove our troops from South Korea if that happened. The Prime Minister turned ashen. It really shook him.
Clark Clifford: Then you think they are clear on that?
Mr. Vance: Yes.
The President: Walt, do you have anything?
Walt Rostow: No.
The Vice President: What is the status of their Naval craft?
Mr. Vance: They need more to impede infiltration. Most of the infiltration comes in from the sea.
The Vice President: Did you detect any political rivalry between Pak and the Defense Minister?
Mr. Vance: No.
The President: Who is watching the situation on our behalf?
Mr. Vance: Ambassador Porter is watching the President. General Bonesteel will step in at any time.
General Wheeler: As I understand it, General Bonesteel focuses on the Defense Minister and the ROK Joint Chiefs.
General Taylor: It goes back 20 years when the military was a restraining force against Syngman Rhee. The senior military will talk frankly.
Mr. Vance: That is why we meet with them.
Secretary Rusk: I got a reassuring feeling from your meeting this morning.
Mr. Vance: They did say what I consider a very serious thing. If there is a serious incident, they will consult but they will go ahead and take action.
The President: Then you feel pretty well about it all?
Mr. Vance: Except for the last point.
The President: Do our people feel that they are pretty well prepared out there?
General Wheeler: Yes, sir, but we will be doing several things to improve our situation. But, with our Air Force out there, with their ground troops, and with the improvements in the ammunition supplies, the troops in South Korea could do quite well.
[Here follows discussion of Vietnam.]
Secretary Rusk: I think all of us are grateful to Cy for the job he has done.
The President: We do appreciate what you have done, Cy. Thank you very much for an excellent report.
 
181. Memorandum From Cyrus R. Vance to President Johnson/1/
Washington, February 20, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea–Pueblo Incident, Vance Mission to Korea (B), February 9 to 15, 1968. Top Secret. Forwarded to the President under a February 21 covering memorandum from Rostow that indicates that the President saw the report. Vance prepared a second version of this report, virtually identical to the first, except it was written in the third person and included numerous supporting documents, for dissemination to Rusk, McNamara, Clifford, Katzenbach, Nitze, Wheeler, and a select group of staff members working on Korea. A copy of that report with attachments was requested by and given to President Johnson. (Ibid., Vance Mission to Korea (A), February 9 to 15, 1968) a precis of the report was prepared for Senator J. William Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in response to his request for information about the Vance mission. (Letter from William B. Macomber, Jr., to Fulbright, March 4, 1968; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 US/VANCE)
The Objectives of My Mission
Under the broad delegation of authority given me, I formulated the specific objectives of my Mission in the following terms:
“The objective of my Mission is to persuade President Park, and through him the Korean Government, that we intend to stand firmly with them in the current crisis and that our policy for handling the developing situation is soundly based. It is necessary to establish a sufficient level of Korean confidence in the United States to permit the ROKG to provide the Mission with adequate assurances that (1) the ROKG will take no independent military actions against North Korea; (2) the ROKG will dampen down public agitation for retaliatory actions; and (3) the ROKG will consent to our private bilateral discussions with the North Koreans of the Pueblo issue in order that the crew and ship will be promptly released.
I believe that these objectives were essentially realized. I have no illusions, however, of the necessity of wise and painstaking follow-up action by our able representatives in Seoul, working in closest coordination with Washington. We must not permit the Communists to separate us from President Park and his Government–that is the publicly stated objective of Pyongyang. The situation in Korea remains acutely dangerous to our national interest and to peace in that area.
The Situation in Seoul
When I arrived in Seoul on 11 February, I found a fragile and serious political situation, pockmarked with tension, suspicion, and distrust.
President Park was in a highly emotional state. He was incensed over the North Korean raid on 21 January against the Presidential Mansion (the Blue House) and the seizure of the USS Pueblo on 23 January. He held the United States partially to blame for the Blue House raid since the North Korean strike team had infiltrated across the DMZ in an area defended by U.S. forces. He considered the seizure of the Pueblo as an affront to the ROK since, to him, it demonstrated the impotence of the U.S. and South Korea to thwart such actions.
Park doubted both the resolve of the United States and her commitment in Korea, partially because of U.S. involvement in SEA and partially because of alleged delays in providing military equipment to ROK military forces and in modernizing those forces. He objected to the bilateral discussions at Panmunjom between U.S. and North Korean representatives since he considered them demeaning to the U.S. and therefore to the ROKG. He also felt that the discussions infringed on ROK sovereignty.
Park is a distinctive leader who has wrought much good for his people. However, the raid on the Blue House had unfortunate psychologic effects on him. He felt that both he and his country had lost face and his fears for his own safety and that of his family were markedly increased. Compounding this problem has been his heavy drinking. This is not a new development but it may be having cumulative effects. Highly emotional, volatile, frustrated and introspective, Park wanted to obtain from me a pledge for the United States to join his Government in instant, punitive, and retaliatory actions against North Korea in the event of another Blue House raid or comparable attack on some other important South Korean economic, governmental, or military facility. He wanted my assurance of an “automatic” U.S. response in the event of another serious raid against the ROK. I refused to give any such assurances. Park’s views were mirrored by almost every member of his Cabinet, who, while now civilians, are mostly retired colonels and generals.
Meetings with Koreans
In my meetings with the Koreans, I included Ambassador Porter and General Bonesteel as members of my Mission not only in recognition of their high competence but also in hope of emphasizing the importance of their positions and their stature as your representatives.
In subsequent days, I had two meetings with President Park (which took about seven hours); two meetings with the Prime Minister and other key members of the Government (Foreign Minister, Minister of National Defense, Minister of Public Information, Director of the ROK CIA, Chairman of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff, and their principal staff assistants); and two meetings with the Foreign Minister and members of his staff, including a ten-hour meeting over the wording and contents of the final Joint Communique, a copy of which is attached./2/ In all of our meetings with the Koreans, we listened attentively to everything they had to say and endeavored to draw out of them the totality of their views, opinions, and concerns.
/2/Attached but not printed.
With one significant exception, we placed the onus on them to raise topics for discussion. The exception concerned South Korean forays across the DMZ into the North. This information was news to most members of the Cabinet since the South Korean infiltration units are under the personal control of Minister of National Defense Kim and their activities are closely held secrets within the ROKG. We emphasized the provocative nature of these attacks, which, over the past several months, have averaged two per month. We suggested that some of the more serious North Korean incursions into the South may have been launched in retaliation for South Korean raids, in particular the November 1967 raid against a North Korean Peoples Army Divisional Headquarters. The Headquarters was apparently blown up and the twelve-man South Korean strike team exfiltrated without sustaining any casualties. We pointed out that there was no evidence that the South Korean forays had had a chastening effect on Kim Il-Sung.
Just prior to my departure President Park, the Prime Minister, and the Foreign Minister were most pleasant and friendly. The Foreign Minister, his principal staff assistants, the Secretary General of the Office of the President, and the Chief of Protocol also came to bid me goodbye at Kimpo in a complete reversal of the cool reception which greeted me on my arrival.
Observations and Results
I believe that the limited objectives of my mission were realized. President Park will not retaliate for the Blue House raid. The bilateral discussions between the U.S. and North Korea at Panmunjom will not be impeded by the ROKG, providing they do not drag on for months. Korean press agitation against the U.S. will be dampened. No request was made for removing ROK forces in Korea from under the operational control of General Bonesteel as Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command. The ROKG has been assured that we intend to help South Korea in modernizing its counter-insurgency and counter-infiltration forces and facilities.
I believe that a necessary measure of confidence and trust has been re-established. The immediate threat of a serious dispute between the United States and the Republic of Korea has been eased. The prospects of the South Koreans initiating in the near future unilateral retaliatory actions against North Korea in response to infiltration of suicide or strike teams by boat and across the DMZ into South Korea have diminished. Yet, in the longer term, the prospects of the ROKG initiating a unilateral attack against North Korea are troublesome, ominous, and dangerous.
While President Park assured me that he would first consult with the United States before taking any action if North Korea again mounts an attack on the Presidential Mansion, or against some equally important South Korean facility, he would not guarantee to heed our counsel if we recommended against retaliation. If counter-actions by the Republic of Korea resulted in the outbreak of war with North Korea, the lives of some 12,000 American civilians (most of whom are located in the vicinity of Seoul) would be immediately endangered. Similarly, since U.S. aircraft are parked wing to wing on the six ROK airfields and American military forces are deployed along a key portion of the DMZ–to the West and North of Seoul and across two of the most likely attack routes into South Korea–the prospects of American troops becoming immediately involved in combat with North Korean forces are extremely high.
The outbreak of war in Korea could thus be ignited either by a serious North Korean incursion into the South or by a South Korean foray into the North.
ROKG officials are preoccupied with the North Korean threat as they see it. Some of them believe that the situation today is very similar to that which existed in June 1950. While the ROK has emphasized economic development over the last few years, the North Koreans have emphasized military preparedness. The North Koreans have taken a number of steps to improve their offensive and defensive military capabilities. Underground facilities have been built for munitions storage and ammunition production. North Korean airfields have been expanded and revetments constructed for the protection of aircraft. Civil defense exercises are regularly held and a well-trained Red Guard has been formed. Food stocks have been augmented. With the help of the Soviets, military equipment has been modernized and new armored vehicles, aircraft, SAMs and artillery weapons introduced into the operational inventory.
But perhaps more important to understanding the current attitudes of ROKG officials, North Korean Premier Kim Il-Sung has intensified his propaganda campaign against the ROK and has publicly declared that by 1970 he will reunite Korea by force.
As a companion effort to his anti-ROK propaganda campaign, Kim Il-Sung has established an infiltration force of some 20,000 men, including 2400 specially trained soldiers who operate in small reconnaissance/stroke teams of seven to thirty-one men each. Last year a number of these teams were landed along the East and West coasts of the ROK by high speed (35 to 40 knots) infiltration boats which can carry up to 40 equipped men each. North Korea presently has 25 to 40 of these boats.
The ROKG, in turn, is organizing and training its own infiltration force, and, as noted earlier, has made a number of forays across the DMZ into North Korea. In this connection we were impressed with the thought that ethnic Koreans comprise the populations of both Koreas and that there are few “doves” or “hawks” among them; most appear to be “tigers”. It also appears true that a substantial percentage of Koreans, north and south, share a latent and compulsive desire to reunite their country.
The ROKG is controlled by one man–Park. With the possible exception of Secretary General Yi Hu Rak, no governmental official seems willing to challenge Park or offer him tempered advice. Minister of National Defense Kim is impulsive and has little capacity to think through the possible political and military consequences of his policies and actions.
Throughout our meetings with the Koreans we often heard them comment on their inability to contain North Korean infiltration teams. The South Koreans are fearful that a North Korean strike/reconnaissance team will destroy some major economic facility, e.g., a refinery or a dam. It seemed to us that the Koreans lack confidence in their own political, economic and military achievements. Whatever the cause, be it their short history as a nation or their relative inexperience with economic development, the Koreans time and time again demonstrated their insecurity and lack of self-confidence.
We should consider what steps we could take to bolster their confidence in themselves. For example, we should strive to maintain the private investment momentum generated by the Ball Mission. We should push ahead with the task of strengthening their anti-infiltration system by expediting the flow of equipment, making available to General Bonesteel our most competent military personnel and techniques in the anti-infiltration field, continue modernization of the ROK armed forces, and call an early meeting of the Defense Ministries as provided for in the Joint Communique.
The appetite of the ROKG for additional U.S. military assistance is very large as evidenced by my attached letter to Foreign Minister Choi which notes the requirements for MAP as Park and his ministers see them. My specific recommendations in respect to these Korean requests are also attached./3/
/3/Vance’s letter and recommendations are attached but not printed.
A major possible restraining force in the ROK today is the military whose chiefs understand the dangers inherent in the ROKG initiating unilateral action against North Korea. Yet, these same chiefs, while willing to keep General Bonesteel apprised of the orders received from Park, would probably comply with President Park’s orders.
By agreeing to the issuance of a Joint Communique, after initial resistance, President Park is now committed to consult with us whenever he considers his country has been threatened. His freedom of action has therefore been somewhat reduced. However, his position on retaliation remains unsatisfactory. While he has been clearly warned of the grave consequences of taking retaliatory action, he has not accepted the full significance of this warning, nor does he, in my judgment, attach adequate importance to the Mutual Defense Treaties which North Korea has with Communist China and the Soviet Union.
I must also add that Park and his ministers made a number of demands which I rejected. I refused to commit the United States to an “agreed retaliation policy” involving “instant, punitive, retaliatory action” against future North Korean violations of the Armistice Agreement. I also refused to extend or modify the terms of the US/ROK Mutual Defense Treaty, and I refused to agree to a suggested secret minute that would have committed the U.S. to an “automatic retaliatory response,” as the Koreans repeatedly asserted Secretary Dulles had promised the Philippines in 1958.
Further, I refused to endorse the ROK request that U.S. military assistance program to Korea should be greatly expanded. I insisted on reserving the responsibility of determining what recommendations I would submit to you. I made it clear that I attached a far higher priority to improving the counter-infiltration capabilities of the ROK military forces than purchasing six squadrons of F-4s or other high performance aircraft. Furthermore, I warned the President, the Cabinet and the Chairman of the JCS of the severe financial consequences and the disruptive effect on balanced force structures of the introduction of this magnitude of advanced aircraft into their inventory.
While I did not raise the issue of dispatching additional ROK forces to Vietnam, I made it clear that we expected the ROK forces to remain in the RNV. President Park personally assured me that he would not withdraw any ROK forces. I in turn reassured the Koreans that the obligation of the United States under the Mutual Security Treaty would be met.
In my discussions with Ambassador Porter and General Bonesteel concerning the Pueblo negotiations, I was told of the great problems involved in passing messages between the Embassy, General Bone- steel’s headquarters and the U.S. element at Panmunjom. Instructions to our Panmunjom delegation received at the Embassy must be immediately translated into Korean so that Admiral Smith’s interpreter can read them into the official record. When weather permits the use of a helicopter from Seoul to Panmunjom, the total time from receipt of the message at the Embassy to delivery to Admiral Smith averages 2-1/2 hours. Again, with good flying weather, it normally takes about 3 hours from the end of a negotiation session until a message can be dispatched to Washington. When bad weather prevents helicopter flight, another two or three hours must be added to the processing of both incoming and outgoing messages.
In addition, I found a highly unsatisfactory communication system in Seoul and between Seoul and Washington. With the approval of Secretary McNamara and Under Secretary Katzenbach, we have now installed full teleconferencing and secure telephone facilities between the two capitals and within Seoul.
Before closing this report, I have certain recommendations I would like to make.
First, I believe that a small State/Defense/CIA/White House study group should be established to undertake an independent assessment of our current policy toward the ROK and to identify what our political, economic and military objectives in Korea should be over the next several years. This study effort should also assess the current and future policies of North Korea vis-e-vis the ROK. I consider it extremely important that this study group should be formed at a level in Government where its recommendations can be reviewed first-hand by our most senior policy-makers.
Second, I believe that serious consideration should be given to apprising the Soviets of the dangerous political situation that exists in Korea on both sides of the DMZ and the pitfalls it offers for our two countries should North or South Korea sponsor a major raid which could result in war.
Third, I believe that consideration should be given to exposing at the UN and through bilateral exchanges the full dimensions of Kim Il-Sung’s actions against South Korea and their implications for area and world peace. I must point out, however, that this course of action is not without danger because of the ROK guerrilla raids on North Korea which could well be surfaced.
Fourth, I believe that beginning in FY-1969 the basic military assistance program to Korea should be increased from $160 to $200 or $210 million per year. Approximately 85 per cent of the Korean MAP program is expended for the maintenance of existing Korean forces and these costs are rising. The amount of MAP funding available for investment or force modernization is therefore but a fraction of the total program. A sizeable portion of these additional funds, as well as of the $100 million supplemental assistance you have requested of the Congress for FY-1968, should be used for improving the counter-insurgency and counter-infiltration capabilities of ROK military forces.
Fifth, I believe that consideration should be given to the problem of providing additional protection for our [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] weapons sites.
Sixth, I believe that consistent with the Joint Communique, Ministerial meetings between the ROK Ministry of National Defense and the Department of Defense should be promptly arranged. Similarly, Ambassador Porter should be given standby authority to extend an invitation to Prime Minister Chung to visit the United States later this year if, in his judgment, such a visit would be useful.
Seventh, I believe that consideration should be given to improving the Korean DMZ barrier.
Eighth, I strongly recommend that arrangements should be instituted which would permit General Bonesteel to apprise Ambassador Porter monthly of all approved U.S. reconnaissance activities scheduled for the vicinity of Korea. Ambassador Porter did not know of the Pueblo mission.
My final comments concern Ambassador Porter, General Bone- steel, and the members of my mission, Mr. John P. Walsh, Colonel Abbott C. Greenleaf and Mr. Daniel O’Donohue.
Both Ambassador Porter and General Bonesteel are outstanding public servants. They are highly competent and are working very hard and courageously in a very difficult political situation which could turn sour overnight. They are entitled to commendation and our full support.
As for the members of my Mission, I cannot praise too highly the truly outstanding performance of Mr. John Walsh and Colonel Abbott Greenleaf under very difficult conditions. Their ever wise counsel and tireless efforts were indispensable. I also wish to commend the performance of Mr. Daniel O’Donohue and Miss Maria Gardosik.
Respectfully,
Cyrus Vance

182. Letter From the Ambassador to Korea (Porter) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Seoul, February 27, 1968.
/1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, Ambassadors’ Private Correspondence, 1967-1968. Secret. Attached to a March 4 memorandum from Bundy to Rusk, indicating Bundy sent a copy to Katzenbach, Berger, Brown, and the Korea Country Director.
Dear Bill:
1. I think there are several lessons we should draw from events of the past month. We have tended to be pleased about economic progress in South Korea over the past few years, and our satisfaction at this has to some degree obscured the fact that we have concurrently been nourishing a tiger, which is becoming difficult to restrain and confine: It looks to me now as though Park’s desire to go north is not much less acute than his adversary’s intention, some day, to move south. As you know we had a difficulty with Syngman Rhee, too, at one point, back about 1954, when he thought the moment had come; but since that year we have gradually allowed ourselves to ignore the implications of our military aid policy in this country.
2. It is as clear as day that both sides are now preparing to have quite a slapping match during the coming Spring and Summer. Let’s hope we can keep it at that level, though the effect of a major humiliation for one or the other in the form of a successful assassination or demolition will be hard to contain. In such event, we here know whom we will go for and, while we do not have from you yet any comment on useful restraints to impose on our friends, you may be sure that we will use everything that seems necessary in the circumstances.
3. The moment of danger in these matters comes, not a week or ten days later, but during the twenty-four to forty-eight hours immediately following the incident, when the elements of humiliation, face, criticism and anger prevail. One may ask for a special envoy later, but the immediate problem is to apply and maintain restraint. The purpose of the envoy, as I saw it, was to get across to Park, from President Johnson himself, that there was no likelihood of our following them into blind, emotion-packed reprisals, and of course, I wanted to subject someone with ready access to our President to the kind of gut reaction that I was encountering. It was not difficult for Vance to evoke from Park, who was only too cooperative in this sense, all that was needed to enable him to carry home a clear personal account of the danger. Vance is a cool, practical person, and it was a pleasure for both Bonesteel and me to work with him.
4. The immediate aftermath of the Vance visit has been a lessening of tension. The President vented his spleen, a special envoy was sent by President Johnson, $100 million more were in the kitty, and Park feels secure in the knowledge that he is probably right–the NK’s will try again, perhaps even while they diddle us with the Pueblo affair. The President is not churning up press or public the way he was a couple of weeks ago, but he is not letting them forget, either, that he has warned the United States that our policies will encourage Kim Il Sung to believe that more activity can be safely carried on. While he and the Government have allowed things to simmer down, please understand that there is no fundamental change in their outlook or their intentions. The military chiefs closely imitate the President’s attitude, but there is much muttering and rumbling at the middle levels. The exercise now for the Bureau, if I may say so, is to think out ways and means of transforming the tiger from one which would take over the northern jungle, to one which would defend his own den, and I would begin with fuel and ammunition supplies while giving special attention to the type of hardware flowing into this country./2/ One of the remarkable things about Korea, something closely connected with American sentimentality, is that it is almost impossible to control, or even be consulted about, great quantities of aid that flow into the country.
/2/In a March 4 memorandum transmitting this letter to Rusk, Bundy doubted the United States could control such deliveries “to exert any leverage on South Korean retaliatory impulses,” but added that he would discuss the matter with the Department of Defense and others. (Ibid.) In late March the Department of State considered transferring ground ammunition worth as much as $100 million to Korean forces, but Porter opposed that action and advocated periodically supplying the Koreans with limited amounts of ammunition. (Telegram 138433 to Seoul, March 29, and telegram 5410 from Seoul, April 1; both in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 19-8 US-KOR
5. Then there is the Pueblo palaver, which causes as much disquiet among allies for its ineffectiveness, as it does in our consciences for its humiliating character. It is a curious thing that while we permit ourselves to be the victims of a policy of provocation-short-of-war, we do not use the same tactics against those who strike the first blow. It is becoming clear that the short-of-war formula is a masterful one, which can slowly but surely erode such prestige as we have. In the modern world, we are caught between the power of nuclear weapons, which world opinion forbids us to use, and the art of guerrilla warfare in which we are uninstructed. Our conventional arms cannot, as I think many now see somewhat more clearly, prevail over the latter. And where conventional air-sea (as distinct from land) arms could be used in limited, appropriate fashion to discourage those who harass us, this is ruled out by the belief at home that our people, lulled by creature comforts, will prefer no-reaction-at-any-cost. And our people will prefer that, I think, until events make clear that it is their children who will pay the piper. No sensible person would advocate general war in retaliation for a Pueblo, but it is clear that measures short of war could evoke, if not immediate satisfaction in this specific case, some caution on the part of our adversaries that in future might spare us similar experience.
6. I hope the Bureau was better informed about the location of Pueblo than I was. Certainly, even I, with my limited technical knowledge and perhaps limited political understanding, would have promptly moved such a vessel out of waters contiguous to NK after the Blue House raid. I will go so far as to say that technical knowledge of the field in which they were working would have led me vehemently to question the need for putting them into such waters in the first place. The moral here is quite clear: We should be told what is floating around, or over, or through, our areas of responsibility. We just might have something to contribute which could save us a deal of trouble. I went over this rather thoroughly with Cy Vance, and I think the message has been delivered.
7. I will spare you lengthy comment on Viet-Nam this month. There is no pleasure at all in assessing correctly that melancholy situation. But brace yourself, because more is coming. Too few seem to grasp that, to an enemy whose environment is the night, more men mean more compounds and therefore more big targets to hit. Sam’s appointment as D.A./3/ is something Saigon needs in its present state of mind. He will be wrestling with a many-headed hydra, but it is an all-absorbing task, like none other in the Service. Undoubtedly he will be there during a very trying period, and I and all the others wish him Godspeed and success.
/3/Samuel D. Berger was appointed Deputy Ambassador to Vietnam.
8. I hope to begin traveling toward the end of March, as I want to look over the anti-infiltration measures being taken along the coastline. As you may know, the problem is always to see what one wants to see, rather than what our friends want to show. But I think we’ll manage.
9. As I consider the problem of restraining the ROKG, I wonder whether I should invoke the assistance of Moon Myung, Founder and High Reverend of the Unification Church, into which he intends to absorb all other Christian churches, under his own spiritual guidance. (I hope he gives the Pope a job.)
The other day, Moon organized a mass wedding of members of his congregation–247 couples–at Citizen’s Hall. Announcing from the stage that they should all consider themselves married, he then forbade them to engage in “love acts” for 40 days! When asked by reporters the reason for this “inhuman restraint,” Moon declared that it was necessary “because Christ prayed in the desert for 40 days and that’s THAT!”
If I could only determine whether Moon’s edict was obeyed (I have some doubts about it, myself) we might find a government post where he could exercise his ability to restrain their desire to go north–a much easier task than the one he set himself on the wedding day, I think!
Sincerely,
Bill
 
184. Memorandum to Holders of Special National Intelligence Estimate Number 14.2-67/1/
Washington, February 29, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Security Council History, Pueblo Crisis, 1968, Vol. XI, Background Documents. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the National Security Agency participated in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the USIB concurred with this estimate on February 29 except the representatives of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction.
NORTH KOREAN INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES WITHRESPECT TO SOUTH KOREADated 21 September 1967
1. Events since last September tend to confirm the conclusions of SNIE 14.2-67,/2/ that North Korean activities will include a campaign of military harassment in the DMZ area, continued attempts to infiltrate guerrilla teams, and the dispatch of terrorist and sabotage missions. The raid on the Blue House represents the most dramatic and flagrant manifestation of the campaign begun in late 1966 to disrupt political order in South Korea, to tie down large ROK forces, and to encourage insurgency in the South. North Korean handling of the Pueblo crisis reflects an intention to heighten tensions and exploit US preoccupations with Vietnam. Kim Il-song’s recent speeches indicate he is still determined to maintain a bellicose posture.
/2/Document 130.
2. These developments have hardened Seoul’s attitude and increased the likelihood of a major ROK reaction to North Korean harassments. The North Koreans probably believe that the US will impose restraints on the ROK and will be reluctant to escalate its own responses in Korea. The North Koreans now probably see great and continuing opportunities to exacerbate relations between Seoul and Washington.
3. We continue to believe that Pyongyang realizes that an intensification of incidents and attacks could escalate to the point of open warfare. We still estimate, however, that North Korea does not plan to invade South Korea and will not deliberately provoke hostilities on a scale which would amount to a resumption of the war.
4. Nevertheless, the general situation in Korea is more dangerous than it was last fall, since the possibilities of miscalculation are greater. The North Korean attitude is more openly truculent than at any time since 1953. The raid against the Presidential residence indicates that the North Koreans are willing to run high risks; they must have been aware that assassination of President Pak would have provoked a major ROK retaliation. They may be counting heavily on US preoccupation with Vietnam, and on the deterrent value of their own mutual defense treaties with China and the Soviet Union.
5. We believe that North Korea is pursuing an independent policy. Pyongyang probably does not consult with Moscow and Peking on the tactical development of its policy against the ROK and the US. North Korea’s relations with China are cool, and thus Peking’s influence is quite limited. In any event, we believe Peking does not want to be involved in a new Korean War at this juncture. As for the USSR, recent events have probably forced it to pay somewhat more attention to developments in Korea. We believe that the USSR does not want a major war in the area. In the event of a crisis in Korea, the Soviets would probably be reluctant to apply immediate pressures on Pyongyang, lest they jeopardize the position they have built up there. And in any case their influence would not necessarily be decisive. However, we believe that if major hostilities seemed imminent the USSR would try to exert some restraint over North Korea.
6. Additional evidence since our last estimate suggests that North Korea will continue its efforts to establish guerrilla bases in the South. But we believe that their prospects for success in this endeavor remain poor.
7. We now believe that the North Korean Navy has at least four “W”-class submarines, at least seven “KOMAR”-class guided missile boats and associated Styx missiles, and two “Shershen”-class fast patrol boats. Eighteen surface-to-air missile (SA-2) sites, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] have been identified. Otherwise, the general level of equipment and strength of the North Korean forces is as described in Annex I of SNIE 14.2-67.