오산기지2006 이시우 2006/05/10 3559

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USFK EVENTS
January 2006
Changes in Japan and Guam will Affect the ROK (Jan-Mar 2006) (See Revising Japanese Peace Constitution May Spell Big Trouble for ROK (Dec 2005) for background.) On 26 Feb 2005, Pacific Air Forces Commander Gen. Paul V. Hester says President Bush’s proposed fiscal 2006 defense budget includes several construction projects at U.S. bases on Guam, such as a new high school at U.S. Naval Base Guam and an AAFES complex at Andersen Air Force Base. But on March 1, Pacific Air Force wing commanders are told to curtail spending in nonmission-essential areas in the face of mounting war debt. Later in the year, there was talk of stationing the nuclear carrier at Guam if the stationing in Japan was not possible and having a naval air wing at Anderson AB. Part of the master plan for restructuring Japan was to move the headquarters element of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force to Guam — along with its dependents.

On 29 Oct 2005, top U.S. and Japanese officials announced a sweeping realignment of military forces. Plans called for 7,000 Marines to move from Okinawa to Guam and 57 carrier jets and E-2 Hawkeye aircraft to be relocated from Atsugi to Iwakuni. Immediately the Iwakuni residents protested. At the same time, a joint U.S.-Japanese operations center would be set up at Yokota Air Base, and components of the U.S. Army? I Corps would be moved from Fort Lewis, Wash., to Camp Zama, among major shifts. The plans sparked anti-base protests at Yokosuka, Yokota and Zama. The realignment proposed a substitution for the stalled MCAS Futenma replacement project in Henoko: building a smaller facility on Camp Schwab and reclaimed land in adjacent Oura Wan Bay. The report drew immediate opposition from Okinawa officials, despite also calling for moving III MEF headquarters element to Guam and closing some Marine bases in southern Okinawa.

On 16 Nov 2005, President Bush met with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in Kyoto. Koizumi drew fire from local officials opposed to the military realignment plan when he said “Japan’s prosperity is based on peace and security” and that the country “was to pay the necessary costs” for the defense pact with the United States. This meant that the relocation of troops from Okinawa costing $1.2 billion would be partially funded by Japan. However, some Japanese politicians feel that cutting the Marines on Okinawa to too low a level might entail an attack on Taiwan by the PRC — and then threaten Okinawa.

Unlike the ROK, the Japanese are aligning itself closely with the US in coordinated efforts to deal with the North. Senior Vice Foreign Minister Yasuhisa Shiozaki on 6 Jan assured the United States that Japan would not normalize ties with North Korea unless the abduction, missile, nuclear and other pending issues are comprehensively resolved. Japan’s talks with North Korea agreed to set up three separate but parallel working groups to address diplomatic normalization, the North’s past abductions of Japanese nationals and security-related problems. Japan agreed with the senior U.S. officials to continue cooperating closely on moving the six-party talks on North Korea’s nuclear ambitions forward and achieving U.N. reforms. Japan’s position is that North Korea’s demand that the United States remove its financial sanctions should not be linked with the six-party talks, because the sanctions are a law enforcement matter. (Source: Japan Times)

In Washington on 7 Mar, U.S. Pacific Commander William Fallon confirmed that working-level negotiations in Hawaii on the implementation details 밶re nearing conclusion, with an agreed implementation plan expected by 30 March.? In written testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Fallon said the Defense Policy Review Initiative pact 밶ssessed the security environment in the region and bilaterally determined the required roles, missions, capabilities, and force structure.?

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld also indicated on 7 Mar that realignment plans were almost set. 밒t뭩 a final report ?that we뭭e negotiated out with the government of Japan,?he said at a news conference. Japanese officials, he said, will 뱖ork with their local communities to sort things out ?the details. ?Not to worry. It will be fine. It will all work out.? While acknowledging that several thousand people attended a rally in Okinawa on Sunday to oppose the plan, he downplayed the event뭩 significance. 밒f you뭭e got millions of people in a country,?Rumsfeld said, 뱓here are always going to be different views. ?You expect that. That뭩 what democracy뭩 about.? The Japanese government 밾as made a decision,?he said. 밫here will be people who will agree with it and people who don뭪 agree with it. ?Life goes on.?(Source: Stars and Stripes.)

(SITE NOTE: The problem is that everything is like a set of dominoes lined up in a row. One cannot change one piece of the set without affecting the entire chain. The Japanese government was afraid that opening up separate items for renegotiation with local officials would cause the entire agreement to collapse. This reluctance to renegotiate specific items for change — except the cost sharing options which some Japanese politicians think is excessive — applies also to the US. In Japan, the local protests were growing. For example, in Iwakuni, Yamaguchi Prefecture, the city officially announced it would hold a plebiscite March 12 on plans to relocate U.S. carrier-borne aircraft to a U.S. base in that city. Since most residents are expected to vote against the plan, the real question is whether enough people will turn out. However, the results would not be legally binding. In all the cities affected in Okinawa and Japan, there have been rising protests. In Apr 2006, a survey showed that one in two Japanese polled felt that the share of Japan in relocating the troops to Guam was excessive. The Japanese government sought to reduce its cost share to offset the growing public disapproval of the realignment plan — though the Japanese government was pressing ahead with negotiations. The plan that was supposed to be signed in March was stretched into May 2006. )
Guam Air Force Units The 13th Air Force is located at Anderson AFB and Det 1, 13th AF maintains the Diego Garcia contingency base. In June 1991, Mount Pinatubo buried Clark in volcanic ash and forced the closure of the base on Nov 26, Thirteenth Air Force relocated to Andersen and officially established its headquarters on Guam on December 2, 1991.

Andersen is one of four Bomber Forward Operating Location [BFOL] in the Air Force. These locations provide forward support to bomber crews deploying overseas in Europe, Southwest Asia and in the Pacific. The Air Force is establishing forward-deployed bomber beddown support at key locations throughout the world and Andersen is one of two critical bases in the Asia Pacific region. The other location is Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. The 7th AEW was activated in late February or early March 2003 at Andersen Air Force Base just prior to the arrival to 12 B-1Bs and 12 B-52s that were deployed to Guam from in an effort to deter North Korea. The rapid response deployment to the Pacific region made history as the largest bomber deployment since the Vietnam era and the largest B-1 deployment ever.

On 14 Mar 2006 it was announced that the 36th Air Base Wing was being renamed the 36th Wing at Anderson AFB. The wing is the basic war-fighting unit of the Air Force. This signals a change in the wind with Anderson once more becoming the center of the Asian regional defense encompassing the South Pacific Ocean, Indian Ocean, and contiguous land areas.

Naval Units at Guam The Navy has homeported three to five attack submarines in Guam so the boats can spend more time on station in the western Pacific. Transit times from Hawaii and the West Coast substantially impact the availability of subs deploying along the Pacific rim. Stationing submarines in Guam allows them to follow a different operating concept, further increasing the number of mission days they can perform. Attack submarines in the United States typically deploy for a 180-day stretch every two years or so. Submarines based in Guam were to deploy for periods of up to 56 days, but much more often, so they will spend about 182 days a year at sea and 183 days a year in their home port. Creation of a homeport in Guam could not happen prior to around 2005, since the Navy would have to create an infrastructure to care for the ships, an additional 650 to 700 sailors and their families. (NOTE: The movement of 9,000 dependents of the 3rd MEU from Okinawa will also be impacting on the infrastructure with the total movement costs estimated at $10 billion.)

The Los Angeles-class City of Corpus Christi (SSN 705) arrived at its new homeport in Guam in October 2002, marking the first time the Navy has “forward deployed” an attack sub from the Pacific island. The USS San Francisco arrived in 2003, and a third submarine arrived in 2004. By June 2004 the Navy had decided that up to three more attack submarines will be based in Guam, positioned to respond to a Chinese attack on Taiwan.

In 2005, the topic of stationing an aircraft carrier at Guam with the naval air wing at Anderson was surfaced when there was a possibility of the Japanese refusing a nuclear carrier to be home ported at Yokosuka. (NOTE: Naval AS Agana is closed.) The Japanese acquiesced as there was no other option — and the matter was quietly dropped. However, periodically the topic pops up meaning that officials are still considering it as an option.

3rd MEU HQ to Guam Part of the master plan for restructuring Japan was to move the headquarters element of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force to Guam — along with its dependents. On 2 Feb 2006 the Asahi Shimbun reported that The U.S. Defense Department will ask Japan to shoulder 75 percent of the estimated $8 billion (940 billion yen) needed to relocate U.S. Marines from Okinawa Prefecture to Guam. Later the Stars and Stripes stated that the DOD requested $250 million to initiate environmental impact studies in Guam prior to the relocation of the personnel.

The original realignment plan called for the move of 7,000 Marines off Okinawa, some 6,000 of them to Guam. That would include moving headquarters of the III Marine Expeditionary Force to Guam and consolidating most Marine bases south of Kadena Air Base to existing Marine bases in northern Okinawa. (NOTE: Later the plan was changed to 8,000 Marines, with 7,000 to Guam — and the departure of 9,000 dependents from Okinawa.)

Under a bilateral interim report on realignment issued in Oct 2005, the headquarters of the III Marine Expeditionary Force would be relocated to Guam and the remaining Marine units on the island would be reduced to a Marine Expeditionary Brigade. The transferred personnel would come from air, ground, logistics and command elements. In addition, about 9,000 dependents would move to Guam. The United States has asked Japan to pick up part of the tab for the move — some $7.6 billion. The October report states that Marine Corps units that remain in Okinawa would be consolidated to camps in the north.

This would enable the return of significant land in the densely populated areas south of Kadena Air Base. Okinawa officials have interpreted that portion of the report to mean that Camp Kinser, as well as MCAS Futenma, would be closed, along with Camp Lester, which is already going through a return process as outlined in a 1996 agreement. Parts of Camp Foster also would be closed. Earlier agreements identified part of the Kishaba Housing Area to be returned. Also, single-family housing in the development is slated to be razed and replaced with multifamily units.

On 27 Feb 2006, the Yomiuri Shimbun reported that the US had told Japan that it would withdraw some 8,000 marines — 1,000 more than originally proposed — from the Japanese island of Okinawa as part of its military realignment. The number was increased after Washington reassessed its personnel needs. A Japan official confirmed reports that the United States was offering to move an additional 1,000 Marines from the island as part of its realignment of U.S. forces in Japan. If included in a final bilateral realignment report, it would mean that some 8,000 Marines would be transferred, most of them to Guam, effectively cutting their numbers on Okinawa by more than half. Both governments are working on a concrete plan to be compiled in March. Currently 13,000 Marines are assigned to Okinawa. (Source: Stars and Stripes.)

On 8 Mar, the Stars and Stripes reported that the strength of the Okinawa opposition to the realignment was being overstated in the press. The Okinawa opposition at Ginwon claimed that 35,000 attended a rally, but the US military contended less than 10,000 were present. Also noted was the absence Sunday of Okinawan politcal leaders, including Gov. Keiichi Inamine and Yoshikazu Shimabukuro, mayor of Nago, where the plan calls for building a new air base. Both objected to the airport plan, though Shimabukuro said he was willing to accept it if Japan and the U.S. tweak some details, such as moving aircraft flight paths away from residential areas.

Many Okinawans concerned about the heavy U.S. military presence on their island have expressed mixed feelings. They applaud the proposal to move some 8,000 Marines and more than 9,000 of their dependents off Okinawa, mostly to Guam. They also support the plan’s call to return “significant land in the densely populated areas south of Kadena Air Base,” which Okinawa officials have interpreted as Camp Kinser, Naha Military Port, the rest of Camp Lester and parts of Camp Foster. But they object to moving Marine air operations to a facility to be built on part of Camp Schwab and reclaimed land in Oura Bay in rural northeastern Okinawa.

US and Japanese were to meet in Hawaii in mid-March over the plan. Okinawa Marines for the first time joined other U.S. officials in asserting publicly that only minor details remain to be agreed. US officials have said they consider the bilateral realignment agreement released in October final, with only implementation details remaining to be hashed out. According to a Voice of America report on 7 Mar, Marines considered the October announcement final, not a draft. Quoting Lt. Col. Richardo Stewart, deputy assistant chief of staff for U.S. Marine Corps Bases in Japan. 밒t뭩 an agreement and what comes out in March is really, how do we implement that agreement??he said, according to the report. But Japanese officials have called the report an 밿nterim?plan, saying it뭩 not to be finalized until month뭩 end. (Source: Stars and Stripes.)

Futenma AS and Camp Schwab Airstrip The interim report called for replacing MCAS Futenma with an air facility to be built on Camp Schwab and reclaimed land in the shallow waters of Oura Bay. It has been met with near universal opposition by Okinawa officials, who had favored an air base, jointly used by civilian aircraft, to be built on reclaimed land and a reef about two miles offshore, near Camp Schwab.

In 1996, the two countries agreed MCAS Futenma, located in the middle of urban Ginowan in central Okinawa, posed a hazard to the surrounding community and needed to move to a more remote area of Okinawa. The crash of a Marine helicopter on the grounds of adjacent Okinawa International University in August 2004 heightened the fears of the base뭩 neighbors.

On 15 May 2005, almost 24,000 people surrounded Marine Corps Air Station Futenma with a 6.8-mile human chain, to demand its closure. The United States and Japan agreed in 1996 to close the base within seven years once an alternate Okinawan site was found. A Henoko site later was chosen but protests and construction delays stalled the project. Then the US-Japan restructuring plan proposed to move the site to another location on Okinawa — killing the off-shore airstrip proposal at Futenma.

Later newly-elected mayor of Nago, Yoshikazu Shimabukuro, said he was ready to show flexibility if the government considered revisions supported by local residents — viewed as positive by the Japanese with the plan already drawing flak everywhere, the government may not want to amend anything. The proposals included moving the flight path away from residential areas to reduce complaints of potential noise.

Then some started to propose ridiculous ideas. The mayor of Okinawa’s capital city Naha, Takeshi Onaga, sought support from Kanagawa Gov Shigefumi Matsuzawa for his proposal to relocate the U.S. Marine Corps’ Futemma Air Station in Okinawa to Iwo Jima Island about 1,200 kilometers south of Tokyo. Okinawa Governor Keiichi Inamine, who supported the original plan for an off-shore Henoko site which included a shared civilian airport, said that he could accept the realignment plan if the Futenma issue could be resolved.

In Feb 2006, 8000 people in Kanoya, Kagoshima Province protested U.S. plans to make the MSDF base at Kanoya a candidate for the transfer Marine refueling planes from Futenma. The mayor stated the noise was already at “intolerable levels” without adding the KC-135 tankers.

On 21 Mar Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Defense Agency Director General Fukushiro Nukaga agreed that the government would consider making minor changes to the government’s plan to relocate U.S. Marine Corps’ Futenma Air Station to a coastal area of U.S. Camp Schwab in Nago in the prefecture. The two agreed that minor changes would help win the cooperation of local governments to be affected by the relocation.

The prime minister has been opposed to making changes to the plan. However, he seems to have changed his position to win the acceptance of local communities as the Japanese and the U.S. governments aim to complete a final report on the realignment of U.S. forces stationed in Japan within the month. The two agreed that a modified plan should be one that can be realized even if a protest movement develops. This is a reflection of the way that a plan to relocate the air station to waters off Henoko district in Nago became deadlocked due to protest activities. The defense chief said minor revisions to the plan, which is based on the Japan-U.S. interim report on the realignment agreed in October, will be accepted by the United States. Proposals by them included a change in the angle of the planned runway to reduce noise because the flight path of U.S. aircraft from the runway overflys 10 houses. Another change proposal calls for constructing the runway 50 meters farther out to sea.

There is an idea, among local officials, of constructing the runway 200 meters to the sea from the original plan. However, the government and the ruling parties oppose the proposal because it would increase the area of reclamation and adversely affect the natural environment. Thus, if the runway is built at a location different from the plan, the distance will be between 50 meters and 200 meters, government officials said. However, there still remains dissention amongst local leaders to the relocation plan. (Source: Yomiuri Online.)

New Nuclear Carrier at Yokosuka On 28 Oct 2005, the Navy announced the conventionally powered Kitty Hawk was to be decommissioned in 2008 and replaced at Yokosuka by a Nimitz-class carrier, the first nuclear-powered carrier to be deployed to Japan. The Navy later announced the replacement carrier would be the USS George Washington. The announcements trigger numerous protests among anti-nuclear and anti-military groups, but Japan acquiesced to the change saying there was no alternatives. The US agreed that the nuclear reactor would be off-line while in port. At the same time, there was discussion of a carrier being stationed at Guam with a naval airwing at Anderson AFB but no firm commitment that this was being considered.

In Apr 2006, the Mayor of Nagoya changed his mind about objections to a nuclear carrier after what he said was “impressive documentation” of nuclear safety on the carriers.

Iwakuni NAS Under the plan, some 57 aircraft, including F/A-18 fighters, and 1,600 troops would relocate to the base. Currently 3,500 U.S. troops, most of them Marines, are stationed there. The plans call for the air wing from the USS Kitty Hawk aircraft carrier, now based near Tokyo, to be moved to the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, 450 miles southwest of the capital.

Also on 28 Oct 2005, it was announced the runways at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni was to be used for both military and commercial aircraft operations, base officials say. No timetable is announced but a new $2.2 billion runway under construction in Iwakuni won’t be completed for about four years, engineers have said. Tokyo and Washington reached an agreement in October to allow up to four commercial flights a day to land at the existing Iwakuni airfield after the U.S. marines’ new landing strip is built. The agreement was reached as part of a measure to compensate Iwakuni’s city government and business community for the transfer of 57 U.S. carrier-based planes and 1,600 marines from the U.S. Navy’s Atsugi base in Kanagawa Prefecture to Iwakuni. A 2,440-meter runway is planned to be completed on reclaimed land about one kilometer from Iwakuni Air Station in fiscal 2008. The new strip will replace the existing runway. The Japanese government put forward a proposal to build a terminal for civilian flights on the space vacated by the existing runway, but the U.S. government in January refused the plan at a meeting of senior officials, saying the vacated space was earmarked as a parking area for carrier planes as well as for other military purposes.

In Jan 2006, the U.S. government requested that tanker planes stationed in Okinawa be relocated to the U.S. Marine Corps’ Iwakuni Air Station in Yamaguchi Prefecture instead of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force’s Kanoya base in Kagoshima Prefecture as initially agreed by Japan and the United States. Reason suspected that the US wants to concentrate Marine operations at Iwakuni. The Japanese are opposed to the idea. Most local governments named in the report as possible hosts for the U.S. military have expressed opposition, and central government officials fear that reviewing any component of it would lead to an escalation of demands for the entire document to be amended, the sources said.

On 10 Feb 2006, the Yomiuri Shimbun reported that the U.S. has refused to allow the construction of an air terminal for commercial use on the site of the U.S. Marine Corps’ Iwakuni Air Station in Yamaguchi Prefecture, despite a basic agreement reached last year to allow civilian flights to land at the airfield. The Pentagon has insisted on siting the new terminal for civil flights outside the base, putting the current plan to allow commercial airlines to land at Iwakuni from fiscal 2009 in doubt. Concerns have been raised among Iwakuni’s local community that construction of a new terminal outside the air station might delay the start of commercial flight services and result in higher construction costs and a less convenient service. The Pentagon’s refusal to let the civilian air terminal construction proceed at the agreed site could impact Iwakuni’s March 12 referendum on whether to accept the transfer of the U.S. carrier-based planes. (SITE NOTE: It was announced on 8 Mar that Japan was going to sign the Restructuring Agreement without seeking local approval because of the dissent. In addition, the referendum was not legally binding, but would most likely would succeed adding more fuel to the dissent. In other words, local support was not likely in the future so the Japanese government has given up on the idea of attempting to persuade the local government.) (Source: Yomiuri News.)

On 12 Mar the non-binding referendum over whether the troops were welcome resulted in a total of 43,433 residents in the city voting against the relocation; while just 5,369 voted in favor. Some 58 percent of Iwakuni’s 85,000 eligible voters cast ballots — easily over the 50 percent needed for the vote to be valid. However, just prior to this referendum the Japanese government decided to press ahead with signing the accord without gaining public concensus on the subject. The government stated the results of the referendum was “expected.”

Yokota Airspace In 2003, Yokota became a joint use base with the JSDF moving an Air Defense element to Yokota, however, the proposal of Tokyo Governor Ishihara to make Yokota into a joint use civilian airport was rejected. The ASDF’s Air Defense Command (ADC) and Air Support Command (ASC) headquarters, both now based in Fuchu, Tokyo, are to be shifted to Yokota AB.

In Nov 2005, it was reported that the US military and the Japanese Self-Defense Forces also plan to develop a 밹ommon operational picture?with US and Japanese command centers co-located at Yokota Air Base in Japan. “Close and continuous coordination at every level is 밻ssential to dissuade destabilizing military build-ups, to deter aggression and to respond to diverse security challenges,?the report said. The two countries agreed on the need to intensify bilateral contingency planning and include Japan뭩 civilian agencies and local authorities in the process. They also agreed to share real-time intelligence, expand joint training and share facilities both inside and outside Japan.”

In the interim report released Oct 2005 the US-Japan agreed to explore giving Japan more control of Yokota’s airspace to facilitate movement of civilian aircraft through the area. On 13 Mar 2006, the Japan Times (“U.S. TO RETURN PART OF YOKOTA AIRSPACE”, 2006-03-13) reported that the US has basically agreed to return part of the airspace over Yokota Air Base in Tokyo as part of the realignment of US military forces in Japan. The basic agreement is expected to alleviate the overcrowding caused by the 470 commercial flights that must take detours around the so-called “Yokota RAPCON (Radar Approach Control)” area each day. A separate report last week by the Asahi Shimbun stated the United States and Japan struck a deal during recent talks in Hawaii on partial return of Yokota airspace by 2009 as a measure to prevent near misses.

However, this was refuted by the USFJ on 21 Mar with the statement that the US and Japan hadn’t reached any agreement on the possible return of Yokota airspace by the military but the issue is being debated as part of higher-level transformation talks. USFJ said the reporting on the subject has been “misleading” and disputed statistics in Asahi Shimbun (Feb 25) and Japan Times (Mar 13) that claimed up to 470 commercial flights a day to and from Haneda and Narita airports in Tokyo are disrupted by Yokota’s Radar Approach Control. The Asahi Shimbun report cited a survey by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport. According to the USFJ, civilian aircraft generally avoid Yokota radar approach by choice, but there are established procedures for them to receive permission for flyovers. Most don’t ask, but the base granted 17,000 requests in 2004 and 22,632 last year. Yokota has approved virtually every flyover request and has the ability to accept increased over-flight traffic. (Source: Stars and Stripes.)

Camp Zama A small element of I Corps was relocated to Camp Zama in July 2005 without fanfare. Camp Zama was the previous home of I Corps before its relocation to Fort Lewis in Washington state. Local residents are opposed to the I Corps returning to the area.

The return of part of the Sagami General Depot and the other base, Camp Zama, was not included in an interim report on the realignment of U.S. forces released by the two governments in October. The interim report did, however, say the U.S. Army planned to build a new Asia-Pacific command headquarters at Camp Zama in Zama and Sagamihara, a plan that was strongly opposed by local city governments.

After further discussions, the US agreed to the return of part of the Sagami General Depot for the construction of a road, but the return of 5 hectares of Camp Zama was rebuffed and only a small portion was to be returned. Tokyo asked Washington to return about five hectares of the 235-hectare Camp Zama. However, due to concerns that the Zama city government might prevent the establishment of the new Asia-Pacific command headquarters at the camp if it regained control of five hectares of the camp, Washington has said it will return only a small area of the land, according to the sources. (Source: Yomiuri Online.)

Missile Defense Line The Japanese are also involved in joint development of a Missile Defense against North Korea in cooperation with the US — though the Japanese are concerned about the escalating costs. In the US Quadriennial Review, the DOD stated that a Missile Defense line would be constructed to thwart any North Korean missile threat — and any potential future Chinese threat. The Japan Times reported on 18 Jan that Defense Agency chief Fukushiro Nukaga stated that Japan and the US will integrate their information networks on missile defense by the end of fiscal 2006. After working out details such as the roles of the Self-Defense Forces and the US military in the initiative, the two countries are expected to sign an agreement possibly this summer, according to Nukaga. On 3 Mar, it was reported that the Defense Facilities Administration Agency will ask the Aomori prefectural and Tsugaru municipal governments to host a U.S. military radar for missile defense at Japan’s Air Self-Defense Force base in Tsugaru, Aomori Prefecture.

The Japanese assemble the PAC-3 missiles in Japan under contract and already are equipped with the PAC-3 in the SDF. Its Aegis destroyers are now equipped with SM2 missiles — and the US-Japan joint research into larger more advanced SM-3 interceptor missiles. The SDF has also been delegated the authority to launch their missiles if Japan is attacked. The reason was that missile launch was critical that immediate response was essential because of the close proximity of North Korea. These destroyers now patrol the straits between Japan and North Korea along with USFJ ships. The Japanese have also started aggressive maneuvers dealing with anti-submarine warfare in its territorial waters — and in disputed areas.

However, Korea still remains under the USFK “umbrella” with PAC-3 Patriot units in Suwon, Osan and Kwangju. The ROK still is “negotiating” with the Germans for used PAC-2 Patriots that was supposed to be completed in 2006. NGO activist groups in Korea area admantly against the Korean involvement in the US Missile Defense System (MDS). Its ships and submarines are limited to coastal defense at this time. It has developed an indigenous ship-to-surface missile “Hae-song” (Sea Star) to replace the US Harpoon missiles on its ships. (NOTE: It has also developed the “Shin Kung (New Bow),뮃 a portable shoulder-held short-range surface-to-air missile and “Chong Sango (Blue Shark),?a lightweight torpedo primarily for coastal defense.) However, the ROK has shown an inability to respond to coastal infiltration of North Korean submarines in the past.

Fumio Kyuma, former SDF chief and presently chairman of Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party general affairs council, was in Washington in Jan 2006 to discuss the need for a mutual aid pact to let Japan repair top-secret U.S. military equipment based in Japan, including Aegis guided missile destroyers. He said he spoke with high-ranking U.S. defense officials, former Defense Secretary William Cohen and Richard Armitage, a former deputy secretary of state. Diet members were to visit America in May 2006 to discuss such a pact with U.S. defense officials.

However, in Korea the US has shown a reluctance to allow military technology to be released to the ROK. The latest was the reluctance to provide defense digital mapping software to the ROK — though they did provide the digital mapping to upgrade the ROK systems that have not updated since 1993. The reason appears to be that the ROK approaches purchases of equipment with the attached concept of technology transfer — while the Japanese obtain the technology transfer while assembling/repairing/manufacturing end products under license. For example the Japanese JF-16 was better than the original with Mitsubishi graphite-epoxy composite wings. This technology led to the Japanese F-2 fighter (F-16 variant) which is reported to be better than the F-16 in some aspects of air defense. The ROK KF-16 was assembled at Socho with some technology transfer, but most of the production was in assembling pieces provided by General Dynamics for the final production. The F-15K production is all in St. Louis.

The Japanese are also producing their own military applications for coastal radar and aircraft avionics. The ROK claims to have started research and development into this area. The US has already transferred the coastal defense radar responsibility to the ROK. The Japanese also already possess indigenous satellite launch capability — and it can be assumed that they also possess the ability to develop their own indigenous missiles — but find it economically beneficial in the long term to do joint research in this area with the US. The ROK prefers to do this on its own.

Japan Reorganizing for Regional Role and North Korean Missile Attacks The ROK had best pay attention to what is happening in Japan. The Self-Defense Forces will begin operating under a new system on March 27 that will centralize the chains of command of the Air, Ground and Maritime self-defense forces. It will be the first organizational change of this kind since the SDF was founded in 1954. Under the new system, the ASDF, GSDF and MSDF will be controlled by one commander.

Under the new system, control will be unified into an integrated staff office that has yet to be established. All operations will be centralized, including the organization of integrated troop units for defensive mobilizations; the dispatch of ASDF, GSDF and MSDF personnel on disaster-relief missions; warning and surveillance missions carried out with P-3C patrol aircraft; and scrambling aircraft for the interception of enemy planes.

The characteristics of the ASDF, GSDF and MSDF have been described as discreet, traditional and fearlessly courageous, but also “obstinate and headstrong” (the GSDF), “self-centered” (the MSDF) and “incoherent” (the ASDF). The ASDF, GSDF and MSDF employ different terminology, codes, and maps drawn to different scales, all of which have been highlighted as reasons why the SDF arms have failed to communicate adequately. The need to centralize information and chains of command among the three branches of the SDF has long been urged.

In Japan-U.S. joint war games held at the GSDF Western Army Headquarters in late January, GSDF Gen. Naoto Hayashi acted as the commander of the first integrated troop unit. The exercise involved shutting down the supply routes of enemy troops trying to land in Japanese territory. (SITE NOTE: The Japanese consider the Chinese submarines operating in Japanese territorial waters a direct threat and have now undertaken policies and programs to improve their anti-submarine warfare. They still consider the Chinese as an open threat in invading Japan because of their overwhelming manpower.)

The recent joint exercise was based on the premise that ballistic missiles–some with chemical warheads–were raining down on Japan while Japanese and U.S. Aegis-equipped destroyers were on patrol in the Sea of Japan. Various terrorist attacks, including on nuclear power plants, were anticipated in the exercise. (SITE NOTE: This is directly aimed at defense from North Korea with its long-range Taepdong missiles and special operations forces that will infiltrate and attack the infrastructure to create panic.) (Source: Yomiuri Online.)

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles The Associated Press reported on 12 Jan that Japan was planning to introduce unmanned spy planes (UAV) as early as April 2007 to gather intelligence about a possible ballistic missile launch by the DPRK. Defense Agency chief Fukushiro Nukaga said officials will travel to the US, Germany and Italy to examine difference types of the unmanned vehicles before deciding which type to buy, Kyodo News agency reported. What makes this interesting is that the US has refused the ROK request to purchase their UAV while approving the request of Japan. The UAV Predators have been tested along the DMZ — but under the USFK control. The ROK has stated that it intends to develop its own indigenous UAV in the future, and has already developed a small-scale indigenous reconnaissance UAV.

Increased US-Japan SDF Cooperation (Jan-Apr 2006) There has been a significant increase in cooperation between the Japanese SDF and the US military. In Jan 2006, it was announced that Japanese troops were to land on the U.S. mainland next week for the first-ever exercise there with Marines. In a move that demonstrates how Japanese troops will increase joint exercises with U.S. troops under Japan’ new defense program adopted in 2005, about 130 Japan Ground Self-Defense Force troops will begin training at Camp Pendleton, Calif. The drills, to run through Jan. 27, are to train the Japanese soldiers to respond to threats against Japanese islands off Kyushu and Okinawa under Japan’s new national defense program guideline. He said the training will simulate landing on an occupied island, something they had not practiced under their previous “conventional defense-oriented posture.” The Western Army regiment, formed in 2002, is under direct command of Western Army Headquarters, which is in charge of defense of Kyushu and Okinawa. (Source: Stars and Stripes)

On 23 Jan 2006, Foreign Minister Taro Aso and U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick signed an agreement that requires Japan to cover some of the costs of stationing U.S. military forces in Japan for the two Japanese fiscal years from April 1. The latest agreement extends a similar accord but calls for shortening the current term of five years because of the difficulty in assessing changes in the structure and activities of the U.S. forces under the planned U.S. military realignment in Japan, Japanese officials said. The Special Measures Agreement calls on Japan to provide 139.8 billion yen annually to defray expenses for labor, utilities and relocating military drill sites. (Source: Crisscross.)

For the first time, the JSDF is sending the soldiers to Camp Pendleton. This comes soon after Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso cited China as a threat to the disputed Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea between Taiwan and Ishigaki Island. The islands, approximately 138 miles northeast of Taiwan, 230 miles east of the Chinese mainland, and 230 miles southeast of Okinawa, are believed to be sitting on vast oil and gas deposits. On Nov. 10, 2004, tensions between Japan and China Jan 2006 that Japanese Defense Agency Director General Fukushiro Nukaga expressed eagerness for the Self-Defense Forces to take a more proactive role in international cooperation activities by making them part of the SDF’s main duties. “World peace is directly linked to peace in Japan. Participation in international cooperation activities has been deemed a secondary duty, but we are considering upgrading it to a main duty,” The statements were made by Nukaga in a speech delivered at the Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies during his visit to London.

(SITE NOTE: As of January 2006, the Japanese changed their strategy to obtain a UN Security Council seat by distancing itself from the other four G-7 nations seeking a permanent seat, and attempting to formulate a proposal for UN reform that the US will support. Japan has refused to join Germany, India and Brazil in a new bid for permanent seats on an expanded UN Security Council, deciding instead to negotiate with the US to come up with an alternate proposal. Tokyo would continue as part of the so-called Group of Four, however, calling it the “primary driving force for council reform. Previously they had shelved the issue after declaring that it might reduce its contributions to the UN due to its failed UNSC seat bid. As of Mar 2006, it appears the Japanese still have not given up on the idea, but now are seeking to become a regional military power first — then reenter their bid with the backing of the US. The change to Article 9 of the Peace Constitution must first take place.)
On 27 Apr the Yomiuri Daily reported that the alliance between the U.S. and Japan will undergo an upgrade as the two nations have settled how to share the relocation cost of the U.S. navy base in Okinawa, Japan. The Daily Yomiuri reported that the U.S. and Japan have agreed to amend the Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation, which were agreed to in 1997, and that they are currently working out the final details. According to the Japanese daily, the U.S. and Japan are currently discussing amending the guidelines during US-Japan Security Consultative Committee, a meeting attended by U.S. state and defense secretaries, and Japanese foreign affairs and defense ministers planned for early May. As a result, military integration between the two countries will be accelerated.

What will be in the new guidelines?-

Japan`s Defense Agency Director General Fukushiro Nukaga suggested to U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in January 2006 that the guidelines be amended. Secretary Rumsfeld agreed to the suggestion on April 23, during the negotiation on how to split the costs of moving the U.S. Marine base from Okinawa to Guam. The new guidelines are believed to include widening mutual cooperation during international peacekeeping activities, sharing information and expanding joint strategic plans on weapons of mass destruction, and giving the U.S. access to Japanese airports and harbors in case of a war in Japan and surrounding regions.

The current guidelines were introduced in 1978 and were amended in 1997. The guidelines include specific cooperation procedure for three different situations ?in time of peace, war in Japan, and war in surrounding regions of Japan. Japan enacted its laws regarding wars based on the guidelines in 1999. According to the Daily Yomiuri, Japan`s Defense Agency will prepare a new draft of the guideline in 2007.

The implications-

The strengthening of the alliance shows that the definition of national security has taken on new meanings in this new time of territorial dispute which replaced the cold war. The U.S. has been inspecting its organization and equipment, since the 9-11 terror attacks, and it is now requesting its allies to take up more of the human and financial burden. It is a chance for Japan to change from being a country under U.S.뭩 deterrence and move one step closer to becoming a 뱊ormal state??a nation with a voice in international politics and its own defense force. It is also a remedy to 뱊ew threats?like North Korea뭩 nuclear weapons.

When the guideline is amended and the 밣ermanent Law on Overseas Deployment of Japan뭩 Self-Defense Force?is enacted, the integration of the U.S. and Japanese forces will be accelerated, because Japan will be allowed to send the Japan Self-Defense Force to US-led coalition forces. (Source: Donga Ilbo.)
Pact to be signed in April (Mar 2006) Because of the on-going protests and political upheaval caused by the local politicians and NGO activists, on 8 Mar 2006 it was announced that Japan would finalize the Realignment and Restructuring Agreement with the US in early April on realigning U.S. forces in Japan — effectively giving up on gaining prior consent from local authorities. The Japanese government is eyeing having Defense Agency chief Fukushiro Nukaga and Foreign Minister Taro Aso visit the United States for security talks with their U.S. counterparts April 1-2. The move reflected Tokyo’s prioritizing Washington over local opinion and risks igniting further anger from areas to be affected by the relocation plans. After the announcement was made, the Okinawa Governor attempted to lobby the Ministry of Defense in Tokyo to allow public concensus on the issue, but the Ministry stated that it would work with the local governments after the accord was signed.

A plan to realign U.S. troops in Japan likely will be completed in early April, comments from U.S. and Japanese officials indicate, regardless of reaction from affected communities. Japan Defense Agency Chief Fukushiro Nukaga and Foreign Minister Taro Aso will visit Washington April 1-2 to sign a pact reached in October to cut U.S. troop strength on Okinawa and relocate a carrier air wing from Naval Air Facility Atsugi to Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japanese government sources.

In the bilateral talks in Hawaii leading to the signing of the agreement, the US has agreed to return three facilities in Okinawa Prefecture to Japan. The three are the Makiminato Service Area in Urasoe, Naha military port, and Camp Kuwae (Camp Lester) in the town of Chatan.

Impact to Korea The impacts to Korea is that these moves are the prelude to the possible relocation of the CFC functions OUT of Korea if the US-ROK alliance sours. In the Oct 2005 Security Consultative Meeting (SCM), Secretary of Defense Rumsfield stated that there was a major change as the US would become a “supporting partner with the ROK” and no longer would be its “patron.” All that is awaiting is the Article 9 changes to Peace Constitution which came out of the committee in Nov 2005 and is being circulated and discussed nationally prior to a vote on a constitutional amendment. The JSDF has reorganized to implement a regional role. The Japanese government has declared that Taiwan is of “strategic importance.” Currently the Japanese are preparing for their regional role with joint exercises with the USFJ — as well as deployments to Alaska.

Roh has been stating repeatedly that he would seek to gain wartime control BEFORE the end of 2006. The US position is that it should be accomplished after the transfer of specific tasks to the ROK — based on the ROK capability to assume the roles. Seven of ten tasks have been transferred and should be completed by 2007. Working-level groups are in work identifying the next set of items for transfer to the ROK but it is admitted that these tasks may take significantly longer. For example, the ROK “spy satellite” (Arirang 2) is still in the development stage — but the US is reluctant to allow the software to exploit the data to be transferred to the ROK. (Arirang 2 was scheduled for launch in July from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome, about 200-kilometers northeast of Moscow.) Currently the ROK is NOT able to fulfill many missions until new weapons systems and upgrades are in place — and much of this is in question as the ROK has a falling tax base in ability to come up with funding for all the social welfare, foreign grants (including North Korea), and domestic programs (including the Administrative City).

The ROK does not seem to be paying attention to the subtle changes that have been occurring since the US-Japan restructuring negotiations have been going on. When it first started in earnest about three years ago, the US was still adamantly speaking of the solidarity in the US-ROK alliance. After the negotiations entered a more concrete phase where numbers were being discussed in reductions in Japan, the tone of USFK talks were more concessionary in acceding to ROK “demands” of the transfer of wartime control. At the same time, the USFJ moved elements of I Corps back into Camp Zama, Japan in July 2004. In 2005, the implementation of the transfer of the major tasks were underway and the US was now speaking vaguely about transferring control to the ROK of wartime control in the future and Donald Rumsfield agreed to “appropriately accelerate” the process. At this point the agreement was coming together with Japan agreeing to the stationing of a nuclear carrier and movement of troops to Futenma. Then there was a stumbling block over Futenma with the environmentalists and the US switched the move to another Okinawa location. At this point, the USFK started to speak of transferring control when the ROK was capable of handling the missions. Roh on the other hand, was still attempting ot gain war-time control with his latest demand in March 2006. After the hub-bub of moving the base on Okinawa and the removal of 8,000 Marines and 9,000 dependents from Okinawa to Guam was agreed upon, the tone in ROK talks on transfer of power again took on a concilliatory tone. The USFK seemed more willing to discuss the matter. In his first meeting with President Roh on 1 May 2006, USFK Commander General B.B. Bell said that it was “normal for a sovereign South Korea to have wartime military control of its troops.” The general was quoted as saying the United States supported Seoul’s position and would work to make progress on such a transfer, which he reportedly said Washington supports.

The bottomline is that the fate of the CFC hangs in the balance with the signing of the restructuring agreement in Japan. AND if the CFC disappears, the UN Command will surely follow immediately thereafter. The Missile Defense Line has been agreed upon — and Korea is on the outside of the line. (NOTE: This is the same scenario as the Dean Acheson line that started the Korean War — but this time the North is much too weak and there is no element of surprise that could take place.) Realistically, the CFC would not disappear overnight, but could be reduced to a three-star position within two years (2008) when the US completes the majority of its move off of the DMZ

US and Japan Near Agreement on Cost Sharing (Apr 2006) The United States and Japan have settled their differences on a payment plan to move thousands of U.S. Marines out of Japan, with Japan agreeing to contribute nearly 60 percent of the $10.3 billion cost, the Japanese defense chief said. Japanese Defense Minister Fukushiro Nukaga flew to Washington to secure the agreement, spending more than three hours in a meeting with Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld. Officials were uncertain about the outcome of the talks. An official who was accompanying Nukaga said prior to the meeting, “The probability is 90 percent for a collapse and 10 percent for an agreement.” During senior working-level talks in March, the United States demanded that Japan shoulder 75 percent of the 10 billion dollars. Japan, fearing the costs might swell, responded with an offer of 3 billion dollars in loans for construction of housing for marines’ families. The nations’ positions on cost-sharing were poles apart.

Nukaga said that Japan wanted an “appropriate sharing of the cost” of transferring 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam. Nukaga and U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said Japan would cover 59 percent of the 10.27 billion dollars relocation cost, or 6.09 billion dollars, of which the government will pay 2.8 billion dollars in grants from its general account, with the remainder in the forms of investment and loans.

Japan had earlier balked at a U.S. proposal that Japan contribute $7.5 billion of the cost to relocate the Marines from the Japanese island. The United States initially asked Japan to shoulder 75 percent of about 10 billion dollars in expected costs, but the government only said it would pay about 3 billion dollars in the form of loans for housing for families of U.S. soldiers. Japan later suggested it could offer up to 3 billion dollars in grants in addition to the assistance in loans. Washington then offered to split the burden into three–Japanese grants, government investment and loans, and the remainder underwritten by the United States. But Japan rejected this offer, claiming it would be difficult to gain the understanding of the Japanese public. The two countries finally settled on reducing Japan’s burden to under 60 percent.

According to the agreement, government grants, which form the core of Japan’s burden, will be used mainly to construct headquarters and other buildings for marines and school buildings for their families. Out of 2.55 billion dollars earmarked to build houses for marines’ families, the government will invest 1.5 billion dollars into a newly established third sector body and pay the remainder in loans through the Japan Bank for International Cooperation and other financial institutions. Tokyo likely will pay through loans the costs for social infrastructure, including electricity and sewage facilities. The United States will pay the costs of training facilities for marines, runways and recreational facilities, such as golf courses. The U.S. government’s expenditure from its general account will be 3.18 billion dollars. The remaining 1 billion dollars the United States agreed to provide will be used mainly to construct roads around the base in Guam. (Source: Daily Yomiuri.)

With the agreement made, the government was expected to start working on legislation necessary for allocating necessary funds. This was because no existing law made it possible to earmark money for construction of U.S. military facilities to be built outside Japan. The government was considering a revision of the law on establishment of the Defense Agency so that fiscal funds for the relocation plan could be allocated in the general account by giving new authority to the Defense Facilities Administration Agency. For loans through such institutions as the Japan Bank for International Cooperation, the government also could revise the law on the government-affiliated bank, which was established with the unification of the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund and Export-Import Bank of Japan. The government also was considering submitting a set of bills promoting the realignment of U.S. forces to the current Diet session. The aim was to gain public support for the plan. Targeting local governments that would bear heavier burdens hosting remaining U.S. bases after the realignment, the government was considering the establishment of a new law to allocate grant funds for those local governments. As of April 2006, how the money would be funded was still up in the air. (Source: Daily Yomiuri.)

The agreement is part of a broader plan to streamline the 50,000 U.S. forces based in Japan and to give Japan’s military greater responsibility for security in the Asia-Pacific. An outline of the overall realignment plan was announced in October and was to be finalized by the end of March. However, it bogged down over details. Four U.S. military facilities in Okinawa Prefecture–including the U.S. Marine Corps’ Futenma Air Station–will be returned to Japan by the end of fiscal 2013 according to an outline of the final report on the reorganization of the U.S. military in Japan. The other three facilities to be returned are Naha Military Port in Naha, Makiminato Service Area in Urasoe, and Camp Kuwae in Chatancho. They have a combined area of about 880 hectares, accounting for about 4 percent of the total area of U.S. bases in the prefecture. In addition to these four facilities, part of Camp Zukeran, located in Ginowan and neighboring towns, and part of the U.S. Army petroleum depots in Chatancho–thought to be several hectares in size–will be returned.

The two countries will compile a final report in early May. Besides outlining the cost of sharing the relocation of U.S. marines to Guam, the report will include details of:
– The relocation of U.S. carrier-based aircraft from Atsugi U.S. Naval Air Facility in Kanagawa Prefecture and airborne refueling aircraft from Futenma Air Station to U.S. Marine Corps’ Iwakuni Air Station.
– The return of part of the 214-hectare Sagami General Depot in Sagamihara, Kanagawa Prefecture, and part of the 235-hectare Camp Zama, in Zama and Sagamihara.
– The relocation of the U.S. Army’s 1st Army Corps in Ft. Lewis, Wash., to Camp Zama. (SITE NOTE: The Relocation of I Corps to Camp Zama will directly impact on the need for the CFC in Korea and could lead to the downgrading of the position — or more likely the complete elimination of the CFC and return of the wartime command to the ROK in line with President Roh’s “vision” of “self-reliant defense.”.)
The Japanese government hopes a Japan-U.S. joint statement will be announced along with the final report during the May 2 meeting, ahead of Japan-U.S. summit talks scheduled for late June. (Source: Daily Yomiuri.)

However, shortly after the announcement of the cost sharing agreement, the Japanese media outlets reported that the Japanese government was in shock when Richard Lawless, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, stated that Japan’s share of the relocation costs wouldl amount to 3 trillion yen (approximately $25.5 billion). Japanese government officials played down the statement as a message to satisfy the U.S. citizens. Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi went on record to conjecture that the U.S. government is just countering the U.S. media which is unhappy that Japan committed too little to meet America’s contribution. If Lawless’s statement is accurate, Japan will have to pay an average of 500 billion yen yearly, which accounts for 10 percents of Japan’s yearly defense costs of about 4.8 trillion What was unclear was why Lawless would release such information knowing full well that there would be a backlash in the Japanese press. High level officials stated Lawless’s figures were a “little exaggerated.” The following appeared in the Yomiuri Shimbun on 28 April 2006:

Japan may have to spend more than 2 trillion yen to assist in the realignment of U.S. forces in the next six to seven years, although the U.S. estimation has been said by Tokyo to be exaggerated, government sources said Wednesday.

“There will be about 1.5 trillion yen spent [regrouping bases] in Japan alone, and the total [spent on U.S. force realignment by Japan] likely will be more than 2 trillion yen,” a senior Defense Agency official said in his reaction to the figure of 26 billion dollars, or about 2.89 trillion yen, mentioned in a statement by U.S. Deputy Defense Undersecretary Richard Lawless.

Lawless said in Washington on Tuesday the cost of realigning U.S. forces in Japan, which he hopes to complete in 2012, will be about 26 billion dollars. “It is their [Japan's] responsibility [to cover that cost],” Lawless said.

The 26 billion dollars figure includes the cost of relocating U.S. marines from Okinawa Prefecture to Guam, Lawless said. Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe said Wednesday his impression of the figure 26 billion dollars that Lawless mentioned was “extraordinary.”

But Abe added he was aware there would be a need for an “appropriate” amount of spending out of the budget, adding that the Defense Agency and the Finance Ministry would be dealing with the U.S. request.

A senior Defense Agency official said the figure Lawless presented was perhaps a little exaggerated. “The U.S. administration, because of its concerns in Congress, needed to emphasize the costs Japan would be asked to shoulder,” the official said. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi also said the U.S. government needed to impress its domestic audience.

“There are views held among the American public that Japan’s defense burden is too small compared to theirs. [Lawless' remarks] were spoken with an eye on American public opinion,” Koizumi said Wednesday.

The government, however, has yet to scrutinize exactly how much would be needed for the overall regrouping of U.S. forces in Japan, officials admitted.

If Lawless’ estimation was accurate, Japan would have to pay nearly 500 billion yen annually until 2012, the target year for the completion of the realignment. That would equal roughly 10 percent of the nation’s annual defense-related budget, which is about 4.8 trillion yen for the fiscal 2006.

The Finance Ministry, which advocates an overall reduction in government spending, insists all funds needed for assisting U.S. forces’ regroup should be raised out of the defense-related budget.

On Tuesday, before Lawless’ remarks were reported, Finance Minister Sadakazu Tanigaki spoke of the need to consider cutting the 24.24 trillion yen five-year defense build up program for fiscal 2005 through 2009 if Japan is to assist with the U.S. forces realignment. (Source: Yomiuri Shimbun.)
The Japan Times on 27 Apr 2006 reported that the Japanese government plans to slash defense spending to come up with the 2.71 trillion yen that Japan will need to shoulder the cost of realigning the US military presence. It also plans to ask the US for an overhaul of Japan’s payments to support hosting US forces, including abolishing the practice of Tokyo paying the utility bills for bases.

Realignment Plan Signed in Washington (May 2006) The realignment plan was signed on 1 May 2006 between the US and Japan at the so-called two-plus-two meeting between Foreign Minister Aso, Defense Agency Director General Fukushiro Nukaga, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in Washington, where the agreement was made. Following the agreement, Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon of Korea played down concerns that the buttressed military cooperation between the United States and Japan could weaken Seoul’s military alliance with Washington. The agreement raised concerns in Seoul that it may transfer greater power over to the U.S.-Japan alliance if a crisis broke out on the Korean peninsula. North and South Korea are still technically at war.

Ban Ki-moon said excessive worries were not appropriate for the Korea-U.S. alliance and said he wished the realignment of U.S. troops in Japan will contribute to stabilizing Northeast Asia. Korea and the United States are currently negotiating for Seoul to assume greater independent security from Washington and to reduce its dependency on U.S. forces. South Korea is still in negotiations with the United States over who will take charge of military operations on the Korean Peninsula in the event of war. “South Korea and the U.S. have no disagreement over the operational control issue and will continue to have consultations to draw up a roadmap for the transfer as early as December this year,” the ministry said in a statement. The changing Korea-U.S. military alliance continues to remain a thorny issue. (Source: Korea Herald.)

A former U.S. commander said on 1 May that the Seoul government should consider whether it is doing enough to secure independent military capability in its push to assume a bigger role in its own national defense. John Tilelli, former head of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), said the transfer of wartime operational control to South Korea was a designated path but that Asia should be aware of the consequences. “It’s not a matter of if wartime operational control changes, it’s a matter of when,” he was quoted as saying during the Korea-U.S. Forum held in Washington. (SITE NOTE: Though President Roh keeps talking of assuming military control in 2006, he still has committed only 2.8 percent of GDP. Other countries that are “flash points” (Israel, Pakistan, India, etc.) commit a minimum of 6 percent of GDP. Since Kim Dae-jung the portion committed to defense has fallen from 8 percent to the current 2.8 percent — though the ROK continues to mouthe the words of increased spending. New weapons procurements continue, but there are questions as to how the ROK will fund the new expenditures for new high-tech weapons.) (Source: Korea Herald.)

The following editorial is from the Yomiuri Shimbun on 3 May 2006.

Document seen as alliance road map / Relocation plan hailed for easing hosting burden on Okinawa Pref.
Tatsuya Fukumoto and Takashi Imai / Yomiuri Shimbun Staff Writers

Relocation plans for U.S. bases in Japan finalized by the Japanese and U.S. governments Monday in Washington are to become the “road map” for the two nations to strengthen their security alliance and reduce burdens on local communities hosting the bases. The document includes timetables for relocation plans, which are aimed at reducing the burdens of hosting U.S. bases on Okinawa Prefecture and other parts of the nation while maintaining deterrent capabilities by seeking more integration in operations of the U.S. forces and Self-Defense Forces.

“It was a significant achievement that [the final report on] realignment plans included detailed plans for reducing burdens on Okinawa,” Foreign Minister Taro Aso said at a press conference following the so-called two-plus-two meeting between Aso, Defense Agency Director General Fukushiro Nukaga, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in Washington, where the agreement was made.

Nukaga also boasted that “nearly half of the U.S. marines based in Okinawa Prefecture will be moved under the plan.” (SITE NOTE: What is significant is that only a year ago, the USFK was boasting that with the “fast boats” (hydrofoil ships from Okinawa) the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Unit could be in Korea in 24 hours. Now “nearly half” are being relocated to Guam. What does this do to plans for the defense of Korea?)

In the seven-page document, stipulations on realignment or reduction plans for bases in Okinawa Prefecture take up more than two pages. It can be seen as an indication that full consideration was given to people in the prefecture.

Regarding U.S. marines’ Futenma Air Station, the biggest focal point in the realignment, the report set a timetable that a replacement facility in the Camp Schwab area be completed by 2014. It is planned that three years will be spent on compiling environmental impact assessments and five years for construction work.

On the relocation plan for about 8,000 U.S. marines to Guam, the document set 2014 as the deadline although it was earlier set for 2012. The 2014 deadline is the same as that for relocation of the Futenma base.

This was aimed at sending a “message” that relocation plans for Futenma and Guam are “in the same package,” according to a senior official of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency.

The headquarters of 1st Marine Air Wing Headquarters, which is stationed at the Futenma base, is to be moved to Guam in a move associated with the relocation of Futenma. (SITE NOTE: The 1st MAW has had as its primary mission the defense of Korea since the days when it came to the rescue of the ROK in the first days of the Korean War. Now the unit is being relocated to Guam.)

The document said that the marines’ relocation to Guam would depend on actual steps taken for construction of alternative facilities for Futenma and financial contributions made by the Japanese government. This is an indication the U.S. government still had doubts on the feasibility of the Futenma relocation plan.

Regarding the replacement facility, the document said the U.S. government did not have a plan to operate fighter jets from the facility, thus showing consideration to residents in Nago, Okinawa Prefecture, which houses Camp Schwab, as residents were concerned that military functions at the new facility might be increased.

Concerning the Yokota Air Base, the report clarified the return of airspace for radar approach control operations, which were left unclear in an interim report.

The document says operations in part of such airspace will be returned to Japan by September 2008.

The area subject to return will be determined by October, and conditions for the return will be examined by fiscal 2009 when the fourth runway is completed at Haneda Airport, Tokyo.

According to the Construction and Transport Ministry, the construction of the fourth runaway will increase the number of flights by 40 percent.

Since it is difficult to cope with the increase in flights under current circumstances, there is an urgent need to have part of Yokota’s airspace returned.

A senior ministry official welcomed the final report. “It’s significant that timetables have been set for the return of airspace,” the official said.

A senior Defense Agency official also said, “I thought it would be difficult to have a road map for the return of airspace in another decade unless it was made at this time.”

=== Coordination body in the pipeline

A coordination body, which involves officials from the Foreign Ministry, the Defense Agency and the Construction and Transport Ministry as well as the U.S. military, is planned. The body will examine the plan on the return of Yokota’s airspace after control operations at Kadena Air Base in Okinawa Prefecture are handed over to the Air Self-Defense Force at the end of fiscal 2007, taking into account actual operational conditions.

The document also includes details on measures to strengthen cooperation between the SDF and U.S. forces that were mentioned in the interim report.

A joint operation coordination center to be set up at the Yokota base will be tasked with coordinating work between the two nations on missile defense and air defense policies. The Air Defense Command, which will act as the command for operations of the nation’s missile defense systems, will be relocated in fiscal 2010 to the Yokota base.

The document also includes a plan to deploy the U.S. military’s mobile X-Band radar system for early detection at the ASDF’s Shariki base in Tsugaru, Aomori Prefecture, by the summer so that intelligence obtained by the radar systems can be shared by the two nations. This measure is sure to foster sharing of intelligence, a core policy for the two nations’ defense cooperation in the future. (SITE NOTE: This is part of the Missile Defense Shield that is being jointly fielded by the US and Japan. With this X-Band radar, the ROK is left on the “outside” of the MDS.)

About the Ground Self-Defense Force, which is behind the Maritime Self-Defense Force and the ASDF in terms of cooperation with the U.S. forces, the Central Readiness Force that is tasked with international cooperation activities and deployment in emergency cases will be relocated to Camp Zama in Kanagawa Prefecture.

As the headquarters of the U.S. Army’s 1st Corps will be moved from Ft. Lewis, Wash., to the same facility, the GSDF is expected to promptly obtain information on operational plans devised by the U.S. Army and incorporate it into its own operational plans, according to a senior Defense Agency official. (SITE NOTE: Two years ago, the USFK was saying that David Halloran’s news reports of the Realignment in Japan off-track. Halloran reported that the USFK’s CFC could be downgraded and the USFK position could be reduced as a subordinate command to I Corps that was moving to Camp Zama. Under the roadmap, the U.S. Army plans to integrate its First Corps headquarters based in the state of Washington with U.S. Army Japan headquarters at Camp Zama in Kanagawa Prefecture by 2008. Japan also plans to move its Ground SDF command counterpart to the camp by 2012. News reports say the camp will serve as the “nerve center” to respond to military emergencies on the Korean Peninsula and around the Taiwan Strait. In effect, this replaces the need of the CFC — and at the same time, removes the US role from one of massive influxes of manpower to stop the North invasion — Oplan 5029 war plans — and supplements it with air power and naval support.)

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DoD Report: ROK paid 40 percent of USFK cost in 2002 (Jan 2006) Digging up old news, a recent DoD Report stated that South Korea contributed US$843.11 million toward the cost of having United States military forces stationed on the peninsula in 2002, about 40 percent of the total expense. At the same time, Japan paid $4.41 billion toward the stationing of U.S. troops on its soil, the largest among nations hosting U.S. military forces at 74.5 percent of the total. Japan’s contribution amounted to over 50 percent of the total defense contributions paid by 26 allies covered in the report. South Korea’s payment was about 9 percent of total contributions. (Source: Yonhap News.)

This is old news, but important when listening to the ROK’s claims of how it is paying too much. Remember that in 2002, the massive anti-Americanism was sweeping the nation. The Koreans were claiming that the US was in Korea for their own geo-political purposes and wanted the Americans out. After the hysteria died down in 2003, the Koreans still wanted the Americans out — but many changed their minds into “not just yet.” But the key point was that before the ROK was a poor country, but it had grown to a G-11 nation. Unfortunately it still did NOT want to pay its share. In Japan, 75 percent of the married servicemen had their dependents with them. In Korea, 10 percent had their dependents — and most of them were living off-base in 2002. There was a building freeze since the Nunn-Warner initiative in 1990 and the USFK intended drawdown. The full drawdown never took place as the North Korean nuclear crisis escalated in 1994 and forces were frozen. Even with the nuclear crisis threatening South Korea, it continued to play “poor country” and “developing nation” cards as it grew to a G-11 nation. In 2002, the anti-Americanism exploded and the cries for “Yankee Go Home” resounded throughout the land. With it Roh Moo-hyun was swept into office. The massive changes in the ROK-US alliance has taken place with the ROK refusing to pay its “share” in 2005. Crisis after crisis has been created by the Roh government because it claims that it was paying too much — but at the same time, it engaged in give-aways to the North in the form of fertilizer and food. The US is getting fed up with the ROK foot-dragging on the moves off the DMZ and unwillingness to shoulder its fair share.

The release of this dated tid-bit might be in time for the Jan 2006 Strategic Consultation for Allied Partnership. The point will be driven home that the US will no longer be a “patron” but instead become a “supporting partner.” The US wants the ROK to foot its fair share — or else the implied threat is that the promise that George Bush made to the Korean people may come true. He stated if the Korean people did not want the US, the US would stay a minute longer. With the new Japanese Alliance Pact to be signed in March 2006, the ROK playing hand is very weak — and the US is fed up.
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Strategic Consultation for Allied Partnership (Jan-Mar 2006) In their summit in November 2005 in South Korea, South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun and his U.S. counterpart, George W. Bush, agreed to start the high-level talks, officially named the “Strategic Consultation for Allied Partnership,” in 2006. This dialogue between the diplomatic heads of both countries, ROK Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon and U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, is a high level regular forum launched after the ROK-U.S. summit talks held in Gyeongju, Gyeongbuk last November. “The meeting will be held for the first time in the middle of January (19 Jan). There are just a few nations having such talks with the U.S.,” Ban Ki-moon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, said. According to South Korean officials, the United States regularly holds strategic alliance talks with Japan, Australia and Israel so this is nothing out of the ordinary. However, it is not coincidence that it comes almost simultaneously with the new agreement between the US and Japan that will take effect in Mar 2006.

Condoleezza Rice, Sec of State (Feb 2006)

Discussion ItemsThe topics was to cover not only bilateral issues, such as the North Korean nuclear standoff and the South Korea-U.S. alliance, but also global and regional issues of mutual concern, including global terrorism and the political situation of Northeast Asia. Specifically, the agenda was to include talks on the transfer of U.S. Forces Korea camps, strategic flexibility, the redemption of Korea뭩 Operational Control Authority, free trade agreement negotiations between Korea and the U.S., and other pending issues. In addition to the ongoing struggle between Japan and China over sovereignty, Japan뭩 views toward its past history and other potential conflicts in Northeast Asia will top the agenda.

There were major military issues that needed to be discussed. First was the reluctance of the US to release technology that would allow the ROK to buy Isreali AWACS aircraft. Second was the issue of the WRSA-K which went defunct in Dec 2006. The ROK has munitions that supposedly would only be able to support its ROK forces for 30 days — instead of the 90 days which it is planned for. Then we have the ROK move to “demilitarize” the DMZ which defeats the US presence in Korea. Of utmost importance was the use of the USFK forces in a regional peace-keeping role that the ROK opposes but states that it has no control over the USFK forces in a back-handed slap at the US.

The other main issue was the war-time control of the ROK troops by the ROK — which would spell the death knell for the Combined Forces Command (CFC). With the current developments in Japan and Guam, the ROK had better be careful to NOT ask for too much. They may get what they wish for and it will be a point of no return for the ROK-US alliance. In 2005, the 5th AF moved to Guam and 13th AF moved to Hickam. Hickam will be an overall Pacific area war-fighting force, but a special force will be dedicated to the Korea flashpoint. It appears that Guam will be the headquarters of this force with the building up of the 36th Air Force Expeditionary Unit on Guam — along with the relocation of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Unit headquarters element with 7,000 troops to Guam. The sub-unit at Camp Zama with I Corps could replace the CFC function in the blink of an eye — and everything is downhill for the ROK after that. The US moved a brigade with all its heavy armor with three months notification (2d Bde, 2d ID to Iraq in 2004) to never return — and the same could be done for the rest of Korea. This is an open threat that no one wants to mention publicly.

The Results: According to Yonhap News on 19 Jan 2006, South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon and U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced agreement on “strategic flexibility” of American troops stationed in South Korea, a policy allowing U.S. forces to swiftly move to and from host nations to areas of conflict or of other military needs. On strategic flexibility, the statement reflects both the needs of the U.S. and concerns of South Korea. “The ROK, as an ally, fully understands the rationale for the transformation of the U.S. global military strategy, and respects the necessity for strategic flexibility of the U.S. forces in the ROK,” the statement reads. “In the implementation of strategic flexibility, the U.S. respects the ROK position that it shall not be involved in a regional conflict in Northeast Asia against the will of the Korean people.” (SITE NOTE: Bottomline is that the US as before was going to proceed with its strategic flexibility — with or without the ROK’s permission. In essence, it states the ROK is welcome to stay out of the regional role the US and Japan will now jointly pursue. The US specifically states that it does NOT EXPECT the ROK’s participation in its strategic plans for the region — but this is also can be read as meaning the US does NOT WANT the ROK participation at this time. The painful episodes of getting the ROK support for the Iraq coalition in 2003 ended in the US pulling out the 2d Bde 2d ID from the ROK after Roh’s foot-dragging to send 3,600 troops in 2004. Interestingly, the ROK used the same example to illustrate that the US-ROK alliance could deal with deployments, “The government explains that the two countries are capable of dealing with emergency situations because they share a relationship based on trust, and points to the deployment of 3,600 USFK troops to Iraq in 2004 as an example.”

HOWEVER, the ROK interprets the statement, to mean that when conflicts occur between China and Taiwan or the U.S. and China, the USFK must have the consent of South Korea if they are to be engaged. The ROK objects to the USFK forces being used in a regional role as it may leave a security vacuum if the troops are deployed. Until this use of USFK forces is put to a test, no one really knows what will happen. The specific details have not been agreed upon regarding the strategic flexibility of the USFK. Therefore, a possible conflict over USFK operations cannot be ruled out. There is a possibility of a conflict of national interests between the U.S., with its global strategy responsibilities, and South Korea, with its top priority being stability on the Korean peninsula. In Seoul on 21 Jan anti-war protestors showed up with signs that said, “Cancel the ROK-US Strategic Consultation” as they interpreted the agreement to mean that the US would use Korea as a base of operations in case of a regional dispute involving the Korean neighbors.

The drive toward military innovation that has gained momentum since the 1990s has further accelerated the relocation of U.S. forces stationed overseas. The revolution in military affairs (RMA) refers to a fundamental transformation in military operations and strategy that transpired in the process of amplifying combat capabilities by linking ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) and PGMs (precision guided munitions) with highly sophisticated C4I (command and control, communication, Computer, and Information) via advanced IT technology.4) The so-called system-of-systems that obtains accurate information through sophisticated battlefield awareness capabilities and relays it to the shooter has proved its effectiveness in wars in the Gulf, Kosovo, Afghanistan and, more recently, Iraq.

One salient aspect of this transition has been Secretary Donald Rumsfeld뭩 strong commitment to parlaying future-oriented military capabilities such as air power and Missile Defense (MD) into leading roles in future warfare. The hard lesson from the Vietnam War was that air power should be applied to the depths of enemy territory in order to strategically paralyze the enemy command system and thus, take the initiative at an earlier stage of the war뼎a strategy first conceptualized in the context of air land battle. After long-range bombing campaigns via air refueling achieved remarkable results in Kosovo and Afghanistan, U.S. top brass came to a clearer realization that large-scale ground forces no longer play a conventional role. In addition, the RMA dramatically enhanced combat effectiveness for the U.S. military, which led to the recognition that its forces, ground troops in particular, could be concentrated. As a U.S. military analyst recently predicted, 뱖hen the system of systems is in place sometime in the first decade of the twenty-first century, the actual personnel levels of the U.S. armed forces will no longer provide much indication of their ability to safeguard American interests.

Other striking changes include enhanced lift capabilities and improved deployablity of rapid deployment forces (RDF). Airlift aircraft like the C-17 have allowed for rapid airlift of cargo and marines, reducing the need for advance deployment of large-scale ground troops. The Stryker, an RDF unit, which replaced the former 2ID brigade that was withdrawn from Korea in 1992, can dispatch light infantry troops together with light armored vehicles to any part of the world. This attests to the desire of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff for a global base installation that would keep U.S. troops overseas to a minimum and also enhance responsiveness to various regional conflicts. The U.S. Department of Defense is known to be planning to reorganize 2ID into light mobile infantry forces and realign them to locations where they can move swiftly. Therefore, a part of 2ID might move to Osan where it would facilitate airlifts, or somewhere near Pyongtaek Port where troops would be dispatched in navy vessels to regions in conflict. (Source: EAST ASIAN REVIEW AUTUMN 2003.)

Two USFK soldiers in full battle-gear lie wide awake on their bunks, ready to be dispatched at a moment뭩 notice to a trouble spot anywhere in the world under a new policy of 뱒trategic flexibility?the Korean government finally agreed to endorse on Thursday. 밄ad luck,?the Korean soldier on the next bunk commiserates. (20 Jan 2006) (Chosun Ilbo) (NOTE: Notice the stereotype Americans with the white “big nose” and black “big lips” — in all anti-American cartoons, these stereotypical images of Americans persist.)

The touchier issues of the ROK defense capability and its change in status of the US from a patron to “supporting partner” was side-stepped and these discussions will be left to the Secretary of Defense and ROK Ministry of Defense. The turn over of wartime control of the CFC and the WRSA-K discussions will be part of these talks. The timing of this and the equivalent Japanese government talks are interesting. It is also interesting that the Japanese Defense Ministry officials, JSDF officials and Diet members involved in military affairs were all visiting Washington in Jan discussing the details for the upcoming US-Japan Reorganization and Restructuring of the JSDF pact expected in Mar 2006. Any major changes in the ROK-US military agreements are contingent on the outcomes of the Japanese agreement — and progress on changing the Article 9 of the Japanese Peace Constitution.)

On 21 Jan 2006 Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-ung said that he opposed any expansion of South Korea’s military operations outside the Korean Peninsula because it could cause security instability and trigger an arms race in East Asia. South Korea “basically understands and respects” Washington’s needs for flexible troop deployment incorporated in its new global strategy. “But we are concerned about the possibility for us to be implicated in Northeast Asian conflicts against the will of Koreans because of the ‘strategic flexibility.’ Following the agreement, the two sides will resolve U.S. forces’ flexible movement on a case-by-case basis when a crisis emerges in the region. (Source: Korea Herald.)

Although Seoul and Washington have a wide range of bilateral channels, the point of the new strategic dialogue was for the two countries to commit to regular meetings every year. Kim Sook, director-general of the North American affairs bureau at the South Korean Foreign Ministry, said there will be follow-up negotiations at the deputy-minister level. U.S. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns is expected to visit Seoul around April for these discussions, Kim said. Ban and Rice are expected to hold a second round of the strategic dialogue later this year. At the same time, the Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in Oct 2006 will address the security/defense issues. (SITE NOTE: Our opinion is that these talks separate the two conflicting interests of the US State Department and the US Defense Department. The two pursue different strategies and methods to achieve the same goals. In the past — especially under Colin Powell — the two US Departments were at odds with each other strategies.)

The key initiatives set down for future strategic dialogue include “cooperation and coordination of efforts to promote freedom, democratic institutions and human rights worldwide, cooperation on fighting terrorism, strategies to fight transnational pandemic disease, and developing approaches to multilateral peacekeeping and to disaster management.” (SITE NOTE: This involves common-sense cooperation efforts in combatting the recognized common enemies of the avian flu and terrorism — while agreeing to cooperate in the Iraq mission and global disasters.)

At a regional level, the two countries agreed to “maintaining a strong U.S.-ROK alliance to contribute to peace and stability in Northeast Asia, leading possibly to an eventual regional multinational mechanism for security cooperation.” On the North Korean nuclear issue, the two ministers reaffirmed that Pyongyang “must return promptly” to the six-party talks and that the focus of future discussions in Beijing must be on steps to implement the Sept. 19 joint statement. The parties “touched upon” the six-party talks and talked about human rights issues in North Korea. (SITE NOTE: This is mouthwash. Sweet-smelling gargle that politicians spit out. The Roh demand for “war-time control” and the US reaction of shutting the CFC down was side-stepped. South Korean-Japanese relations, South Korean-Chinese relations and how the foreign minister viewed those relationships were discussed. The US has informally stated that the ROK furor over the Yasukuni Shrine impedes good relations. The US-Japan are in sync on North Korean actions, but the ROK will go its own way…which is something that WEAKENS the alliance. The refusal of the ROK government to address the human rights abuses in North Korea that is plain to the world which the US condemns further weakens the alliance.)

Ban and Rice also emphasized economic ties between their governments, discussing “ways to further deepen bilateral economic cooperation.” Trade officials of the two countries have suggested that an agreement is imminent on starting negotiations for a free trade agreement. (SITE NOTE: The Roh administration wishes to have a one-sided FTA which benefits the ROK, but does nothing for the US. The ROK’s protectionist practices — and now substituting red tape for the protectionist tariffs — continues to be a road block. There was talk of it at the start of Jan 2006, but the talk soon became one of “maybe later” by mid-January. The opening of the beef market was in work after the ROK closed it due to the “mad-cow disease” scare. The outlook as of March 2006 was dim for any agreement on a FTA in the near future.)
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Activist View of Strategic Flexibility Agreement (Jan 2006) The response from the anti-war NGO activist groups was immediate with strong claims that the Government had “sold out” Korea. The following is from an essay, “Strategic Flexibility of U.S. Forces in Korea”, by Lee Chul-kee. Lee Chul-kee, a professor in international relations at the Dongguk University, writes, “We must build a cooperative multilateral security system for Northeast Asia, instead of a bilateral alliance system. Peace and reunification of Korean peninsula will be possible only when Northeast Asian order becomes multilateral, balanced and cooperative.” We notice that Lee parrots Roh Moo-hyun’s “cooperative economy” with the North, multilateral alliance (meaning China, North Korea and South Korea) and Korea being the now discredited “balancer” role between the major powers. Lee’s views reflect the myopic self-centered activist positions of the anti-war and Unification groups positions on the “Strategic Flexibility” issue. Throughout their arguments underlies their skewed self-centered national outlook that Korea is somehow essential in the US world “hegemony” plans — when in truth, Korea is simply a “player” — not a “shaker and mover.”

The following was reprinted in Nautilus on 11 Mar 2006.

The news flashed from Washington at dawn of the last 20th was in a word shocking. At the first Korea-US ministerial-level ‘strategic dialogue’ held in Washington, Korean side suddenly accepted the “strategic flexibility of the U.S. Forces in Korea (USFK)” which had been the top diplomatic and security issue pending between two countries.

At the Korea-US summit meeting held in November last year at Gyongju, the two presidents agreed to hold “a ministerial-level security dialogue” regularly. Korean government boasted this agreement as its diplomatic achievement. But what Korean side did at most at this first “security dialogue” was just to accept the “strategic flexibility of the USFK” which Washington has been persistently demanding from the Korean government.

The content of the joint statement issued after the strategic dialogue is almost unbelievable. It’s like a ‘document of surrender’ to the U.S. in the field of diplomacy and national security. It has accepted not only “the strategic flexibility of the USFK” but also all what the U.S. has been demanding from Korea, namely: the strengthening of Korean cooperation to the “war on terror” which Washington is using as a pretext for its military aggression and pursuit of hegemony; cooperation to “the spreading of freedom”, a new cause for the second-term Bush administration; Seoul’s active participation in “the U.S.-led initiative against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction(PSI)” which is actually targeted on Pyongyang.

The joint statement is just disappointing to us. The efforts of our peace-oriented civic groups and sensible experts that have been warning against the potential danger of “the strategic flexibility of the USFK” seem to have come to nothing. The earnest desire of our people for a more balanced Korea-US relationship appropriate for the new era, freed from the current subordinate relationship of Korea to the U.S., and for the nation’s future-oriented diplomatic and security policies, has been frustrated. There seems to be no more hope for a ‘balanced diplomacy’ and ‘self-reliant national defense’.

Without going through any public debate and obtaining a national consensus, the Korean government has, behind closed doors, decided on such important issues that are directly linked to our peninsula’s security and the nation’s future, and has suddenly accepted the U.S. demands.

In a speech at the officers’ commission ceremony at the air-force academy on March 8th last year, President Roh Moo-hyun said that “Korea will never be involved in conflicts in Northeast Asia without our consent” and that “this is a firm principle that can never be compromised”. He has broken this promise even in less than a year. Then, we wonder why he created a fuss last year by bringing up the doctrine of “the Korea’s balancer role in the Northeast Asia”.

We cannot understand why Korean government hung out a white flag to the U.S. so hurriedly, accepting all of its demands. Perusing the content of the Korea-US joint statement, we cannot see any hint of Korean delegates having agonized over the pending issues and assiduously negotiated with the U.S. side. It seems that they agreed to the U.S. text only revising a few words for face-saving.

The responsible Korean negotiators should be held accountable for this outcome. They have demonstrated their lack of vision for future, lack of insight into the situation, a blind kowtow to the U.S. and incompetency, deception to the people. They seem to be more tuned to Washington than to President Roh. It is a reprise of their negotiating stances previously displayed in the negotiations with the U.S. on the dispatch of Korean troops to Iraq and relocation of the Yongsan USFK base. security team’s perception of the situation and negotiating strategies.

Their professed plan has been that Seoul accepts the U.S. demands on so-called “global issues”, while Seoul plays the leading role in the issues of the Korean peninsula. So, Korean government seems to have dispatched its troops to Iraq and obediently accepted the U.S. demands on the relocation of the Yongsan US military base. On the other hand, Seoul expected to lead negotiations on Pyongyang’s nuclear issues and South-North relations. But such a naive idea of the Korean government has been adversely exploited by the U.S. side. Our expectations that the Bush administration would moderate its policies on the North and its nuclear issues, in return for our sending troops to Iraq, have not yet been met.
(SITE NOTE: This is utter garbage. The ROK promised to send 3600 troops to Iraq in Mar 2003, but only after Roh tearfully told the nation he did so to “protect” the nation — implying that the US had threatened the security of the nation. However, Roh waffled and delayed until the US simply got fed up and pulled out 3600 troops of the 2d Bde, 2d ID (the exact same numbers as Roh promised) and sent them to Iraq — though the press releases stated it was because of the escalating tension in Iraq. The ROK continued to waffle until they could find a “safe” place in Irbil in the stable Kurdish semi-autonomous territory. That the 2d Bde, 2d ID never returned doesn’t seem to enter into Professor Lee’s logic that the US does NOT want to be in Korea and is playing “hardball” with the ROK after having to endure the anti-Americanism his party fostered. The activist position is that somehow the US should “repay” the ROK favor of sending troops to Iraq — but fails to see that the US saw it as the ROK “repaying” the favor of stationing troops in Korea. The ROK slapped the US in the face — and now the 2d Bde, 2d ID is gone from Korea forever.

As to the Yongsan issue, for over a decade, the ROK activists have demanded that the USFK leave Yongsan — but after Donald Rumsfield said “enough” in 2003 and said that USFK was pulling out of Yongsan without any more delays, the activists suddenly changed and said the the US was dictating the move.)
It seems that Korean government has accepted the “strategic flexibility of the USFK” in anticipation of the U.S. changing its North Korea policies which Washington has been hardening recently by raising the issues of Pyongyang’s human rights and counterfeiting of U.S. currencies. But also this time, Seoul was betrayed by the U.S. Now, the U.S. has an easy way to make its demands accepted by Seoul; if Washington increases the fear of war in Korea and takes a hardline, then Seoul government will become obedient to it. Now, both hard-liners and moderates in Washington are respectively toying with the Seoul government. In addition, this time Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon also might have had an illusion that Washington would support his candidacy for the post of Secretary General of the United Nations if he accepted the U.S. demands and pleased it.
(SITE NOTE: Added hogwash. It is the ROK that is attempting to “sit on the fence” while the Bush administration has stated simply: “you are either with us or against us.” It is that simple. The ROK has chosen to be against the US. Though it is a G-12 nation, the activists in their myopic nationalism cannot see that they are tweaking the nose of the last remaining superpower on earth. They are set to lose greatly if they persist.)
We are afraid of the negative effect the Seoul’s acceptance of the “strategic flexibility of the USFK” will soon have on the situation of Northeast Asia including Korean peninsula. The “strategic flexibility of the USFK” is the concept that the USFK will no longer be confined to Korea only dealing with the military situation of the peninsula, but they will also flexibly pursue various military objectives outside the Korean peninsula. It means that, from now on, the role of the USFK will be transformed to that of implementing Washington’s Northeast Asian and global strategies rather than that of war deterrence to North Korea.

As a result, the USFK will be mobilized for America’s military aggressions now being conducted here and there under the name of “war on terror”. Especially, the main reason for Washington’s pursuit of the “strategic flexibility of the USFK” is to prepare for a military action against China. In other words, the primary target of the “strategic flexibility of the USFK” is China. It’s very certain that the USFK will be mobilized in case military conflicts occur in the Taiwan Strait between China and Taiwan.
(SITE NOTE: This is true about attempting to contain China, but this is not new. This policy of Chinese containment was outlined immediately after WWII and the rise of the Communists under Mao Tse Tung. After the Korean War, the animosity between the US and China was solidified — especially after China invaded Tibet and Nepal and border areas of India. In 1957, Eisenhower authorized the forward positioning of nuclear weapons STATIONED IN KOREA and aimed at China — which at the time was starting its nuclear programs. After it achieved nuclear status — and subsequent ICBM capability — it has had a bullseye painted on its military targets eversince.

But to be serious about the matter, the Chinese have also been using the Taiwan issue as a means to split the forces defending Korea and Japan. The best example was when Kim Il-sung brought the world to the brink of nuclear holocaust by his announcement that he had nuclear weapons. President Clinton wanted to attack the North, but Kim Young-sam refused to permit the use of ROK troops against the North. At this time, the Chinese started to conduct exercises by repositioning its missile batteries along the coast across from Taiwan. At the same time, its fleet moved into the Strait of Taiwan for “training exercises.” The US 7th Fleet that was positioned off the coast of North Korea was split with the carrier Kitty Hawk and three quarters of its carrier group dispatched to position themselves between the Chinese and Taiwan. This only left the Aegis destroyers with their cruise missiles off the coast of North Korea. Effectively, the Chinese had split the US forces — in fact, creating a situation where the US was at a disadvantage in both Taiwan and Korea.

The Taiwan issue is very simply democracy versus communism dating back to the 1953 Matsu blockade. The US, and now Japan, have drawn the line that Taiwan will remain a democracy as long as it wants to be — but if it decides to join China, that is its choice like Hong Kong. Japan sees that if Taiwan falls, Okinawa and adjacent island groups would subject to Chinese encroachment. The espoused “one China” policy of the US is a balancing act as the US still provides military hardware to the Taiwanese government.

Currently the US and Japan openly criticize the military buildup in China. China is undergoing a reorganization from a manpower heavy organization to one that seeks to upgrade its forces with high-tech military hardware. From AWACS capability to increasing the submarine fleet to seeking to turn itself into a “blue water navy,” the threat to Taiwan and Japan seem obvious. Though the ROK has attempted to straddle the fence, it is currently siding with China both from an economic standpoint, but also with the view of opening dialogues for a military alliance in the form of its discredited “balancer” role in Northeast Asia.)
Mr. Kim Sook, Director General of North American Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, has alleged that the possibility of the “strategic flexibility of the USFK” being applied in future is not high. On the contrary, it is a concept that can be applied immediately, because it is a core strategic concept for “military transformation” of the U.S. military forces, and for strengthening military hegemony of the United States.

It is a well-known fact that the global strategic goal of the United States is to check and blockade China that can potentially challenge the U.S. global hegemony in the 21st century. Therefore, the principal role of the U.S. forces in Asia including the USFK is changing to that of checking China. The current move to strengthen the naval and air power of the USFK and enlarge their naval and air bases is also intended for China.
(SITE NOTE: We agree that China is — and always has been — the target. But Professor Lee doesn’t see that Korea is simply a shrimp swimming amongst whales. The way things are shaping up is that the ROK is AGAIN being shaped into a buffer zone through the ignorance of people like himself and President Roh. The US is pulling out — not immediately, but it is pulling out in slow increments — but if it decides to go, it can be as swift as the 2d Bde, 2d ID which departed with four months notification. With the Japanese reorganization of the JSDF complete and the new Missile Defense Line drawn now between North Korea/South Korea in the Sea of Japan — the ROK is on the outside in a buffer zone.)
The Korean Ministry points out that Korea-US joint statement includes a conditional clause which says that “in implementing the strategic flexibility, the U.S. will respect the Seoul’s position that Korea will not be involved in regional conflicts of Northeast Asia without the consent of Korean people”. The ministry boasts this as a diplomatic achievement of balancing the positions of the two sides.

However, such an assertion is a deception to Korean people or reveals their incompetence to perceive the situation.

First; Even though we admit the assertion of the ministry, it is either a big retreat from the existing government position or to admit that the government has so far cheated the people. The Korean government has maintained that although it recognizes the “strategic flexibility of the USFK”, it is opposed to applying it to Northeast Asia including China. Though the conditional clause in the joint statement says that Korea will not directly be involved in regional conflicts in the Northeast Asia, it doesn’t say that the USFK will not participate in any military action in the region. Seoul Government has to clarify why it has changed its position so much.

Second; even if Korean forces will not directly participate in the U.S. military action against China, Korea will be plunged into a military confrontation with China, if only the USFK are put into military operation against China or the USFK bases in Korea are used for anti-China military operations. Korea will be used as “an advance operation base” of the U.S. and the USFK will act as “foremost troops” to blockade China.

Furthermore, there is no guarantee that Seoul will not directly intervene militarily in the Northeast Asia at the heels of American troops. There is a great possibility that the U.S. will ask for a direct or indirect intervention of Korea, on the ground of the Korea-U.S. alliance. In this case, it is doubtful that Seoul can reject the U.S. demands and pressure.

It is also unrealistic to assume that the “strategic flexibility of the USFK” will not be applied to Northeast Asia, because the main target of this flexibility is China. It’s like asking a cattle thief not to steal a cattle.
(SITE NOTE: The arguments of Professor Lee are infuriating as they try to promote some truely stupid arguments. First, the US has ALWAYS stated that “strategic flexibility” would be applied WORLD-WIDE — and Northeast Asia is in the world ever since George Bush announced his vision for the new military BEFORE the Sept 11th tragedy.

However, he is correct that Korean bases would be used as “forward bases” in a regional conflict — it is common sense if the USFK is to assume a regional role. The real gripe that Professor Lee has is that the ROK will be left undefended from the North. But at the same time, his group talks out of the side of their mouths stating that their “brothers” to the North would not attack them as the ROK seeks rapproachment.

Professor Lee is wrong that the US troops will contain China. It simply cannot contain them as long as they remain within their own boundaries. The US is attempting to “contain their influence” — especially by weakening their support for North Korea.

The US worry is that China is attempting to become a “superpower” like the US based upon its economic strength coupled with its military might. It is reducing its manpower heavy military and shifting to high-tech hardware upgrades for its air and naval forces. It is upgrading its navy into a true blue-water navy as well as increasing its submarine fleet. It is estimated that by 2025, it will have a military capable of facing off against the US if it continues at the present rate of procuring foreign technology along with the hardware.

The US knows that it cannot contain the Chinese by military might. All it can do is make any open conflict so costly that the Chinese needs to rethink the consequences before they attack.
In this way, the USFK are being reorganized into regional forces for Asia whose main objective is to check China. The USFK bases are being transformed into advance bases for blockading China. The $11 billion worth of weaponry that the U.S. is going to additionally deploy in Korea, allegedly for filling up the gap caused by the recent reduction of the 2nd division troops of the USFK, are in fact mostly Patriot missiles for Missile Defence (MD) and intelligence-gathering equipment intended for China. The U.S. is not only reinforcing its Patriot missiles (PAC-3) at Osan air base near Seoul but also deploying PAC-3 at Gunsan and Gwangju bases in South Korea. Deployment of such PAC-3 lengthwise on the peninsula is clearly targeted on China.
(SITE NOTE: This idea that the USFK bases are being transformed into advance bases to “blockade” China is preposterous. One wonders if he can do simple mathmetics — Chinese numerical superiority versus US high-tech weaponry. Now that China is upgrading to high-tech weaponry, the US could not — even if it wanted to — blockade anything from China.

As to his stating that the PAC-3 missiles prove the aggressive intent of the US against China, he is sadly misinformed. The PAC-3 is a DEFENSIVE system — unlike the ATACMS that the ROK has procured — so the use of the PAC-3 as an example of offensive capability is faulty. However, Lee is right that the $11 billion was for upgrading US systems and the “mirror-game” of calling it “an investment in Korea’s defense” was a political trick to get the ROK to increase its share of its defense. The ROK refused. That is the impasse now. The US is being reorganized for mobile deployment — while the ROK is organized for fixed positioning based on its Korean defense structure.)
Meanwhile, acceptance of the “strategic flexibility of the USFK” signifies not only the change in the role of the USFK but also the fundamental change in the nature of the Korea-U.S. alliance. This is because the change in the USFK’s role and that in the Korea-US alliance are like two sides of a coin. As the USFK will be transformed into regional mobile troops, the Korea-U.S. alliance will become a regional alliance. This means that, under the name of the Korea-U.S. alliance, Korean armed forces can be mobilized for the U.S. military operations and military needs outside the Korean peninsula. Korean troops will have to join any war of aggression waged by the U.S.
(SITE NOTE: Lee uses “sophistry” here to make a nonsensical conclusion by stating the because there is a ROK-US alliance, the ROK regional force and will become sucked into a regional conflict because they are part of the ROK-US alliance. This type of logic (A=B and therefore, B=C) is played by college sophmores. The truth is there is NO mechanics whereby the ROK would be automatically committed to a regional role. They could only be committed to such a force — if, and only if, the ROK government approved it through the National Assembly. The Japanese have declared Taiwan as in its strategic sphere and its defense was in its national interests. The ROK has NOT done any such action. It cannot be committed unless it wants to. Under the current Strategic Flexibility agreement, it only recognizes that the USFK forces are a regional unit.

The main point that the activists do NOT talk about is that over the years, the US has used its USFK forces in a regional role by deploying its units to such exercises as Cobra Gold in Thailand or Cope Thunder in the Philippines — but ALWAYS there was a “backfill” by units from stateside or Japan to balance the temporary numerical loss. In the case of the USAF elements, most of the time Marine air units or elements of the 3rd Fighter Wing at Elmendorf have backfilled. For the Army units temporarily deployed, there have been elements from the Reserve and National Guard units that were rotated in for “training.”)
Already, we can read such intentions here and there in the joint statement. It suggests that the Korea-U.S. alliance should endeavor to overcome the challenges it faces regionally and globally. Just before attending the Korea-US “strategic dialogue”, Minister Ban said at a regular press briefing on last 11th that the fact the two countries have decided to hold a regular ministerial “strategic dialogue” reflects that “the Korea-U.S. alliance has developed to the stage of holding strategic consultations on Northeast Asian and global issues, beyond the Korean peninsula.”

At the Korea-U.S. summit meeting held in May 2003, the two presidents said through a joint statement that they agreed to build up “a comprehensive and dynamic alliance”. In this way, Korean side has in fact already accepted the U.S. demand.

In last May, Gen. Charles Cambell, commander of the Eighth U.S Army in Korea, said that “the Korea-U.S. alliance is transforming into a regional alliance and that the operational sphere of the Korea-US joint forces can be extended to Northeast Asia”. This remark also reveals the U.S. intention to make the Korea-US alliance a regional alliance.

Such a change in the nature of the Korea-U.S. alliance violates the Korea-US Mutual Defense Treaty. The treaty stipulates its casus foederis as “the occurrence of armed attacks from outside” and limits its geographical bounds to “the territories under the administrative control” of the contracting parties. Thus, the original nature of the Korea-US alliance is a “defense alliance” which is confined to the Korean peninsula, pursuant to the objectives of the Korea-US Mutual Defense Treaty.

Therefore, acceptance of “the strategic flexibility of the USFK” is to deviate from the objectives of the USFK’s stationing in Korea. Furthermore, If Korea-US alliance doesn’t remain as a “defense alliance” limited to the Korean peninsula, and if its role and territorial coverage are expanded, it will be transformed into a “regional alliance” intended for the blockade of China, and into a “hegemony alliance” or “aggression alliance” contributing to the U.S. military hegemony. Therefore, if the Korean government accepts the “strategic flexibility of the USFK”, it has to revise the Korea-US Mutual Defence Treaty and get an approval of the National Assembly beforehand. Otherwise the acceptance will be invalid.

It’s hard for Seoul to accept such a transformation of the Korea-US alliance because it can lead to a military confrontation with China and the worsening of security environment for Korea. Korea may have to go to war with China if Korean troops are mobilized to military conflicts on the Taiwan Strait. This means a deterioration of security environment for Korean peninsula. In that case, the peace and reunification of Korean peninsula will be almost impossible.
(SITE NOTE: This is horse-puckey. The first step is that the ROK must identify Taiwan as being of “strategic importance” to its national interests — which is has not done. Japan on the other hand has done so and therefore is positioned to side with the US in such a conflict. The ROK has not.

The danger for Korea is that the Chinese and North Korean strategy is to split the US forces. In 1994 when Kim Il-sung first brought the peninsula near the brink of war, the Chinese stepped up moves that were intended to split the forces. The naval forces off North Korea were split with the carrier and support elements sent to the Taiwan Straits. All that was left was an Aegis destroyer with cruise missiles targeting the North. THIS IS WHAT WILL HAPPEN AGAIN.

But to the ROK activist this is an impossibility with their rapproachment efforts. This was fine in 2003, but now in 2006, many South Koreans are questioning what is being gained from the outflow of aid to the North. It has NOT changed anything. Now the US is fed-up with the ROK actions. If it wants to feed the North, then it should sign a peace accord. That is the bottomline. The ROK wants its cake and to eat it too — with the US footing the bill. This is about to end within the next few years.

IF China attacks Taiwan, the Chinese strategy is to divide the US forces. But now there is a big change in the wind with the Japanese about to become a regional military power after the changes of Article 9 of the Peace Constitution. In addition, it was to sign the USFJ Restructuring agreement in April 2006. The ROK under Roh Moo-hyun has demanded the “wartime control” which has given the US the “out” to get out of Korea. With the transfer of the CFC, there is no more need for the US troops in Korea. Roh wants control by the end of 2006 and the USFK just MIGHT give it to Roh. George Bush put out a simply statement in 2003 to the ROK. “The US will not stay a minute longer in the country where we are not wanted.” It was a warning for anti-Americanism in Korea — and the problems with the US-ROK Alliance as well.
Some argue that it is unavoidable to accept “the strategic flexibility of the USFK”, if Korea-US alliance has to be maintained at all. Otherwise, they say the USFK may withdraw from Korea. Then, will the USFK really withdraw from Korea if Seoul does not accept U.S. demands? Now we have to think about this mistaken myth realistically.
(SITE NOTE: Lee lives in the world of fantasy that most Korean activists inhabit. They first mistakenly believe that Korea has strategic importance in the geopolitical games of the world. It does NOT. The world has changed. Its only value is as a buffer zone — an member of neither side.

The second is that they simply cannot accept that the US has ALWAYS wanted to leave Korea. Up to the 1970s, the ROK was important, but soon the US started to withdraw its troops with the 7th ID leaving in 1977 and the DMZ being turned over to the ROK — with the promise that the US would fund the ROK military upgrade programs with new weaponry. Carter wanted to pull ALL the troops out as part of his Presidential campaign but was dissuaded. In the late 1980s, the Nunn-Warner Initiative surfaced to again remove the troops from Korea and was only stopped in 1994 when Kim Il-sung brought the world to the brink of war. Thus Lee’s fantasy world is based on fiction.

The only sticking point for America was where would the US troops be stationed if it wasn’t in the ROK. The answer has come with the new mobile forces being drawn back to the mainland US and being capable of deployment on short-notice on C-17s. THIS IS HAPPENING NOW. 8,000 troops (and 9,000 dependents) of the 3rd MEU from Okinawa will relocate to Guam.

In Mar 2006, the new USFK Commander, Gen Bell, aluded to more troop cuts after “wartime control” has been given to the ROK — and strengthening the UN function which implied the CFC function was eliminated. In fact, since January 2006, the USFK has been ACTIVELY talking about swiftly giving the ROK its “wartime control.” There are massive changes about to take place in the ROK-Japan theater, but we are not certain where it will lead.)
Will the USFK withdraw from Korea, giving up its 105 military bases scattered all over the country? Can Washington so easily give up South Korea that provides, without a complain, $700 million annually as a direct contribution to the USFK and bears $3 billion annually as a direct or indirect share of expenses for them? Will the USFK withdraw from Korea, giving up the new, cutting-edge Pyongtaek U.S. military base that Seoul is going to build with billions of dollars, which will become the largest single U.S. military base in the world and the advance base for China? Will the USFK withdraw from Korea with their Patriot missiles that they are deploying in Osan and Gwangju bases along the western coast for missile defense against China?
(SITE NOTE: This paragraph is mind-boggling in its complete stupidity. The ROK did NOT pay for its defense until 1991 after the first major revision of the SOFA since its inception in 1963. The ROK has systematically been cutting its defense expenditures since Kim Dae-jung took office. It stood at 8 percent of GDP under Kim Young-sam, but dropped to 2.8 percent of GDP under Roh Moo-hyun — and will remain there until he leaves office. The US wanted the ROK to spend 3.2 percent of GDP — though most flashpoint countries like India and Israel spend 6 percent of GDP. In other words, if the ROK is NOT interested in its defense, then why should the US???

The Camp Humphreys relocation is turning into a nightmare with the ROK dragging its feet — plus resurfacing the cost sharing and payments for improvements to the land, etc. The US is getting fed up…and mumblings are now heard at the Congressional level. The Patriot system as explained before is a “defensive system” and his logic that it is “offensive” is out in left field.)
The strategic importance of the USFK bases and South Korea for the U.S is growing further as the U.S. containment strategies against China become more concrete. As President Roh said in Los Angeles, “Korean peninsula is not a place which the U.S. can give up easily even if is not happy with South Korea, because of the peninsula’s strategic position”.
(SITE NOTE: We disagree. As we explained before, the ROK’s importance in the current geopolitical world is its position as a buffer between China and Japan — and of course, North Korea as a buffer between China and the West. This is about to change in the near future as the US is plainly getting ready to disengage from Korea.)
Also, we have to change the idea that an alliance can be maintained only by stationing a large army in the partner country. The U.S. doesn’t keep a large army in Thailand and Philippines even though it has concluded military alliance treaties with them. New Zealand has the ANZUS Treaty with the U.S., but it is denying the calling and landing of U.S. naval vessels and war planes carrying nuclear weapons, on the strength of its denuclearization policy. But we haven’t yet heard that this has resulted in any worsening of their bilateral relations and U.S. economic sanctions against New Zealand.

(NOTE: We smile at the Professor’s lack of knowledge in these areas. Thailand is in a “caretaker” status with assets prepositioned and bases maintained with a small force. This is what Korea may become very shortly if things continue to deteriorate. The Philippines is a case where the US was asked to leave and since that time, the Filipinos are being exported throughout the world as cheap labor — look at Shinjang Mall. It screwed up big time and now wants to reverse itself, but the US is not ready to return with its political instability. As far as New Zealand, it is reacting to the same political anti-nuclear pressures as Japan has for years. Remember that where the French conduct their nuclear tests are in New Zealand’s backyard. The US has no problem with this — though it is inconvenient.)
As a matter of fact, the U.S. will have an enormous strategic benefit just to keep South Korea as an ally, even though it cannot station any soldier on the Korean soil. The U.S. should be most thankful only for keeping Seoul from entering into alliance with China or becoming militarily close to it.

(SITE NOTE: This is typical activist nonsense. The US has been deeply concerned that the ROK has continued to form military alliances with the Chinese. Because of its continuation of its North Korean policies and closer relations to China, the US is becoming more and more distant. The US-ROK Alliance is in big trouble.)
What the U.S. really fears is the emergence of a situation where growing anti-American sentiment and public opinion for the withdrawal of USFK necessitate American troops to leave Korea, because this will seriously jeopardize the global strategies of Washington.
(SITE NOTE: After the events of 2002, the ROK has lost a lot of goodwill amongst the American people — simply by word of mouth of the anti-Americanism that is prevalent in Korea. The big loser if the US draws down is the ROK. The reality is business is that security of one’s investments is the prime key. Moody will NOT increase the national credit rating because of the North Korean situation. If the US left, the business investments will collapse. That to the Professor is something he cannot believe in his self-appointed importance of Korea as the center of the universe.)
The greatest danger of “the strategic flexibility of the USFK is that Korea will be firmly incorporated into the global hegemonic strategy of the U.S. The global strategy and Northeast Asian policy of the United States are to check and blockade China through the US-Japan alliance as the main axis and Korea-US alliance as the subsidiary axis.

But they will force a confrontation and a division in Northeast Asia, creating a new cold war order in the region. If confrontation and enmity persist in Northeast Asia, peace and reunification of Korean peninsula will become remote and national division will be perpetuated.

Korea cannot have a future-oriented security policy without a critical self-reflection on its security policy which is subordinate to Washington. Korea must make efforts to extricate itself from America’s military strategy and policy framework. Korea must change its perception and idea. Self-reliant national defense and amelioration of security environment for Korea depend on how much room Korea will have for independent security strategies and policies free from the U.S. military strategies and policies.
(SITE NOTE: As of Mar 2006, the US is the one that is starting to extract itself out of the military relationship. It is talking of increasing the UN commitment in Korea — implying that the CFC will NOT exist in the near future. Without the CFC, there is no need for US troops in Korea.)
If the existing Korea-US alliance system rather endangers our national security and aggravates our security environment, we cannot but raise a basic question whether such an alliance system is really necessary. Therefore, it is necessary to fundamentally reexamine the Korea’s current security paradigm that entirely depends on the Korea-US alliance system. We must build a cooperative multilateral security system for Northeast Asia, instead of a bilateral alliance system. Peace and reunification of Korean peninsula will be possible only when Northeast Asian order becomes multilateral, balanced and cooperative. This depends on how much Korea can effectively play the role of a balancer in the Northeast Asia.
(SITE NOTE: Lee still clings to the idea that Korea can become the “balancer” which even now “progressives” are stating as an unrealistic proposal. The bottom line is that the ROK is a shrimp swimming with whales. It started its military upgrades 15 years after its counterparts in North Korea and Japan — then after Kim Dae-jung took over, it slowed down its upgrades. Now it is so far behind Japan that the two are not even in the same class. From space launches to spy satellites, indigenous designs of its aircraft, Aegis ships, AWACS, Radar, Missile Defense research, etc. the Japanese with a smaller force, has greater capabilities than the ROK. Now it is openly in the US camp in its military strategies — while the ROK will be left outside the “umbrella.” And of course, the Chinese don’t really look at Korea as “allies” — but rather as competitors for defense contracts.)
Suit filed against Roh over Strategic Flexibility (Mar 2006) On 20 Mar 2006, Rep. Roh Hoe-chan from the Democratic Labor Party filed a suit with the Constitutional Court against President Roh Moo-hyun, claiming the president infringed parliamentary rights over ratification of the treaty. This is the first time in judicial history that a National Assemblyman has filed a lawsuit against the president. The lawmaker saud the president and Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon pressed ahead with the deal with the U.S. government and forced acceptance of the agreement through a joint announcement in order to avoid parliamentary ratification in January. Rep. Roh also said he is considering a bill to ban the movement of U.S. forces outside the peninsula as part of his campaign to abolish the strategic flexibility agreement. However, the government dismissed his claims as groundless, saying the agreement doesn’t require parliamentary ratification because it doesn’t violate the Korea-U.S. mutual defense treaty. (Source: Korea Herald.)
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Gen LaPorte: Seoul Can Take Wartime Command “When Ready” (Jan 2006) Gen Leon J. LaPorte stated on 26 Jan 2006 in his farewell address before retirement that South Korea will recover wartime operational control of its armed forces when its military capability improves enough to achieve a “self-reliant” defense posture. In 2005, Gen LaPorte called the Combined Forces Command (CFC) the “cornerstone” of the US-ROK military alliance on the 25th Anniversary of the CFC hinting that if the ROK persisted in their demands for a “self-reliant” defense, the USFK may be dramatically altered. (SITE NOTE: Without the CFC, there is no reason for the USFK to exist –IF ALTERNATIVE BASING ARRANGEMENTS EXIST. The US has been attempting to disengage from South Korea since the 1970s under Nixon, 1980s under Carter, 1990s under the Nunn-Warner Agreement, 2000s under Bush. The precedent has been there since 1949 when the US laid out the Dean Acheson line that led to the Korean War. The bottomline is that the US has ALWAYS wanted out of Korea — but ALWAYS determined to protect Japan first. This has ALWAYS been the reality.)

The main point is that the US strategic belief is that the role of air power has changed the face of warfare on the peninsula. It is the belief that once the air war has been neutralized, the ROK Army can defeat the North by themselves with the assistance of the US Army (attack helicopters and fire suppression directions). In effect, the US forces are changing to high-tech and become smaller and more mobile. This in turn will impact the face-off of two static forces (North and Forces) which is based on 1950s strategies. The US believes that its air power will disintegrate the North’s centralized command and supply in the early stages of the war leaving the North’s forces without support or direction. This is the central crux of the much discussed Oplan 5029. The first role is to contain the North’s forces until the reserve forces arrive. Then the fight will move North to collapse the North Korean regime.

LaPorte stated that the U.S. government fully supports the transfer in responsibility in the ROK-U.S CFC. As for the timing of the transfer, however, LaPorte said, “I don’t believe there is any set timeline at this point. I think that has to be discussed further.” “The United States is prepared to move as rapidly on this issue as the ROK government or its military believe it is prudent to do,” said LaPorte. When Sec of Defense was pressed on setting a timeline, he replied that it would be “appropriately accelerated” when the time was right … meaning just about anything. (SITE NOTE: However, in viewing the regional situation, it is plain to see that the developments in the ROK are contingent upon the Japan-US Military Restructuring treaty to be signed in Mar 2006. If Article 9 of the Japanese Peace Constitution is changed, the change would be indeed accelerated. The CFC function could be moved to Camp Zama under I Corps — where elements of the 1 Corps was moved in July 2005. The USFK in the ROK would be reduced to a three-star position with the four-star already residing at Camp Smith in Hawaii in the new combat command created in Aug 2005. 5th Air Force has already been relocated from Yokota, Japan to Anderson, Guam — and 13th Air Force relocated to Hawaii. If the picture is not getting clearer — the 3rd MEU Hq section will relocate from Okinawa to Guam. Many changes are still up in the air on the Japan treaty — but it will certainly “accelerate” things once signed. During the brinksmanship in 2004 with the massive buildup at Guam, the use of Guam as a staging base for action in Korea was tested. The carrier group exercised off Guam — while at the same time stood ready for deployment to waters off Korea. When it was drawn down, a “Contingency” Group was formed to handle future influxes of troops. The mobility section of the Anderson area was changed to civilian contract meaning that they are building up a long-term deployment center.)

The USFK maintains about 30,000 troops here as a deterrence against North Korea. The number of troops is to be reduced to 25,000 by 2008 under Washington’s plan to reorganize its global forces. In his New Year’s news conference, President Roh Moo-hyun unveiled plans to speed up talks on the issue of regaining wartime command from the United States at an early date, within this year if possible. He described the matter as a “very complex issue,” referring the current armistice on the Korean Peninsula.

“By resolution, there are 17 nations that have continued to say they would support South Korea during times of crisis. So if you have changed commanders, an issue such as the U.N. command and support of U.N. nations also have to be addressed,” he added. (SITE NOTE: Without the CFC, the mainly ceremonial UN command could be dissolved. However, the political problem is that IF the North attacked after the UN command was resolved, it would not be easy to mobilize a world force again. The ROK is betting everything that the North will NOT attack.)

South Korea reclaimed the authority to control its military during peacetime in 1994. But wartime control has remained in the U.S. hands since the Korean War. As part of efforts to achieve a “cooperative but more self-reliant” defense capability, the Roh administration has sought to take back control of its military during wartime from the U.S. government. The two countries plan to launch SEPARATE task forces responsible for studying the issue in an in-depth manner next month. (Source: Korea Times.)

Gen. Leon J. LaPorte told local press on 27 Jan, 밫he United States is prepared to move as rapidly on this issue as the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea military believes it prudent to do.?밆etermination has to be made in terms of capabilities,?the general said. The statement came a day after South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun said he hoped for an agreement by the end of the year for Seoul to remain in charge of its own forces if conflict erupts. (Source: Stars and Stripes.)
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US to Give Seoul Digital Map (Jan 2006) The U.S. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency promised to deliver the “digital topography intelligence” to South Korea. It will provide the digital maps and video images, which will help South Korean cruise missiles fly close to the ground to avoid radar detection. Supposedly this was communicated to Kim Jang-soo, Korean Army Chief of Staff, on his visit to Washington. This would be part of the turn over of the “critical tasking” for return artillery fire if the North opened a barrage on Seoul.

The digital map is the exploitation and analysis of geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the Earth. It contains information, collected from U.S. military spy satellites, that could be used “in times of emergency” to conduct surgical strikes.

The South Korean Army has an outdated version of the digital map, which also was provided by the United States in 1993. It reportedly has not been updated since. South Korea’s commercial satellites are currently used to produce digital maps, but they are not suitable for military operations due to relatively poor resolution of images. Not date was given as to when the data will be transferred.

South Korea’s Air Force has also planned to import a military software, named Digital Point Positioning Data Base (DPPDB), from Washington to enhance its ability of attacking underground bunkers. But it has faced troubles, as the software is one of the items that are regulated by the U.S. Arms Export Control Act. The military forces frequently use DPPDBs for precise coordinate derivation to support the targeting and mission planning requirements of a variety of weapons systems. It is called a data base as it is made up of the rectified aerial imagery and the support data needed to exploit that imagery. (Source: Korea Times.)

(SITE NOTE: The US has become wary of allowing technology to be transferred to the South as it may end up in the North — and the protection of confidential material is also suspect. There is very little trust between the ROK and US in the intelligence area. The interesting point is that it has been a decade since the ROK had the updated imagery. The point is that the US has been reluctant to share intelligence with the ROK. But the date being 1993 would place the last update in the Kim Young-sam administration when there supposedly was no conflict between the US and ROK. After Kim Dae-jung took office — and especially after his “sunshine policy” was announced — the flow of intelligence was limited. But the distrust worked both ways as the ROK refused to share any first-hand intelligence received from defector debriefings.)
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Preparations underway in Pusan for Turnover of Camp Hialeah (Jan 2006) U.S. military units and organizations are to vacate Camp Hialeah by August 2006. The installation is to be shut in December. Closing Camp Hialeah comes as part of a larger plan. The United States is shutting down many installations around the peninsula before shifting the bulk of its forces to two regional hubs, one in Pyeongtaek, the other in the Daegu-Busan region.

The Pusan American School will close after 46 years because it’s located inside the Army’s Camp Hialeah, which the U.S. military will vacate in 2006 and turn over to South Korea in 2007. Pusan American opened in 1960 as a small elementary school, adding a high school in 1967. It now has about 30 staff, including teachers, clerical and other employees. Of this year’s students, 71 are from the U.S. military community. The other 24 are U.S. citizens whose families work in the Busan area. They pay tuition, ranging from about $14,640 to $16,830 per year and will have to find other means of education. As soon as classes finish, the movers will arrive.
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February 2006
US and ROK Military Alliance in Big Trouble (Feb-Mar 2006) Starting in openly in 2003, the whole fiasco of the US-ROK alliance continued unabated with the ROK refusing to pay for its “share” of its defense and openly supplying aid to the North. However, both the ROK Foreign Ministry and Ministry of Defense continued to maintain the relationship was strong. In turn, the US and USFK officials ALWAYS used terms to indicate the alliance was solid and unshakeable. (See Military Events: US and ROK Military Alliance in Trouble (Apr 2005-Dec 2005).)

The tensions are not new — they have ALWAYS been there from the start of the Roh administration in 2003. The following is excerpted from CNS.news in 2 Jan 2003.

Amid continuing tactical differences between Seoul and Washington and attempts by North Korea to drive a wedge between the two allies, South Korean lawmakers Thursday planned to discuss concerns about a possible reduction of U.S. forces in their country. (SITE NOTE: It was not the North driving the wedge — it was Roh trying to drive a wedge between the US-Japan alliance. The tri-national agreement to act with “one voice” on the North Korean problem became a farce with the ROK attempting to be the negotiator in the nuclear talks. The North has told the ROK to its face that it does NOT want it to be in this role — and only wants bilateral talks with the US.)

South Korea’s parliamentary intelligence committee would discuss recent reports about a cutback in the number of American troops “and map out measures to deal with it,” the official Yonhap news agency reported. The committee would also hear from the head of the country’s national intelligence service about North Korea’s nuclear intentions. (SITE NOTE: The US cutback came after Roh dragged his feet on sending his promised 3,600 troops to Iraq. In the space of three months, the 2d Bde 2d ID’s 3,600 troops departed for Iraq. The point was made… and the 2d Bde 2d ID left to never return to Korea.)

Pyongyang has kicked out U.N. on-site inspectors who had been monitoring nuclear facilities mothballed under a 1994 accord with the U.S. It also threatened to pull out of another international pact, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). (SITE NOTE: The KEDO Project died in Jan 2006…and the North did pull out of the NPT.)

Reports indicating that a U.S. response to those moves could include economic sanctions and interception of revenue-earning missile shipments caused a stir in South Korea, whose outgoing and incoming presidents both favor dialogue and worry that sanctions could lead to war. (SITE NOTE: The US in 2006 is no longer feeling restrained and is applying economic sanctions and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is now in place.)

President-elect Roh Moo-hyun, who takes office next month, voiced skepticism about the U.S. approach, telling a press conference Washington should discuss options with Seoul rather than decide on its own what steps to take. “If the United States makes and announces a unilateral decision, and South Korea follows it, it can’t be called real cooperation between the two countries,” he said. Roh campaigned for office last month on a platform that included calls to change the U.S.-Korean relationship from one of protector and protected, to that of equals. He was elected on a wave of anti-U.S. sentiment, some of which was directed against the 37,000 U.S. troops stationed in South Korea.
Signs that the Alliance Changing The fact is that there is indeed some deep problems as the ROK under Roh Moo-hyun continued to move towards the left and attach itself to the North. The crux of the problem is that the ROK in supporting the North has negated the very reason for the existence of the USFK. The ROK has continued to push for a “self-reliant defense” with the ROK having authority of its forces in case of a war.

Cracks in US-ROK Alliance (Chosun Ilbo)

The ROK-US tried to work out the problems under the Future of the Alliance (FOTA) talks but that did not work out. Then they decided to shift it to the Security Initiative (SPI) and finally at ministerial level talks At the Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in Oct 2005, Donald Rumsfeld announced that the US would no longer be a “patron” of the ROK military, but rather become a “partner” in the relationship. In other words, the US was NOT going to pay for the massive upgrade programs that the ROK needed to undertake to become “self-reliant,” but would remain a “partner” — under the Mutual Defense Treaty — to “support” the ROK in case of hostilities.

At the same time, the US agreed to “accelerate appropriately” the process that would turn over the war-time control to the ROK — but left the time-table open. In Jan 2006 USFK out-going commander Gen. LaPorte stated the turnover rotated around the ROK having the capabilities to assume the role. The ROK embarked on a program to upgrade the ROK forces with hi-tech weaponry. Unfortunately, the bill would be $692 billion over a period of 15 years — that the ROK simply cannot afford with its present shortfalls in funding. (NOTE: The ROK is a formidable force, but nothing that is even in the same league as the high-tech weaponry of the US. However, the ROK assumptions is that the North will not attack its “brother” and therefore, much of the defensive hardware is not required. For example, after years of debate, the ROK still does not have its own PAC-3 Patriot defenses — and continues to “negotiate” with Germany for its used PAC-2 missiles — and after four years it is supposedly to be finalized in 2006. Another example is that the ROK assumed the artillery suppression role in case the North fired on Seoul — but the US had to provide it with the digital maps and video images as their data had not been updated since 1993. (See US to Give Seoul Digital Map.) The problem is that the US is reluctant to provide it with the Digital Point Positioning Data Base (DPPDB) software to enhance its ability of attacking underground bunkers as the software is one of the items that are regulated by the U.S. Arms Export Control Act. In fact, the US refused the sale of its UAV to the ROK. The biggest cliffhanger is the changes to Article 9 of the Peace Constitution and the Japan-USFJ Restructuring to be signed in Mar 2006. Once changed, the basing of troops in Guam and Japan may lead to the elimination of the CFC — and reductions in USFK forces.)

US Stance on North Korea Hardens The failure of the last round of six-party talks where the North demanded that the US back off on its financial sanctions as a prelude to resumption of the talks. The US position was that the sanctions had nothing to do with the nuclear issue. The fight had raged for some time in the US between the moderates who wanted the nuclear problem to be resolved through the six-party talks and the hard-liners who wanted the North to be isolated and brought to heel by economic sanctions. The hard-liners finally prevailed. The Bush dictum of “you’re either with us or agin’ us” was put into effect. The US State Department put out the word of the hardline stance — and US Ambassador Vershbow to Korea started the vilification campaign of the North — who shot back that Vershbow was a “tyrant” masquerading as a diplomat. His remarks were seconded by the Secretary of State Rice, but Vershbow continued to act as the lightning rod.

The Bush administration took a three-prong attack on the North. The first was to attempt to cripple the North financially and isolate it from its sources of revenue — drugs (mostly metamphetamines), contraband (primarily counterfeit brand-name cigarettes), counterfeiting (primarily US “supernotes”) and sales of WMD. After 15 years of investigations, the counterfeit money issue was pursued with a vengence. The US approached Asian countries to garner support to force the North to stop its counterfeit operations. The US brought charges against the Bank of Macao for its money laundering operations for the North and shut down its operations. However, the ROK took the position that it needed more “proof.” The North’s commercial companies used for the money-laundering operations left Macao for mainland China. The Chinese started their own investigation and reached the same conclusion. Then the US put a full-court press on Asian countries to support the US position with briefings of Asian allies to provide them with evidence the US had garnered.

On 8 Feb 2006, it was reported that Kang Sang Choon (66), Kim Jong Il뭩 chief of staff and secretary of the Worker뭩 Party of North Korea, was arrested by Chinese police in Jan 2006 for illegally transferring real estate ownership in Macau. Kang was released the following day. According to a number of sources familiar with North Korea, shortly before Kim Jong Il visited China (from January 10 to 18), Kang was arrested by the police after it was revealed that he had illegally transferred ownership of a patch of land he owned there three or four years before. The South Korean government has recently confirmed this fact. Kang was known to have been arrested during Kim뭩 visit to China, which led to various suspicions on the background of his arrest. (Source: Donga Ilbo.)
As the North was identified as a “terrorist state” the US froze the assets of companies doing business with the North. It then added the charges of contraband cigarettes that were being smuggled throughout the world. But in this respect, the US was more worried that the North Koreans ability to smuggle cigarettes into the US, could also be used to smuggle in WMD.

The KEDO Project for the North’s nuclear reactor project was finally put to bed — after years of the ROK attempting to keep the project open. The ROK had promised electrical power to the North on condition that it give up its nuclear ambitions — but it seems the Unification Ministry has “forgotten” about the nuclear ambition caveat and is progressing with the project as though the nuclear problem was resolved. This has brought criticism from former President Kim Young-sam and a slew of critics who say the South can’t even provide enough for the South, much less provide a multi-billion dollar project to the North. (See KEDO Project Finally Dead!! (Jan 2006) for details.)

The US had hoped to once again have a unified tri-national front on the North Korean problem — but the ROK continued to be adamant that it would support rapproachment with the North through “humanitarian” aid and commercial enterprises. On the other hand, the Japanese were in sync with the US purposes and had closed off the flow of money and espionage to the North by limiting ferry ships entry until they could meet the safety and insurance requirements. In June 2003, nearly 2,000 inspectors went to the port of Niigata to check for customs and immigration violations, infectious diseases, and safety violations on the North Korean vessel Man Gyong Bong-92. North Korea responded by immediately ceasing all ferries traveling between the two countries and cancelled a port visit by an unnamed vessel believed to be involved in espionage. (NOTE: Ferries have restarted visits.) In 2006, there were other considerations for the Japanese cooperation with US efforts as the Japanese prepared to submit the Article 9 changes to the Peace Constitution — spurred by the threat North Korea poses of a nuclear missile attack — and sign the Japan-USFJ restructuring package in Mar 2006. However, the ROK has taken the stance that rapproachment was more important and has expanded its programs to support the North’s economy — most noticably through its tourism and Kaesong industrial sites.

Then the US sought concensus with its Asian partners to cease food aid to the North until it could have verifiable inspections on the distribution of the donated foods. This had been a primary criticism of the World Food Program (WFP) before it ceased its food operations in the North in Dec 2005 at the request of the North. The WFP departed the country upon the North’s request. The North stated that it no longer needed the food aid because it has sufficient food from its domestic production as well as “other sources.” This shifted the burden of supplying the North with sustenance on the Chinese and South Koreans. Japan sided with the US and stated it would cease its promised food aid until its abduction issues with North Korea were resolved. After the stopping of international food aid, the ROK continued to supply “humanitarian” aid to the North, including rice, fertilizer and clothing shipments.

The third step was to attack the North through the spread of weapons of mass-destruction (WMD). The North had been providing SCUD missiles and submersible boats to countries to obtain hard currency. The US used the “proof” of the North supplying uranium to Libya — and then linked the North to the rogue Pakistani nuclear scientist in its nuclear program. It then sought to link it to Iran in its nuclear ambitions — and in Jan 2006 with the Iranian issue being referred to the UNSC, the taint had rubbed off on the North.

That the US is tracking every North Korean vessel leaving their ports is a given. With the US spy satellite capabilities and advanced imagery techniques, there is very little the North Koreans can hide — even if they load the ships at night. In 2003, a North Korean vessel with missiles was stopped by Spanish naval forces after being tracked by US spy satellites that it was carrying missiles — but later released as the missiles were found to be a legal sale. In 2004, there was the well-publicized shipment of heroin that was dropped in Australia and the North Korean ship was stopped on the high-seas and the crew arrested. Thus the US spearheaded in May 2003 the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) through international agreements and partnerships that would allow the US and its allies to search planes and ships carrying suspect cargo and seize illegal weapons or missile technologies. It envisions partnerships of states working in concert, employing their national capabilities to develop a broad range of legal, diplomatic, economic, military and other tools to interdict threatening shipments of WMD and missile-related equipment and technologies. On June 4, 2003, during testimony before Congress, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John R. Bolton announced that the United States had, within the previous two months, intercepted aluminum tubes likely bound for North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and a French and German combined effort had intercepted sodium cyanide likely bound for North Korea’s chemical weapons program are examples of recent interdiction successes. (Source: GlobalSecurity.org.)

On July 23, 2003 a USA Today report indicated that the United States had reached an agreement with Japan, Australia, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, the Netherlands, Bulgaria, and Spain to intercept North Korean ships suspected of carrying narcotics or weapons materials. Since 2003, international exercises have been conducted in both the Mediterranean and Coral Sea areas.

In 2006, the ROK did not want to join the PSI for fear of its impacting its relationship with the North, but it also feared world public opinion if it didn’t join the fight against nuclear proliferation and WMD. As such, it said it would send “observers” of the training exercise — but would not participate. The U.S. in trying to broaden participation in Central and East Asia in the PSI put a “smiley face” on it by saying that South Korea is not a participant in the U.S. initiative on detecting and interdicting weapons of mass destruction (WMD), but is “cooperating closely with the efforts.”

ROK Resorts to US Lobby to Polish its Image With the rising anti-Americanism in Korea (i.e., the Oct 2005 MacArthur Park statue incident and the violent July 2005 protests at Camp Humphreys), the public opinion in the US was slowly turning against the ROK and US congressmen were openly questioning the US-ROK alliance.

Things had deteriorated to a point that in Nov 2005 it was reported that the Korean Embassy in Washington was enlisting the help of a professional lobbyist — run by a Korean American — as part of efforts to improve the country’s battered image in the U.S. Congress. It was to be the first time in 30 years since the illegal lobbying activities of maverick fixer Park Tongsun in the mid-1970s blew up in a scandal known as “Koreagate” — leaving lobbying since then to the embassy staff. A diplomatic source said whenever the Korean government faces criticism in Congress, it blames “misconceptions” among congressmen when it should be blaming inadequate PR. Supposedly the campaign was to cost $1.2 million. (Source: Chosun Ilbo, “The Gov’t Needs W1.2 Billion to Deceive America,” 2 Nov 2005.) Ironically, a month later the arrest of South Korean businessman Tongsun Park — the 1970s “Koreagate” lobby — again tarnished the ROK lobby effort. He was accused of accepting millions of dollars from Iraq in the UN oil-for-food scandal and arrested by the FBI in Houston in Jan 2006. (See Former “Koreagate” Figure Indicted in Food-for-Oil Scandal: Korean Image in US Gets Dirtier and Dirtier (Jan 2006) for details.) The ROK lobbying was not looking to be off to a good start.

Situation Comes to a Head After the US surfaced the counterfeit currency issue, the South attempted to sit on the fence claiming it needed more proof. (See Counterfeit “Supernotes” Furor Continues (Jan 2006) for details.) On 23 Jan, the visiting U.S. delegation met with Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT), the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE) and the Korea Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) officials to discuss the counterfeiting issue. A U.S. investigation team headed by the Treasury Department’s deputy assistant secretary for terrorist financing and financial crimes, Daniel Glaser, presented Korean officials with its evidence that North Korea is engaged in counterfeiting U.S. dollars. The team was met by Kim Sook, the director-general of the North American affairs bureau in the Foreign Ministry.

South Korean officials said the evidence offered by the U.S. team was “pretty convincing.” However, the ROK continued to vacillate. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)

After the briefing, the US Embassy released a statement that the US had asked Seoul to assist in stop the illicit counterfeiting operations. On 24 Jan, the US Embassy Press Release, “Treasury Official Visit to Korea Focuses on DPRK Illicit Financing, Strengthening Defenses Against Money Laundering & Financial Crime.” In it stated, “While in Seoul, Glaser met with officials throughout the Korean government to continue joint efforts to bolster defenses against illicit financial activity in the region. Money laundering, currency counterfeiting and weapons-of-mass destruction (WMD) proliferation finance constitute a grave threat to global security. Glaser discussed US efforts to warn its financial sector of illicit finance threats worldwide, including those emanating from North Korea, and urged the ROK to take similar steps. He stressed the need for rapid practical steps to ensure that financial institutions such as Banco Delta Asia – which the United States has designated a “primary money laundering concern” – do not provide a facilitative environment for North Korean illicit activities and other criminal conduct. Glaser praised the serious focus Korea has given to these important issues. Seoul has taken important steps to help protect its financial sector from dirty money — namely by implementing strong anti-money laundering measures. Glaser urged Korea to further strengthen its regime in the area of WMD proliferation by focusing efforts to financially isolate WMD proliferators and their support networks.

Korea denied on 24 Jan that it had been asked to join Washington in penalizing North Korea in connection with the communist country’s alleged currency counterfeiting and other illicit financial activities — while the US Embassy stated TWICE in releases that the ROK had been asked. A South Korean government official denied Glaser asked anything of the government, in blunt contradiction to the US embassy press release, which twice said the U.S. asked Seoul to join in efforts to combat the North’s illegal activities. The fact that the embassy took the rare step of distributing its own statement and bypassing the host government smacks of fears in Washington that the South Korean government would present a substantially different version from the U.S.’ own. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)

Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon told reporters on 23 Jan the Korean government needs to take no further steps. “The nation’s financial regulations provide appropriate legal means to conduct investigations and take necessary steps when illegal money laundering or suspected transactions by those connected with terrorist activities occur,” a ministry official said. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)

The statements were followed by Roh coming out saying that the ROK would NOT abandon its policy of rapproachment with the North — and rejected the US plan to isolate and bring about the collapse of the North. President Roh Moo-hyun said the Korean government “does not agree with some opinions in the U.S. that apparently want to take issue with and pressure the North Korean regime, sometimes hoping for its collapse,” and warned of “friction and disagreements between Seoul and Washington” if the U.S. wants to resolve the standoff by toppling the regime. (Source: Korea is One.) (NOTE: In addition, Roh stated that he would push for the return of war-time control from the US WITHIN the year … an impossibility as stated by ROK officials. However, he is alienating the US in a very direct manner — supporting openly the North while US troops are stationed in the ROK for its defense from the North.) The American team “has neither officially nor unofficially urged our Government to take specific steps,” South Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman Choo Kyu-ho said.

The US stood by the statement released by its embassy. “We stand by the press release issued yesterday and we have nothing further to add,” embassy spokesman Robert Ogburn said. In essence, the US will continue its plan of action, while the Korea is free to pursue its path — though the US is visibly miffed.

US Prepares Further Sanctions On 28 Jan the Chosun Ilbo reported that the US was readying fresh sanctions against North Korea over the regime’s alleged financial crimes that will be significantly more severe than the ones already in place. Authorities completed a rough draft of an executive order that would stop any financial firms involved in transactions with North Korea from conducting business in the U.S. That will mean all banks, brokerage houses and insurance firms and refers not only to illegal transactions but to any financial deals with the North. Once the regulations are finalized, “the message to financial institutions operating in the U.S. will be that the time has come for them to choose between the U.S. or North Korea,” he added. (SITE NOTE: This could be disastrous to the growing business connections between the ROK and North Korea — especially in the Kaesong area.)

Observers will be watching closely if the draft takes effect since it is far more sweeping than the sanctions already in place. Under the draft order, almost all finance companies would be effectively prohibited from doing business with North Korea. That would also affect international financial institutions outside the U.S. and thus deal a heavy blow to North Korea’s overseas trade. Financial institutions would have a choice whether they are with or against the U.S., but given the importance of their U.S. interests, it would in effect force most major international firms to stop dealing with the North. Given that Pyongyang is already boycotting six-party talks aimed at dismantling its nuclear program over the earlier measures, the plan could be the death knell for the negotiations. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)

Strategic Flexibility Conflict In March 2005 made his opposition to the plan clear, saying Korea could not allow itself to become “embroiled in a Northeast Asian conflict against its will,” as it would be if U.S. troops stationed in Korea that would intervene. The ROK arguments were not realistic as the US as the Strategic Flexibility was part of a global restructuring program. In Korea, the US units were reorganized into “units of action” which combined units as well as downsized organizations in order to create a highly mobile unit able to react rapidly to situations with greater effectiveness. Roh’s non-concurrence to the Strategic Flexibilty Initiative in essence was the return of the ROK to its “tripwire” strategy of keeping a large stationary US force in Korea. Unfortunately, this was not the new reality for the US armed forces. If the conflict was brought to a head-to-head face-off, the US would have been left with only one choice which would be to leave Korea — an unacceptable option.

Thus the two powers finally “agreed to disagree” on the issue — without either side conceding anything. This is the same tactic used in 2005 when Roh objected to the already approved Oplan 5029 that carries the provisions for “carrying the fight north” in the current war-fighting plans for the USFK and CFC. (NOTE: In early 2005, the NGO groups again resurfaced the row over the Oplan 5027 (with its many scenarios of the North invading South Korea) and Oplan 5029 (the Collapse of North Korea) — two scenarios where the crux being “taking the fight North.” Roh’s unrealistic objections dealt with his perception that the existence of the Oplans threatened the rapproachment efforts of the South. Regardless of Roh’s opinions, portions of Oplan 5029 will be exercised in 25-31 Mar 2006 in Foal Eagle and Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI) exercises (RSOI-FE-06).)

According to Yonhap News on 19 Jan 2006, South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon and U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced agreement on “strategic flexibility” of American troops stationed in South Korea, a policy allowing U.S. forces to swiftly move to and from host nations to areas of conflict or of other military needs. On strategic flexibility, the statement reflected both the needs of the U.S. and concerns of South Korea. “The ROK, as an ally, fully understands the rationale for the transformation of the U.S. global military strategy, and respects the necessity for strategic flexibility of the U.S. forces in the ROK,” the statement read. “In the implementation of strategic flexibility, the U.S. respects the ROK position that it shall not be involved in a regional conflict in Northeast Asia against the will of the Korean people.” (See Strategic Consultation for Allied Partnership (Jan 2006) for details.)

(SITE NOTE: Bottomline is that the US as before was going to proceed with its strategic flexibility — with or without the ROK’s permission. In essence, it states the ROK is welcome to stay out of the regional role the US and Japan will now jointly pursue.

The US specifically stated that it did NOT EXPECT the ROK’s participation in its strategic plans for the region — but this is also could be read as meaning the US does NOT WANT the ROK participation at this time. The painful episodes of getting the ROK support for the Iraq coalition in 2003 ended in the US pulling out the 2d Bde 2d ID from the ROK after Roh’s foot-dragging to send 3,600 troops in 2004. Interestingly, the ROK used the same example to illustrate that the US-ROK alliance could deal with deployments, “The government explains that the two countries are capable of dealing with emergency situations because they share a relationship based on trust, and points to the deployment of 3,600 USFK troops to Iraq in 2004 as an example.”

HOWEVER, the ROK interprets the statement, to mean that when conflicts occur between China and Taiwan or the U.S. and China, the USFK must have the consent of South Korea if they are to be engaged. The ROK objects to the USFK forces being used in a regional role as it may leave a security vacuum if the troops are deployed. Until this use of USFK forces is put to a test, no one really knows what will happen. The specific details have not been agreed upon regarding the strategic flexibility of the USFK. Therefore, a possible conflict over USFK operations cannot be ruled out. There is a possibility of a conflict of national interests between the U.S., with its global strategy responsibilities, and South Korea, with its top priority being stability on the Korean peninsula. In Seoul on 21 Jan anti-war protestors showed up with signs that said, “Cancel the ROK-US Strategic Consultation” as they interpreted the agreement to mean that the US would use Korea as a base of operations in case of a regional dispute involving the Korean neighbors.
In Feb 2006, an Uri Party legislator, Choi Jae-cheon, revealed classified National Security Council documents that he stated showed the Foreign Ministry in 2004 bypassed Cheong Wa Dae in discussions with Washington on so-called strategic flexibility for the U.S. Forces Korea. The U.S. and Korean chief diplomats finally reached agreement last month allowing the USFK to be deployed to trouble spots elsewhere but requiring consent from Seoul if they intervene in a regional conflict. The move by Choi was aimed at overturning the agreement with the US over Strategic Flexibility use of troops stationed on ROK soil. The classified documents allege that the US proposed the use of US-Korean forces in the regional role. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)

Choi’s release of the classified documents brings up a disturbing situation of a “Deep Throat” in the National Security Council (NSC) staff. The documents contain detailed information on bilateral consultations about permitting the USFK to be deployed to trouble spots elsewhere, and NSC discussions that are classified as a level 3 state secret. Another NSC document made public by Choi later is marked “strictly confidential.” Under Chief Presidential Secretary Lee Byeong-wan stated that Cheong Wa Dae decided the situation is “critical” since the documents must have come from inside the NSC and it put the presidential secretary for civil affairs in charge of the investigation. The office believed the material disclosed by Choi is just the tip of the iceberg. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.) (SITE NOTE: A skeptic would suspect it was instigated by Roh himself as the “VIP” listed on the documents. He is the only one to gain politically by such a revelation to attempt to overturn the Strategic Flexibility initiative. This strategy of “mobilizing” the people is typical of Roh’s political tactics — only this time, he cannot be the lightning rod.)

Blind Alley for ROK On 30 Jan 2006, the Chosun Ilbo ran an editorial about the present impasse where the US is following the George Bush tactic of “either you’re with us or you’re agin’ us.” In the past, the words glossed over the rift, but President Roh stated that the US pressure on North Korea will cause friction between the US and Korea. Unless someone blinks, the problems with the ROK-US Alliance has entered a new phase — one that the ROK will pay dearly for.

However, whether the ROK attempts to patch over the mess or not, will not impact the perceptual changes in the diplomatic arena. The rift in the US-ROK alliance is plain to see — and the US is not apologizing for its actions. The US is pressing on with its plans to isolate the North — without attempting to involve the South. In supporting the North, the South will soon find itself having to choose between the North or the US in its economic policies. Tensions in 2006 were bound to get worse — not better.

A Blind Alley in the Korea-U.S. Relationship

U.S. President George W. Bush made it clear in a New Year’s press conference that Washington has no intention to compromise on North Korea’s alleged counterfeiting. Bush will reinforce a ban on transactions with the Macau-based Banco Delta Asia, which the U.S. says is Pyongyang’s primary money laundering channel; a U.S. congressional researcher in charge of tracking Pyongyang’s drug deals and counterfeiting said this is meant to squeeze North Korea so it gives up its illegal activities.

President Roh Moo-hyun, in his own earlier New Year press conference, sent a message to the U.S. to ease pressure on the North Korean regime if it wants to avoid friction with Seoul.

Whenever so far concerns about the Korea-U.S. alliance have surfaced, Bush said it was an “important” relationship and Roh that it was “healthy.” Seeing one president evade questions and another gloss over problems, some people believed them and some did not. But now that both presidents have made their differences over the counterfeiting question explicit, nobody can keep claiming that the relationship is in the best shape.

Standard procedure is to solve differences between working-level officials or, if that fails, at the ministerial level or in a summit. But Korea and the U.S. have come to a point where the two countries’ heads of state contradict each other in public. To make matters worse, the informal dialogue channel between the two countries that should continue dialogue out of sight of the world when the official line is not working, appears to have run dry.

The alliance has deteriorated to such an extent that it is difficult to see how it can be mended. The reason is that this government has in the past three years conducted a foreign policy that jettisons the national interest for slogans like “dignified diplomacy” and “independent national defense.” Even as well nigh all other countries are doing everything they can to maximize benefit for their own national interest in a unipolar world dominated by a sole superpower, the Republic of Korea alone has driven up a blind alley with the sort of politics you find in big letters on campus posters.

Having maneuvered us there by comprehensively pulling the wool over people’s eyes, the government must explain how we will find a way out of this dead end for the country’s security and prosperity. (Source: Chosun Ilbo Editorial.)
Changes in the Wind for USFK (Mar 2006) In Feb 2006, Gen Bell took over the reins of the USFK and then in Mar 2006 testified before Congress. It was revealed that the US military is studying command options to replace the current Korea-U.S. Combined Forces while the two countries discuss Korea assuming wartime control of its forces from the US. Supposedly the Joint Chiefs of Staff have begun exploring how South Korea’s forces may be realigned after any future transfer of wartime command. The current CFC system would not be compatible if South Korea regains wartime operational control of its forces. This is the reason we are considering a new system. Gen Bell stated that he was envisioning the expansion of the UNC role in Korea. It was hinted that there would be troop reductions even greater than the amounts previously discussed. (See USFK Mulls Over Eliminating CFC)

All of this rotates around Roh’s continued insistence that he regain wartime control of the ROK forces — and the fact that the US has suddenly started to openly discuss the matter. In Oct 2005, Donald Rumsfield stated the US would “appropriately expedite” the matter — a vague and non-committal statement at best. When Gen Laporte retired, he stated that the ROK would regain control “when it was ready.” However, now there is talk of eliminating the CFC after Gen Bell took over. Thus in a matter of months there has been a dramatic change in US attitudes on the US presence in Korea.

Putting two-and-two together, one starts coming to some strange speculations. The US-Japan Restructuring Agreement was to be signed in March, but was postponed until April. Bilateral meetings continue between the US and Japan to work out the details of the broad-based plan. With it there will be a new structure for the regional forces as the Japanese have (1) declared Taiwan being in its strategic interests and totally revamped the SDF structures to accomodate a regional role (while the ROK fights with “strategic flexibility”) (2) has successfully tested a new SM3 missile as part of the joint US-Japan Missile Defense System (MDS) (while the ROK refuses to consider any MDS as it feels the North would never attack it with missiles) and (3) move to change Article 9 of the Peace Constitution (out of committee in Nov 2005) to allow it to reestablish its military for national defense — while the ROK is still fumbling with attempts to upgrade its military and trying to figure out how it will pay for it.

Japan has agreed to pay 75 percent of the costs for relocating 8000 Marines and 9000 dependents from Okinawa to Guam ($7 billion). With the new concept of using the C-17 to fly troops to hot spots within 24 hours means that troops do not need to be physically in Korea to respond. Elements of I Corps are already in place in Camp Zama from Jul 2005. The whole USFK structure could be revamped in the blink of an eye to place it directly in a chain to the newly created Pacific Combat Command 4-star position. Such a concept in mind-boggling, but the mechanics seem to have already put into place with the 13th AF being relocated to Guam already from Japan in 2005. Without a CFC, the UNC would be the only remaining US link to the defense of Korea — and definitely not a four-star position.

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Gen Bell assumes USFK Command (Feb 2006) Gen. Burwell B. Bell, who officially took over as the new commander of U.S. forces stationed here on 3 Feb 2006, set forth reinforcing of the South Korea-U.S. alliance as one of the key tenets he will abide by during his service. In his speech, Bell made clear that he was committed to maintaining security not only in South Korea but also in Northeast Asia. Gen. Bell in his speech denied that recent restructuring in the CFC was a sign of a deteriorating alliance. The innovations would in fact make the alliance stronger and more capable, he said. Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-ung and the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Peter Pace also attended the ceremony together with Adm. William Fallon, the head of U.S. Pacific Command, Korean Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Lee Sang-hee and some 1,000 other government and military figures from both countries.

Change of Command Gen Bell, Gen Pace, Command Sgt Major and Gen LaPorte at Yongsan. (3 Feb 2006) (Chosun Ilbo)

Outgoing Gen LaPorte will retire to Houston. Because of his special abilities, he was extended in Korea to handle the transition to a new USFK organization — as well as provide continuity on transitions of defensive roles to the ROK Army. Gen LaPorte, called on supporters of the Korea-U.S. alliance to speak out. LaPorte made the appeal during a ceremony at Collier Field House in the Yongsan Garrison to hand over command to his successor Gen. Burwell Bell. LaPorte warned the alliance faced difficulties ahead in both countries from those who think it has served its purpose and those who benefit from cracks in the relationship. He said there was no need to get overly exercised by criticism or public discussion but urged people who care about the alliance and think of soldiers 밶s our joint defense team?to speak out clearly. LaPorte뭩 leaving remarks are seen as a departure from the line he has taken during his three years and nine months in the post that he is not worried about the alliance since it is based on a solid relationship. Some say the general took the opportunity of the handover to vent frustrations he concealed during his tenure as chief of Combined Forces Command. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.) (SITE NOTE: We have the deepest respect for Gen LaPorte who has had some of the roughest times we have ever seen a commanding general be in. To fight a war is easy compared to what he faced. He had to manipulate the hostile political situation of Korea with a “left-leaning” President while reconfiguring the USFK to meet the Global Positioning Strategy and implementing the Strategic Flexibility initiative — at the same time, reshaping the USFK for the 21st Century into “units of action” while downsizing the bases. Throw in the bullcrud from the Congressional hell heaped on the USFK over human trafficking and prostitution in a land that was cited for its role in human trafficking by the US government and whose $2.4 billion sex trade makes the miniscule “camptown trade” seem like a drop in an ocean. However, the ROK and the Congress heaped all the trash on his desk — and though we disagreed with his solutions, we understood exactly why he was forced to do it. An unbelievable General who juggled some impossible things!!!)
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Squabble Over US Base Contamination (Feb-Apr 2006) Seoul and Washington are locked in tough negotiations over who should deal with contamination on U.S. bases that are to be returned to South Korean ownership, a government source said. The conflict has delayed the U.S. base relocation plan, a major agreement struck between the two allies in 2004 as part of Washington뭩 realignment of all its overseas forces.

On 5 Feb 2003, the USFK agreed to a “joint environmental examination” of bases. On 30 May 2003, the MND and USFK signed an agreement to clean up all bases to be returned to the ROK before they are turned back to ROK hands. Though we felt at the time that this had a great potential risk, but we believed the U.S. was playing a game that would allow it to vacate the DMZ as expeditiously as possible under their global repositioning plan announced in March 2003 and at the time was being implemented worldwide. Though the ROK wants to drag its feet on the removal troops from the DMZ for a multitude of reasons, the USFK was attempting to remove any stumbling blocks before it actually moved.

According to a government report to the National Assembly in September 2005, toxic contaminants above the safe limit were detected underground in large quantities at 14 out of 15 bases checked by the joint investigation team. Included in the contaminants were substances of the BTEX group, which include benzene, ethyl benzene, toluene, and three isomers of xylene. BTEX substances are known to be a serious hazard to public health and are linked to cancer, as well as being an environmental pollutant. (Source: Korea Times.)

However, the USFK position is that it agreed to clean up to KISE (Known, Imminent, Substantial Endangerment to Human Health) standards. In other words, it would clean up obvious hazardous waste contamination and SUBSTANTIAL endangerment hazards to human health — not simply the existence of hazardous contaminants that exceed the safe limit by an arbitrary amount. This area is in “intense negotiations” that the environmental groups claim is behind closed doors and lacking “transparency.”

Camp Closure under LPP (Jan 2006)

Background on Pollution Issue and SOFA Agreement (2003) On 5 Feb 2003 the Choson Ilbo ran an article on the SOFA. This was the hash-over from the SOFA agreement on “agreed upon items” initialled off on by the Ministry of Justice and the USFK to hopefully defuse the growing tension. However, there were some new twists that were added such as the “joint environmental examinations” of land that was to be returned to Korea under the Land Partnership Plan. Some of the other items seemed rather strange and needed more clarification before we dared to comment. These SOFA Joint Committee Meetings were NOT negotiations, but rather meeting of both sides to work out the mechanics of the SOFA as it exists — providing interpretations and procedures to implement the SOFA.

THIS IS THE KEY POINT. The agreements listed as attachments to the SOFA were NOT negotiated SOFA agreements, but rather “understandings” on SOFA implementation of environmental issues.

New SOFA Implementation Agreed
by Kwon Kyung-bok (kkb@chosun.com)

Improvements in the implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) were discussed Wednesday during the 182nd SOFA Joint Committee, headed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s North America Bureau Director Shim Yoon-jo and the deputy commander of United States Forces Korea Lieutenant-general Lance L. Smith.

The committee agreed that USFK soldiers suspected of drunk driving will be stopped at sobriety checkpoints and required to take breathalyzer tests in the future. Owners of vehicles will also need to submit documentary evidence of insurance when registering their automobiles.

Also if a soldier causes a traffic accident while off duty, the Korean victim will be able to recover damages before the decision of the court is given. Previously, victims of car accidents caused by US soldiers could only recover damages after a court ruling.

Moreover, starting this month, a joint environmental examination will be conducted on all land and facilities returned to Korea by the US military. The examination has only been applied when the US military in Korea caused an environmental contamination until now. Thus, examinations of the 28 facilities and three training centers of the US army bases that will be returned to Korea by 2011 according to the Land Partnership Plan (LPP) will take place.

Both parties agreed to take the case of two schoolgirls accidentally killed by US military vehicles in June as a momentum, and give prior notice to neighboring residents when exercises take place. In addition, the rights and interests of Korean workers in US army bases will be protected, as they will be handled according to Korean law.

SITE NOTE: On 5 Feb 2003, the USFK agreed to a “joint environmental examination” that we felt at the time played directly into the hands of Green Korea, a vocal anti-USFK NGO environmental group. This group was responsible for the organization on the May 2003 Sangmangeum March from Pusan to Seoul that gathered international attention.

Under the original SOFA agreement (prior to the environmental attachments), the USFK was NOT liable for cleanup and could return the bases/camps in “as is” condition. However, President-elect Roh supported changes in the environmental provisions of the SOFA. According to the current SOFA, the camps returned under the LPP was to be handed back “as is.” This provision had not been changed dramatically from the original SOFA.

To be realistic, there will be some environmental damage to ANY land occupied by the USFK by operational units for a significant amount of time, though areas used as storage areas will be minimal. This was due to the fact that in the past, there was no environmental concern on the part of the military anywhere in the U.S. and world in general. In addition, it will be almost impossible to assess how much damage to the water tables was done by the Koreans themselves. In the U.S., the Superfund continues to try to cleanup the environmental damage to these U.S. bases — some active and some long closed.

A negative environmental report is just what the Green Korea NGO group wants to demand compensation/cleanup and then spread the compensation to include areas surrounding the camps. Green Korea envisions the U.S. picking up the tab. This is because Korea refuses to cleanup its own back yard — and continues to be some of the worst polluters in the world for dumping toxic wastes secretly in forests and rivers — while the Seoul government actively suppresses any Environmental Protection Agency monitoring by cutting off its funding from 1992 on.

The “joint environmental examination” was a bothersome addition as it played right into the hands of Green Korea, a vocal anti-USFK NGO environmental group. However, if the USFK sits down to renegotiations with negative environmental reports, the USFK negotiators may be at a handicap.

In the U.S., the Superfund continues to try to cleanup the environmental damage to these U.S. bases — some active (Pearl Harbor, Hawaii) and some long closed (George AFB, CA). A negative environmental report is just what the Green Korea NGO group wants to demand compensation/cleanup and then spread the compensation to include areas surrounding the camps. Green Korea envisions the U.S. picking up the tab. This is because Korea refuses to cleanup its own back yard — and continues to be some of the worst polluters in the world for dumping toxic wastes secretly in forests and rivers — while the Seoul government actively suppresses any Environmental Protection Agency monitoring by cutting off its funding from 1992 on.

We were only guessing in 2003, but the ROK has a much more lax standard for pollution than the U.S. and we surmised that the USFK lawyers had advised them that the cleanup operations could be to ROK standards. To clean up to U.S. standards would be a disaster. However, by 2006 new standards are now in place after many areas — including Pyeongtaek — complained of pollution from the nearby bases/camps.)

Camp Howze Pollution Off-base (2002)

On 30 May 2003, the MND and USFK signed an agreement to clean up all bases to be returned to the ROK before they are turned back to ROK hands. According to the agreement, the USFK was to test for and repair cases of environmental contamination. To implement the Land Partnership Plan (LPP), the USFK was to be financially responsible for environmental damage on 55 percent of the land it now uses, including 28 bases in cities and three training camps that will be returned to the Korean government by 2011. Seoul agreed to be financially responsible for repairing environmental damage occurring on U.S. bases that will be newly provided.

On 30 May 2003 Shim Yoon-joe, director general at the Foreign Ministry’s North American Bureau, and Lieut. Gen. Lance Smith, deputy commander of the USFK, inked two sets of agreements concerning USFK soldiers during the Korea-U.S. Joint Committee meeting on the Status of Forces Agreement in Seoul. According to their environmental agreement relating to U.S. bases, South Korea and the United States will conduct environmental contamination surveys if needed in case of returns or projected grants of USFK facilities and areas.

The U.S. side will bear the financial burden if contamination is found in its military sites, which will be returned to the South according to the Land Partnership Plan (LPP). “The environmental agreement is the strongest that we have with any of the alliances. The agreement allows mutual consultation throughout the entire process,” Smith said during a news conference. “We will never meet all the demands of the activists and some of the more extremists, NGOs. But we’re making every possible effort to make sure that we operate as safely as possible.” Smith said.

(SITE NOTE: Though we felt at the time that there was a great potential risk, we believed the U.S. was playing a game that would have allowed it to vacate the DMZ as expeditiously as possible under their global repositioning plan announced in March 2003 — and at that time being implemented worldwide. Though the ROK wanted to drag its feet, the USFK was removing any stumbling blocks before it actually moved.

We were only guessing at the time that the ROK had a much laxer standard for pollution than the U.S. and we surmised that the USFK lawyers had advised the USFK that the cleanup operations could be to ROK standards. To clean up to U.S. standards would be a disaster. Most likely cleanup operations would be contracted out to Korean companies instead of American companies to eliminate activist claims that the Americans were cheating — and also to avail themselves of Korean companies cleaning up to lower standards. The acceptance of the bases cleaned up by Korean companies would not provide Green Korea with ammunition to protest at a later date.

We have since learned that the pollution issue is indeed handled under contract. However, the destruction of hazardous waste materials by incineration is handled under contract by ROK companies. The cleanup of identified soil areas of spills or contamination is in the hands of military personnel. The problem of soil being removed for excavation and used as land fill in other locations is a problem. Currently soil being removed from Camp Humphreys for excavation worked has been trucked off base — and if the soil is determined to be “oil-soaked,” it is refused. Where the soil goes after refusal we don’t know — and we didn’t ask. Procedures do exist for the incineration of contaminated soil.)
The problem arises once the camp has been returned to the ROK under the provisions of the LPP. At that time, does the South have redress to claim the camp was polluted by the USFK — AFTER it signed off on the acceptance under the guidelines of the SOFA environmental agreement. In the US, the Department of Defense does assume responsibility if the pollution can be proved to have been caused by the military under the “polluter pays principle.” However, the problem in the US is that the onus of proof lies with the accuser. In the case of BRAC bases — the bases returned for civilian uses — the new user must prove that the DOD was responsible and the pollution did not occur after the property changed hands. In reality, the DOD will fight tooth-and-nail against any claim after the BRAC ownership has taken place. The DOD will also take the same position on land that is leased. Because of this problem, special insurance is provided to handle the costs of litigation.
Current Situation: Environmental Squabble Stalls LPP Turnover (Jan 2006) Attending a National Assembly session on Jan. 26, Hwang Kyu-sik, vice minister of defense, said the cost of cleaning up 13 bases that were seriously contaminated was estimated at between $300 and $400 million. The U.S. military declined to comment on the matter as it is “under negotiations.”

The USFK SOFA was revised in 2001 but failed to clarify which country should take responsibility for cleaning up contaminated bases. At the end of May 2003, the USFK-MND signed off on agreements to the SOFA dealing with cleaning up the bases before the land was returned to the ROK.
(SITE NOTE: We were concerned in 2003 that this agreement would lead to being trapped into U.S. “Superfund” type commitments as the bases were occupied long before the current standards were adopted. The truth is that it is uncertain where pollution comes from as the ROK companies are also notorious for dumping toxic waste into streams or burying them in the green belt areas. Under the original SOFA, the USFK would return the lands to the ROK “as is.” In other words, the USFK had an “out” for returning the lands, but signed it away. It appears our fears were well-founded in that the ROK is now using the environmental issue to stall the LPP program — and in turn the relocation of forces in Korea.

However, the USFK position is that it agreed to clean up to KISE (Known, Imminent, Substantial Endangerment to Human Health) standards. In other words, it would clean up obvious hazardous waste contamination and SUBSTANTIAL endangerment hazards to human health. This means that it was not responsible for the pollution to the water table contributed to by the pig farmer outside the fenceline of former Camp Gary Owens and such pollution problems. It was only limited to pollution that posed SUBSTANTIAL health risks. This may be in the sub-notes of the negotiations, but was NOT in the SOFA paragraphs that was on the USFK website for public viewing in 2003.
Under the relocation pact, the United States is required to hand back in stages 34 military bases spread around the country by 2011, including 11 last year. In their stead, it will build two consolidated and modernized bases in Pyongtaek and Osan, 70 kilometers south of Seoul, by 2008.

But the environmental squabble has put the handover of the bases on hold. “The issue is now under intense negotiation,뮃 Park Ki-yoon at the Defense Ministry뭩 Environmental Protection Office said in a recent briefing. “The two sides are still conducting joint surveys on environmental contamination of U.S. bases.뮃
(SITE NOTE: Under the Land Partnership Plan, the USFK was to hand back the camps no longer required back to the ROK in a “win-win” situation. Under the SOFA the camps would be returned to the ROK “as is.” However, in 2003 due to the protests of activists that condemned the USFK for any spill and made public headlines over the controversy. At the time, we complained that the ROK companies were being prosecuted for dumping tons of toxic waste into the streams — and fined. While a USFK employee who dumped a few gallons of formaldahyde into the drain was taken to court and prison sentences were demanded. Bending to the public sensitivities, the USFK amended the SOFA to agree to joint cleanups if required and joint inspections of facilities.

We feared that this would be a prelude to opening a floodgate of claims by activists of damage — in hopes of starting up a “Superfund” like they have in the US. Such an idea would be disastrous. The USFK has maintained that it has been proactive in actions on the environment and has “voluntarily” spent monies on environmental actions. For example, Gen Laporte in Jan 2006 stated that in 2005, the USFK “voluntarily” spent $1 million to replace underground tanks. However, civic groups, such as Green Korea United, dismissed LaPorte’s remarks as “self-praising,” saying the removal of fuel tanks is something the USFK was obliged to do under U.S. law.)
Since 2003, a joint survey team led by the Environment Ministry, Park said the government has asked the USFK to clean up environmental pollution at 14 bases found to be contaminated beyond safety standards under South Korean environmental laws. However, the USFK is rejecting the request, citing different and lower test results.
(SITE NOTE: In Pyeongtaek, the city officials are at the forefront of claims that Osan AB and Camp Humphreys have polluted the off-base areas with spills that leaked off-base through drainage canals.)
NGO Activist Group Position (Feb 2006) According to Green Korea claimed that 14 of 15 returned USFK camps were found to have ground and water pollution. “Ground is contaminated mostly by TPH, BTEX, Lead, Zinc, Cadmium and Copper etc, also water is polluted by TPH, Benzene, Phenol, PCE and Xylene etc.” The Green Korea article continued that the Ministry of Environment to reported to the National Security Committee that it would cost $100 million to clean up Yongsan Garrison. It claimed that the ROK government and local governments would have to take all responsibility for the pollution AFTER a camp is returned. It went on to state that the ROK government should evaluate the pollution status and demand the USFK accept responsibility. (NOTE: Green Korea is involved in highly political environmental areas such as the Saemangeum project. However, it has focused exclusively on the US over the Kuni Range conflicts — leading to the US finally simply closing the range. Once done, the Green Korea is now targeting Chi-do range off Kunsan which is being used as a replacement site.)

Table of Pollution (Mar 2006) (Green Korea United)

Table of Pollution (Mar 2006) (Green Korea United)

Green Korea claimed that according to “Tab A to the joint environmental information exchange and access procedures,” Korea and US agreed in 2003 they will start joint research for contamination 1 year before the return of the bases and any discovered pollution would be cleaned up by the USFK. Chuncheon City where Camp Page used to be located received the results of the environmental pollution report only ORALLY.

Green Korea claims that “experts” are expecting at least 20 ~ 30 years will be needed to clean up the contamination. The Minister of Environment was questioned by members of Committee of Environment and Labour during the inspection regarding contamination of U.S. Army bases in Korea and he promised that the Ministry of Environment will try to solve problems of information release, execute precise research for pollution and correct imperfections in the clean up process through the SOFA.

In a statement, the environmental group Green Korea United urged the USFK to immediately clean up the pollution left behind, following the environmental standards of the host nation. “The USFK must take responsibility for the pollution at its bases on its own money, not on that from South Korean citizens,뮃 Lee Jong-hak, a member of Green Korea United, said.

According to Green Korea United, on 13 Feb, a poll 79.1 percent of Koreans stated, “It’s your mess, you clean it up.” However, the US position is that it will clean up only eight types of pollution.

A recent poll suggests that the US should be held responsible for clean-up costs of pollution withing US military bases. Recently, Gen. LaPorte, the former commander of US Armed Forces, Korea (USFK), proposed that the US would clean up only eight kinds of pollution cases. It appears as if negotiations between the US and Korea have entered its last phase, and the US has made its final gesture regarding issues of clean-up costs. Although the Korean people have the right to know and participate in this negotiation process, the two parties have kept the public in the dark regarding negotiations.

The US claimed it would clean up pollution within military bases according to KISE (Known, Imminent, Substantial Endangerment to Human Health). However, KISE’s ineffectiveness was cleary demonstrated in the Philippines where people suffered from pollution left behind by the US military. Moreover, the pollution assessment does not include critical information such as the degree of exposure to local people. Nor does the assessment indicate how pollution spreads and how pollution reaches the local people. Since the pollution assessment does not include such necessary information, the KISE provision (Known, Imminent, Substantial Endangerment to Human Health) should not be applied based on this type of assessment.

Korean people’s rights are being hampered by this veiled negotiation process which is based on insufficient information and invalid provisions (KISE). Therefore, Green Korea United conducted a public opinion poll to inform the ROK and US governments of Korean public opinion regarding base environmental issues. The poll selected over 1,000 Korean males and females nationwide who over 18 years old.

The following present key findings from the poll:
1. Pollution assessments should be transparent to the public: Yes 92.7 % No 3.9% (cf) the US is against revealing the assessment
2. Information pertaining to negotiations should be made public: Yes 88.7% No 6.4%
3. Who should be responsible for the cost of cleaning up pollution within US military bases: the US 79.1%, Korea 4.0% Both countries 10.8%
4. Korea should be responsible for the cost of cleaning up pollution: 4.0%
5. Agree to raise taxes to pay for cleaning up pollution within US military bases (if Korea pays for cleaning up): Yes 22% (certainly 2.0%+with hesitation 20.0%) No 74.3% (Absolutely not 47.9%+probably not 26.4%)
6. Possible Solutions to US military base pollution
a. Amending SOFA (Status-of-Forces Agreement) 59.6%
b. Korean government should strongly demand the US take responsibility for environmental pollution 25.1 %
c. Making pollution assessments transparent to the public 10.
(Source: Green Korea United.)
BAI to Investigate Environmental Pollution (Mar 2005) On 3 Mar, South Korea’s Bureau of Audits and Inspection (BAI) said that they will soon investigate environmental pollution on military bases. (Source: Yonhap News.)

Seoul City Government File Suit over 2001 Oil Leak at Yongsan (Mar 2006) Seoul Metropolitan Government has filed a lawsuit against the central government over underground water contamination at a Seoul subway station caused by an oil leak at Yongsan. The Seoul Central Court said yesterday that the city was seeking nearly 1.4 billion won ($1.43 million) in compensation for contamination at the Noksapyeong subway station in Yongsan, central Seoul. The city argued that because the U.S. military has already admitted its role in the leak, the central government was responsible for compensation under the Status of Forces Agreement, which makes it liable for damage committed by the U.S. military to parties other than the central government. It added that it it was seeking compensation for money spent employing Korean and U.S. experts to find the cause of the January 2001 oil leak.

(SITE NOTE: This specific incident was well-documented at the time and hailed as an example of the cooperation between the ROK and US in resolving polluton contamination. The oil came from leaking tanks on Yongsan and appeared in the drainage systems of the subway station. Once identified, it took very little time for the USFK to identify the source, and it readily admitted its fault. In the aftermath of this incident, all underground fuel tanks in Korea were inspected, repaired and/or replaced at all USFK bases with supplementary budgetary funds. This suit is obviously politically motivated as “pollution” is now a “hot topic” with the Seoul mayoral race coming up. It is also the current ploy of environmental groups to seek judgements from “friendly” Seoul District courts against the ROK government and then prod the ROK government into asking the US to pay for its “share.”

But the biggest question is: “Why now?” Why wait five years before filing a lawsuit? It is strictly political. The Mayor of Seoul is the front runner for nomination to the Presidency — and he must retain his office in the May 2006 elections to achieve that goal. This suit plays to the NGO activist groups that he is going to hold the US accountable — even if it means he has to sue the ROK to get at the US.)
MND Minister Calls for Easing Rules on US Base Pollution (Mar 2006) On 20 Mar, Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-ung urged the Ministry of Environment to loosen its environmental standards for U.S. bases here that are to be returned to South Korea for the smooth process of the U.S. base relocation plan.

Defense Chief Calls for Easing Rules on US Base Pollution
By Jung Sung-ki Staff Reporter

Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-ung on Monday urged the Ministry of Environment to loosen its environmental standards for U.S. bases here that are to be returned to South Korea for the smooth process of the U.S. base relocation plan.

Yoon stressed the U.S. side is engaging in negotiations over the base contamination issue in an “unprecedented and positive” manner compared to similar cases in other nations, calling for a speedy conclusion of the matter. “The U.S. military has been stationed here to meet our nation’s security demands,” the minister said during a press briefing at the ministry. “I hope our people will understand this and give support for the controversial issue.”

The current pollution standards pushed by the environmental authorities are “too strict” to narrow the gap between the two sides, Yoon said.

A spokesman for the Ministry of Environment, however, dismissed Yoon’s complaint.

“Of course, our ministry understands the positions of the Defense Ministry and the U.S. side,” Song Jae-yong, an official at the Environment Ministry’s public affairs office, told The Korea Times.

“But this issue is not a matter that should be concluded in a hasty manner as it is important enough to have serious impact on our people’s health, environment and taxpayers’ money,” Song said, adding that his ministry will keep its position on safety standards under the South Korean law.

The environmental squabble has put on hold the U.S. base relocation pact struck between Seoul and Washington in 2004. Under the agreement, the United States Forces in Korea (USFK) is required to return in stages 34 of 41 military bases scattered around the country by 2011. (SITE NOTE: This may be the final straw — the Koreans signed the SOFA which has the status of an international treaty approved by the National Assembly and US Congress. The actions of the Environmental Ministry has the potential of backfiring on the ROK.)

In exchange, the U.S. military will build two consolidated bases in the Pyongtaek area, about 70 kilometers south of Seoul, by 2008.

Since 2003, a joint survey team involving officials from the Ministry of Environment and the USFK has conducted on-site inspections at relocating U.S. bases.

The government asked the USFK to clean up environmental pollution at 14 out of 15 bases found to be contaminated beyond safety standards under the law, an official at the Ministry of Environment said.

However, the USFK is rejecting the request, citing different and lower standards set by the U.S. government. The USFK argues it is under no obligation to clean up any bases if the contamination is not a “known, imminent and substantial endangerment (KISE) to human health,” he said.

Adding to the complex dispute, the U.S. military’s Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with South Korea, revised in 2001, fails to clarify which country should take responsibility for cleaning up contaminated bases. Recent reports said pollution in a U.S. installation in Chunchon, Kangwon Province, was 100 times higher than the country’s standard. The permissible levels of kerosene and lead in the soil are 500mg/kg and 100mg/kg, respectively. (SITE NOTE: The SOFA stated that the bases would be returned “as is.” This was very plain — and agreed to by the ROK in 1991. The “amendments” added later were simply “understandings” that the USFK would work jointly with the MND to clean up the bases, but the USFK states the agreed upon level was KISE levels.)

At a National Assembly session on Jan. 26, Hwang Kyu-sik, vice minister of defense, said the cost of cleaning up 13 bases concerned that were found to be seriously contaminated is estimated at between $300 and $400 million. (Source: Korea Times.)
However, on 21 Mar the Defense Ministry denied South Korean media reports that its top official had asked the Korean Environmental Ministry to ease restrictions to speed the exchange of closed U.S. military bases. South Korean environmental officials have said the United States must clean up much of those areas before the South Korean government will take back the land. (Source: Stars and Stripes.) (SITE NOTE: The MND denial means that the Roh administration has backed the Environmental Ministry — and the US must be wary of the next steps. The Roh administration is NOT an ally in fostering the move to Camp Humphreys. In addition, the conviction of the Roh administration procuring the land — that was to be completed by Dec 2005 — was proven to be hot air in Mar 2006 when the MND backed off on evicting the farmers whose lands were expropriated legally.)

Kunsan AB Accused of “Serious” Pollution Problems On 24 Mar 2006, the Gunsan city government accused the base has serious “pollution” dealing with its soil conditions. The pollution supposedly has spread to surrounding farms causing the lands to be unusable. This accusation appeared on Korean news on 23 Mar showing soil that had been contaminated with oil. The Korea Herald story read, “Water at a U.S. airbase in Gunsan, North Jeolla Province, has been seriously contaminated, the city government said yesterday. The state-run Environmental Management Corporation examined 89 sites inside the base from last November to February, and found that soil and underground water contained pollutants at 10 and 89 times respectively more than the acceptable standard, according to Gunsan City. “If contamination levels are higher than the standard, it is impossible to farm,” a city official said. “It is necessary to have restrictions on pollution.” (Source: Korea Herald.) (SITE NOTE: Having compiled the history of Kunsan AB, I would probably say that there is in fact a large amount of pollution on the base due to people dumping oil and such off the end of the runway. Try to remember that environmental standards weren’t established until the mid-1970s — and they weren’t enforced overseas. The problem though is that the Kunsan City government should also take a look at their community. I first arrived in Kunsan in 1987 and having come from an environmental “superfund base” (George AFB), I was very sensitive to the problem. However, when dealing with the bases, the SOFA was amended in 1991 to include an enviromental “understanding” where the ROK and USFK would work together. The USFK promised to cleanup any environmental hazards — but this was to the KISE standard (Known, Imminent and Substantial Environmental hazard). Prior to this “understanding” in the SOFA, the SOFA stated the land reverting to the ROK would be “as is.” After I retired, I settled in Kunsan and watched how the pollution progressed as industry moved into the area and the Kunjang Industrial Area grew. I remember when the blue trucks from the Environmental Ministry was parked across from the old City Hall (Gu-Shichang) until the central government found that the pollution was getting out of hand and washed their hands of the program — turning it over to the provincial government — who in turn kicked to the city governments who did not have the funding. With all the construction in Kunsan, the pollution was everywhere. There used to be a junior college at Kunsan harbor and from the riverside one could look down the bank to the factories and see all the pretty colors of purple, green and orange where the companies dumped their waste directly into the river. There are two sides to this story…and the environmental folks are only telling one side.)

USFK presents environmental cleanup plan to South Korea (Apr 2006) According to the Stars and Stripes on 9 Apr 2006, the US proposal included: Cleaning remaining storage tanks. Removing underground fuel storage tanks. Removing all PCB materials (polychlorinated biphenyls, a carcinogenic chemical used in electrical and heating systems). Removing lead and copper left in any old firing ranges. Removing unexploded ordnance. Removing refrigeration and air conditioning chemicals. Removing visible spills in motor pools. (SITE NOTE: The proposal does not come as a surprise. The removal of PCBs has been on-going throughout the military for years and the remainder of the items are not drastic. The location of PCB materials were identified in the DoD data bases long ago — and if not removed, they should have been long ago. The underground tanks have been an identified problem in Korea and most underground tanks were removed or replaced in recent years under a multi-million dollar project starting in 2001. The other items are on-going items under the USFK so they are not major impact items.)

The USFK said the plan went 밶bove and beyond?previous agreements about the almost 60 bases going from U.S. to South Korean control. South Korean officials still must accept the plan. USFK declined to release any estimate of the cost, which the United States will pay, before a joint U.S.-South Korean public statement was prepared. The proposal is part of a 17-month negotiation about land the U.S. military has used for training and living for decades. In addition to everyday infrastructure such as heating systems and parking lots, some areas include firing ranges.

Already, the United States has turned over 26 bases ?about 11,000 acres ?as part of an overall plan both countries approved to move most U.S. forces here to a central part of the peninsula. USFK will go ahead with the planned environmental cleanup measures for future land turnovers. For the 26 bases the United States already vacated, USFK is waiting to negotiate a schedule to complete the work. Until then, the United States will continue to pay South Korean contractors a combined $400,000 a month to guard the land.

USFK also plans to use a technique called 밷ioslurping,?which treats petroleum-contaminated soils by both creating vents in the land and skimming fuel from the groundwater. Under the current U.S.-South Korean agreement, the South Koreans get back the sites as-is, complete with infrastructure. The United States is required to clean only areas that contain 밿mminent and substantial endangerments to human health and safety.? (SITE NOTE: This technique of “bioslurping” is used to cleanup stateside bases identified under the “Superfund” to pump out the pollution caused by dumping fuels directly into the ground over a period of years. However, under the current “known, imminent, substantial endangerment” (KISE) criteria, this would only be aimed at those areas with massive contamination — or potentially hot spots like the Yongsan garrison.)
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Conflict on Relocation Costs (Feb-Mar 2006) The US and ROK appear to have reached conflicting assessments on the relocation cost of the USFK. According to the Korea Times, Gen LaPorte testified before a U.S. House committee in March 2005 that the U.S. government would only have to pay 6 percent of the cost, estimated at $8 billion, according to reports. (Source: Korea Times.) However, what he said was that the US government paid 60 percent of the non-personnel costs. The South Korean government support equaled 40 percent of the command’s non-personnel costs.

The ROK is mixing apples and oranges. The support of the USFK is one issue, while the relocation of the USFK is another. Gen LaPorte said 94 percent of the relocation costs would be footed by the Seoul government, including 53 percent that South Korea promised under the 2004 agreement regarding the base relocation project and the remaining 21 percent would be covered by South Korea뭩 defense cost-sharing contribution.

The discussions on cost-sharing were going on in 2005 because it could not be settled in the SCM. The ROK wants its costs reduced because they feel they contributed to Iraq — though they refused to send their troops to where they could relieve US combat troops for combat duties. Instead they were sent out of harm’s way and safe in Irbil where no one shoots at them — while over 2000 Americans have died so far in action. Also there are fewer troops in Korea than in 2004 because 3,600 troops of the 2d Bde 2d ID were removed permanently. What’s not said politely is that the 3,600 troops were pulled out after the ROK kept dragging their feet and vilifying the US on sending their promised 3,600 Zaytun troops to Iraq in 2004.

In addition, under the LPP the returned bases meant there was less cost. Suddenly the “win-win” situation claimed by the USFK at its inception was suddenly being turned around. The ROK got back its land — and it wanted a rebate as well. That the troops were relocated to Camp Stanley, Red Cloud and Camp Humphreys and installed into buildings constructed with US funds meant nothing. That the same troops were now residing in a different location meant nothing. The frustration of dealing with the Roh administration was starting to wear thin.

The following is from the EAST ASIAN REVIEW AUTUMN 2003.

Even though a substantial portion of the SOFA Grant Land is owned by private landlords, there has been virtually no compensation for them. Out of the lands South Korea grants to the USFK뼎exclusive use grants and training area easements뼎privately owned lands account for 24.2 percent. Nevertheless, central government has never paid rent to the landlords. According to data submitted for National Assembly뭩 Inspection 2002, the SOFA Grant Land is valued at around 1 trillion won and private lands account for 19.4 percent and 48 percent of the USFK exclusive use grants and training area easements, respectively. (It is worth noting that the Japanese government pays landlords for the use of land granted to the U.S. Forces Japan, based on a certain proportion of the land value. Thus, complaints regarding the rights to private lands are not as serious.) At the same time, the problem in Korea has also worsened because democratization has reinforced a sense of ownership regarding their land, and has triggered friction with the U.S. Engineer Command. The Land Partnership Plan, 2001, basically a decision to return a sizable amount of privately-owned land to the original owners, was based on the understanding that neither continued free use by USFK of privately-owned land nor compensation by the South Korean Ministry of National Defence (MND) for land use was feasible.

U.S. bases are scattered across Korea, which unnecessarily increases operational costs: In particular, the numerous small camps dispersed in northern Kyonggi Province. Their protection, telecommunications and transportation has become so expensive that since the mid-1990s a plan has been discussed to integrate them into a large-scale hub. This provides the background for the 2001Land Partnership Plan, and also correlates with the plan in the Future of the ROK-U.S. Alliance Policy Initiative to merge USFK bases into a few large camps prior to backward-deploying them.

Another issue: the current location of bases reflect the warfare doctrine set up back in the 1950s, which does not take into consideration the many technological and strategic changes that have transpired during the past 50 years. Yet, it stands to reason that the structure of bases should remain flexible in accordance with emerging threats, development in military technology and changes in base environment. For instance, South Korea and the U.S. would continually reevaluate whether the current stationing structure is in line with its original purpose and addresses other key factors. In the meantime, the design of each base would reflect its strategic and tactical value (location, functionality and scalability), economics (efficiency and cost-saving) and other implications (social, developmental and ecological). However, the opposite has been the case for the USFK bases. They have seldom been redesigned to address strategic, tactical, budgetary, or social needs. In fact, most of the current USFK bases were constructed in the 1950s뼎either during the Korean war or immediately thereafter. The long-range capability to strike and detect the enemy, and the mobility of troops and equipment has significantly improved compared to 50 years ago. Nevertheless, most of the base structures set up in the 1950s have not changed.

When the USFK serves as a Northeast Asian security cooperation force, in addition to current deterrent power against the North, the base installation is likely to experience significant changes. In particular, should troops be relocated to enhance mobility, part of the forces currently in northern Kyonggi will necessarily be transferred close to airbases or seaports in the rear. Furthermore, as the air force has come to play an ever greater role in the initial stages of war, as illustrated in the Gulf War, changes are foreseen in the USFK structure, currently centered on ground forces along the DMZ.

. If overwhelming air superiority is mobilized to paralyze the enemy’s central command to isolate the enemy뭩 armored units through close air support, and finally to intercept enemy supply lines in the rear, the ROK Army뭩 forces can win without USFK ground forces. The US Army can lend assistance through state-of-the-art military maneuverability (i.e., attack helicopters and artillery detection capabilities) while the ROK Army plays a major role in ground battles. Should such a division of roles materialize, it might lead to a reduction of division-level U.S. ground forces in northern Kyonggi and also to a partial relocation to the rear. This scenario is actually reflected in the 2003 plan for the realignment of the USFK troops.

Lastly, despite official denials by the U.S. government that the realignment plan has anything to do with rising anti-U.S. sentiments in the wake of the accidental deaths of two middle-school girls caused by a U.S. armored vehicle, it is likely that complaints related to U.S. bases and growing anti-U.S. resistance play some role. Those issues deal mainly with military training, noise, property damage, accidents and crime. Complaints about noise include aircraft landings/takeoffs, air-to-ground artillery fire, artillery fire, and the sounds of helicopter flight and hovering, and armored vehicles. Property damage reportedly includes loss of crops and livestock and damage to rooftops due to fighter/helicopter contour chasing; vibration and road damage due to tank maneuvers; and accidental bombing and firing. However, the most serious causes of anti-U.S. sentiment among local residents are the all-too-common bodily injuries and loss of life and the crimes committed by U.S. soldiers. A prime example is the case of the two middle-school girls who were crushed by a U.S. armored vehicle in 2002, igniting massive candlelit vigils, and putting a serious strain on the U.S. troops stationed in Korea.

Such damage, both physical and economic, and crimes, coupled with public resentment over the bars and brothels near U.S. bases, have complicated the environment in which U.S. troops are stationed. A failure to harmonize with local communities and continued conflict will negatively impact training efficiency and morale. Thus, wanting to avoid conflict with local communities, the USFK naturally became more serious about its realignment. Presumably, friction with residents might have affected, albeit indirectly, the decision to move 2ID in Dongduchon and Uijongbu to the rear. Therefore, the course in which the realignment proceeds may possibly be affected by how the public responds to the expansion of U.S. bases in some regions.

Though Washington does not accept it publicly, many U.S. citizens took umbrage at large-scale anti-U.S. demonstrations triggered by the two girls?deaths. During a major TV broadcast, the commander of 8th U.S. Army was infuriated over an anti-U.S. mob destroying the star-spangled banner. This, in turn, induced several members on Capitol Hill to threaten a reduction of the USFK. For instance, after the candlelit vigils were aired, opinion leaders including Richard Allen, a former U.S. National Security Council advisor, columnist Robert Novak and Washington Post columnist Fred Hiatt as much as stated that if the Koreans didn’t want the U.S. troops, America should pull out altogether. Even though the current plan to relocate 2ID has nothing to do with anti-Korea resentment on anti-U.S. sentiment, it still suggests that the USFK has not harmonized with residents in northern Kyonggi and that conditions surrounding the bases are deteriorating. In this vein, it is fair to say that complaints about the U.S. military indirectly set off the discussion about revamping the U.S. bases in Korea. (Source: EAST ASIAN REVIEW AUTUMN 2003.)
The “Future of ROK-US Alliance” meetings would be concluded just prior to the ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) scheduled in October 2003. At the SCM, the ROK-US alliance of the future would be laid out. The Pentagon would decide on a major realignment – and perhaps a substantial withdrawal – of forces in South Korea. The third and fourth meeting of the Future of the US-ROK Alliance Initiative gave the distinct appearance of the U.S. “telling” the ROK what would happen. It was hard-nosed negotiations.

The USFK has never waivered on the costs being around $9.5 billion, but the ROK wishfully thinks the relocation costs can be in the $3.2 billion range — and wants to renegotiate the costs. Under the agreements, the South Korean government was held responsible for all relocation costs for the U.S. garrison in central Seoul. However, government officials have argued that no specific means of calculating the moving costs which were stated in the original agreements. The ROK government claimed that the U.S. had unilaterally estimated the cost and they had no way of confirming a final figure ($9.5 billion) calculated by the U.S. This remains open.

Both sides agreed to ask “an outside, independent institute” to draft a master plan to relocate the Yongsan base. This most likely a contractor to handle all the planning, engineering and implementation work — much like the system used to create the Inchon International Airport.

The ROK wanted to renegotiate the entire package, but the U.S. stood firm on an “umbrella agreement” to modify conditions. “The two sides agreed to draw up an umbrella agreement to modify the flaws, and we will ask the Assembly to ratify it before the end of this year.” The umbrella agreement will stipulate the outline of the policy involving the relocation of Yongsan Garrison.

Any new agreements will not override the existing 1990 pacts, which will remain binding. The U.S. negotiators “demanded that the legal structure of the agreements be kept.” The U.S. negotiators wanted to have “an umbrella agreement” that would generally modify the two pacts — without affecting the legal force. On the other hand, the ROK continues to desparately seek ways to renegotiate the costs down — as well as slow down the relocation process. (See Korea Marches to its own Drum.)
Remember that the Oct 2003 SCM where the US simply stated the troops would move across the Han –or out of Korea. At the same meeting, Donald Rumsfield simply said “Enough!!!” The USFK troops were moving out of Yongsan. Then the ROK pleaded to slow the time-table to give it time to take over the missions. (See Korea Marches to its own Drum.)

In June 2003, the two sides held the second meeting of the Future of the ROK-U.S. Alliance Policy Initiative in Seoul to lay down a blueprint for USFK realignment. At the second meeting, Yongsan뭩 relocation became an accomplished fact and a few basic concepts regarding USFK realignment were introduced. According to the joint statement,6) 밿n order to support the early movement of U.S. forces currently located in Yongsan out of Seoul and the overall realignment of U.S. forces in Korea, to include those north of the Han River, both sides agreed that the ROK government would start procuring appropriate land in 2004.?With regards to 2ID realignment which will proceed in two phases: 밬nder the first phase, U.S. forces north of the Han River will consolidate in the Camp Casey and Camp Red Cloud area. In Phase II, U.S. forces north of the Han River would move to the key hubs south of the Han River.?The two sides also agreed to sustain a U.S. military rotational training presence north of the Han even after the completion of Phase II.

Since the agreement was announced, the South Korean defense ministry has argued that, as Phase I alone will take several years and the completion of both phases will require six to seven years, 2ID will not be moving south of the Han River immediately. Thus, the claim that the plan is a preparation for preemptive attack on the North is argued to be groundless. The joint statement also suggested that some of the heavy equipment like tanks, artillery and helicopters might stay in forward areas, since it will allow the ROK U.S. alliance to carry out joint exercises at a training center to be located in northern Kyonggi Province.

At the third meeting, held in Hawaii in July 2003, the two sides agreed to work jointly for Yongsan relocation by the end of 2006, to begin jointly drafting a Master Plan (MP) for Yonsan relocation this year, and to start land acquisition for relocation, facilities design and construction in early 2004.

Analysis of the three joint statements suggests that the relocation of a large part of Yongsan Garrison to the Osan and Pyongtaek regions is certain. In addition, the two sides seem to be reaching a consensus that in Phase I (4 to 5 years), U.S. bases in northern Kyonggi Province will be moved and consolidated at bases in the Dongducheon-Uijongbu area and, in Phase II, be aligned into key hubs south of the Han River like Osan-Pyongtaek on the one hand, and Daegu-Busan on the other. It was also announced that besides the two aforementioned key hubs, Gunsan, a joint training center north of the Han River, some remaining facilities at Yongsan will be added by the time the USFK realignment is completed.

… Besides, though the U.S. military currently frames the realignment of 2ID to south of the Han River as a mid- and longterm undertaking, the joint statement does not stipulate the time planned for the implementation of Phase II. Some interpret this absence of a clear roadmap as a move to be more flexible in putting the agenda at work. By comparison, the specific timeline was clearly announced in the case of Okinawa consolidation in Japan. It seems, although the U.S. publicly denies it, should diplomacy fail and the nuclear threat from North Korea significantly intensify, the U.S. might reduce 2ID forces, close some of its bases and relocate the remainder to south of the Han River quite early in order to allow strategic flexibility for a preemptive military campaign against Pyongyang. (NOTE: Under the current rapproachment plans with the North by the Roh Administration, even the mention of this item results in public outrage and demonstrations from NGO activist groups. Some operational helicopter units have been relocated to Pyongtaek but the USFK claims it is under the “unit of action” reorganization.) Also, the U.S. might go ahead with an early reduction or relocation of the USFK in response to an increase in demand for ground troops or a possible terrorist attack on a large U.S. base in the Middle East surrounding Iraq and Iran. (NOTE: When the ROK dragged its feet on the sending of its 3600 troops to Iraq, the 3600 troops from the 2nd Bde 2d ID were relocated to Iraq in the space of a few months in 2004 — and never returned to the ROK.) At any rate, the U.S. seems to be moving ever closer to securing more lands and constructing a hub in the Osan-Pyongtaek area, and reorganizing its troops into rapid deployment forces for the mid- and long-term. In this vein, some of the heavily armored equipment may stay at a northern-Kyonggi training center to be maintained by a small unit for peacetime operations. (NOTE: The ROK agreed to build a railway from Pyeongtaek to the training area, but this may be cost prohibitive.) It is also expected that while new land will be granted in the Osan and Pyongtaek regions, most of the supplementary facilities in areas like Daegu, Busan, Jinhae and Pohang will remain as is, with the possible exception of Daegu and Busan, where Camp Walker might be consolidated into Camp Carroll and Camp Hialeah closed. (Source: EAST ASIAN REVIEW AUTUMN 2003.)
SOFA and Cost-sharing SMA The ROK populace conveniently forgets that, the ROK paid NOTHING as its share of the ROK defense from 1963 to 1991. The ROK started contributing for the FIRST TIME in 1991 after the SOFA was renegotiated by the ROK insistence to gain control of prosecution US “criminals” — soldiers falling under ROK jurisdiction for prosecution. (NOTE: There was no SOFA prior to 1963 though Japan and Germany (defeated WWII countries) had SOFA agreements before Korea. Polite histories don’t want to mention this fact as the US had “bought and paid for” Korea under President Syngman Rhee — with an economy almost 100 percent dependent on US aid or grants. Even today, one only hears mumbling from the USFK when questioned of this fact. They state that the SOFA was delayed because it hinged upon the SOFA negotiations in Japan — though Japan was a “defeated nation” and Korea was a “freed nation.” In truth, SOFA agreements were a hinderance to the type of operations that were in Korea where the enemy was seen as China — not North Korea. Eisenhower started “forward-positioning” nuclear weapons (Kunsan AB and Osan AB) starting in 1958 and with tactical nuclear artillery in 1960. Korea was nothing more than a buffer zone to protect Japan.)

When the SOFA was renegotiated in 1991, it also meant the entire SOFA was open for renegotiation. The US had maintained for a long time that Korea was no longer a “poor country” though it kept claiming that it was throughout the negotiations. In fact Korea was a G-13 country in 1991and grew to be a G-11 nation by 2004. All the while it has failed to carry what the US felt was its fair share.

The Special Measures Agreement (SMA) dealing with the cost sharing formulas was agreed upon in the SCM (Security Consultative Meetings). The SMA was instituted in 1991 under which South Korea paid $622 million in direct costs to support USFK.

The US position has remained that the ROK has NOT paid its fair share. The ROK has not supported its own military defense spending — and under the “progressive” elements have slashed the military budget. As a G-11 nation, it could afford to increase its share — but instead of supporting its defense funding, it has systematically cut the percentage of GDP from 8 percent under Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo; to 6 percent under Kim Young-sam; to 3 percent under Kim Dae-jung; to 2.7 percent under Roh Moo-hyun. Though the ROK stated it would increase its defense budget to 3.2 percent of the GDP in 2004, it was still far less than other nations with hot spots which stands at 6.7 percent of the GDP. (NOTE: The ROK reneged on its promise to increase spending and budgeted only 2.7 percent of GDP for 2004 — the same as 2003. In 2005, the budget grew to 2.8 percent of GDP (though it had promised 2.9 percent)– but it was still far below the 3.2 percent recommended by the US.)

In 2005, it boasted that it would increase to 2.9 percent, but it was only 2.8 percent. The ROK government’s refusal to authorize a significant 2004 defense spending increase compels the MND to delay further major force development projects. President Moo-Hyun Roh’s announcement that the defense budget will probably not reach 3 percent of GDP during his administration does not augur well for future Mid-Term Defense Plans. Defense budget restrictions will continue to force the MND to continue to neglect short-term readiness to fund long-term force development. While the MND recognizes the importance of interoperability with US forces, it is not an overriding factor in procurement decisions because cost is increasingly a key consideration in major procurement programs. US defense industry must also contend with the Korea’s increased emphasis on developing the Korean defense industry base. (Source: GlobalSecurity.org.)

To achieve the five-year plan to enhance cooperative self-reliant defense capability by 2008, the Ministry of Defense will secure a total of 99.4 trillion won ($94 billion). On 30 Mar 2005, the Defense Minister noted his intention to increase the defense budget to 3.2% of the total gross domestic product by 2008 from the current 2.8%, a 12.5% increase in relative terms even before economic growth is factored in. The ministry requested 23.3 trillion won for its 2006 budget, up 12% from 2005. This was an “eyewash” move. The National Assembly slashed the spending to 2.8 percent of GDP — effectively shelving the procurement of new weapons systems and forcing a “reprioritization” of programs already on the books.

Under the “self-reliant defense” scheme of Roh Moo-hyun, the ROK will have to spend over $692 BILLION over the next ten years — a sum it simply cannot afford. Roh is throwing out pipe-dreams with grandiose promises — but the reality is that the ROK will not be able to pay for this as the tax base will shrink because the birth-ratio is dropping. The ROK faces major problems as a society that is NON-VIABLE and even now has announced plans to reduce the size of its military by 500,000 simply because by 2010 there will not be enough men to fill the slots.

The response of the NGO activists has been that the US was in Korea for its own purposes geopolitical reasons and therefore there was no need for Korea to pay for the Americans — a logic that pervades any Korean discussion on the SOFA and cost-sharing. However, remember that when the Nunn-Warner Initiative was to cut in in 1990 with an initial 25 percent reduction in the USFK, the Korean government pleaded for the US forces to remain. When the US announced that it would pull off the DMZ, the ROK fought it tooth-and-nail as they were losing their “tripwire” that ensured the US would enter the fray if North Korea attacked.

In trying to lure the ROK into shouldering its share, the USFK announced that it was “investing” $11 billion in ROK defense in 2004. However, this was really a trick with mirrors put out for PR purposes. The much vaunted $11 billion dollar “investment in the ROK defense” was simply upgrades to the USFK equipment — Apache Longbows radar and Hellfire missile upgrades, MA-1A Abrams computerized upgrades, new ATACMs munitions with mountain piercing capabilities, increased Command and Control capabilities to allow battlefield commanders real-time intel, etc. Then the USFK changed its structures to the “unit of action” which combined like units giving them greater flexibility as well as improving their ability to react as self-contained units. Some of the enhancements were actually directed at deploying surveillance and attack UAVs and new precision-guided bombs. Because these could have provoked Pyongyang since they were aimed at strengthening the capability to strike the North뭩 military facilities, they were “hidden” under the “investment in ROK defense” scheme.

In 2004, the US pushed the issue with the contentious C4I upgrade of the ROK computer communication systems. The ROK maintained that the US should pay for the upgrades, while the US stated that no-such agreement was ever made. In the end, the matter was dropped with the ROK having no upgrades and unable to interface with the US real-time intelligence. It maintained the manual interface at the command post level with its forces.

The ROK openly refused to increase its share in 2004. The US at that point ceased to press the matter of cost-sharing — instead preferring to go its own way and allowing the ROK to go on its own. However, the US simply stated that because the ROK would not increase its share, it was sorry but 1000 Korean jobs were going to be cut — in addition to the jobs that were being lost due to the relocation south. The ROK simply shut up and no more has been said — at least officially. The US started to play hard ball.

(SITE NOTE: We have been stating all along that the Roh administration would not be an active supporter of this move — providing lip service, but not much else. In Dec 2005, the land was supposed to have been all procured, but the ROK announced that 80 percent of the lands was procured, but it needed to go to the courts to “expropriate” (condemn) the remaining 20 percent of the lands for the expansion. The farmers who were the owners of the land “celebrated” their 500th day of continuous protests in Jan 2006 — the land that could have been “expropriated” long ago. The results are still out as of Feb 2006 — but the Roh administration track record does not lead us to trust it much. However, the ROK has announced very attractive plans of a “business city” near Songtan and major expansion projects. It all sounds fantastic, but so does the rest of the promises that Roh has made. However, we still wonder when will the land be officially transferred so the perimeters of Camp Humphreys can be expanded? Then on 9 Jan 2006, the USFK attempted to change plans to fill an area near the river at Camp Humphreys for flood prevention that would increase the costs by $500 million. The ROK openly refused and said it would appoint its own panel to “study” the matter. (See Site alterations for American military base vex the allies (Jan 2006)).) We distinctly hear the sounds of feet dragging. We also have not heard how the relocation budget amount agreed to by the National Assembly — which does not match the USFK estimates — will be reconciled. This is still in “negotiations.” The foot-dragging becomes louder.)
But the Defense Ministry refuted the reports that the ROK “share” is settled, saying related negotiations are still underway. “It is wrong that South Korea will cover the expenditure for the BTL program,뮃 Col. Kang Yong-hee at the ministry뭩 public affairs office said. “I believe the cost will be covered by the U.S., or it will at least be shared.뮃 (Source: Korea Times.)

Move to South of Han Impacts ROK Jobs The consolidating of small bases in northern Kyonggi to Camp Casey and Camp Red Cloud and relocating them again to south of the Han River in a matter of a few years was considered a redundant investment and thus, unfeasible. Camp Casey and Camp Red Cloud were already saturated, and could not accommodate additional engineering facilities and equipment originally used throughout the Paju and Munsan areas. Given the bilateral agreement that some bases would not be consolidated into Camp Casey and Camp Red Cloud, but relocated south of the Han River, it was possible that only a portion of 2ID would move to key Kyonggi hubs like Camp Casey while a majority of the bases will move to Pyongtaek early on. Some civilians and Korean employees would, in fact, have to face job loss due to redundancy. (Source: EAST ASIAN REVIEW AUTUMN 2003.)

The USFK attempted to offer job openings at other USFK bases to personnel losing their jobs, but it was not sufficient. Then the ROK stated that it would not pay what the USFK considered its “share” and the USFK announced that it was cutting 1000 jobs. The Korean Union threatened to strike, but word has it that any illegal strike would result in the strikers in an illegal strike being the first ones considered for termination. The ROK government did not support the strike and all talk of strikes ceased.

Many USFK units were moved directly out of the ROK or deactivated due to the reshaping of the USFK into “units of action” which were smaller and more mobile. Most of the engineering battalions were moved to Camp Casey and Camp Red Cloud and then the functions were transferred to ROK units. Another move was to relocate administrative units to Camp Stanley and rotate operational units to Camp Humphreys. Consolidations, relocations and reductions of units were taking place simultaneously.

The ROK contends the reduced numbers and functions mean their share should be reduced. As such the ROK has continued to drag out negotiations — much to the frustration of the USFK.

ROK Refusal to Pay its “Share” Impacts on Interoperability within CFC South Korea has given financial support to the USFK since 1991 — for the first time when it demanded changes in criminal jurisdiction under the SOFA and as a trade off was “forced” to start increasing its “share” of its defense cost. It contributed about $150 million. In cost-sharing talks in Seoul last March, the two sides agreed on the amount of Seoul’s share for 2005 and 2006 that is less than the $622 million South Korea paid in 2004. (Source: Korea Times.) In the end, the US agreed to reduce the ROK share by about $60 million, but it was still not finalized as of 17 Mar 2005.

The SMA was renegotiated with the view that the Global Positioning Strategy would impact the USFK forces which must trained to the same levels as other US forces — and possess the same equipment as their counterparts. Unfortunately because it is a Combined Force Command (CFC), the ROK and US forces must interface — which is the reason for the Foal Eagle portion of the RSOI/FE05. As such this is a large problem.

As mentioned previously, the upgrades are already impacting the “interoperability” of the taskings. For example the ROK KMA-1A tank does not possess the “real-time” battle-field displays that the US MA-1A possess making the tactics both use dissimilar. Whereas the US battlefield commander can direct fire, the ROK units must rely on information that must go up the chain for decision-making and down the chain for implementation. (SITE NOTE: Regardless, even without the computerized systems, the MA-1A is only outclassed by the German Leopard tanks meaning that the antiquated North Korean armour would be chopped to ribbons.) Another is the return artillery fire mission tasking recently returned to the ROK that requires coordinates of the artillery trajectories from the USFK Paladins that are attached to the ROK. In January 2002, South Korea announced procurement of the 300km-range Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) from the US for 110 ATACMS by 2004. The ROK added another ATACMS Brigade in 2005. However, the ROK ATACMS units do not possess the new earth-piercing munitions the US ATACMS units possess — and also required digital mapping data from the US to target their weapons. The long-awaited surveillance satellite (Arirang 2) development was accelerated and was scheduled for launch in July from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome, about 200-kilometers northeast of Moscow.

Also understand that there is a matter of “trust” between the ROK and the US. In November 1999 it was reported that spy-satellite photos had revealed that South Korea had built a rocket motor test station in 1998 without notifying the United States. The station, which includes a large concrete or tempered steel cradle in which rocket motors are locked for firing tests, appeared to have been built secretly as part of a larger South Korean ballistic missile program. South Korean officials said privately that Seoul had acquired technology for a longer-range missile from European countries and is developing its ”next-generation” missile. The ROK Defense Ministry requested the ATACMS Block 1A missiles in December 1999, but negotiations the US continued to delay talks on allowing South Korea to deploy missiles with a range of up to 300km. On 17 January 2001 the South Korean government announced it would develop and deploy missiles with a range of up to 187 miles and a payload of up to 1,100 pounds. On 04 December 2001 Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control announced that it had received an $80.7 million contract to produce 111 Army Tactical Missile System (Army TACMS) Block IA missiles for the Republic of Korea. The Foreign Military Sales (FMS) contract included 110 Army TACMS FMS Block IAs and one ATACMS FMS Block IA for testing, and 29 multiple rocket launchers. The contract with South Korea had a total value of 400 billion won ($307 million). South Korea began deploying US-made missiles in December 2003 that can strike most of North Korea. The Army Tactical Missile System Block 1A missiles are being deployed near the Demilitarized Zone. South Korea deployed 110 surface-to-surface missiles with a range of up to 300 km (187 miles) by April 2004. This marks the first time that South Korea will deploy 300-km medium-range missiles, which are capable of striking Pyongyang and other key North Korean cities. (Source: GlobalSecurity.org.)
For years we have been claiming that the ROK has NOT assumed its fair share — and in reality has been reducing the military expenditures as a percentage of the GDP from Kim Young-sam to present. The ROK under Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun have loved to play with deceptively high numbers for PROPOSED military defense funding and then slashing the military budget in the National Assembly until the REAL budget actually entails decreases in funding.

(SITE NOTE: We suspect that a partial reason that the US is willing to allow the CFC to lapse in recent months is the gap of the “interoperability” factor is broadening. The statement of Donald Rumsfield that the turnover of war-time control would be “appropriately accelerated” was a shift that said, we are willing to allow the ROK take control — when it has the capability. There was a side snicker that the ROK may not be capable for sometime because it had underfunded its military for so long that it will be hard to catch up.

The ROK remains a manpower-intensive military, while the USFK is now organized under the “unit of action” concept that is completely different from the ROK. In 2005, the ROK during RSOI-FE05 used the Army’s high-speed ships to transport their troops for a practiced landing. The US Army has now switched to real-time battlefield control, while the ROK has remained locked into reliance on the US intel for decision-making. With its high-tech weaponry, the USFK now uses different tactics to engage the enemy. For example, during RSOI-FE05 the Stryker units were used to demonstrate the increased speed in which the USFK forces could react. The ROK still uses the tracked APBs for personnel transport which are much slower in reaction time in urban situations. However, the shift in strategies is not only in the defensive role. The current USFK strategy to “take the fight North” — and WIN — is based on the belief in the USFK’s over-whelming high-tech advantage over the North Korean forces with its outdated weaponry and fixed positions. (NOTE: The combating of the North’s special forces which would invade the South is not outlined under the Oplans except as base protection. The ROK infrastructure will be the target and USFK has no control over these areas.)

It should be noted that the Japanese Self-Defense Force underwent a reorganization in 2005 that broadly matches the US force structure. At the same time, the JSDF has increased cooperative training funding by 300 percent. Australia and New Zealand are currently undergoing force-structure changes that will reflect the “unit of action” concept as well based on their nations’ military objectives. The ROK military is being left behind with its blinders on and focused on its rapproachment with the North.)
Relocation Costs In 1990, a MOU was signed to move the Yongsan Garrison, but the ROK would not come up with the $9.5 billion it required to relocate the USFK headquarters. In addition, cities refused such as Pyongtaek refused to have the new USFK headquarters located in their cities. It was a stalemate and everything returned to a status-quo. However, the anti-American demonstrations in 2002 culminating in the knife attack on an Army Officer at Yongsan led to a backlash that added ammunition to moving the troops out of harms way — not from the North Koreans, but from the South Koreans. In February 2003, it started with whispers to fact to actual discussions to set up the framework for the April review that will discuss a large area from relocations, time-tables and cost-sharing.

The major worry in 2003 was the costs of relocation as well as additional costs to the defense budget once the USFK is pulled back and the ROK must fill the void. The worst case scenario would entail the US leaving Korea entirely and the Korean defense budget would have to increase by $20 billion to maintain the same level of defense — and still relying heavily on the US promise that it will come to its defense if attacked. (SITE NOTE: The Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953 requires the U.S. Congress approval to enter the fray unlike other automatic mutual defense treaties as in Europe.)

On 28 Feb 2003, the new Defense Minister Cho Young-kil warned against any drastic change in the military alliance between South Korea and the United States. Cho said, “I don’t think we have any factors which will change the Korea-U.S. alliance.” The defense minister said the issue of U.S. troop withdrawal or any other reorganization of U.S. forces here should be dealt with in a cautious manner from the national strategic standpoint. Now that the wheels were in motion, the MND was seeking to slow its course.

In March 2003, Donald Rumsfield smacked the MND between the eyes and stated that the USFK was relocating south of the Han. Korea immediately attempted to deny reports initially. The matter was brought up at the first ROK-US Alliance Policy meeting in April but the ROK refused to talk about relocations. A second meeting was scheduled in May, but was later shelved as the matter was elevated to the May 15 ROK-US summit. After the summit, the ROK issued a statement accepting the movement of the 2d ID off of the DMZ as part of the U.S. global repositioning of forces.

The handwriting was on the wall as the U.S. was pulling out of Saudi Arabia and its longtime ally, Turkey. Germany was scheduled for reductions and there was movement in Japan to rewrite its “peace constitution” as the U.S. talked of reducing forces in Okinawa to other bases in the Pacific. The MND took the position that the USFK could not move without “close coordination with the ROK.” It appeared that the ROK strategy was going to be to stall the process of movement ot Osan/Pyongtaek and Taegu/Pusan by waffling on providing the land — though the ROK had been forced to sign off on providing the land in April because the U.S. Congress had to commit funds for the relocation.

When it looked like the ROK would be reluctant to release the large land are in Pohang as promised under the LPP plan of 2001, the U.S. “proposed” a plan to station a heavy brigade’s equipment off the coast in three to four transport ships. Later there were also reports that the ships would be positioned off the coast of Vietnam. (SITE NOTE: The ships are now position off the coast of Saipan along with a fleet of floating warehouse ships. This concept was implemented with one set of ships to support Europe and one to support Asia. The Army and Navy support their own ships to meet their separate needs for the Army and Marines.)

In a panic, President Roh asked the MND to prepare a plan on how the ROK could become self-sufficient in its defense. The report that was completed in May 2003 was not what Roh wanted to hear. It stated what we had been saying all along that the ROK would need an additional $20 billion annually to make up for the short-falls that the U.S. brings to the defense of Korea. The hardware improvements would be a staggering cost. In addition, there was no way that Korea could be self-reliant in the intelligence arena. Operating from this weak position, the ROK-US summit in May 2003 addressed the U.S. relocations and the U.S. was playing hardball. Roh returned to Korea singing the praises of a U.S. alliance — much to the dismay of his supporters. They claimed he had practiced “diplomacy of humiliation.” Roh responded that he was only being a pragmatist.

Then at the end of May 2003, the USFK-MND signed off on agreements to the SOFA dealing with cleaning up the bases before the land was returned to the ROK. (SITE NOTE: We were concerned in 2003 that this agreement would lead to being trapped into U.S. “Superfund” type commitments as the bases were occupied long before the current standards were adopted. The truth is that it is uncertain where pollution comes from as the ROK companies are also notorious for dumping toxic waste into streams or burying them in the green belt areas. Under the original SOFA, the USFK would return the lands to the ROK “as is.” In other words, the USFK had an “out” for returning the lands, but signed it away.) (See Squabble Over US Base Contamination> for details of conflict in 2006.)

(SITE NOTE: The bottomline is that the root causes of the anti-Americanism seen in 2002 are still here in 2006. The two sides are miles apart — the U.S. arrogantly maintains in its unilateral stance in foreign policy and the ROK stubbornly maintains that its belief that rapproachment is the only way to bring about peace on the peninsula. The two nations’ beliefs are opposed and the anti-American wound still festers. The nationalistic fever in South Korea makes things worse. All the catchwords in the world will not make this problem go away. One of the sides must give. Currently the U.S. has taken the initiative and simply stated we are relocating and reducing our forces as part of our global strategic plans. If the ROK protests, it will get a boot in its teeth. The ROK has no bargaining strength. After three years under Roh Moo-hyun, the alliance teeters on the brink of collapse. (See US and ROK Military Alliance in Big Trouble for details.)
The future of the US-ROK military alliance was to be finalized in September 2003, but there was no agreement. After the SCM of Oct 2003, the discussions continued under the Security Policy Initiative (SPI) which was to continue the process at a working group level. At that time, we were certain that there was a basic change in the U.S. approach to Korea negotiations. Differences had been papered over and both sides talked about “alliance” and “close coordination,” but we also saw that the U.S. was TELLING the ROK what it was intending to do.

The Roh administration had not learned that the U.S. does NOT engage in military partnerships well. It prefers a big brother relationship — or no relationship at all. NATO was a big brother relationship, but now that the NATO forces are in discord in their support of the U.S. over the Iraq War and the U.S. is seeking ways to limit its role in the organization — though it continues to mouthe the political correct words to the contrary.)
ROK STILL In Denial over Relocation Costs The following is from the Chosun Ilbo on 9 Mar 2006. The newspaper claimed that Adm Fallon, CINC of US Pacific Comand came up with a different estimate of the cost to Seoul of relocating the USFK. Actually it is not quite true in that the ROK is that one in denial over the cost of the relocation which it continues to claim is too high. (NOTE: Remember that in 1990, a MOU was signed to move the Yongsan Garrison, but the ROK would not come up with the $9.5 billion it required to relocate the USFK headquarters — and this was for the Yongsan relocation only. The ROK reneged on the relocation plan and the situation returned to the “status quo.” The reduction in relocation costs to $6.8 billion by Fallon now includes BOTH Yongsan and the 2d ID off the DMZ.)

On Tuesday, Adm. William Fallon, head of U.S. Pacific Command, reported to the House Appropriation Committee that South Korea promised to shoulder some US$6.8 billion (W6.664 trillion) of the total cost required to relocate the USFK. But Seoul has said it will cost $5-5.5 billion including moving the Yongsan base and the Second Infantry Division, $1.3-1.8 billion less than Fallon뭩 estimate.

The Defense Ministry on Thursday said Fallon뭩 numbers came about by adding Korea뭩 share for USFK upkeep to the W5-5.5 billion for relocation of the Yongsan garrison and a Land Partnership Plan, which is 뱒imply an estimate made by the U.S. on its own.?

The figure suggested by Adm. Fallon is already $1.2 billion less than the $8 billion cited by former USFK commander Gen. Leon LaPorte before the committee last March. At the time, LaPorte said the $8 billion included $1.6 billion for investment in build-transfer-lease (build-to-lease) projects, $1.68 billion for South Korea뭩 share in troop upkeep and $480 million for USFK facilities.

Adding the $1.6 billion for BTL projects, as LaPorte suggested, to the $6.8 billion quoted by Fallon comes to $8.4 billion, suggesting Fallon subtracted the BTL projects.

The Defense Ministry says different estimates are likely depending what items are included in the total USFK relocation budget. It promises the exact estimate will be available when the master plan for moving the Yongsan base is complete within the first half of this year. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)
On March 7 (local time), United States Armed Forces Commander in Korea Burwell B. Bell said, 밯hether Korea is willing to share defense costs is a sign showing that it needs the continuous stationing of U.S. forces and that it respects U.S. troops,?and strongly suggested that the U.S. will request the Korean government to bear additional costs for the stationing of U.S. troops there in the future. At a hearing of the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, Bell stressed the above and stated, 밙orea and the U.S. should create a cost-sharing framework that accurately reflects the conditions between the two countries?alliance partnership and properly supports the U.S. Forces in Korea (USFK).?(Source: Donga Ilbo.)

At that during the same testimony Gen. Bell testified that the United Nations Command, meaning control over the UN forces that nominally remain engaged in the Korean War, will be developed into a “standing multi-national alliance.” Korea, by contrast, had been under the impression that the UNC would be either scrapped or seriously curtailed once the armistice that still officially prevails on the peninsula is being replaced with a peace treaty. MND Minister Yoon denied that this had ever been discussed and claimed it was Gen Bell’s “personal idea.” (SITE NOTE: The ROK does not seem to understand that if the ROK gains its “wartime control” there will NOT be a CFC. The US — a superpower — will NEVER be subservient. Bell stated, “Korea’s demand for wartime operational command means that U.S. troops should play a new supporting role and in that case, the U.S.’s supporting role would revolve around naval and air forces.” In this testimony, the US has come out and stated that it will be in a “supporting role.” In 2005, Donald Rumsfield stated that the US would no longer be the “patron” of the ROK and the ROK needed to contribute to its own defense. At that time, he also promised to “appropriately accelerate” the process. It is being accelerated now — as the USFJ Restructuring and Reorganization Agreement is about to be signed in April 2006. Once in place, the CFC most likely will be disbanded with the position reverting to Camp Zama. As far as a UN role, as long as no peace treaty is signed, it will remain as a minor ceremonial function. We do not believe the USFK and PACCOM commanders are talking about the Japan-US alliance to contain China. The ROK has already been isolated — and with its rapproachment stance, it could not become a part of it. Bell noted, 밫he U.S. government is working to transform the UNC into a multinational coalition by increasing the UNC staff of the countries participating in it, establishing an operational strategy, and attending the training.)

Fallon also expressed hope for 밶 substantial increase in tripartite military cooperation among the U.S., Japan and South Korea” after citing changes in the security environment including China’s military modernization. That could be another headache for Seoul, which has made it clear it will not join the U.S. and Japan in encircling China. (SITE NOTE: The US already knows that this will not happen, but it is throwing it out as a morsel to say that the ROK is the one who refuses to join with the US and Japan. In fact, the ROK has sided with North Korea while the Japanese sided with the US. The Missile Defense line has been drawn and the ROK is on the side with North Korea. Things are starting to turn against the ROK…as their supporters in the US Congress is also slipping away. The ROK in its actions to support the North has also lost most of its support in the US public who now view North Korea as one of the biggest threats to world peace…and by extension, the ROK is aiding the North.)
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US-ROK Alliance Meetings refines “Strategic Flexibility” (Feb 2006) On 9 Feb 2006 it was announced that Seoul and Washington had prepared a draft set of principles for their alliance that will be further refined at the Security Policy Initiative (SPI) meeting in mid-Feb in Guam. A military source in Washington said that the document, when agreed to by the two nations, would be a governing document for the alliance and address the overall direction of military cooperation issues. The paper would also include scenarios of possible developments on the peninsula and how the two countries would address them – scenarios such as a peace treaty on the peninsula or the status of U.S. forces in a unified Korea. A recent agreement between Washington and Seoul on “strategic flexibility” for U.S. forces here led to an unexpectedly quick agreement on the first draft of the document, the military source said.

(SITE NOTE: The document may be fine in draft — but the agreement may not be so easy. The Roh administration policies still are against the Oplan 5029. The scenario for peace has always been that the US would remain in the ROK until such time as stability on both sides of the border is realized. The scenario called for a ten-year period when first laid out under Kim Dae-jung — as both sides “assimilate. However, the reality is that the North is so far behind economically, educationally and socially that it will not be easy to do — even in a decade.)
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Sixth Round of Security Policy Initiative (Feb 2006) High-level defense officials from Korea and the United States met on 14 Feb to discuss pending issues between the allies for two days on Guam. In the sixth round of Security Policy Initiative meetings, Korean Assistant Defense Minister for Policy Ahn Kwang-chan and U.S. Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless discussed the transfer of wartime operational control of Korean armed forces to Korea from the United States, the consolidated relocation of U.S. bases in South Korea to Pyeongaek and Osan and the U.S. handover of 10 major security missions to Korea.

The two countries began, through an assigned task force, exploring the various factors involved in Korea taking fulltime command of its military as part of efforts to facilitate discussions on the transfer of wartime command. This was agreed in the fifth round of SPI meetings held last December, following an announcement to “appropriately accelerate” the matter made by the defense ministers of both countries in the Oct 2005 Security Consultative Meeting (SCM).

During the first-day session of the talks, the allies reviewed the progress of their negotiations to reshape the 50-plus-year-old military alliance. Since 2003, Seoul and Washington have explored how Seoul can take greater responsibility for its national defense and Washington gain more flexibility in operating its forces on the Korean Peninsula. The Seoul government aims to establish a roadmap for the command transfer by the end of this year — an impossible task. Regarding the issue, however, the Washington government sees South Korea뭩 warfare capability as a prerequisite for the command transfer to go ahead.

During the two-day meeting, the allies operated a joint panel to study what additional defense missions South Korea can take over from the U.S. military in the near future. In line with a 2003 agreement, the USFK has handed over responsibility for six of the ten major security tasks intended to be complete by 2006. (Source: Korea Herald.)

The SPI Meeting agreed to hold a fresh round of military talks in late March to review the progress of their program to shape a new alliance. In their seventh round of the SPI to be held in Jeju Island, the two sides was to again focus on hammering out changes to their military alliance, including Seoul’s demand for a greater role in military operations. South Korea is to field a new representative for the forum as President Roh Moo-hyun appointed Ahn Kwang-chan, assistant defense minister for policy, as chairman of the Emergency Planning Commission on 15 Feb. U.S. Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless leads the delegation. Agenda items at the SPI include South Korea’s wish to regain full operational control of its own troops from the U.S. military, the realignment of American forces here and ways to strengthen the two sides’ combined deterrent effect against foreign aggression.
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USFK to Set Up Brigade in Charge of Reinforcements (Feb 2006) The Chosun Ilbo reported on 14 Feb 2006 a Stars and Stripes article.

The U.S. Forces Korea is to set up a brigade that will receive troops and military equipment dispatched from elsewhere in an emergency and move them efficiently to the frontlines. It will be the first brigade charged specifically with that task.

The Stars and Stripes military paper said Monday the 501st Sustainment Brigade, as it will be known, will take charge of base reception and dispatch, transport to frontlines and coordinating efforts, to assist forces dispatched to Korea from the U.S. and elsewhere. The plan aims to boost the effectiveness of reinforcements.

In other changes, the 3,000-man brigades forming the core of the USFK will be reorganized from two to three units each to between five and seven under plans to ensure greater mobility and flexibility of troops. The USFK already transformed a division into what is now known as a Unit of Employment X and a brigade into a Unit of Action last year. The paper quoted Col. Richard Parker, the officer in charge of changes in the U.S. Eighth Army stationed here, as saying the Army wants the brigades to be mobile, self-contained units that can deploy quickly anywhere in the world, with the aim of amassing a fighting force within 30 days.

Cumbersome personnel offices in South Korea will be shut and replaced by each unit뭩 own human-resources office, known as the S-1 office, which would refer only the big decisions to two remaining personnel offices worldwide, the daily added. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)
The Stars and Stripes article, “Transformation in South Korea making 몀ore capable?units” appearing on 14 Feb 2006. It stated,

When the U.S. Army is finished transforming in South Korea, the differences will go far beyond smaller troop numbers and larger bases in the central part of the country, according to the 8th U.S. Army뭩 top officer for force management and future operations.

The changes ?part of both the Pentagon-wide plans and agreements between America and South Korea ?will create more stability for military families, will cut down on deployed human-resources staff, and will create more unit cohesion, according to Col. Richard Parker, the officer in charge of implementing the changes for 8th Army.

In South Korea, plans already have caused historic changes. More than a dozen bases have closed, the 2nd Infantry Division has restructured and a new Army aviation brigade was created. Stand-alone personnel units, like the 175th Finance Command at Yongsan Garrison, are being dismantled or meshed into other, larger commands. But more changes are on the way, Parker said during a talk Thursday night to a group of 8th Army officers. The linchpin of transformation is the Army뭩 focus on brigades, units that typically contain around 3,000 soldiers, rather than the larger divisions, which hold at least two brigades.

밒n each case, we뭨e creating smaller but more capable and lethal organizations,?Parker said. The Army wants these brigades to be mobile, self-contained units that can deploy quickly anywhere in the world, Parker said. The goal, he added, is to be able to amass a fighting Army within 30 days.

Ultimately, brigade soldiers will train together, deploy together, and return to the same American military base together, he said. The idea is to keep units together longer while giving soldiers?families the ability to live in the same area for years at a time.

The brigades will consist of five to seven battalions to provide the firepower, maintenance, equipment, manpower and policing needed to engage in a battle, Parker told officers in an educational briefing. Traditionally, an Army brigade has held two to three battalions.

For South Korea, a key change will come this summer with the creation of the 501st Sustainment Brigade, Parker said. The brigade will be the first operational unit of its kind in the Army and will be responsible for one of the major missions here: reception, staging, onward movement and integration.

Other changes involve how the Army runs its personnel offices worldwide, Parker said. Eventually, there will be no personnel offices in South Korea other than each unit뭩 individual human-resources office, usually known as the S-1 office. Decisions like assignments and questions about pay will be directed to two human-resources offices worldwide, he said.

The way the Army conducts troop rotations will also affect soldiers assigned to South Korea. Soldiers attached to stateside-based brigade combat teams will rotate to South Korea together on a one-year, unaccompanied tour. Other support staff will come to South Korea on accompanied tours for as long as three years, much like in Germany.

The drawdown of troops here will continue through 2008, the planned end date for the changes agreed to by the U.S. and Korean governments.

The Army here has shrunk by about 8,000 soldiers already; another 3,500 will go by 2008 under the current plan. USFK뭩 overall plan is to reduce servicemembers here down to 25,000. (Source: Stars and Stripes.)

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7th Mission Transferred to ROK (Feb 2006) With years of training and planning but few public announcements, South Korean military forces have been taking over key missions from the U.S. military in the past year. In January, another mission was transferred from U.S. to South Korean control, the seventh of 10 transfers to take place under a 2003 agreement between both nations.

As of mid-January, South Koreans now are in charge of the maritime response to any invasion by North Korean special operations forces should war break out. The move marks South Korea뭩 goal of evolving from a ground-based military to a stronger multi-branch force. (SITE NOTE: This move included the responsibility for radar surveillance of the coast line. At the same time, the ROK announced it was developing a new maritime radar of its own design. The truth is that the ROK gave up attempting to stop infiltrations by the North back in 1992. The sub landings along the coast continues unabated, but the ROK cannot stop them. The discovery of a minisub grounded along the shoreline in the past — reported by a taxi driver — illustrates that it simply cannot protect its shoreline. In 2005, the US reported a sighting of a North Korean sub off the ROK coastline using its thermal detection technology of its satellites, but the ROK even with this information could not capture the sub. Later the sub was sighted outside the territorial waters.)

One of the more public transfers happened in the fall of 2004 at the Demilitarized Zone, the border that separates North and South Korea. On Oct. 31, 2004, the South Koreans took control of patrolling the Joint Security Area, the compound where talks between the two Koreas occur and where millions of tourists on both sides visit each year.

But some of the more strategic changes include South Korea뭩 ability to protect supply routes in wartime and to counter and destroy North Korea뭩 underground missile system, which can hit Seoul repeatedly while barely revealing its weapons. Improved technology for the South Koreans helped with this 밹ounter-fire?transfer. (SITE NOTE: The ROK has added another ATACMS brigade, but it still has retained the USFK ATACMS and Paladin units on the DMZ. Certification occurred in 2005. Digital Mapping info was transferred to the ROK indicating locations of North Korea’s artillery for use in an “emergency” in Jan 2006. It was the first time the ROK had updated their data base since 1993. The ROK is developing their own satellite surveillance systems with the Arirang 2 spy satellite to be launched in cooperation with Russia. Arirang 2 was scheduled for launch in July from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome, about 200-kilometers northeast of Moscow. A portion of the Muguhwa 5 satellite launch in Feb contained some spy surveillance equipment as well.)

Three mission transfers remain: weather forecasting, close-air-support controllers and day/night search and rescues. Those should be completed by early 2007. Already, U.S. and South Korean sides are making suggestions for the next round of transfers. That likely will be outlined at Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld뭩 next meeting with Korean Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-ung. The next set might require longer timelines in order to get appropriate equipment in place for the South Koreans. (SITE NOTE: The big problem is that Roh’s “self-reliant defense” requires upgrades that the ROK cannot afford. The upgrade programs will cost $692 billion and the ROK does NOT have the revenues to support this — and social welfare, administrative city relocation and support of North Korea programs. At the same time, the Japanese change to Article 9 of the Peace Constitution and restructuring of the USFJ may impact directly on some of these programs. The USFK is structured for “strategic flexibility” and the ROK continues to oppose the concept — though it now states that it “understands” the US position.) (Source: Stars and Stripes.)

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March 2006
USFK Mulls Over Eliminating CFC The US military is studying command options to replace the current Korea-U.S. Combined Forces while the two countries discuss Korea assuming wartime control of its forces from the US. Supposedly the Joint Chiefs of Staff have begun exploring how South Korea’s forces may be realigned after any future transfer of wartime command. The current CFC system would not be compatible if South Korea regains wartime operational control of its forces. This is the reason we are considering a new system.

Korea aims to release a roadmap outlining the wartime transfer by the end of this year although it admits the process may need more time to fall into line with a U.S. prerequisite that Korea should have full wartime capability before the transfer is made. “We are planning to draw up a roadmap for the project by June,” the source said. The blueprint will be presented to the annual defense ministers’ talks, the Security Consultative Meeting slated for October. “But it would be hard to set a date for establishing a new body during the annual meeting because it is directly related to the issue of wartime operational control,” the source said. (Source: Korea Herald.)

(SITE NOTE: AT LAST!!! We have been preaching that the US has been considering this possibility for the past two years. Pat Halloran reported on this in 2004 and the DOD and USFK jumped up and down and denied this. The big news is that the US is finally admitting that it is being considered — where as it was a verbotten topic.

However, in 2005, elements of I Corps from Washington were quietly relocated to Camp Zama, Japan as the potential home of the Theater Commander with the USFK position downgraded to a two-star position with a three-star at Camp Zama and the four-star at Camp Smith. Currently the realignment of forces in Japan which is due to be signed in March 2006 is headed that way. But if the CFC is eliminated, there really is no need to station troops in a fixed position in Korea. The bottomline is the ROK insistence on war time control of its troops — as well as forces on its soil. The US will NEVER relinquish the control of its forces to the ROK in time of war. The US position is now changing to have the ROK as no longer a “partner” — but as the lead element with the US as a “supporter” of the ROK defense. Donald Rumsfield has stated bluntly that the US will no longer be a “patron” of the ROK. Thus far 7 missions have been assumed by the ROK — with the other three slated for completion by 2007. After that there are other missions that the USFK wants to turn over but they may take time as the ROK simply does not have the weaponry to assume these roles. But also remember that when the CFC goes — the next “hat” to go is the UN Command of which the USFK commander is the head. This is a political bombshell as the ROK becomes all alone if the North attacks — having to wait for US support to arrive and praying that the UN will send troops — which is not likely without a long and drawn-out debate.)

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OPlan 5029 Nears Agreement??? In early 2005, the NGO groups resurfaced the row over Oplan 5027 (with its many scenarios of the North invading South Korea) and Oplan 5029 (the Collapse of North Korea) — two scenarios where the crux being “taking the fight North.” Roh’s unrealistic objections dealt with his perception that the existence of the Oplans threatened the rapproachment efforts of the South.

In Jun 2005, the ROK and U.S. hit an impasse on contingency plans in North Korea. Military authorities of the two countries had been working on the ill-fated OPLAN 5029, which was to respond to a specific set of sudden changes in North Korea, when Seoul pulled the plug. The two powers finally “agreed to disagree” on the issue — without either side conceding anything. Roh objected to the already approved Oplan 5029 that carried the provisions for “carrying the fight north” in the current war-fighting plans for the USFK and CFC. The Korean and U.S. defense ministers agreed to supplement the “Concept of Operations Plan (CONPLAN) 5029″ plan for a joint response to sudden changes in North Korea, but not to put the plan into “operation plan (OPLAN)” format. While the concept of operations plan contains plans for responding to sudden changes in North Korea and rough blueprints of military forces needed, the operational plan contains specific military force deployment programs like the formation of operational units.

The OPlan 5029 is now being downplayed by the ROK — but to the USFK, it is the crux of “taking the fight north.” Regardless of Roh’s opinions, portions of Oplan 5029 will be exercised in 25-31 Mar 2006 in Foal Eagle and Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI) exercises (RSOI-FE-06).)

The danger in all this talk of OPlan 5029 is that Roh has come out and said that the ROK would NOT abandon its policy of rapproachment with the North — and rejected the US plan to isolate and bring about the collapse of the North. President Roh Moo-hyun said the Korean government “does not agree with some opinions in the U.S. that apparently want to take issue with and pressure the North Korean regime, sometimes hoping for its collapse,” and warned of “friction and disagreements between Seoul and Washington” if the U.S. wants to resolve the standoff by toppling the regime. (Source: Korea is One.)

The “new” OPlan 5029 is supposedly talking in “broad outlines” instead of specific numbers — which is NOT the OPlan 5029, but rather the CONOPlan 5029 (Concept Oplan) upon which OPlan 5029 is based.

The Korea side is now playing up the fact that the US “gave in” on many of the points during the negotiations. However, the ROK had best look closely as to why. Beware when the adversary (US) caves in too easily. Roh stated in Feb 2006 at the Military Academy graduation that he would push for the return of war-time control from the US WITHIN the year … an impossibility as seen by ROK officials, but repeated multiple times by Roh since. He is alienating the US in a very direct manner — supporting openly the North while US troops are stationed in the ROK for its defense from the North. If the CFC were to be removed, there is no need for the OPlan 5029 as there would be no JOINT actions. The US now agrees with the transfer of wartime command, but stated that it was dependent on the South’s capabilities to assume key wartime roles to replace the US presence.

Korea, U.S. ‘Close’ to Agreeing N.K. Contingency Plan
Seoul and Washington have virtually concluded negotiations on a contingency plan for radical upheaval in North Korea, including natural disaster and regime change, which has been causing headaches in the alliance. If all goes smoothly, the two defense ministers will sign off on supplementary guidelines for Concept Plan 5029 in April. Unlike an Operation Plan earlier shelved by South Korea, the Concept Plan deals with scenarios in a more abstract sense and does not specify details like troop numbers.

The two countries had been trying to agree an Operation Plan since 2003, but the National Security Council raised objections last year, saying the draft plan contained elements that could compromise Korea’s sovereignty, so discussions went back to square one. South Korea has been keen to shed some elements of the plan that focus on a possible putsch or civil war for fear of their negative impact on inter-Korean relations. After a meeting between the two defense ministers last June, discussions have been focusing on 뱒trategic guidelines?to supplement Concept Plan 5029, according to a diplomatic source. (SITE NOTE: It did not go back to “square one” only on both sides “agreeing to disagree.” OPlan 5029 was NOT rescinded by the National Assembly that approved it.)

In the regular Security Policy Initiative meeting between Korea and the U.S. in Guam last month, the two sides were close to agreeing on a draft, so Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-ung and U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld plan to sign a written agreement next month at the earliest, the source added.

Sources said the U.S. in the process was surprisingly willing to accommodate a majority of Korean requests to omit sensitive parts or relax the language.

The shelved Operation Plan 5029 envisaged five scenarios in North Korea — civil war through a coup or the like, hostage-taking of South Koreans in the North, large scale defection of North Koreans, preventing weapons of mass destruction from falling into the hands of rebels, and massive natural disaster. (SITE NOTE: The “shelved” OPlan 5029 is only “shelved” by the ROK because of the deficiencies on the part of the ROK that it revealed. It was found that only FIVE buildings were identified along the DMZ to handle a flood of refugees fleeing south if the North’s regime collapsed. It upset the North that OPlan 5029 envisioned that the US would launch a possible preemptive move to seize control of the North — and its nuclear weapons — before the weapons disappeared and turn control over to the South. OPlan 5029 was approved previously by the National Assembly and until rescinded, it remains in effect. In fact, portions of Oplan 5029 will be exercised in Foal Eagle and Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI) exercises (RSOI-FE-06) on 25-31 March 2006. All of this boasting of general agreement is on the CONPLAN 5029 (Concept Plan 5029) which does not deal with implementation — only the broad outline and general concept to base the OPlan 5029 on.)

Once the guidelines are signed, Combined Forces Command and the Joint Chiefs of Staff will work out practical details. (SITE NOTE: This is the OPlan 5029.) (Source:Chosun Ilbo.)

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USFK Commander Warns of N.Korean Missile Threat (Mar 2006) On 9 Mar, it was reported that USFK Commander Gen. Burwell Bell warned Senators in Washington of a growing threat from North Korea뭩 missile power. Bell told a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing the North had 200 Rodong missiles with a range of 1,300 km and around 600 scud missiles capable of striking anywhere on the Korean Peninsula. “Reports indicate North Korea is also preparing to field a new intermediate-range ballistic missile which could easily reach U.S. facilities in Okinawa, Guam and possibly Alaska,” Bell said. It was the first official USFK estimate of Pyongyang뭩 Rodong missiles, while the 600 Scuds the commander cited are 100 more than mentioned in 2004-2005 congressional reports. (SITE NOTE: In Mar, the DPRK launched two surface-air missiles near the Chinese border indicating its missile development programs are still active. Associated Press (“REPORT: NORTH KOREA FIRES MISSILES”, 2006-03-08) reported that the DPRK reportedly fired two surface-to-air missiles near its border with the PRC. Japan’s Kyodo news agency cited a “security source” in the PRC as saying the missiles were fired by mistake in the direction of the PRC during a military drill and apparently landed inside the DPRK. The agency also cited a “Western military source” as saying the short-range missiles were test-fired in an eastern direction from the DPRK’s eastern coast, toward the Sea of Japan. At least one of the missiles landed in the sea about 100 kilometers (62 miles) northeast of the launch site, Kyodo said, citing a Japanese defense official. Japan’s Defense Ministry said it couldn’t confirm the report, and officials in the ROK who monitor the DPRK also said they didn’t have any information on the reported launches. Reuters (“NORTH KOREA CONDUCTED NEW MISSILE TESTS, U.S. SAYS”, 2006-03-08) reported that the DPRK fired two short-range missiles on Wednesday. “Indications are that North Korea launched two short-range missiles. The regime has conducted similar tests in the past,” White House spokesman Scott McClellan said in a statement to reporters travelling with President George W. Bush in Mississippi. “We have consistently pointed out that North Korea’s missile program is a concern that poses a threat to the region and the larger international community,” he said. A senior Bush administration official said in Washington the two missiles were launched from the DPRK and landed in the country. “They did not leave North Korean territory,” he said.)

The general urged a greater role for Combined Forces Command, which he promised to mold into a permanent multi-national alliance. The newspapers interpreted this to mean that the U.S. plans to step up functions of Combine Forces Command under the armistice that officially still prevails on the peninsula while progress is being made on the road to an eventual peace treaty. (SITE NOTE: This is the major change as the CFC is a joint US-ROK initiative, but the General was speaking of a “multi-national” alliance probably centered around the UN Command function. This is ominous news as this would indicate the USFK is willing to give up the CFC function — but retain the UN Command function in Korea, thus freeing the way for the ROK “wartime” command function. Only the UN command (“multi-national alliance”) will remain. If the US contributes as many troops as the other nations TOTAL, the 200 man unit headed by a 2nd lieutenant should make a formidable contribution to the ROK defense. (SARCASM INTENDED))

According to the Chosun Ilbo, “The remarks could open a fresh can of worms in the Korea-U.S. alliance by contradicting speculation that the CFC, which is under U.S. control, will be dismantled as more powers are handed over to South Korea. Korean Defense Ministry officials said Bell뭩 remarks did not imply plans for a reorganization of CFC but only meant that reopening of railways and roads between the two Koreas in the near future will increase the number of personnel on missions overseeing the Demilitarized Zone.” (SITE NOTE: The MND remarks are patently “stupid” about “increase number of personnel” on DMZ missions. The roads and rails are open and not good infiltration spots. The USFK forces pulled off the DMZ in 1977 and the UN troops in Korea are strictly ceremonial stationed out of Yongsan.)

Bell told senators a Korean Navy base set to be completed by June includes a dock where nuclear-propelled aircraft carriers can anchor. Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-ung said at a press conference commented, the dock was 뱊ot being built with U.S. aircraft carriers in mind. The commander may have pointed to the possibility, but the dock is not for the U.S.?(SITE NOTE: Chinhae Harbor project is part of the ROK plans to make it a “logistics hub” and was completed ahead of schedule. As a deep-water port capable of handling huge container ships, it is possible that they could be modified slightly for a carrier. Also note that the ROK grandiose plan calls for the carrier Yi Su-shin in 2010.

As to the US naval presence in Korea, the MND is shying away from the provisions that have been made to handle US naval ships. Under the US NEO (Non-essential personnel evacuation), naval ships have docked at Ansong and the container port has been used for naval receptions for other military ships. Pyeongtaek Harbor is also developing a Naval piers and docks as part of its expansion as well. These would also be used as part of the defense of the nation if North Korea attacked.

US nuclear subs have been docking in Chinhae as part of annual exercises since the 1990s (at least officially) with activist groups protesting the nuclear weapons on board (that were officially “no comment” items). Carriers have anchored off Pusan, but the newly completed deep-water container ship docks could handle a carrier if need be. Defense Minister Yoon statement is a “spin doctoring” of the topic as there were NEVER any plans for stationing carriers in Korea — or even docking them in time of war as the risk is too high. However, during FE/RSOI-06 will see the nuclear subs docked at Chinhae. This is as it always has been since the cancellation of “Team Spirit.” The subs are docked there as part of the war-scenario. A carrier from Yokosuka docks off Pusan. That is fact.

We are saying that the MND Minister Yoon is trying to put a positive spin of some definitely ominous statements, but he’s fighting a losing battle with a boss like Roh. We believe he is just trying to hang on and protect the military until Roh leaves office in 2007. We have the deepest respect for Yoon — but we also understand that he is also a politician who must survive if he is to protect the military and nation (as he swore to do as a Navy admiral).)

On the matter of wartime operational control of troops, which now rests with the U.S., Bell said the South Korean government asked to start negotiations on the issue and predicted the system would in the long run shift from equally shared command between the two countries to giving South Korean forces the lead while U.S. forces assist them. He said if South Korean forces exercise wartime operational control of the military, the U.S. forces will provide support centered on air and naval forces. (SITE NOTE: The Korean spin on the USFK-ROK relationship is completely off-center. The USFK and ROK operate separately during peacetime operations, but during wartime scenarios, the USFK is the lead element. If the ROK becomes the “lead element,” it will be standing alone to face the North Koreans — while the US promises naval bombardment and cruise missile support. Once the CFC is gone, the reason for maintaining any USFK ground presence in Korea is eliminated. Roh wants to have wartime control by the year’s end — and he may get it. The US is playing hard ball with the North — and the ROK’s continued support of the North makes the US presence in South Korea a farce.)

The general also called on South Korea to shoulder more of the cost of keeping U.S. forces on the peninsula, saying its willingness to do so was a good indicator of whether it wants the USFK to remain there. Most of his predecessors have made the same demand. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.) (SITE NOTE: Though downplayed by the US, the latest balking of the ROK in the cost sharing in the move to Camp Humphreys has strained the US-ROK relationship almost to the breaking point. Taken as a whole, there are some ominous words in Gen Burkes report to Congress — and there are equally confounding words from the MND as they fumble trying to place a different spin on statements.

South Korea and the United States reportedly have entered the final stage of negotiations, with South Korea set to pay about 55 percent of the 10 billion dollars relocation cost. The relocation of the U.S. base in Seoul was proposed by South Korea, while the United States asked for the transfer of the 2nd Infantry Division. Therefore, the percentage of the cost-share was being negotiated. In addition, added costs of $500 million for the US demand for flood control of the area the ROK is turning over to the USFK is still in the midst of hassles. Also the return of bases to the ROK under the LPP has stalled as the ROK demands the USFK cleanup the bases — which the USFK states it need only cleanup to known conditions posing imminent health hazards.)
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Foal Eagle/Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (FE/RSOI-06) (Mar 2006) On 11 Mar, Korean and U.S. forces were ready conduct regular exercises to increase the efficiency of the way troop and equipment reinforcements are processed in an emergency. The combined Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI) and the Foal Eagle training will run from March 25 through 31.

Combined Forces Command said some 20,000 U.S. troops would be involved in the drills including 3,000 from the U.S. mainland, Hawaii, and Okinawa as well as 17,000 stationed in Korea, supported by the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Kitty Hawk and Stryker units. The exercise was to be similar in scale to previous years, but the number of the U.S. forces from outside will decrease by 2,000 from last year since they were tied up in Iraq and elsewhere. Roughly 5,000 U.S. troops will take part in off-peninsula locations.

Foal Eagle, a joint and combined field training exercise, also will be conducted during the same period, according to the release. RSOI focuses on honing combined U.S. and South Korean forces?ability to receive and integrate forces from outside the country. Foal Eagle focuses on rear-area security and stability operations, onward movement of critical assets and select war-fighting training events.

This year will mark the 45th Foal Eagle exercise and the fifth time it뭩 been combined with RSOI, which was first held in 1994. While the simulated enemy never is named, the exercise scenarios involve an enemy whose characteristics mirror those of North Korea.

The CFC notified North Korea of the joint exercise plan via the Military Armistice Commission of UN Command, but there was no response. The North regards the drills as hostile and usually steps up its rhetoric around the time of the exercises. The North stated that it would delay the inter-Korean meetings until after the exercises.
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7th Round of SPI (Mar 2006) On 21 Mar defense officials of South Korea and the US opened talks aimed at readjusting their half-century military alliance. The two-day negotiations, called the Security Policy Initiative (SPI), focused on Seoul’s wish to regain the wartime control of its own troops and perform greater roles of defense against North Korean threats. The U.S. has agreed to speed up talks on its return of the wartime operational control of the 680,000-member South Korean military, but the allies have yet to work out a specific timetable on the issue. South Korea is represented by Kwon An-do, assistant defense minister for policy, and his American counterpart is U.S. Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless. (SITE NOTE: In the past months, the tone of reverting wartime control changed from Oct 2005 “appropriately accelerated” by Donald Rumsfield to “when ready” by Gen LaPorte to “expand UNC role” — meaning elimination of CFC — by Gen Bell. The tone has shifted rapidly as the ROK “progressives” have now thrown up a road block to the Land Partnership Plan return of lands over conflicting pollution standards. The issue of cost sharing is still not resolved. In addition, the requirement by the US to fill the land at Camp Humphreys costing $500 million has not been resolved. There are a multitude of other problems that are impeding the completion of the Camp Humphreys relocation. In addition, the pending signing of the US-Japan Restructuring agreement in April may throw this whole negotiations out the window. As of Mar 2006, something is brewing but we are not certain in what direction the wind is blowing.)

On 20 Mar, South Korea’s Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-ung said his country and the U.S. will come up with a road map on the return in April. Yoon also said it is expected to take at least five years to completely get back the wartime operational control.

The talks, the seventh of their kind, were also expected to deal with environmental contamination on U.S. military bases in South Korea. (See Squabble Over US Base Contamination (Feb-Mar 2006) for details.)
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Rumsfield Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld said on 23 Mar the United States must retain wartime command of South Korea’s military until that country’s forces are strong enough to maintain stability on the Korean Peninsula. In a Pentagon news briefing, Rumsfeld said South Korea has brought up the idea, and “everyone agrees that 55 years after the war, it’s reasonable that the South Korean forces would increasingly take on more and more responsibility.”

Asked whether he thought the change in command structure could start this year, Rumsfeld replied: “No, no, I don’t at all.” He said no time has been set for the turnover, but South Korean forces already are taking increasing responsibilities. “They’re doing that,” he said, “and as they continue to take on more and more responsibility, the United States will be able to reduce its troops.” He said he had not heard that Roh had suggested a 2006 agreement on a turnover, which he said will not happen.

The vital consideration is not to inject instability into the peninsula, Rumsfeld said. Before the Koreans can assume the responsibility, he said, they must “make investments and increase their capabilities.” (Source: Associated Press.)
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April 2006
Gen Bell Urges Seoul to Increase its Share of Costs Gen. Burwell B. Bell, commander of the USFK, urged South Korea to pay more for the presence of U.S. troops on the Korean Peninsula in accordance with Seoul뭩 growing economy and military capability in interviews with the Stars and Stripes published on 24 April. He also called for an early conclusion of the stalled talks on environmental issues regarding U.S. bases to be returned to South Korea.

Gen Bell reiterated what others before have stated — that Korea as a G-11 (or G-10 according to Gen Bell) — “has a lot of capability and gross domestic product the 10th largest in the world by many measures, would feel comfortable contributing large sums of support to ensure that the United States stays present on this peninsula.뮃 The general referred to the ongoing transfer of security missions from the USFK to ROK military as one of the main reasons for Seoul뭩 increasing share in defense expenditures.

“Burrow down into that, and say, now what is the percentage of burden sharing? You know as a philosophy when you go in we say, You know, 50-50? And that is where it starts. I hope we can achieve 50-50,뮃 Bell said. Currently, South Korea contributes some 40 percent of the total budget for maintaining the 29,500-strong U.S. troops here under an agreement made in 2005. In the talks, the two sides agreed to cut Seoul뭩 burden sharing to $680 billion, 8.9 percentage points down from the previous year, for 2005 and 2006.

South Korea has contributed financial support to the USFK since 1991, when it paid about $150 million. The cost sharing more than quadrupled to $622 million by 2004. (SITE NOTE: The ROK loves to embellish on how its share has increased, but never mentions that prior to 1991, it paid NOTHING while other countries did pay their share. In addition, the ROK does not mention that since Kim Dae-jung, the percentage of GDP for defense expenditures fell from 8.0 percent to 2.8 percent at present. The US asked the ROK to increase its defense expenditures to 3.2 percent — and received a promise to do so — but it soon reneged on the promise with the spending remaining flatline under Roh Moo-hyun at 2.8 percent of GDP.)

The ROK has refused to increase its share in 2005. As a result, to meet potential funding shortfalls in the wake of South Korea뭩 decreased budget contribution, the USFK announced last year it would reduce the South Korean workforce at U.S. bases by 1,000 until 2007. “Nothing has been determined regarding the burden sharing issue yet. But I don뭪 think South Korea will see such a large increase in cost-sharing in the upcoming talks as demanded by the U.S. side,뮃 the official said, requesting on anonymity.

Gen Bell expressed regrets over the delayed U.S. base turnover process due to the conflicting assessment between the two nations over environmental cleanup costs and contamination levels. He stressed the USFK has done what they have to do for base pollution according to the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) “We agreed to do certain things to that land to ensure that the immediate threat to life and limb is removed,뮃 he said, adding the USFK is paying some $400,000 a month to guard already vacated installations, some of which have been vacated for up to 17 months. Under the Land Partnership Plan (LPP), the United States agreed to hand back 34 of its 41 military bases across the country by 2011. In return, South Korea promised to provide 12 million square meters of land in Pyongtaek for a consolidated U.S. base to be built by 2008 — along with other lands in the Pohang area. But the environmental squabble has put handover of the bases on hold. The government asked the USFK to clean up environmental pollution at 14 of 15 bases found to be contaminated beyond safety standards under South Korean law, but the USFK is rejecting the request, citing lower standards (Known, Imminent, Substantial Endangerment to Human Health) agreed to under the SOFA.
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KOREAN MILITARY EVENTS
January 2006
ROK Yongsan Planning Meeting Held (Jan 2006) The ROK held its first planning meeting this week to decide the future of the 600 acres in the capital city that is now Yongsan Garrison. The Yongsan National and History Park Construction Promotion Committee met on 23 Jan to begin brainstorming ideas for the future of the land, which is about three-fourths the area of New York’s Central Park. The land, which once housed Japanese military quarters and now is home to U.S. Forces Korea headquarters, could become a key part in linking the Han River with nearby Namsan Park for a large public space in this crowded city of more than 10 million people. That idea would add to a plan already approved by Seoul City Hall that includes improving the land just north of the Han River.

But another idea includes combining a park with development, namely residential housing and underground shopping areas, according to Kim. The combination plan also might include new roads to ease traffic.

The advisory committee was formed in November 2005 and includes 26 people from public and private sectors in South Korea, including Prime Minister Lee Hae-chan. The goal is to set a long-term policy, through 2030, Kim said. The committee also must make recommendations about selling portions of the land to pay for the relocation of U.S. troops southward on the peninsula. (SITE NOTE: Note that the Prime Minister Lee Hae-chan is the chairman of key committee’s that make “recommendations” that the government acts on. The committees give the impression of legitimacy and public “concensus” but are in fact simply “tools” of the Roh administration to implement its agenda. For example, he is a co-chairman of a panel to come up with effective measures introduce a more peaceful rally culture in Korea. The NGO groups have been tools of the administration in “mobilizing” public sentiment and it needs to be “protected.” Other “tools” are the National Human Rights Commission and the NIS “Truth Committee” that make recommendations that support the Roh agenda.)

The turnover of Yongsan is part of a long-range plan to centralize most of U.S. Forces Korea in the Pyeongtaek area, about 50 miles south of Seoul, by 2008. The problem remains that the Ministry of Defense — who owns the land — wishes to have development on portions to enable it to have the monies to pay for the move — at least this is its public stance. (Source: Stars and Stripes.)
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S Korea to cut Iraq troops by a third (Jan 2006) The flap created during the Nov 2005 APEC summit when President Bush on his world tour to drum up support for the Iraq mission was blind-sided by the ROK intention to withdraw its troops. That Roh had just met with George Bush in Kyongju and never mentioned the subject made the fact all the more galling to the US. Two days later the Roh cabinet approved the measure and sent it to the National Assembly.

The National Assembly approved the bill to cut by about one-third the size of its troop deployment in Iraq, the third-largest foreign contingent there. The unicameral National Assembly voted by 110 to 31 to extend the country’s troop deployment in the northern Iraqi region of Arbil by one year until the end of 2006 but cut the contingent to 2,300 from 3,200. Seventeen members abstained.

The troops are stationed in the “safe” area of Irbil in Kurdish territory. While the US has suffered over 2000 deaths, the ROK has suffered not one. The deployment is unpopular among South Koreans worried about security concerns. In June 2004, Islamic insurgents beheaded a South Korean civilian working in Iraq after South Korea rejected demands to withdraw its troops. The cut, which will begin in early 2006, could drop South Korea’s unit to the fourth largest after Italy. Italy has said it will reduce its 2,900 troops in Iraq by 10 per cent in January and plans to pull out its troops by the end of 2006. Ukraine and Bulgaria announced this week that their soldiers had left Iraq. The US has also announced that it is scaling back its troop commitment in Iraq in 2006 as well.
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Minister of Defense to Review Conscientious Objector Issue (Jan 2006) Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-ung on 6 Jan said that his ministry plans to launch a pan-governmental committee to study alternative civil service for conscientious objectors. The decision on whether to implement the system will be made after a MND committee, also involving civic representatives, finishes its analysis on the system to offer alternate forms of service for objectors this year. Immediately following the announcement, the first of the conscientious objectors from the Jehovah’s Witness group was arrested and jailed.

The move draws attention as the ministry has reacted negatively to the issue in the past, citing a possible security gap resulting from the weakness of military manpower, as more young people could take on the alternative system to evade their mandatory service. The problem the MND faces is that manpower for the military is dropping because of the falling birthrates. South Korea maintains 680,000-strong military under a compulsory conscription system. All able-bodied men aged 20 and over are required to serve in the military for 24-28 months. However, at the same time, the Ministry of Defense in July 2005 announced plans to reduce its 680,000-member military by one fourth by 2020 and streamlining its combat organizations in an effort to carry out comprehensive reform of its armed forces. The move was due to demographics where falling number of military age conscriptees was rapidly going to affect the military. (NOTE: The reorganization also had an underlying motive to implement the Roh administration push to place “progressive” civilians in key positions to control of the military.)

The National Human Rights Commission (NHRCK) recommended in December 2005 that the government recognize the individual right to refuse compulsory military service for their religious conviction, calling for an alternate form of service to be considered. It was the first time that a state institution officially recognized people’s right to conscientiously object. The recommendation was NOT legally binding. (NOTE: The NHRCK is a body that is controlled by President Roh and makes recommendations — that end up as policy.)

However, a Constitutional Court decision in August 2005 affirmed that the current conscription law as lawful. The top court said religious beliefs couldn’t come before national security. Every year, about 700 conscientious objectors are punished mostly with jail terms. At present, there are about 450 young men imprisoned for that charge.

The issue of evading military service is a highly sensitive issue as ALL Korean mothers do not want their children to go into the military because of the brutality of the training and duty. The issue became political when it was found that movies stars had evaded military service because of “health” reasons. Lee Hoi-chang, the GNP Presidential candidate running against Kim Dae-jung in 1997, was smeared with allegations that he had abetted in his two sons in evading military service by deliberately losing weight before the medical checkup. In recent years, there have been highly publicized deaths from beating that were attempted to be covered up as suicides. Also in 2004, a soldier on the DMZ went on a rampage and shot and killed 8 of his unit before committing suicide. Suicide rates in the military are high — though covered up. Because homosexuals are NOT exempt, they are mandatorily entered in service — as the military is forced to pretend that homosexuality does not exist. If the homosexual activity is found in service, the person(s) is simply transferred and the incident hushed up.

In 2006, the military is attempting to portray the “new” military as one where harsh living conditions have been upgraded and quality NCOs retained with higher pay and benefits. Unfortunately, incidents of brutality continue to be reported.

SITE NOTE: In Jan 2006, my nephew as a “newbie” Army security policeman was severely beaten by his “senior” to show who was “boss” and hospitalized with severe bruising to his body and head — on his FIRST day on duty at the camp near Taejon. His assailant was jailed and my nephew was to be assigned to another camp because of the fear of retribution. This type of brutality incident is still common in the Army. We agree that the idea of having a recruit break in training is better than having him break during battle. Physical and mental hardships are part of the training to weed out the unfit. However, we disagree with the use of physical brutality to show who is the “superior.” This is not training — but simply thugs running amok. Discipline and obedience to the orders of superiors is required — but the door opens both ways in that leadership bears responsibility for their actions.

In Jan 2005, Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-ung apologized amid mounting anger from the public for the news that an Army captain responsible for training fresh draftees allegedly ordered his soldiers to eat human feces. A company commander, identified only by his family name Lee, forced the 192 soldiers to pick up feces and suck their fingers as a punishment for not flushing toilets. After the incident, the public was astonished with the news while some posted angry comments on the defense ministry homepage and Internet portal news sites.

However, ever since a soldier on the DMZ went berserk and killed 8 of his comrades and himself in 2005, the Army and MND have been more sensitive of the criticism over its brutality. Harsh treatment in the name of “strong discipline” has been a constant headache in the military.

On 19 Jan, the NHRC requested the MND and the prosecution to investigate alleged abuses of human rights in the Marine Corps and recommended the ministry to compensate the victim. The commission, which received a petition from a former Marine who was in service from 1999-2002. The petition was filed in 2004 and the NHRC concluded that the marine’s personal liberty had been infringed on by his senior soldiers’ harsh treatment with verbal abuse and beatings. It is the first time the commission has issued a recommendation involving human rights violation cases related to the Marine Corps. The panel has investigated other cases in the Army or police before. “Based on doctors’ diagnosis, it can be said that the victim’s health disorder resulted from harsh treatment during his military service. Thus, the government should compensate for him in accordance with related laws,” the panel said in a statement. The commission also requested the prosecution to investigate six marines, who were involved in the harsh treatment. Two of them have been discharged while four Marines are still serving in the Marine Corps. According to the commission, one of the wrongdoers, clubbed the victim’s forehead saying that he failed to carry out his superior’s order well and was not good at military training. Because of that, the victim was hospitalized three times even after finishing his service showing symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The disorder is the development of characteristic symptoms following exposure to an extreme traumatic stressor involving direct personal experience of an event that involves actual or threatened death or serious injury, or other threat to one’s physical integrity. (Source: Korea Times.)

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Japanese to Launch Two More Spy Satellites (Jan 2006) According to the Kyoto News on 8 Jan 2006, Japan will launch two more reconnaissance satellites targeted at the Korean peninsula. The two additional satellites were to be placed in different orbits from the first two that began flying over Korea in 2006. The Japanese reconnaissance satellite system consists of an optical satellite system and a radar satellite system, and two satellites operate as a team. If the second units are added, the photographic frequency of the Japanese surveillance will be increased from once every other day to once a day.

Japan launched the first set of spy satellites in March, 2003. In the same year, Japan had previously attempted an H2A rocket launch, developed by Japan itself, in December, 2003, but it failed because the satellite exploded. The rocket laden with the second set of two satellites was launched but the rocket derailed and the two satellites were lost. A re-launch was scheduled last year, but it was delayed due to the detection of a glitch in the satellite. The H2A launch was scheduled for Jan 2006 due to a malfunction in the ground equipment. On Jan. 24, the space agency successfully launched a land-observation satellite after a lapse of nearly a year.

The H-2A rocket, which carried the Advanced Land Observing Satellite, nicknamed “Daichi,” launched from the Tanegashima Space Center in Kagoshima Prefecture. Japan has begun production of a third generation of satellites with remarkable discrimination capacity and plans to put them into service in 2009. The current satellites in operation have a capacity to identify objects within a meter in size. However, Japanese third-generation satellites are able to discern objects 50cm across, matching the capacity of U.S. commercial satellites.

H2A Launch (18 Feb 2006)

The second H2A rocket successfully delivered into orbit on 18 Feb a satellite for weather observation and air traffic control. The rocket lifted off from the launch pad on Tanegashima Island off the southern tip of Kyushu. It was the first time H2As have been launched successfully within a one-month span.

The satellite carried into space was officially called the Multifunctional Transport Satellite 2 (MTSAT-2), and was expected to reach geostationary orbit about 36,000 km above the equator in 5 1/2 days. MTSAT is a dual mission satellite for the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport and the Japan Meteorological Agency performing an air traffic control and navigation function as well as a meteorological function. On one hand, it is an integral part of a next-generation global-scale air traffic safety system comprised of communications, navigation, tracking and air traffic control. The purpose is to improve traffic congestion and safety in the Asia Pacific region. On the other hand, the MTSAT-2 is designed to take on a meteorological mission to capture, collect and deliver meteorological images and/or data. In this capacity it inherits and expands the mission of a previous satellite.

It weighs in at 4.7 tons, making it one of the heaviest satellites Japan has so far launched. The MTSAT-2 will be a backup for the MTSAT-1, which was put into orbit in February 2005. The MTSAT-1 was later named the Himawari-6. Himawari means sunflower. The Himawari-6′s mission is scheduled to end in 2010, according to the satellite’s operator, the Land, Infrastructure and Transport Ministry. The ministry also plans to use the MTSAT-2 as an air traffic control satellite. The MTSAT-2 and Himawari-6 satellites will be part of a safer air traffic control system that can cope with an increase in civil aviation flights in the Asia-Pacific region.

(NOTE: Other newspapers report this as: “It marked the start of an intelligence-gathering programme prompted partly by North Korea’s launching of a long-range ballistic missile over Japan in 1998, although Pyongyang said it was a rocket launching a satellite.” The two satellites, the first of at least four in the 250-billion-yen ($2.05bn) spy programme, were propelled into clear but windy skies by a Japanese-made H2-A rocket.

They are intended to give Tokyo independent surveillance capabilities, since it has used US-gathered intelligence until now. Japan is thought to be especially concerned about North Korea’s Taepodong missiles, which are able to reach virtually all of the country. It also wants to monitor Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons programme. Japanese officials have stressed that the satellites, which will orbit the Earth at a km to 600 km (250 to 370 miles), can also be used for monitoring weather, crop conditions or natural disasters.

They will not be fully operational for several months. Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda said they were not intended to provoke North Korea. But a Japanese military analyst, Hajime Ozu, told the Associated Press that it was likely Pyongyang would respond. “For North Korea, a missile launch means a way to boost patriotism at home and a warning to the United States… It is one of the few remaining key diplomatic tactics North Korea has,” he said. (Source: BBC.)

(SITE NOTE: In 1995, the Japanese launched its first weather satellite which soon developed into communications satellites. The technology for launch of a satellite could be easily modified to a medium-range tactical weapon — equivalent to the Taepodong ballistic missile — as the ranges are well-within the reach of these rockets. The MDS technology is being developed jointly by the Japanese and Americans — though the Japanese are now complaining of the high expense in the project. In Jan 2006, the ruling LDP is expected to seek enabling defense-purpose use of satellites as long as it is not aimed at invading other countries and explore ways to enable the Defense Agency to develop and operate spy satellites that produce high-resolution images.)
The North Korean KCNA news agency warned on 17 Feb that Tokyo was “wantonly violating” an agreement on improving relations made by Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il last year. At that summit, North Korea pledged to extend its moratorium on ballistic missiles beyond 2003. The Japanese replied that it would not be sucked into a missile-arms race that is against its Peace Constitution.

After North Korea launched its Taepodong long-range ballistic missile, Japan decided to have its own spy satellites, not relying on the U.S. for surveillance information. (SITE NOTE: The advantage that the US has is its Thermal Surveillance technology in its satellites. Unfortunately, the ROK is fully reliant on the US for its spy intelligence — and are not even near the stage of technological development that it could seriously think of doing the same. In 2000 it dreamed of creating a space launch program centered in the Chollabuk-do area, but it soon fell apart as a pipe dream. The ROK has launched communications satellites piggy-backed into space on Arianne rockets, but the technology was not home-grown. Instead of pursuing a weapons program it has decided to pursue the option of denying that there is a missile threat. The ROK is fully dependent on the PAC-3 Patriot Missiles to defend against any missile threat from the North. It is procuring PAC-2 surplus missiles from Germany but it will not be finalized until 2006.)

More spy satellites (Apr 2006) The Japanese government announced that it will launch additional data-collecting satellites aimed at watching the Korean peninsula in July. On May 1, the daily Yomiuri reported that the Japanese government will launch an optimal satellite in July and a radar satellite around next January or February. The data-collecting satellite system consists of an optimal satellite and a radar satellite.

Japan launched the first set of satellites in March, 2003. In the same year, a rocket laden with the second set of two satellites was launched in November. But the rocket derailed and the two satellites were lost at once. To disperse risk, they will launch an optimal satellite and a radar satellite separately this time. If the second set is added to the power of the first, Japan can scan every point in the world once a day.
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Japan to Buy SM3 Missile Interceptors (Jan 2006) On 10 Jan 2006, Kyodo News reported that Japan was to buy 36 sea-based missile interceptors from the US between 2007 and 2010 for deployment on Aegis-equipped destroyers under Japan’s missile defense shield program. The Defense Agency plans to conduct a joint test with the US around 2008 in Hawaii for one of the SM-3 interceptors by deploying it on the Kongo, a Sasebo-based destroyer equipped with the advanced Aegis air defense system.

(SITE NOTE: READ BETWEEN THE LINES: Once the Missile Defense Line is erected in Japan, if the US forces were to leave Korea, the new defense line would be the East Sea (Sea of Japan) — and the increased pressure on settling the Tokdo issue as it would then become a matter of national defense to the Japanese. This is a terrible worst case scenario where the US wants its ground forces out of Korea so that it could prepare for a preemptive strike on North Korea. The thought is insane — but it was reported that the US warned the North of just such a strike in April 2004. It should be noted that the ROK is NOT investing in missile defenses, but in submarine defenses — pointedly aimed NOT at the North, but at Japan — and supposedly China.)

On 12 Feb, it was reported that there were sweeping changes called for in an interim U.S.-Japan military realignment report. The two countries are to place a massive new missile detection radar system in Japan. The details of when and where the system will be based are being decided, but the report, issued in October 2005, indicates a pivotal change in the countries’ approach to missile defense technology is in the works. The two countries have shared research and technology in the past and signed a memorandum of understanding on missile defense cooperation in 2004, but the October 2005 report recommended not only a tangible example of the cooperation but signaled both sides’ willingness to move forward.

The new Forward-Based X-Band radar will form part of a web of surveillance designed to find and help destroy an enemy incoming ballistic missile. It also intricately aligns the two nations and nudges them toward closer cooperation, information-sharing and potentially a joint ballistic defense system, officials say. A final realignment report, expected to contain more specifics, is due this spring. The new X-Band radar is one of three the Pentagon plans to place in allied countries, Chris Taylor, a Missile Defense Agency (MDA) spokesman, wrote in an e-mail. In January, the Pentagon deployed a similar but larger radar system, a massive floating ocean-going radar called Sea Based X-Band. From its main base in Adak, Alaska, it will operate around the Pacific.

The X-Band radars are capable of differentiating missiles from decoys as well as tracking their trajectory in the stratosphere, according to the Missile Defense Agency. They augment radars on U.S. and Japanese Aegis warships, the latter of which began scanning for missiles in the Sea of Japan in 2004, according to Navy reports. The radar systems will join one Japan is developing called “FPS-XX,” which it hopes to deploy by fiscal 2011, according to a Defense Department report released in 2005 White Papers on Japan’s defense. Together, the systems allow a new level of shared surveillance. But they are only a piece of the missile defense plan.

The missile defense system (MDS) is comprised of three elements. First is the low-altitude, low-trajectory defense of the Patriot PAC-3 missiles. Second is the ship-borne SM2 missiles carried aboard Aegis destroyers. (NOTE: The USS Shiloh with SM-3 missiles will be stationed in Japan.) The third is the high-altitude interceptor missiles intended for intercontinental or high-altitude missile trajectories. (NOTE: In Japan, the first two elements are in place in Japan’s MDS. Israel and Germany are in work on missles with a lower-altitude interception than the PAC-3.) The high altitude interceptor missiles, or Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAD), are designed to destroy incoming missiles in the stratosphere but unfortunately have had limited success thus far. Interceptor missiles are positioned at Fort Greely, Alaska, and at Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif., according to the MDA. Japan and the United States also are working jointly on a similar sea-based interceptor that would deploy on ships, according to Japanese government reports. Besides the technology, the October agreement also committed both countries to working more closely in their missile defense command and control, the heart and brains of the operation. Although both governments laud the joint effort, changes have been slow and carry with them political turmoil in Japan as not all agree with the MDA. (Source: Stars and Stripes.)
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ROK Space Program “On Schedule” (Jan-Feb 2006) Plans to send the Arirang Two, a satellite able to transmit high-resolution images that match those taken by sophisticated surveillance satellites, into orbit this May, and plans to develop a rocket are proceeding as scheduled. “It can distinguish buses and automobiles on the roads,” says Korea Aerospace Research Institute (KARI) researcher Dr. Lee Joo-jin, who is charge of the Arirang Two’s development. The satellite’s camera, developed in cooperation with Israel, has a large concave mirror and countless electronic parts that process and transmit data. Camera resolution has been improved approximately 40 times compared to its predecessor, Arirang One.

Arirang Two is currently in its final testing stage. As soon as the tests are over, it will be sent to Russia for launching. About 80 percent of Arirang Two has been produced domestically. Although high-resolution satellite images are for sale on the private market, experts point out that when it comes to satellite images, it is important to be able to obtain information on demand. The Arirang Two can accurately film the Korean peninsula with digital images and provide them on demand. (NOTE: See US to Give Seoul Digital Map. The U.S. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency promised to deliver the “digital topography intelligence” to South Korea in the form of digital maps and video images, which will help South Korean cruise missiles fly close to the ground to avoid radar detection. South Korea’s Air Force has also planned to import a military software, named Digital Point Positioning Data Base (DPPDB), from Washington to enhance its ability of attacking underground bunkers. But it has faced troubles, as the software is one of the items that are regulated by the U.S. Arms Export Control Act.)

Another division of KARI is busy designing the KSLV-1, a joint Korea-Russia rocket project that will launch next year. “The first stage liquid-fuel engine is being developed in Russia, while the second stage solid-fuel motor is being developed in Korea,” said Dr. Park Jung-joo. About 20 Korean researchers have been sent to Russia as well. After a partial assembly of the rocket system, it will undergo comprehensive testing, and is scheduled to launch sometime in the middle of next year. The Science and Technology Satellite Two that will be loaded onto the rocket has already been developed and in production.

Korean Space Center Construction work is in full swing at Korea’s new space launch base in Oinalodo, Goheung-gun, Jeonnam, and it will begin test operations in October. “About 60 percent of the facility construction is complete. We plan to test-operate all of the base facilities in October except for the launching pad,” Dr. Yoo Jung-joo of KARI said. “If we succeed in launching our rocket with a satellite aboard, Korea’s space technology will rank among the world’s top ten.” (Source: Donga Ilbo.)

Arirang 2 to be Launched in July 2006 along with Koreasat-5??? The South Korean government said on 20 Feb that it plans to launch its new “Arirang 2″ multipurpose satellite in July to boost the country’s expertise in the aerospace industry. The new satellite will house a high-resolution multi-spectral camera (MSC) jointly developed by a local firm and Electro Optical Industries Ltd. of Israel. The camera can capture imagery with a 1-meter resolution, the Ministry of Science and Technology said. (Source: Yonhap News.) (NOTE: This was a surprise announcement after the January announcement that launch would be in the middle of next year in Russia. Arirang 2 was scheduled for launch in July 2006 from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome, about 200-kilometers northeast of Moscow. Supposedly last minute checks of the Arirang 2 were underway in Mar 2006.)

South Korea뭩 fourth commercial, and first military-purpose satellite Koreasat-5 was to be shot into the orbit from the southern Pacific Ocean near Hawaii in July according to Korea Telecom (KT). (NOTE: We are NOT certain if this is the Arirang-2 as described in this article.) The nation뭩 dominant fixed-line operator said that the new satellite will be launched from a floating launch platform located at a point near the equator and 154 degrees west in longitude by an international venture firm Sea Launch. It is the first satellite from South Korea, and the 23rd in the world, to be launched from an open sea. The sea launch results in a 30 percent cost savings. (Source: Korea Times.)

The Koreasat-5, also dubbed as South Korea뭩 national flower “Mugunghwa-5,뮃 will also be the first satellite to service the military officially. Koreasat-5 will be put into orbit some 36,000 kilometers above the earth surface. Safety, cost issues as well as international laws were taken into consideration in selecting the launching site. The new satellite will replace the Koreasat-2, which has been on service for ten years since 1996. South Korea currently has 7 satellites in operation but only two satellites of KT are geo-stationary, which means they float in the same location and rotate at the same pace as the earth, in order to continuously transmit TV and other communication signals.

The maritime launch of Koreasat-5 will be operated by an international venture Sea Launch, which is the only company in the world to be able to do so. It was founded in 1995, and the U.S. aircraft maker Boeing is its largest shareholder with a 40-percent share. Companies in Russia, Norway and Ukraine have 15 percent to 25 percent shares in it.

KT currently has two satellites in orbit _ Koreasat-2, Koreasat-3, each with a lifespan of 10 years. Koreasat-1 was launched in 1995 and left its orbit for outer space last December. Koreasat-4 was never put into orbit. It was never made because the number 4 is considered bad as it has the same sound as the Chinese letter for ”death’ Usually, the satellites are launched in various sites in Africa or in the United States.

Nation plans to launch a satellite with its own rocket next year
By Hwang Si-young

A nation can truly be said to have entered the “space age” when it has three related homegrown technologies that constitute a space program – satellites, rockets to lift the satellites into orbit and a space center with launch facilities.

Korea has made substantial progress to usher in the space age during recent years. Besides the nine active and decommissioned satellites, the country plans to complete a space center, launch two more satellites and develop the country’s first satellite launch vehicle by next year.

A multipurpose satellite “Arirang 2″ will be launched at Plesetsk, Russia, in July. Dubbed “Science and Technology Satellite-2,” the satellite is likely to be launched next year at a space center to be completed by 2007.

An artists rendering of a multipurpose satellite called Arirang 2. The satellite will be launched at Plesetsk, Russia, in July.[Korea Aerospace Research Institute]

The space center, being built on a remote island near Goheung, South Jeolla Province, will be the nation’s hub of space science and technology research. The state-funded Korea Aerospace Research Institute plans to develop the country’s first satellite launch vehicle, in a joint project with Russian scientists. Named KSLV-1, short for Korea Space Launch Vehicle, it will be designed to put a 100-kilogram payload into low orbit. The KSLV-1 will launch “Science and Technology Satellite 2″ next year at the Goheung space center, if everything goes according to the plan.

Only eight countries have the capacity to manufacture rockets, or satellite launch vehicles, in the world. The Science and Technology Ministry fist announced a national strategy for the aerospace sector in 1987, but failed to make significant progress until later in the 1990s, due to a lack of technical expertise, low investment in space science and technology and low awareness among companies.

Korea’s aerospace research and development projects, in a real sense, began with the Mid and Long-term National Space Development Plan, designed by the ministry, and the Master Plan for the Development of the Aerospace Industry by the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy in 1996.

Later, space technology was designed among the six national strategic technologies drawn up in the National Technology Road Map, which also includes biotechnology, information technology and nanotechnology. The Science and Technology Ministry intends to foster the local aerospace industry with a focus on satellite technology and services. Government officials hope that the local market for satellite-based technology and services will reach 5.4 trillion won by 2015, about one percent of the global market.

The state-funded Korea Aerospace Research Institute spearheads the ministry’s satellite program. Established in 1987, the KARI oversees the national development policy and research and development projects in the aerospace industry.

After five years of collaborated efforts with U.S.-based defense contractor TRW Inc., KARI developed Korea’s first multipurpose satellite, Arirang 1, which was launched in December 1999.

Arirang 1, a 470-kilogram small earth observation satellite with an orbital altitude of 685 kilometers, is equipped with an electro-optical camera, an ocean scanning multi-spectral imager and a space physics sensor. The satellite has been sending earth data to Korea and neighboring countries since 2000.

In another move, the ministry expects to launch an unmanned multipurpose satellite, named Arirang 2, in July this year. It plans to experiment with the latest technologies in earth observation and satellite imaging.

Arirang 2 is designed as a 765-kilogram earth observation satellite with an orbital altitude of 685 kilometers. The main mission of Arirang 2 is to provide geographical information system-based data of the Korean Peninsula during its three-year lifespan, covering information such as hydrology, road networks, urban mapping and demographic data.

Also, the multipurpose satellite will send information on changing natural environments to provide preventive measures against natural disasters. It will scan disaster-stricken areas, survey the country’s agriculture, fishery and forestry resources, according to KARI.

KARI spearheads the project, along with other research institutes such as the Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute and Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology. Companies participating in the Arirang 2 consortium are Korean Air, Hanwha Group, Korea Aerospace Industries Ltd., Korean Air, Doosan Heavy Industries and Construction Co. and Doosan Infracore Co.

KARI is developing a multi-spectral camera with Israel’s ELOP Electronics Industries Ltd., which will be installed on Arirang 2. The MSC is designed to offer high-resolution imaging for the mapping of the Korean Peninsula, KARI said.

“By seeing pictures sent from Arirang 2, people can recognize shapes of any given cars on streets,” said Hwang Do-soon, head of KARI’s Overall Coordination Department.

“A total of 263.3 billion won and around 300 scientists were invested to see the launch of Arirang 2. Eighty percent of Arirang 2′s manufacturing process was achieved by Korean scientists,” Hwang said. Arirang 3 will be launched in 2009 and Arirang 5 will be sent into orbit in 2008. Progress for Arirang 4, however, has stalled according to the science ministry.

The institute is also developing an ocean and meteorological satellite. It has plans to launch it in 2008. The main objective of the satellite is to provide weather monitoring and data for disaster management and prevention. The satellite will also be used to obtain information on marine resources and ecosystems.

Other than these public-purpose satellites, there are broadcasting and communications satellites developed by the private sector. For instance, the country’s largest telecom carrier SK Telecom Co., in cooperation with Japan-based Mobile Broadcasting Corp., launched “Hanbyul” in 2004 at the Kennedy Space Center in Florida, which now enables people to enjoy seamless multimedia services on handheld devices.

By 2015, Korea hopes to put 20 satellites into orbit, including eight multipurpose satellites, seven science satellites and five geostationary orbit satellites, said a government official of the science ministry’s space technology development division.

In another move, the Korean government is pushing a plan to put its first citizen into space by 2008, and said it will select astronaut candidates this year.

The candidates should be 164-190 centimeters tall and weigh between 45-90 kilograms. They must also have eyesight of over 0.1 and corrected eyesight of 1.0. Blood pressure is required to remain between 90 and 140 in contraction, and between 60 and 90 in relaxation. The candidates will be required to be fluent in English and Russian.

The two candidates will go through space training at Russia’s Yuri Gagarin Cosmonaut Training Center, but only one of them will be finally chosen to be the first Korean astronaut to ride on the Russian manned spacecraft Soyuz, the government said.

“We will make a public announcement in the first half of this year, go through selection processes to sort out two astronaut candidates later this year,” a science ministry official said earlier this year.

The future astronaut will move to the International Space Station via the Soyuz to conduct various tasks involving science experiments, while residing in the Russian module of the ISS for ten days, according to the science ministry.

The Korean government has allocated a total of 6 billion won for the project and plans to channel more from the private sector. (Source: Korea Herald.)

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WRSA-K Stock Authorized for Sale to ROK — but… (Jan 2006) President George W. Bush signed into law a bill for the United States to sell its war reserve stockpile (formerly the WRSA-K) in South Korea. Signed on 30 Dec 2005, the new law gives three years for the U.S. to sell the munitions items currently stored in South Korea or Japan. The U.S. Senate passed the bill in November 2005. After the three years, the WRSA program will be terminated and the U.S. Department of Defense will remove or discard the remaining items. The law covers munitions, equipment and materiel such as tanks, trucks, artillery, mortars, general-purpose bombs and repair parts.

The bill calls for the U.S. to turn over its munitions and equipment stockpiled in Korea for use in case of war to Korea for a fee, and stipulates that all items the Korean government doesn’t purchase should be discarded. The deadline for implementation is December 2008. (NOTE: The items unsold will have to be shipped out of country as the facility for destruction of munitions in country — fully funded by the US — has not been completed. The ROK anticipated that this would happen and simply waited until the bill was signed. However, the kicker is that Donald Rumsfield said that the US would not be a “patron” of the ROK, but a “supporting partner” in Oct 2005. The agreed upon prices should be at the going-rate — not at discount rates or free that Korea wanted. If it is discovered that the munitions were sold at discount rates, the fingers will point to the US Congress where the price is set.)

: The U.S. Department of Defense estimates that if the WRSA is sold to Korea, $1.2 billion (about 1.2 trillion won) in budget money will be saved. A Korean official of the Ministry of Defense explained on January 3, “I understand that the U.S. is listing WRSA items which will be transferred to Korea. After Korea reviews the items it needs, it will negotiate with U.S. for them in earnest within the first half of this year.”

Because the U.S. Department of Defense will submit a list of items which are negotiation subjects within 60 days after the bill takes effect, ROK-US negotiation may begin as early as April. (SITE NOTE: The lists were known when the USFK closed the accounts of the WRSA-K in Dec 2005. In 2005, the MND had already drawn up a “shopping list” of weapons and munitions that it wanted. Basically, it wanted high-tech weaponry at discount rates. The ROK strategy is very plain — offer the US to take the WRSA-K munitions off its hands at discount rates to save it the shipping costs. This may work — but only if Congress approves the cut rates.)

According to the press reports, the U.S. hopes that some of the 600,000 tons of munitions that account for 90 percent of WRSA will be used by U.S. forces in Korea or transferred to the U.S,. and that the rest will be turned over to Korea. (SITE NOTE: This is unrealistic. The US is building up munitions for follow-on forces to be stored at Osan, Kunsan and Taegu is true, but it would not be realistic for the USFK to stockpile this much munitions. These WRSA-K munitions were stockpiled specifically for the ROK — though administered by the USFK. The munitions belongs to the US, but the USFK does not really need these munitions — especially with its changing concept of a smaller more mobile force. In addition, the concept of floating munitions ships in Saipan has supplemented the idea of fixed munitions sites in Korea. In addition, the munitions will not be “turned over” to the ROK free. It will be sold at set prices.)

However, because the Korean government “plans to buy just some necessary items in good condition from the stockpile, challenges in the negotiation process are expected.” (Source: Donga Ilbo.)

(SITE NOTE: This statement is distressing as the ROK is known to have only TEN DAYS of munitions in case of an attack. To buy only “necessary” items means that the ROK intends to NOT procure the normal 90 day munitions supply that all Oplans are based upon. The ROK and US forces MUST hold the North in case of an attack until reinforcements (follow-ons) arrive. With 10 days of munitions, the Oplan 5027 that the ROK signed off on — but later disputed — is worthless. The US needs to reevaluate the commitment of the ROK to provide for its own defense … and if it does NOT want to provide the minimums of its “share” then the US needs to consider removing its troops immediately. The ROK-US alliance will be dead!!!

In 2005, the ROK was wanting JDAMS “smart bombs” for a ridiculous reason of using them for the “return fire mission” (if Seoul is subjected to a North artillery barrage). The ROK was just trying to get some cheap munitions at discount rates under the guise of the WRSA-K closure. The JDAMS was never a part of the WRSA-K as the ROK aircraft had not been modified at the time. The ROK wants discount prices — but the US had made it clear in 2005 that the time has run out for those bargains prices. Donald Rumsfield made it clear that the US would be a “supporting partner” and not a “patron.” The Congress is the final approving authority on any weapons sales — and the sale price.)
According to Chosun Ilbo on 8 April 2005, a letter sent to the Ministry of Defense (MND) in which Washington officially told Seoul of its plan to eliminate its War Reserve Stocks for Allies-Korea (WRSA-K), ordinance stored on the Korean Peninsula for use in an emergency meaning first weeks of a war. The letter dated May 20, 2004 was signed by then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and addressed to South Korea’s then-Defense Minister Cho Yung-kil following several years of discussion. According to the letter, the Pentagon formally notified the ROK MND that it would end the war reserve stocks program in December 2006. According to the USFK, the letter “provided a two-and- a-half- year notification to allow for adjustments to the loss of the program.” The USFK stress that “the U.S. government never intended for WRSA-K to be a permanent program. With the ROK becoming the 11th largest economy in the world, the program outlived its original purpose and was deemed no longer necessary a few years ago.” When Dong-A Ilbo reported in April about U.S. plans to terminate WRSA, the MND boasted, “If WRSA is abolished, there will be no negative effect on the Korean military’s war fighting capability.” In reality, however, two months later, it asked the U.S. for a new agreement. The answer came back that there would be no new agreement and that the ROK is on its own in replenishing its war readiness materials. The US bluntly told the ROK it must purchase its ammunition without the US support it has had in the past. (See WRSA-K stockpiles to be Dumped??? for details.)

US Asks 500 Million for WRSA On 24 Mar, it was reported that the U.S. asked $500 million WRSA stockpile of ammunition and military supplies. It reportedly was America뭩 first public disclosure of an offer price for the supplies. WRSA transfer talks between Korea and the U.S. are expected to start in April 2006. (SITE NOTE: We question this news report as the US has not started negotiations. The $500 million may be the ROK wishful thinking and needs corroboration.)

According to a military source on March 23, the Military Assistance Program (MAP), which is handling the WRSA transfer, met with officials of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) under the Defense Department, the U.S. Pacific Command and the State Department, and decided to write off the $5.3 billion in WRSA items, including $639 million worth of ammunition, $1.17 billion in expendables, and other items worth $1.2 billion. (SITE NOTE: This report seems reasonable, but the point is that once an item is written off, it will be destroyed or sent to salvage — not marked for resale or grants to the ROK. In the case of ordnance, this means disposal. This is a key point in our minds as to the report that the offer of $500 million was so low.)

If Korea refuses this offer after the U.S. initially suggested a price tag of $2 billion, the U.S. offer will likely be around $500 million at minimum, depending on the disposal costs of the ammunition and equipment. Until now, people concerned in the military have estimated the cost of purchasing WRSA items except for old ammunition at about one trillion won ($1 billon).

An official of the military said, 밃fter the legislation on WRSA disposal was signed by President Bush and took effect late last year, the U.S. has been trying to come up with a scheme to move old ammunitions and equipment to U.S. soil or overseas and have them disposed of, excluding items to be transferred to Korea. However, considering the enormous cost to transport the equipment, the U.S. is also reviewing a plan to dispose of it in Korea.? (SITE NOTE: The US paid for a facility in 2004 to dispose of munitions within Korea after Korea stopped the practice of exploding ordinance as a means of disposal. There is some question if the facility every was completed and if it is in use.)

Meanwhile, the Korean Defense Ministry plans to buy ammunition it needs from the WRSA, and is making a want list. Taiwan and the Philippines were the beneficiaries of free and cheap ammunition and equipment when their respective WRSA programs were terminated.

The Defense Ministry has made it clear that it will proceed with the negotiations in consideration of Korea뭩 national interests and alliance with the U.S. In June, 2004, then-U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz notified Korean Defense Minister Cho Young-gil that the WRSA termination would run through the end of 2006. (Source: Donga Ilbo.)
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MND Launches Procurement Agency (Jan 2006) The Ministry of Defense launched a streamlined military procurement agency to enhance efficiency and transparency in its arms introduction projects. The Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) consolidates eight organizations related to procurement and technology development that were dispersed in the country’s Defense Ministry, Army, Navy, and Air Force. The new agency, operated under the control of the defense minister, employs 807 public servants, and its annual budget reaches 10 trillion won ($ 9.8 billion). The role of DAPA is all the more important because the South Korean military has just embarked on a reform program that will make it rely less on manpower and more on weapons and equipment. The plan will cut the number of soldiers from the current 680,000 to 500,000 in 15 years. The DAPA mandate of supplying the armed forces with the right weapons at the right time is of the utmost importance.

2005 MND Programs On a percentage basis, the 2005 defense budget was broken down to 66.1 percent for Operations and Maintenance (O&M) and 33.9 percent for Force Investment Plans (FIP). The O&M budget was US$13.76 billion while the FIP budget is US$7.06 billion. All offshore purchases come out of the FIP budget. The 2004-2008 Mid-Term Defense Plan calls for incrementally increasing the FIP share from 32.8 percent in 2003 to 37.9 percent in 2008 to help “lay the foundation for a self-reliant defense capacity by 2010″. The FIP budget is divided into two categories — New Projects and Continuing Projects. Approximately 97 to 98 percent of the total FIP budget is allocated to continuing programs and the remainder to new programs.(Source: Buy USA Info)

IP New Programs:

o Critical Capabilities Related to USFK Transfer of 10 Missions to ROK: 3 programs, including search & rescue equipment, counter-fire center expansion, etc. (SITE NOTE: The first task of counter-artillery fire mission has been transferred, but we question why the USFK Paladins and ATACMS are still positioned with the ROK on the DMZ. The USAF search and rescue was deactivated at Osan in 2005 leaving only the ROK to handle the workload.)
o C4I / Electronic Warfare Capabilities: 2 programs, including military intelligence integrated processing systems, etc. (SITE NOTE: C4I Program was basically shelved after the US refused to pick up the tab. This is a problem that has not been resolved. The computer interfaces for the ROK military is in work. There continues to be problems meshing the logistics networks as the various services systems do not mesh.)
o Replacement of Old Equipment: 5 programs, including western region future electronic warfare equipment, beach mat, air-to-ground radio, etc.
o Tape-Type Explosives for Army and Navy
o Miscellaneous: 102nd armored brigade reorganization, 17th chemical unit augmentation, K-9 ammunition carrier, etc. (SITE NOTE: Only $61 million was allotted for the initiation of new programs, including SAM-X, K-9 ammunition carrier and two research & development programs under the 2005 Budget.)
FIP Continuing Programs:
o C4I/Electronic Warfare Capabilities: 21 programs, including AWACS, ground tactical C41, tactical communications system, coastal surveillance radar, fighter chaff/flare, etc. (SITE NOTE: The AWACS is in trouble as the Israel aircraft was found to have US Communications equipment that the US may not transfer technology.)
o Mobility/Strike Capabilities: 14 programs, including mechanized infantry division/3rd armored brigade reorganizations, K1A1 tank, K-9 self-propelled artillery, Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS)/ Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), Korea mine dispenser, etc. (SITE NOTE: A massive reorganization is planned that will shift active forces to the North and eliminate the reserve forces in the South of Korea. The ATACMS has added Block 1A missiles, but does not have the newest earth-piercing munitions.)

ATACMS Block 1 (2004)

o Sea/Landing Capabilities: 20 programs, including KDX-III, large transport vessel, 1,800 ton class submarines, and 2nd maritime patrol aircraft program, Busan operational naval base construction, etc. (SITE NOTE: The Kimchae Port facility is completed on the commercial end and the military side as well, but remains low-key. The KDX-III stealth destroyer is under construction and the ROK released plans to build larger class submarines. The “large transport vessel” is an acronym for the Admiral Shin aircraft carrier which is more of a pipe-dream at this stage…though it is envisioned by 2010. The maritime patrol aircraft program is in trouble.)

ATACMS Block 1 (2004)

o Air/Air Defense Capabilities: 15 programs, including F-15K, T-50 production, shortrange anti-air missile, KP-SAM, transporter simulator, etc. (SITE NOTE: The first F-15Ks are now at Taegu and operational. The T-50 is seeking buyers to sell the aircraft world-wide in hopes that the production lines will then allow the production of the T/A-50s at reduced cost. The SAM-X program is still in the air over procurement of used PAC-2 missiles from Germany.)
o Support Capabilities: 74 programs, including organizational equipment reinforcement, equipment maintenance, combat reserve ammunition, defense cost sharing, 2nd Bulgom project (Russian supply of weapons systems to Korea in repayment for outstanding loans), and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credit repayment, etc. (SITE NOTE: The most immediate problem that the ROK faces is that the WRSA-K program went defunct and the ROK must procure munitions. It has been said that the ROK has only 10 days of ammunition in case war broke out instead of the 90 days that is required. The ROK wants to select only those items it wants and there are plans in work to offer it to the ROK at cost — not the freebies the ROK hoped to get. The Russian equipment accepted as partial repayment of the $1.2 Billion loan has encountered problems with spare parts and unit sent to the DMZ, but nothing has been heard of it as it does not mesh with the other units.)
o R&D: 36 programs, including core weapon systems development and advanced technology/parts development such as M-SAM, military satellite, next generation tank, etc. (SITE NOTE: The Arirang 2 will contain a spy satellite portion being built in coordination with Israel and will be launched by Russia. Supposedly it is “on-schedule” though it was supposed to be launched in Jul 2006.)

ROK goes to High-tech Weaponry and Military Transformation Plan On 21 Jan 2006 Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-ung said, “The most serious problem in the Korean military is that its warfare capability is a quantity-based one that depends on a huge troop level, which lacks both efficiency and joint operability between the armed forces. It is urgent to transform the outdated troops to quality-based forces of low cost and high efficiency,” Yoon said. “Military transformation is a worldwide trend. France, Germany and China have successfully completed or still been conducting large-scale restructuring of their militaries. China has reduced its troop level from 5 million to 2 million.”

This military transformation has been partially brought about by the reduced birthrate that means fewer military conscriptees. However, in moving to a high-tech military comes the expense which the ROK can ill-afford at this time. Roh has programs for everything to make everyone happy. However, there will be a 10 trillion won shortfall that needs to be addressed first. The ROK will have to prioritize whether social programs, aid to the North or military defense is important. It is about to explode in politics in 2006. The ROK has also started to realize that its “self-reliant defense cannot be supported by the tax base as it is. The ROK budgeted W620 trillion (US$620 billion) for the Military Reorganization plan — assuming prospects for the inter-Korean relationship remain rosy. The Roh administration is scrambling to find funding sources — but it appears they are targeting the rich and businesses.

The government unveiled last year its plan to restructure its military into a streamlined elite forces by 2020. The 67 trillion won project features curtailing troops from 680,000 to 500,000 and equipping forces with a cutting-edge weapons system such as jet fighters, submarine and tanks. Yoon expects the military reform bill will be passed in February 2006 through the National Assembly. It was submitted last year but the approval was postponed because of a disagreement between ruling and opposition parties over other issues. (Source: Korea Herald.)

Technology Transfer as Integral Part of Selection Process On 21 Jan 2006 Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-ung announced his ambition to facilitate the country’s commitment into international cooperation in the defense industry. He said he will push for diversifying partnerships to accelerate Korea’s entry into the global defense industry market. “The Defense Ministry plans this year to hold bilateral talks with 16 countries including Australia and Turkey in an attempt to foster cooperation in the field. Now, we are under consultations with five countries such as Ukraine and Chile to conclude memorandum of understanding for exchanges in the sector,” he said. Currently the country has concluded agreements with 22 countries regarding cooperation and exchange in the defense industry. (Source: Korea Herald.)

This policy has started with the transfer of technology under license for the KMA-1A Abrams tanks, K-2 rifles (Korean version of M-16) and ammunition back in the 1980s. The technology was transferred and Korea now manufactures 80 percent of the spare parts. From this technology, the ROK was able to build an indigenous armored personnel carrier that it has offered for sale to South Asian countries. From the technology transfer gained in the depot-level repair of the F-4s, the ROK gained the technical personnel to be able to start its aircraft industry. With the experience gained from the KF-16, the ROK was able to build its first indigenous aircraft the T-50/A-50 “Golden Eagle” project. The A-50 entered the aircraft competitions in 2006 the start of its military aircraft industry.

The process of technology transfer will be a key component to weapons systems selection. In the selection of the F-15K, it was stated that it was “interoperability” that sold the aircraft — though the French offered a better deal on technology transfer and the aircraft outperformed the F-15. However, the ROK said it was only by .1 percent and that was not important — so they readjusted the contract requirements much to the anger of the French — to ensure the US won the contract. (SITE NOTE: Actually the F-15K buy was used as leverage to gain concessions from the US on the Yongsan and 2d ID moves. To the US it was “pork barrel politics” as the fighter is at the end of its active USAF life cycle and the St. Louis lines were going to have to shut down. So the US promised to retain the F-15E in use in the Guard and Reserves for 15 more years. The ROK also selected the F-15K because the French aircraft was brand new and spare parts would have been prohibitively high. With the F-15K there was the bone-yard at Davis-Montham filled with Foreign Military Sales discount parts. To the ROK, the F-15K was a “cheap” aircraft in replacement parts — which is why it continued to fly the F-4, F-5E and A-37 until the present day. Regardless of all the conflicting views, the F-15K has DUAL ENGINES which is what is required for use in the mountainous terrain of Korea. A single engine F-16 is a great air superiority fighter — though getting a little long in the tooth — but as a single engine aircraft, it is a disaster waiting to happen in mountainous areas.)

Question of Weapon system Process and Corruption The DAPA’s first major job will be the selection of a contractor to supply four early warning aircraft, a 2-trillion-won business code-named “E-X Project.” The Israeli aircraft was selected for the low bid, but it was found that some critical communication components were US technology — and the US appeared reluctant to transfer the technology. The decision is expected to come around May. The foundation of the agency is a key part of government efforts to reform the nation’s scandal-ridden arms procurement programs. (See Roh Moo-hyun: ROK “Self-Reliant Defense” in BIG Trouble for details of on-going defense contracts.)

(SITE NOTE: We don’t know if this new agency will help the accusations of corruption. In the F-15K procurement process, a whistle blower was hung out to dry because he allegedly accepted “gifts” of $5,000 from the French — a pitiance if one considers the risk to his loss of rank and prestige. It didn’t smell right. The question of who got the millions doled out to the real power brokers — the ones who approved the F-15K — remains unknown. These power brokers are the folks who changed the rules after the French aircraft performance beat out the US aircraft.

We also wonder if this will change the irregular bidding process when one aircraft wins — as the Boeing AWACS did because everyone else drops out — and the ROK simply goes back out for rebids. The only major change is that now the money to “grease the skids” will have to flow through the Ministry of Defense — instead of the separate services. Before long this “one-stop” procurement agency will find out that each branch of service has special needs — even for the same item. We don’t believe it is the answer — just as Sec of Defense McNamarra found out during the fiascos of the Kennedy and Johnson Vietnam era.)

An Korea Heral editorial stated:

“When it comes to arms procurement, the importance of transparency and fairness cannot be overemphasized. There were at least eight agencies, including the three military branches and the Agency for Defense Development, which were involved in weapons acquisition. This not only led to inefficiency but also to corruption. With the involvement of corrupt politicians, arms procurement often became a hotbed for dirty money and illegal lobbying.

DAPA director, Kim Jung-il, says his agency has installed various anti-corruption devices, such as the appointment of ombudsmen and the inclusion of civilian experts. The agency has promised to mete out harsh penalties, including disqualification from bidding, for military contractors if they are found guilty of wrongdoing.

All this sounds very good. But Kim and other DAPA staff need to be reminded that whatever seemingly perfect system you may have in place, it will not be effective enough to completely eradicate corrupt bureaucrats and businessmen. Moreover, they need to heed the concerns that military contractors who previously had to deal with multiple agencies now have to work with just one single agency. Indeed, DAPA is a monopoly, which spends 10 trillion won a year and which employs 2,200 people. It needs the most stringent code of ethics of any government agency or department.

Securing political independence in defense contracts is as important as preventing corruption. It was an open secret that during the tenure of past governments, the final decision was often made by the president. We emphasize this fact because the Roh administration publicly advocates military independence from the United States. There is nothing wrong in seeking some diversification in the procurement of our military weapons systems, which still depends heavily on the United States. Roh’s personal beliefs, however, should not be the deciding factor in making these choices.

Immediate Problem with Classified Data Leak DAPA, which began its business on Jan. 2, was immediately under fire for the leakage of confidential documents. The agency “mistakenly” posted a three-page dossier regarding the country’s mid- to long-term arms buildup programs classified as second and third military secrets on its official Website (www.dapa.go.kr) on Jan.3-4. It deleted the contents 30 hours after the documents were posted, but about 250 arms purchases and development plans were found to have been already distributed via the Internet, officials at the Defense Ministry said. Included in the plans of the leaked dossier was the Navy’s plan to build six 1,800-ton level Type 214 submarines between 2012 and 2020 and deploy three 3,500-ton class next-generation vessels in the field by 2020 in stages. The documents also revealed that the country is seeking to build advanced fighter jets using its own technology beginning 2018, under the “KF-X” program, which is in the last stage of a feasibility study by the state-run Agency for the Defense Development. It also included mass production plans for the A-50 light attack plane, the Army’s plan for unmanned reconnaissance drones and production plans for 130mm and 227mm multiple rocket launchers. (Source: Korea Times.)

The Defense Security Command (DSC) looked into the information leakage case, intended to charge some 10 DAPA officials concerned, and handed over the results of investigation to the National Intelligence Service, Park said. Under the current law, military documents are classified into three categories according to their contents. Nine of 538,000 secret documents are classified as first-class secrets. About 235,600 belong to the second class and some 308,100 to the third. The leaked DAPA information was in the second and third class category.

An official at the DAPA said, “The documents only amounted to three A4-form pages, and the administration will unveil most of the information after going through proper procedures.” (Source: Joongang Ilbo.) (SITE NOTE: We tend to agree as we have known about these “secrets” for some time by following the news reports and developments over the years. These “secrets” are really “open secrets.”)

On 18 Jan it was reported that evidence supporting the charges was obtained during a joint investigation by The Defense Security Command and the National Intelligence Service. The three pages of data concerning medium-term weapons procurement appeared on the agency’s website on Jan. 1, the day the agency was launched. The military’s own prosecution will conduct the case. “As a result of our probe, we have concluded the disclosed document contains classified information and that five field grade officers at the Defense Acquisition Program Administration were responsible for the incident,” Jeon Jong-chan, spokesman for the Defense Security Command, said. “We have committed the officials to the Defense Ministry’s prosecution office on charges of violating confidentiality regulations.”

The detained DAPA officials are alleged to have skipped set procedures regarding the release of confidential information when they instructed subordinate staff to put the document online. But a spokesman at the DAPA said the five claim not to have been aware that a third-class confidentiality rating was protecting the information. The Defense Ministry categorizes documents into three classes of confidentiality of which first class is the highest and three the lowest. (Source: Korea Herald.)
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ROK Army Clears Landmines (Jan 2006) The South Korean military has completed a project to remove about 4,000 landmines scattered along the border with the North. The army also cleared a 10,000 sq. m area on the southern side of the civilian passage restriction line. The project is part of a grand plan launched in 2000 to remove all mines around civilian access areas by 2006. (NOTE: The UNC controls the DMZ so the clearing of the mines became a highly political topic. People crossing the DMZ must still be approved by the UNC for crossing.)

In 2006, a large area from Dorasan Station to Paju City will be dug up at the request of the Unification Ministry. There, the ministry plans to set up a cross-border power transmission line for North Korea. (NOTE: Though the cross-border power transmission project was contingent upon the North giving up its nuclear weapons, the Unification Ministry is proceeding with the project as though that agreement was a minor technicality.) (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)

The towns near the DMZ, such as Paju and Uijongbu, are starting to clear away the old tank traps that lined the roads and to expand the highways leading into the cities. The movement is part of an overall plan to “demilitarize” the area below the DMZ fostered by the Unification Ministry — and to bring in new industry into the area.
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Photo Op: ROKAF F-15K Flys Over Tokdo (Jan 2006) In a photo op, ROKAF chief of staff, Kim Sung-il, flying the recently introduced F-15K fighter on 2 Jan led a formation flight over Tokdo. The aircraft took off from an air base (K2) in the southern city of Daegu at 4 p.m. and reached Dokdo islets in the East Sea about 20 minutes later. Kim led a squad of two F-15Ks and two F-16s and circled above the islets for several minutes, staying in communication with the Ulleungdo control unit and the Master Control and Report Center. Kim’s flight was a symbolic gesture to inform Korea and the world that the Dokdo Islets belong to Korea.

F-15K fighter jet, regarded as one of the most powerful fighter jets in the world, can last around an hour in aerial combat whereas existing Korean fighter jets would last only five minutes over Dokdo, making the new jets eminently suitable to defend the outlying islets in the East Sea which Tokyo claims are Japanese territory. The message is that the F-15K is now considered operational in the defense of the country.

New Year’s Greeting with F-15K

The next day, the Japanese government asked Korea through diplomatic channels to explain the sortie over Dokdo by Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Kim Sung-il at the controls of one of the newly introduced F-15K fighter jets. The Japanese Embassy in Seoul called the Foreign Ministry, and requested an explanation of the motive behind the sortie. The official said the call was not in the nature of a protest, but it is rare for a foreign government to ask why Korea’s Air Force chief of staff piloted a jet. Seoul reportedly told the embassy the aim of Kim’s flight was to mark the New Year, boost the morale of pilots and test the new F-15K jet himself.
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ROK Builds More Subs (Jan 2006) The ROK announced plans to double its submarine fleet size. The point is that the ROK is consciously stating that the missile threat is less important than the underwater threat. The Aegis vessels would form a missile defense shield. At the same time, the Japanese are recognizing the submarine threat to its fleet — notably from the Chinese — and are developing shallow-depth anti-submarine torpedoes to be dropped from anti-submarine aircraft. It should be noted that with the top-secret satellite thermal technology that the US has in place, the detection of submarines has been much enhanced. (NOTE: The ROK has been notified by the US of North Korean submarines in their waters using this technology, but the ROK Navy could not locate the subs.)

Until early 1999, Daewoo Shipbuilding had enjoyed a virtual monopoly in the South Korean submarine industry. However, this changed when the ROK Ministry of Defense allowed Hyundai Heavy Industry (HHI) to participate in the KSS-II submarine project. In late November 2000 HHI was selected for the 1.27 trillion-won ($1.12 billion) project to build submarines with the German firm’s technology and design. HHI, a shipbuilding arm of the giant Hyundai Group, outbid rival Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering Ltd. to team up with HDW. HHI won the contract as it offered lower prices and was in better financial shape than Daewoo Shipbuilding. In early November 2000 the ROK Defense Ministry picked the German firm Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft AG (HDW) and its Type 214 submarine as the foreign contractor for the next-generation “KSS-II” submarine project to supply three 1,800 ton-class submarines to the Navy by 2009.

SS Yichon (SS-62) entering port (Changbogo class)

Type 214 Sub

Korea Boosts Submarine Project to Double Fleet
Korea has expanded a plan to build three 1,800-ton level 214 submarines starting in 2012 by another six in a bid to double the country’s fleet by 2020, the armed forces said Wednesday. Observers pricked up their ears at the choice of submarines over Aegis vessels as a key strategic weapon to counter any threat posed by powerful nations like China and Japan in the event of reunification with North Korea.

According to a statement from the Defense Acquisition Program Administration on Wednesday and other sources, the Navy and Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to launch three German-made 214-grade submarines by 2010 in the first phase, and start building six more subs starting in 2012, in addition to the nine Korea already has, a decision that reflects their fresh assessment of what will be needed in the mid- to long term. A source confirmed that the total number of submarines is to be upped to around 18.

On top of the 214-level subs, it has also recently become clear that the administration and Navy plan to acquire three stronger and bigger 3,000-ton submarines estimated to cost W3.7 trillion between 2010 and 2022. Currently, the Navy has nine German-made Chanbogo class subs (Type 209) and three Dolphin class subs. When the Chanbogo class subs introduced in the 1990s are retired, they will be gradually replaced with the next-generation subs to maintain the total at 18.

The 214 class submarines with a 65 m hull and 1,800-ton displacement outstrip the Chanbogo subs, the Navy’s current core subs, in scale and performance. Thus they are capable of two weeks’ continuous operation at sea and are armed with up to 20 torpedoes, anti-ship missiles and mines. When equipped with ship-to-ground cruise missiles, they are capable of attacking strategic targets in both North Korea and neighboring countries.

Japan has 16 state-of-the-art submarines including eight 3,000-ton Oyashio class submarines, while China has a fleet of 60 including Han class offensive nuclear-powered submarines. The U.S. has as its mainstay 7,000-ton Los Angeles class submarines propelled by nuclear power, and North Korea has 22 1,700-ton Romio class subs.
But these new submarines are really not news. The ROK had announced its intentions back in 2004. In January 2004, it was reported in Agence France-Presse (“South Korea Plans to Build 3,500-ton Suybmarines,” 01/26/04) that the ROK had formed a research team to build 3,500-ton new submarines as part of efforts to reduce its reliance on US firepower. Some 1.7 billion won (1.4 million dollars) has been set aside for a two-year study to develop the new submarines but no decision has been made yet on how they will be powered according to the Ministry of Defense. The navy plans to deploy the new submarines from 2010, it said. The plan was unveiled after the newspaper Chosun Ilbo reported that the ROK was considering the deployment of nuclear-powered submarines from 2012. Won Jang-Hwan, head of the ministry’s arms procurement bureau, said diesel engines were being considered to power 3,500-ton submarines. “There is no need to develop nuclear-powered submarines,” Won told reporters. The ROK has nine 1,200-ton submarines and plans to deploy three 1,800-ton vessels worth 2.27 trillion won from 2007, all with diesel or diesel-electric engines designed by a German firm (HDW).

But these submarines will be limited to coastal defense in the short term. On 21 Jan 2006 Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-ung acknowledged the need to build up the naval forces to protect national interests in future sovereignty disputes, to protect maritime transportation and resources, and contribute to international security, but he opposed upgrading the country’s naval forces into becoming a “blue water” navy in the short-term. Some in the Navy and academia have long been asserting the necessity of widening naval forces’ operations to distant oceans to protect its sea lanes of commerce. The construction of the “stealth” destroyers are the prelude to this long-term plan — along with pipe dreams of a carrier in 2010. (Source: Korea Herald.)

As a side note, Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-ung proposed selling South Korean-built submarines to Indonesia when he met with his Indonesian counterpart in Jakarta in Jan 2006. Yoon offered to sell 1,300-ton Type 209 submarines, to be built by Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering (DSME), to the Southeast Asian country during a meeting with Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono. In competition with China and Russia for the Indonesian Navy ugrade, the proposal does illustrate the view of the ROK in procurement and gaining of technology transfer. It then takes the technology and turns it into indigenous military industry expansion.
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ROK to Equip Aegis Destroyer with Domestic Cruise Missile (Jan 2006) According to Yonhap News on 30 Jan 2005, an Aegis-equipped destroyer under construction by the South Korean Navy will be equipped with a domestically built cruise missile aimed at replacing U.S.-made anti-ship Harpoon missiles. South Korea plans to build three 7,000-ton-class, Aegis-equipped destroyers by 2012 and to equip the first vessel with the ship-to-ship missiles, which have a range of up to 150 kilometers.

U.S. manufacturing giant Lockheed Martin was awarded the contract to provide an Aegis combat system, which would make South Korea the fourth nation to have the state-of-the-art system after the United States, Japan and Spain. The missiles will also be mounted on four 4,000-ton-class destroyers with radar-evading “stealth” functions the South Korean Navy has already built.

The missile, developed by the state-run Agency for Defense Development (ADD), drew media attention after its successful test-firing in December 2005. The missile precisely hit a designated target on the East Sea four minutes after its firing from a launching pad about 150 kilometers away. The ADD has spent 100 billion won (US$102 million) to develop the missiles since 1996 to replace Harpoon missiles produced by U.S.-based Boeing (formerly McDonnell Douglas) that have a range of up to 90 kilometers. The Harpoon missile, introduced in 1977, has served as one of the most common air, ship and submarine missiles.
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February 2006
MND Policy Goals for 2006: Independent Intelligence Gathering and complete Assumption of 10 tasks (Feb 2006) Under the plans, the 1,000-man reduction of Korean troops in Iraq will take place in five stages starting at the end of April. (SITE NOTE: As the ROK is in the safe haven of Irbil, there is really no worries of any security impact. No ROK troops have been killed — and the closest to killing action was when a ROK troop accidentally killed an Iraqi with his K2 rifle. It’s a shame that the proud ROK military legend has been tarnished by the impression that they are hiding from danger. This is NOT true as the Zaytun unit are all volunteers. With the US and Japan discussing pullouts, the ROK drawdown became a non-issue.)

The ministry also aims to start work in the middle of this year on increasing Korea’s independent intelligence gathering and processing capacity. (SITE NOTE: The ROK is pegging their hopes on the Arirang 2 (still in development with Israel — and to use Russian rockets for launch) which will give it spy capabilities of the North. Regardless, even with this satellite, the ROK will be far behind the US and Japanese intel capabilities. (NOTE: Arirang 2 was scheduled for launch in July 2006 from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome, about 200-kilometers northeast of Moscow.) The ROK is reliant on US intel — and the trust between the two intel communities is almost nil. Examples of the Robert Kim, spying for the ROK, and reluctance to allow the intel from North Korean defectors to be shared has led to this impasse. As to the dirty hands work, the Roh administration turned over domestic spying to the ROK KNP and external intelligence to the NIS. The functions of counter-espionage has been gutted by the Roh administration.)

Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-ung said the Korean military took over responsibility for blocking naval intrusions by North Korean special forces in January as part of a transfer of 10 duties from the U.S. Forces Korea. So far South Korea has taken over seven duties, with the rest due mid-year. (SITE NOTE: The assumption of blocking the naval intrusions by DPRK Special Ops forces (SOF) was easy. The ROK in 1995 simply threw up their arms and said they could not stop them. The barbed wire fences came down along the beaches (if the farmers wanted to do the work). The fact was proven true when in 1996 as a submarine was found stranded on the shore near Kangnung — and reported by a passing taxi driver, not the military. The 20-man crew committed a murder/suicide pact. A massive manhunt ensued for two SOF operatives. 16 South Korean soldiers and civilians died and 27 were wounded. but two escaped with the entire ROK army searching. (Source: CNN.) Other well-publicized incursions have occurred subsequently. The ROK cannot — and will not — perform this function despite its claims that it is developing an indigenous coastal radar to fill this void. The second problem is the ROK inability to react to intel from the US thermal satellite info showing subs in Korean waters — which the ROK after failing to find the subs, claimed the intel was faulty. The subs were spotted later in international waters.)

The same article stated that Korea will increase the number of troops for UN peacekeeping operations in trouble spots like East Timor by 400-500 and drastically reduce the time until they are ready for deployment from the three or four months it takes now, the Defense Ministry said. Announcing its policy goals for the year, the ministry said it will set up units on permanent standby for deployment at the request of the UN, and decided to take a more proactive role in the UN Stand-by Arrangements System (UNSAS) that determines the size of detachments based on the type of conflict in trouble spots. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.) (SITE NOTE: The UN Role is political eye-wash. It provides good press for Korea with minimal outlays and danger to the affected troops.)
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Controversy of EO-X Selection (Feb 2006) Controversy is arising over the Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF)’s selection of Israel’s Electro-Optics Industries Ltd (ELOP) which had failed to be chosen as a main provider for the state-of-the-art EO-X system aimed at collecting information on North Korea in 1999. “We again pushed forth the EO-X business since 2004 to replace LOROP, a camera for RPV/Drone that is currently being used, because it is outdated,” the air force official said yesterday, and added, “So, we selected Israel’s ELOP as our foreign supplier last December.”

However, within and outside of ROKAF, suspicions are arising, and some have argued that the process and form of selection should be officially unveiled as ELOP was selected within only six years after it failed the assessment test of EO-X system in 1999. “We cannot let the public know the process of selection considering that the business is unofficially driven,” said ROKAF amid this turmoil.

In 1999, Raytheon and ROI in the U.S and Thomson in France, along with ELOP, submitted business proposals to ROKAF which set the goal of introducing an EO-X system in 2003. At that time, ROKAF was assessing four companies based on technology transmission, performance, and price. ELOP failed the test. ELOP immediately complained about the criteria of the test. The business had been delayed for several years because the Ministry of National Defense carried out a full-scale inspection. Rivals complained about the delays because they believed that ELOP would have enough time to make up for their weak points. (Source: Donga Ilbo.)
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Navy to Transfer Shipbuilding Technology to Austraila The Navy is considering transferring its “shipbuilding technology and ship parts in return for a royalty” at the request of its Australian counterpart. The Australian Navy is seeking to model after South Korea뭩 KDX-III program aimed at building Aegis-equipped advanced destroyers and negotiations are now underway. (NOTE: This is an interesting proposal as the ROK operates under license on many of the “technology transfer” items.) The request was made as the Australian military thinks that the Korean version of 7,000 ton-class destroyer is much more suitable for its Navy than those of the United States and Japan. (NOTE: This is a strange remark as the Australian design is supposed to be a variant of the US Arleigh Burke class destroyer with the Spanish F-100 destroyer as an alternate design. The Japanese Kongo class is an improved variant of the Arleigh Burke class. However, the KDXIII has some firsts in its designs that make it attractive.)

Under the Sea 4000 project, the Royal Australian Navy plans to acquire three Air Warfare Destroyers, for introduction into service from 2013. These ships will perform the same area air defence role as the withdrawn Perth class destroyers; the Chief of the Navy described their key capability as providing “a protective 멳ubble?over whatever area they뭨e working in”, in which any hostile aircraft or missiles will be detected and shot down by the ship’s combat systems. The consortium responsible describes the ships as capable of engaging enemy aircraft “at a range of over 150 kilometres”. The ships will also supplement the remaining Adelaide class frigates. In August 2005 the Australian Government announced that Gibbs & Cox was the ‘preferred designer’ of the Air Warfare Destroyer (AWD). While development of the AWD will be focused on a variant of Gibbs & Cox’s Arleigh Burke class destroyer, the Australian Government has not yet ordered any ships and the Spanish F100 design remains the official alternative to the Burke.

The Air Warfare Destroyers will feature the Aegis combat system. Combat system integration will be performed by Raytheon and the ships will be built by Australian Submarine Corporation (ASC) Shipbuilding, at Osborne, South Australia. The first AWD is scheduled to be delivered in October 2013 with the second ship to be delivered in 2015 and the third in 2017. The project cost is estimated at “at least” $6 billion, according to press reports, though reports were vague as to exactly what items are included in the figure. The Australian Minister for Defence announced on 20 January 2006 that the Air Warfare Destroyers will be named Hobart, Brisbane and Sydney. (Source: Australian air warfare destroyer .)

KDX II Stealth Destroyer Launching (2004)
To build a “cooperative self-reliant defense posture,뮃 the ROK Navy plans to build three KDX-III vessels by 2012. The vessels will be made by Hyundai Heavy Industries. KDX-III class destroyers’ highly advanced capabilities (notably AN/SPY-1D radars) makes them closer to cruisers in terms of classification than destroyers. KDX-III class destroyers are often compared to Ticonderoga class cruiser because they both harbor AN/SPY-1 multi-fuction radar antennas. One notable difference between the KDX-III destroyers and Arleigh Burke class destroyer is that KDX-III class destroyers will be able to hold 128 missiles at once while Arleigh Burke class destroyers hold 96 missiles. KDX-III class destroyers are the world’s first destroyers to implement highly advanced AEGIS combat systems with RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missile weapons systems. It will aslo harbor Ram Block1 SAAM and SM-2 Block ?A (MK 41 VLS 80cel) surface-to-air missiles, CIWS 30mm Goalkeepers, two torpedo mounts in 324mm KMK 32 configuration, 32 cruise missiles, 4 Anti-ship missiles, and 16 Anti-submarine Rockets. Its Mark 41 Vertical Launch System will be able to hold 128 missiles.

The ROK Navy embarked a three-phase KDX program in 1986, as part of efforts to form a new “strategic mobile fleet,뮃 consisting of destroyers, submarines and anti-submarine aircraft. Last May, the Navy launched its fourth 4,000 ton-class KDX-II destroyer, “Wang Geon,뮃 equipped with sophisticated weapons systems, including radar-evading stealth technology. Two more KDX-II hulls will also be set afloat by 2007 — one launched in Mar 2006. (See Wikipedia for KDXIII info.)

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The Ministry of Defense on 23 Mar announced the deployment of three, domestically-built advanced guided missiles for the Army and Navy, the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA). The sophisticated precision-guided weapons are “Shingung (New Bow),뮃 a portable short-range surface-to-air missile; “Haesung (Sea Star),뮃 a long-range cruise missile, and “Chong Sango (Blue Shark),?a lightweight torpedo.뮃

The New Bow (Shingung), developed by the Agency for Defense Development (ADD) under a $71 million project since 1995, is a shoulder-launched missile targeting helicopters, or low-flying fighter and transport aircraft, DAPA officials said. The 10 kilogram missile features an integral Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) system, full night and adverse weather capabilities, and a two-color infrared seeker to aid in negating countermeasures. The portable anti-aircraft missile Singung was developed over eight years starting in 1995 with a W70 billion budget. It has a 7 km maximum target range and flies at a maximum altitude of 3.5 km and maximum speed of mach 2.1. The Singung is designed to automatically explode against a target flying within a radius of 1.5 m, shattering into hundreds of pieces while shooting down a target. It is mainly intended to bring down enemy aircraft and helicopter that infiltrate at low altitude. It boasts more than 90 percent-plus hit-ratio accuracy and comes at a unit price of W180 million. Only four countries including the United States, Russia and France, have that kind of portable surface-to-air missile systems. According to the Defense Ministry, the missile is lighter and more accurate than the Stinger missile of the U.S., Russia뭩 Igla and France뭩 Mistral.

Hae-song (Sea Star) Cruise Missile unveiling (23 Mar 06) (Korea TImes)

The Sea Star (Haesung) is a long-range cruise missile to equip the Navy뭩 Aegis destroyers which will be built from 2008 under the KDX-III program, the officials said. The missile will also outfit the Navy뭩 advanced vessels, including the 4,000 ton-class KDX-II series equipped with radar-evading stealth technology. W100 billion (US$100 million) has been poured into development of the Haesung cruise missile between 1996 and 2003. Its effective radius is around 150 km. Launched off a warship, submarine or aircraft, the weapon can strike any vessel and even land targets within its 400-500 km range. The missile, which has a longer range than the Styx anti-ship missile and is more accurate, flies just above the surface and is thus difficult to intercept. The ADD has set aside $102 million to develop the state-of-the-art ship-to-ship missile to replace U.S.-made Harpoon missiles.

The Blue Shark anti-submarine lightweight torpedo can be launched from both sea vessels and aircraft such as P-3C Orion maritime surveillance aircraft, and anti-submarine Super Lynx helicopters, according to the officials. The torpedo, which boasts speeds in excess of 45 knots (83 kilometers per hour), is capable of attacking enemy submarines over 20 kilometers away. It is the seventh such weapon of this kind in the world. Over the last 10 years, W50 billion went into the project. The torpedo measures 32 cm in diameter, 2.7 m in length and weighs 280 kg. Traveling at a maximum speed of 45 knots (83 km/h), it can penetrate an iron sheet of 1.5 m thickness. The torpedo, featuring sonar technology to detect and attack enemy submarines, is capable of penetrating 1.5 meters steel plating to explode within the submarine. The development cost for the Blue Shark since 1995 is $43 million and its price tag per unit is some $867,000, almost half the cost of similar foreign-made torpedoes, the officials said. (Source: Korea Times.)
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MAPS

Map of North and South Korea

Map of Korea (Expressways)

Pyeongtaek-Songtan-Anjung

Songtan Greater Area

Songtan Road Map

Road Map of Songtan area

Map of Osan AB

Map of Osan AB Flightline (NOTE: The Diamond A-D where the nuclear alerts were pulled.)

Map of Songtan Middle School (2001)
Daughter attended (2004-2005) and our apartment is at Kunyong Apartments on top right. On left is the Songtan Branch Office of Pyongtaek City Hall.

Map of Shinjang Shopping Mall (2000)

Map of Shinjang Shopping Mall (2000)

LINKS TO LOCAL AREA:

Pyongtaek (Beetle) — (Hangul) Exceptional 3D type maps of cities of Korea — including Pyeongtaek under Kyonggi-do.

Pyongtaek Map

Pyongtaek

Pyongtaek Map

Welcome to Pyongtaek City Pyongtaek-shi contains: Paengseong-eup Anjung-eup Jinwi-myeon Seotan-myeon Godeok-myeon Oseong-myeon Cheongbuk-myeon Poseung-myeon Hyeondeok-myeon Jungang-dong Seojeong-dong Songtan-dong Jisan-dong Songbuk-dong Sinjang 1(il)-dong Sinjang 2(i)-dong Sinpyeong-dong Wonpyeong-dong Tongbok-dong Bijeon 1(il)-dong Bijeon 2(i)-dong Segyo-dong (NOTE: Ichong-dong missing from this list)

Songtan Map — Topographical map includes geographic data

Osan City Hall

Songtan Fire Station

City population: Korea

Pyongtaek City: General Info

Diaspora (hangul) — Chart of local doctors and hospitals in English.

Songtan Elementary School — Founded as a branch school on 1 Nov 1945 named Seojeong-ni Childrens School. On 1 Sep 1947 and had three classrooms. On 30 Jun 1949, compulsory universal education for elementary school became law. On 1 Jul 1949, there were 6 grades in the school. On 30 Sep 1949, it received a female principal. Most certainly after the North invaded classes ceased until the war stabilized on the DMZ. Most likely reopened in 1952 though not stated as such. On 1 March 1996, it was renamed Songtan Elementary School. (Kajae-dong, Pyongtaek City in the vicinity of the Seojeong Train Station.)

Songshin Elementary School founded on 1 Mar 1963
Songbuk Elementary School — Founded in 1955.
Hyo-myung Middle School — Founded circa 1953

Taegwang Middle School founded in 1964
Songtan Girls’ Middle School — Founded circa 1980

Songtan Girls’ High School — Located in Jisan-5 dong, Pyongtaek City. Founded on 10 Apr 1984.

Songtan Middle School — This is the school my daughter attended (2004-2005) when we first moved to Songtan. Founded 15 Jul 1994. Located at 1195 Jisan-dong, Pyeongtaek City.

Kumbang Middle School — Founded circa 1990

Eunhae Middle School — Founded circa 1984

Taegwang High School Founded in 1969.
Hyomyung High School founded in 1956.
Songtan High School — Located in Ichong-dong, Pyongtaek City. Founded on 1 Nov 1999 with 12 classrooms for three grades.

Kyungmoon College (Seojeong College) — Community College opened 1983; Dept of Business Mgt; Dept Social Welfare; Hotel Management; Food preparation; Vet care. Located near the Songtan Branch of City Hall in Seojeong-dong

Seojeong College

Songtan Seogwang Church (Onnori Church)

Songtan Central Baptist Church

Naver.com Search Engine

Daum.net Search Engine

Gyeonggi-do: Practical Guide for Foreigners — Practical information on almost all topics for a foreigner living on the economy (Highly recommended reading for foreigners)

OSAN AB LINKS

Osan AB: Retired Activities Office: Jack Terwiel — I can not say enough good words about this one-man show. The information on the RAO site is too much to assimilate at one sitting and so indepth that it is phenomenal. This is the ultimate resource for Osan AB.

Osan AB: Retired Activities Office (Newsletter)

Osan AB: AFKN Emergency Evacuation Frequencies

Relocation Net: Seoul (Useful Info) — Base Operator: DSN 315-784-4110 // 011-82-333-661-1110 // Telephone Access……………. : Commercial 011-82-333-66l-XXXX(prefix 784) 011-82-333-660-XXXX(prefix 783) To contact Songtan from Osan AB, dial “99″ plus the six plus the the local number. Also, to reach Osan AB from other cities in Korea dial 0333-661 (784 prefixes) or 0333-660 (783 prefixes). To call Osan AB from a commercial phone in the US dial 011-82-333-660 or 661-XXXX.

American Forces Spouses Club, Seoul: Shinjang Mall: Shopping Bag Lady — Excellent synopsis of shops on mall

— Free classified ads for USFK members selling items

BLOG LINKS

GI in Korea

Marmot’s hole blog

The Lost Nomad blog

Anglertown: Fishing in Korea Lakes, ponds, streams near Songtan/Pyongtaek for fishing for bass

Flying Yangban blog

Songtan After Dark yahoo user group

Songtan (Osan AB) chat and info msn user group