오산기지1965-69 이시우 오산기지1965-69

1965
Life in Songtan According to Jim Price, MSgt, USAF (Ret) who was then assigned to the 6145th Military Advisory Group to assist the ROKAF. His office was just outside the gate in a hotel that stood where the road to the Bravo gate runs. He mentioned that his office was so close to base that he had a water line run from the base to his office off-base. The Main Gate was only one road out the gate to the MSR-1 then. (The Namsan Road leading to Namsan Village under Hill 170 did not exist.) All the roads were dirt which turned to mud when it rained. (Source: Verbral conversation Kalani O’Sullivan and Jim Price, Jun 2005)

Between the Main Gate and the back gate, there were only a few farm houses scattered about primarily along the hillside of the base perimeter. The rice fields were being rapidly reclaimed in the low-lying areas of the Chicol Village area. The area was expanding outward from the Main Gate area up towards the Sonbuk-dong area. Houses were built on both sides of the railroad tracks and up the hill.

The following are photos taken by Harold (Harry) Tezlaf during his first tour at Osan in 1965-1966 assigned to the 2146th Communications Group. One can see there were improvements being made just outside the gate. The Main Gate was still just a gate shack and the roads were all dirt, but the clap-trap shanties of the 1950s had given way to more permanent structures. The poorer structures had corrugated iron or transite (corrugated asbestoes/concrete sheets) roofs with the walls made of mud brick covered with stucco. The farmers’ homes now showed a mix of tile roofs and old rice thatch indicating progress. Electricity lines were strung everywhere. The first sewer lines (drainage) were installed.

In the village across the tracks in Songbuk dong along original MSR-1 (Taehyun Road), there was the Jaeil movie theater — where the Uri Bank (formerly Kukmin Bank) now stands. Two buildings down was where the intracity buses to Seoul was at. Up on the top of the hill of Milwal road — where the Capital Hotel stands now — the larger Seojong Theater had been built. Nearby was the intercity bus stop. Higher up the hills newer houses were being built with tile roofs, concrete covered courtyards and cinderblock walls around the property. However, most impressive was the appearance of television antennas. Besides the older Japanese-era buildings, newer concrete two-story structures were being built along MSR-1. In the open market, the appearance of consumer goods (albeit very limited) indicated the economy was growing slowly.

Harry Tezlaf at Turtle (near where Commissary in 2005) (1965) (Harry Tezlaf)
Pond near Turtle Monument (where Commissary is in 2005) (1965) (Harry Tezlaf)

The Turtle Stele in 1968. Notice the low fence possible to section off sump area (low area) near where the Osan American High School is today. (1968) (Unknown: From Osan AB Yahoo Group Photos)

(NOTE: On 28 Aug 2000, Brig Gen David Clary, 51st Wing Commander, transferred the Yi Taeyun Stele to the Vice-mayor of Pyeongtaek City, Yi Pil-woon. Afterwards, City Workers moved the Stele to a 14th Century Confucian School at Hangkyo, Bongnam-ri, Chinwi-myeon, Pyeongtaek City along with other monuments. (Source: MIG Flyer, 1 Sep 2000) The stele was in honor of the Kwangju Governor Lee Taeyu in 1661. There is some uncertainty about the origin of this stele. An improbable tale is that it was erected in the area in 1661 and was present when the base was constructed. A more likely tale stated that it was relocated from Palgongsan near Taegu during installation of a communications site. (Source: Osan AB: Conservation.) It was turned over to the Pyeongtaek City government in Aug 2000 — though humorously the Osan AB claimed at the time that there were no formal records of this stele being in the USAF possession until 1989.)

View of Farmers’ Houses and Train Tracks beyond (1965) (Harry Tezlaf)

(NOTE: Taken from east side of Hill 180 (before Namsan Village) looking towards Jinwi-myeon. The houses on the top right are in Ojwa-dong as one enters Songtan from Jinwi-myeon. There is a faint white line at the tip of the hill near Ojwa-gaol (hamlet) going down. This is the Jinwi River that flows past the north of the base. There is a faint line just below Ojwa-gaol which is Route 1 (MSR-1). The tracks in the distance are denoted by the telephone/electric poles that run parallel with the tracks. The village in the distance to the left is Mokcheon Village that was between the dirt back gate road (now only used for Shinjang-ni Village) and the Shinjang Mall Road area. The picture appears to be taken from base perimeter and shows the top tier of houses on the slope of Namsan Village. As one looks out, there appears to be a path going from left to right. This is the rail spur and small road from the Shinjang area leading to the “freight gate” at the tip of Bomb Dump Hill.

Main Gate Osan AB (1965) (Harry Tezlaf)
Street Leading to MSR-1 up the incline (Shinjang Road) (1965) (Harry Tezlaf)

Beginnings of Jungang Open Market. A decade after the Korean War, commerce is starting to grow with the appearance of small shops and open stalls. (1965) (Harry Tezlaf)
Outside Main Gate (1965) (Harry Tezlaf)

First sewers in Songtan (1965) (Harry Tezlaf)
Movie billboard along road and one of the few trees (1965) (Harry Tezlaf) (NOTE: The Songtan Catholic Church — built in 1965 — is seen to the right on the skyline. This picture is taken along the Shinjang Road leading to MSR-1 before the area where shops lined both sides of the street.)

Store selling Beer & Soju (1965) (Harry Tezlaf) (NOTE: The cases of empty soju bottles outside the store.)
Typical Songtan house in winter. Houses built with mudbrick and stucco with transite (concrete/asbestoes) roofing. Chimney for hondol heating system with charcoal. Notice the TV antennas indicating the inhabitants are American military. (1965) (Harry Tezlaf)

Songtan tile rooftops and construction (1965) (Harry Tezlaf) (NOTE: These houses are the newer houses built with cinder blocks and having ceramic tile roofs. The houses had a small cinderblock wall built around them for “privacy.” The use of concrete cinderblocks on the walls and in construction indicates that concrete was now available as an inexpensive building material. The method for mixing concrete was to dig a hole in the ground and mix the cement with sand and aggregate (small stones). The sifting screen is for aggregate. Uncertain of location in Chicol Village area.)

Road leading to MSR-1 at Railroad Tracks (1965) (Harry Tezlaf) (NOTE: Position of Jwa-dong Ridgeline indicates that this is the Shinjang Mall Road crossing. The Mokcheon pedestrian underpass is in this location today.)

Intersection of MSR-1 (1965) (Harry Tezlaf) (NOTE: Intersection with MSR-1 ahead. Electric poles indicate this is at the top of the ridgeline and street progresses down the other side.)
MSR-1 looking towards Osan-ni (1965) (Harry Tezlaf) (NOTE: At the base of the ridgeline before leveling off and veering left to Osan-ni. Note the shops end at base of ridgeline.)

Police box at Intersection of MSR-1 and road to Main Gate (NOTE: This is now the location of the Songtan Police Station. To the right was the Jaeil Movie Theater and Intercity Bus Stop.) (Mar 1967) (Harry Tezlaf)
Police box at Intersection of MSR-1 and road to Main Gate (Mar 1967) (Harry Tezlaf)

Rice fields (1965) (Harry Tezlaf)

NOTE: The large building 2/3 of the way from the right is the Seojong Movie Theater at the top of Milwal Road — where the Capital Hotel is presently located. To the left are the houses spreading out from the west side of Hill 180 towards Seojong-ni. The ricefields will be reclaimed later to form the area used for Taegwang Middle School and High School. The expansion towards Seojong-ni will end about where the houses on the left are.

The picture is taken from the Shinjang 2-dong side near the railroad tracks somewhere around where the Songtan Hotel is now. Behind the photographer are the houses that are just to the right of the Shinjang Road leading to MSR-1. At that time, the area between the west side of Hill 180 and the railroad tracks was still mostly ricefields.

(Source: The photos of Harry Tezlaf at Osan Retired Activities Office.)

Changes in Korean Society During the mid-1960s, South Korea’s economy grew so rapidly that the United States decided to phase out its aid program to Seoul. The success of Park Chung-hee’s five-year economic plans in copying the Japanese “kiretsu” (favored-company) success formula with the establishment of “chaebols” (favored family-operated business) — coupled with protectionism to allow the domestic markets to grow — was a success. However, the key factor was the Korean people’s willingness as a group to sacrifice for the good of the nation. But despite these manifestations of success, Korea was still a desparately poor place to live.

During the 1960′s, South Korea made great economic progress. Seoul, the showpiece of this success, became known as the “Miracle on the Han River.” Through its five year plans, the government set out to make Korea into a modern industrial nation. New industry sprang up around Seoul, causing the population to soar to 10.6 million. Rapid growth forced the government to develop plans to ease crowding in Seoul.

It chose an area south of the Han River, where relatively few people lived, to build new housing. Soon huge, high-rise apartments pierced the skyline in other outlying areas. Rice growing fields south of the city disappeared to be filled by apartment complexes. The city absorbed these new residential areas into its orbit. Yongsan and Yongdong-po which had been on the outskirts of Seoul, now became a crowded center.

Korea as a whole was experiencing a change in life-style. The new housing was unlike traditional Korean homes, which were wide, one-story structures with rows of rooms linked by courtyards and porches. Instead, residents of modern Seoul lived in vast apartment complexes surrounded by playgrounds, department stores, and sports facilities. The old-style homes disappeared from the city landscape. (Source: Korean Society.)

However, despite these successes in Seoul, the progress in the rural areas would not be seen for another decade. The area remained a poor rural area with a “one-horse” economy — Osan AB. Though there was a significant numbers of prostitutes (said to number 2,500) and many bar-related workers in the area, the majority of the population of about 80,000 were base workers. The remainder engaged in subsistence farming.

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President Park Sends Troops to Vietnam In May 1965, President Park visited the U.S. upon President Lyndon Johnson’s invitation, and soon after that the agreement between South Korea and the U.S. regarding the dispatch of Korean troops to Vietnam was concluded — despite vehement opposition of a large number of National Assemblymen, students, and intellectual and political leaders in Korea. On 27 Jun 1965, the ROK government reveals receipt of a formal request for the dispatch of one combat division from Vietnamese Premier Nguyen Cao Ky. (Source: The US Military Experience in Korea 1871-1982, p114, Command Historian’s Office, USFK/EUSA)

Park agreed to send two Korean divisions to fight alongside U.S. forces in Vietnam, for which Korea was richly rewarded by Washington. In the mid-’60s, revenues from the Vietnam War were the largest single source of foreign-exchange earnings for Korea. These funds helped launch the country’s transformation over the next two decades from economic basket case to world leader in iron and steel production, shipbuilding, chemicals, consumer electronics and other commodities. Korea’s per-capita income increased tenfold during Park’s tenure. (Source: Park Chung-Hee History)

The bottom line was that Korea was “blackmailed” into providing troops for Vietnam. If Korea refused, LBJ was willing to yank troops out of Korea, but if Korea acquiesced, then LBJ was able to sweeten the pot for Korea financially through loans and military hardware to upgrade its forces. (SITE NOTE: Later the 7th Infantry Division would be removed under the Nixon Policy in 1970 and the ROK took over all of the DMZ because Nixon needed troops in Vietnam. The 2d ID remained by in a support role on the DMZ — and basically a tripwire to ensure the U.S. entry in case of an invasion.)
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Student Demonstration Grow Violent On 26 Aug 1965, Defense Minister Kim Song-un announced that troops from the 6th ROK Infantry Division were moved in Seoul under garrison decree which was involked for the maintenance of order and public security in the capital after six consecutive days of student demonstrations.
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North Korean Aggression April 1965. Two North Korean MiG jet fighters “attacked and damaged” a U.S. RB-47 reconnaissance plane over the Sea of Japan, about 50 miles east of the nearest North Korean coast.

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1966

Outside the Gate Before Railspur (Oct 1966) (Thomas Utts)

To the left is a Glass (window) Shop and a barber shop. To the right is an OB bar followed by a barber shop and Yanghwadang Optical & Gold Shop. At the right edge of photo is the Hanyang Drug Shop and next to it is the Namsan Drug shop.

Outside gate walking up Shinjang Mall Road (Oct 1966) (Thomas Utts)
Just ahead is the rail spur. The double telephone pole to the right was removed in 2003. This is the location of Jungangsijan(7) Road.

To the right is the Shin Jin Barber Shop and a Restaurant. This was the location of the Olive Clothes Shop owned by Kang Sung-yoon in 2005. There was also the Samsong Dong watch Shop.

To the left was the Daeho Inn and Daehung Inn. The sign for the Daehung Yaugwan (Inn) is seen in the 1966 photo to the left. It was established about 1963. The Daehung Inn relocated to the Shinjang Road near the Main Gate in 1970 and is still operated by the same owner, Mr. Hong Yang-san.

Daehung Hotel Lobby (2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan)

The Oscar Beauty Shop was also on the left. It remained in operation at the same location until 2002. Currently the Dong Sung Realty Office is situated in the building. The owner Mr. Kwon Oh-hoon has operated in the Songtan area since 1985, but moved to the location in 2003. The office is typical of the 1960s construction with concrete wall and corrugated transite (asbestos/concrete) roof. Living quarters were located above the store, but is now blocked off. The Mall side has a false front but behind it one can see the corrugated iron roofing added later. Over the years, the road has been built up so that one must step down to enter the office.

2005: (L) Dong Sung Realty (R) Mr. Kwon Oh-hoon, owner of Dong Sung Realty.

Getting off the C-54 aircraft at Osan (1966) (Thomas Utts)

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Nuclear Alert Commitment at Osan Switches to 41st Air Division (Nov 66) after 6441st TFW Departs After Nov 66, the 6441st TFW departed Yokota AB for Tahkli RTAFB, Thailand taking some of the F-105s of the old 8th TFW with it. These aircraft had been performing the nuclear alerts at Osan AB. The 34th, 35th, 36th and 80th were transferred to the 41st Air Division on 15 Nov 1966 and transitioned to the F-4C. (NOTE: The 34th TFS was assigned to the 41st Air Division at the same time on 15 May 1966 but was attached to 388th Tactical Fighter Wing in Korat RTAFB, Thailand. When the units switched to the 347th TFW in 1968, it also switched but remained attached to the 388th TFW.)

On 15 Jan 1968 the 347th TFW was formed with F-4Cs and Det 1 347th TFW at Osan AB came into existence.
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Train Guard Duty A tasking unique to Korea was the train guard duty that lasted from the Korean War until the mid-1970s. In fact, in Jun 1974, Pvt Charles P. Miller, 17, 61st Maintenance Co., was accidentally electrocuted while guarding US property aboard a train. He climbed on top of a boxcar at Seoul station and came in contact with a 25,000-volt power cable. After the Kyongbu Highway was opened up in 1979, the use of train guards was discontinued as trucks became the primary means of delivery of supplies.

During the Korean War for the USAF, the train guard duty was a punishment for lower ranks of airmen that messed up but didn’t get a court martial. The train guards had to ride with the cargo in unheated box cars. The thieves could literally strip a truck or rolling stock while the train was moving and come a pick up their “loot” after the train had passed. If the box cars stopped over in a rail yard siding, the ROK Army guards would shoot first and ask questions later if there saw any prowlers in the train yard. During the Korean War, this duty was also hazardous as the guards were often shot at by insurgents along the train tracks.

At the onset of the war, the railway system was in shambles. Engines were sent in from Japan and the US Army Quartermaster out of Pusan set up the railsystem. Almost all of the cargo went by rail and it was a nightmare of coordination. The Americans installed their own “conductors” as “advisors.” The shortage of freight cars placed a severe strain on the railroad system. We had approximately 7,000 cars, but 500 of these were in very bad shape. The tracks were worn out and derailments were a constant problem. To prevent wholesale pilferage the Americans installed an “advisor” to the conductor with absolute power to insist that no car be cut out of a train at a way station unless he approved. He had to check each claim of a hotbox or other failure. (Source: PART II Transportation Corps, 5. Problems in Railroad Operations (pp63-67) — from Combat Support in Korea, John G. Westover (P/O Center of Military History Online Collection.) This position some became the “train guard.”

After the War, the instances of guards being fired upon subsided and all the guards had to contend with was the highly-skilled thieves. There were instances that the box cars carrying military freight was still locked but the cars arrived empty. The guard’s duty was only for the military cargo — and the rest of the train was fair game for these thieves, but there was nothing worth stealing on those box cars. Now the guards rode in a caboose or conductor’s car with built-in cots with a stove to keep warm.

In the 1960s, pilferage was still a major problem all along the supply chain. Coolies would drop containers containing PX goods to break them while unloading from ships to pilfer goods. The same was true of the transporting of goods by trucks to the trains where children would lay down in the road to stop the trucks — and when stopped, the thieves would hop on board and empty the goods in a flash. Truck drivers were ordered to keep driving and never stop — even if they had to run over people. The rail yards were guarded by the ROK Army with orders to shoot to kill if there were any thieves.

This “extra-duty” was most often on a rotating basis between squadrons/units of an airbase or camp and was standard for all bases/camps in Korea. The military provided protection for their own shipments from their base/camp to the point of receipt. The USAF individuals were given a M-2 carbine, ONE clip of ammo and C-rations — and told to guard the train. They were housed in a caboose at the end of the train and would have to be especially careful when the train was pulled off onto a siding to allow for the passage of another train. (NOTE: Remember that the Kyongbu line was only two tracks — one in each direction.) The route of these trains were the same from the beginning of the US Army taking over the Korean National Train lines at the start of the Korean War. These trains basically followed the same route as MSR-1 — Youngdong-po to Suwon to Pyongtaek to Choneon to Taejon. Then it would split with a line to Kunsan and one to Pusan via Taegu.

Gib Foulke, SMSgt, USAF (ret), was a two-stripe A2C at the time and assigned to the 6175th CES of Kunsan between 1965-1966. (The 6175th of Kunsan was a subordinate unit of the 6134th Support Wing at Osan.) This train guard duty was for any train carrying military cargo anywhere in the country. Normally, the duty was shifted from squadron to squadron on a rotation basis.

Train Guard Duty (1969) (Alan Hahn)

Gib Foulke added, “Finally, I would like to close with “Train Guard Duty” …… a scenic trip from Kunsan to Osan, behind a real live 2-4-4 steam engine. This was a voluntary duty each squadron had to fulfill. Essentially, two guys were armed to ride a “caboose” type rail car, usually connected in front of, behind or bewteen a rail car carrying military equipment. The car was equipped with a bunk bed, table , chairs and a stove. The mission was to protect the equipment while enroute to Osan. We were then flown back to Kunsan.”

“Each GI was issued a M-2 with a 20 round clip and enough k-rations to last 5 days (the rations we received were packed in 1956, and received five cases of 10 meals each case. Now you would think a trip to Osan would only take a day or two …… wrong. We left , guarding a flat car with two truck tractors and manged to reach Kunsan City in two hours, parked all day on a siding and then started again that night. It went that way for the better part of five days …….. 30-40 miles, pull into a siding and wait , then another 25-30 miles, at about 20 miles per hour.”

“We amused ourselves by trying to communicate with some of the local kids who came trackside, outof curiosity and looking for a handout. My partner and I Ray Millet (?) sat on the car steps and would pass out some of the contents of our ration boxes. Most of the stuff went well except for the peanut butter and the “John Wayne” biscuits . Being young 20/21 year olds, we did arrange for some company one evening and were enjoying ourselves when the the train lurched. Ray was thrown from the top bunk and our “company” made a hasty exit. The irony is that the train only moved about 100 feet and then stopped for a couple more hours.”

“The best show was near a ROK army camp when our train released a car to roll into the camp rail siding. I guess it was to be braked before it reached the gate, in that the gate was still closed. Anyway, I can recall a brakeman on top the car turning the brake wheel and the car kept rolling at about 5 mph towrad the gate. We then saw 8-10 ROK soldiers grabbing small logs and throwing them under the train wheels …. no luck … the car did not stop until it was at least halfway through the gate. I don’t understand the Korean language, but I don’t think the soldiers were thanking the brakeman for delivering the freight car.”
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News Tidbits First SR-71 Blackbird went into service. A few years later, the SR-71 was stationed in Kadena and was scrambled during the Pueblo Incident in 1968. The SR-71 credo was born: “Yea, though I pass through the Valley of Death, I fear no evil as I am at 80,000 and climbing.”

The U.S. Supreme Court rules in Miranda v. Arizona that the police must inform suspects of their rights before questioning them. President Lyndon B. Johnson signs the Freedom of Information Act into law. The act goes into effect the following year. Martin Luther King leads a civil right march in Chicago. In Korea, tensions between black soldiers and Koreans at Uijongbu increases.

Demonstrations start against Vietnam War in US. Buddhist demonstrations in Vietnam for free elections. Vietnam War: US planes begin bombing Hanoi and Haiphong. The ROKF-V start operations in Vietnam in August. (ROK involved in Vietnam since mid-1965.)

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1967
Life on Osan AB At Osan, the major USAF units were 6145th Air Force Advisory Group acting as a training/logistical support unit to the ROKAF; the 314th Air Division; and the 6314th Support Wing. The 611th Military Airlift Command Support Squadron (611th MASS) at Kimpo would later move to Osan.

Osan was considered a “command-sponsored” tour meaning that provisions for dependents was provided. However, there was very little at Osan for married personnel. There was no school nor commissary. The BX provided for the needs of the servicemen and stockage was limited. Basically a married couple was living off the economy. If a GI married a Korean during his tour in Korea, his tour was changed to “accompanied non-command sponsored” which meant that his tour was extended a year, but he did not get any of the “command-sponsored” perks — simply because there was none at Osan at the time.

On-base housing was provided only for senior personnel. On-base the heating was from diesel fuel “space heaters” which provided heat only within a few feet of the space heater. The nearest commissary was at Yongsan, but a drive was feasible. The roads connecting Osan AB to Seoul was a dust bowl in summer and a muddy bog in the rainy season. Supposedly the drive to Yongsan took only 45 minutes — presumably in dry weather with no traffic on the road. However, transportation was most by bus as POVs (personally owned vehicles) were still not permitted. Only the “brass” (O-6 and above) had staff cars — and even then it was based on position. Junior officers got run-down jeeps as their transportation.

Military Payment Certificates (MPC) was still the standard of exchange for use on base and off-base. Stephen Cornick, a finance officer at Kunsan AB, wrote at Classmates.com, “In July 1968 I married a Korean girl (best move of my life). Air Force extended my 1 yr “hardship tour” to 2 yrs because I was now “accompanied” even though they provided almost no accomodations for married personnel. At one point I was assigned TDY to Osan AB where I was the Accounting and Finance Officer for all the USAF bases in Korea. During that time we had an unannounced change in the military payment certificate series. It went very smoothly.”

Life off-base was primitive. All the streets were dirt. The houses of Songtan were starting to show some of the improvements of “modern” life — at least those that catered to Americans. Most of these one-story houses were constructed with clay bricks to make a one-room shanty without only one window for ventilation. The rooftops were starting to show more and more use of ceramic roof tiles instead of the corrugated iron or transite from the mid-1950s. Ventilation for the rooms was through small windows. All windows had bars on them to prevent “slicky boys” from burglarizing the premises. The courtyards were unevenly covered with concrete — hand-mixed on the spot by digging a shallow hole in the ground and pouring in sifted sand, concrete and water. In winter, heating was by using the charcoal-fueled “hondol” system (heated water pipes in the floors) for floor heat. However, carbon monoxide poisoning was an ever-present danger. The cooking area was outside either in the courtyard or in a side room. These newer apartments had indoor toilets — the typical squat type “bomb-site” toilets — with a septic tank in the courtyard. The first signs of a village sewer system had appeared.

However, in other areas, there were still the older one-room “apartments” without any ventilation. Many of these were mud-wattle construction with corrugated tin roofs. Insulation in some was a thick layer of dirt on top of a plywood ceiling. There was no indoor plumbing with “water closets” (toilets) not attached to the house. These were very dangerous in winter due to the carbon-monoxide threat. These had “water closets” that were simply holes in the ground covered with a board. The “night soil” (human waste) would be collected by a “honey wagon” (tank on an ox drawn cart) for use as fertilizer in the fields. If you were lucky, there was a cooking area outside with a country-style wood burning stove.

There still remained poorest hovels that were simply slapped together from varieties constructed from military refuse. In the shops, small wood-burning pot-bellied stoves provided the heat. In the farmers homes, macadam on the roads would be torn up and used for winter fuel because fuel was so expensive.

During the summer, the dangers of encephalitis spread by mosquitoes was an ever present danger. The smells of the rice fields using human waste for fertilizer could be over-powering.
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North Korean Infiltrations Increase and SOFA North Korean shore batteries sink South Korean naval vessel in a 20-minute battle off the east coast. Unprovoked attacks along DMZ becoming a daily occurrence. In April a reinforced platoon of 40-60 NKPA soldiers cross the MDL and are repulsed by a 48-man ROKA unit. First time since Korean War that artillery used in DMZ. ROKAF jets sink a North Korean espionage vessel 60 miles southwest of Inchon and six of 15 aboard vessel captured by ROKN. Two 2d ID soldiers killed and 16 injured when satchel charges detonate on their barracks south of DMZ. First such espionage act since Armistice. In Jul three 7ID soldiers killed and 16 wounded in daylight ambush in DMZ. In Jul VC-type ambush with claymore mine kills one 2ID soldier. In Aug 2 US soldiers and 2 Katusa killed in NKPA attack on work party south of JSA. (See Scenes from an Unfinished War: Low-Intensity Conflict in Korea, 1966-1968 by Major Daniel P. Bolger for indepth conditions during the 1966-1969 period when North Korea stepped up infiltrations.)

The SOFA becomes effective throughout the Republic on 9 Feb 1967. First conviction under SOFA in Korean Court under SOFA. Park Chung-hee inauguration in June.
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Murder and Arson in Paengsan-myeon According to the Pyeongtaek History, on 5 Nov 1967, an American Michael Jayce (?) murdered Oh Seo-young after she refused to have sex with him. To hide his crime, he set the house on fire. Paengsan-myeon would indicate this individual most likely from Camp Humphreys. Outcome of this incident unknown but it would have fallen under the newly implemented SOFA. (Source: Pyeongtaek City History CD, “Pyeongtaek Si Sa.”)

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ROK Economic Development It was in the early 1960s that the First Five-Year Economic Development Plan was launched. During the initial period of development,the target was set at laying the foundation for economic growth through the development of import-substitution industries, especially the light industries and producer-goods industries.

The Science and Technoloy policy passed through several phases in response to changeing economic and social needs. Throughtout the period of national deveoopment, the S&T policy has been adusted to conform with national development goals and strategies. S&T policies were geared to the developmenent of S&T infrastructures, such as the syustem of tehnical training, legal and organizational framework for S&T development, and son on. More specifically, the Ministry of Scince and Technology (MOST) was established in 1967 as the centroal governmnet agency for S&T development. The Korea Institute of Science and Technology (KIST) was created in 19666 and the Science and Technology Promotions Law was enactied in 1967, as the legal framework for S&T development. (A Handbook of Korea, 1999, pp325-326)

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1968

Songbuk Elementary School (1968) (Songbuk Elementary School)

Educational Changes On 13 Mar 1968, the Taegwang hagwon was changed to the Taegwang Middle School and supplanted the Songwang Middle School on the same location. (NOTE See “1953: Education” for Taegwang Middle School history.) The area had been reclaimed and the first permanent structures were built — versus the tents that the Songwang Middle School had used.

Along side the Taegwang Middle School was the Songshin School — established in 1963. On 8 Feb 1968, the 1st graduating class from Songshin Elementary (Kungmin Hagkyo) with 388 students.

The rapid development of educational opportunies was naturally accompanied by problems, the most serious being a deterioration in the quality of education. As the 1960s drew to a close, however, Korea’s educators turned their attention to these problems and several projects were launched to improve the curricula an the methods of instruction. Most notable among tese was teh abolition of the middle school entrance examination in 1 968. During the next five years, the proportion of elementary school students going on to middle schools rose from 55 to 75 percent. Such a change contributed not only to raising the educational level of the populace, but also to producing educated workers required for industrialization. While the new system of admitting students on the basis of school district has led to a widening diversity in individual abilities within a single classroom, it has also presented new problems for eduction.

Recognizing the need for educational reforms, the Charter of National Education was promulgated in 1968. The Charter stressed a balance between tradition and development as well as between the needs of the individual and the needs of the nation. (Source: A Handbook of Korea, 1999, p148)
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Songtan area in 1968 During the Pueblo Incident, Bill Bayless was deployed to Osan with the 12th TFS of the 18th TFW from Kadena. He wrote on Tango Way, “Osan was a poor town, with little to support it other than the base. I think a rather high percentage of the people in town engaged in occupations of dubious repute. In the history of Korea there must have been an influx of Christian missionaries, because the biggest and best buildings in town were the abundant Christian churches of various denominations.” The following are some photos he took of the area in 1968.

Jaeil Church (1968) (Bill Bayless)

(NOTE: The Songtan Jaeil Church was first started as the Jwadong Presbyterian Church on 5 Dec 1958. On 21 Mar 1961, the cornerstone was laid for a 40 pyeong church. On 1 Apr 1961, the Songtan Jaeil Church was officially founded. By 1973, the church had grown in size to 324 pyeong and in 1998 it reached its present 328 pyeong size. The church added a daycare school in 1981 and a Christian Missionary School in 1990. On 28 April 2000 it added the Jaeil Kindergarten. It is still at its present location on a hill top on the west side of Hill 180 in the Milwal-dong area.

Hill 180 Gate Road (1968) (Bill Bayless)

NOTE: Taken from the hilltop where the Jaeil Church is presently located. The top of the hill to left is the base perimeter. The wide path (road) running along the left is the Hill 180 Gate road. The dirt path running left to right now is the entrance to the Jaeil Church on the hill. Following the path back towards the Main Gate, the Seojong Movie Theater is at the top of Milwal Road. To the top right in the distance, the white building is the Songtan Catholic Church. The Kyongbu Railroad tracks are behind the hill of the church and the faint line from the Church area towards Osan-ni is the railway. The hills in the distance are the mountains in the Jinwi area. To the right the rice field area would be reclaimed and become the Taegwang High School.

Notice the roofs of the houses below. To the bottom left, the roof of what appears to be corrugated iron is held down with sandbags alongside a mudwattle house (choga chip) with thatched roof. The roof on the bottom right is the same as the shanties built in Chicoville (Chong-mun eup (Front Gate Town)) in the 1950s. The roof is tar paper tacked down with strips. If you look at the houses in the area, you can see that it is a mix of the choga-chip houses with the mudbrick ones.

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2005

(L) Jaeil Church (Aug 2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan) (R) View from Jaeil Church to Milwal-Road. Capital Hotel now where Sejong Theater was. (Aug 2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan)

View from Jaeil Church. Taegwang High School where rice fields once were. (Aug 2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan)

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Looking down on graves from Hill 180 perimeter (1968) (Bill Bayless)
Inside the Perimeter fence from Hill 180 looking towards Songtan (1968) (Bill Bayless)

Milwal Road up to Seojong Theater (now site of Capital Hotel) and Fire Station at top (1968) (Bill Bayless)
Milwal Road up to Seojong Theater and Fire Station at top (1968) (Bill Bayless)

Looking down Shinhang Mall Road with Buraksan Mountains to left (1968) (Bill Bayless) (NOTE: “Krova” may be the “Clover Bar” that was on the road at the time.)
Village in snow with Offbase Train Tracks with Buraksan Mountain in background (1968) (Bill Bayless)

Older area with pre-Korean War buildings (1968) (Bill Bayless)
Alleyway of Village (1968) (Bill Bayless)

Woodburning stove to stay warm (1968) (Bill Bayless)
Namsan Village on Hill 170 (1968) (Bill Bayless)

Farmer houses (1968) (Bill Bayless)
Detail of mudwattle house roofline (1968) (Bill Bayless)

Namsan Village outside gate (1968) (Bill Bayless)
Farmer house (choga chip) in Namsan Village on Hill 170 (1968) (Bill Bayless)

Child (1968) (Bill Bayless)
Child (1968) (Bill Bayless)

Child (1968) (Bill Bayless)
Child (1968) (Bill Bayless)

Tiered hillside for farming (1968) (Bill Bayless)

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The Namsan Village Area In 1953, the first bars opened in Namsan Village where GIs could get off base by simply slipping through the barbed wire fence. The “local working girls” were there in prominence. After the bar row at the Main Gate opened up, the businesses moved and the area returned to being a simple farming village.

Hill 170 View of Bomb Dump and Namsan-Village Area (1953) (Robert Spiwak)

In the 1950s, there was no road to the right of the Main Gate leading to the Namsan Village area. The village below Hill 170 became the first bar areas for Osan AB, but soon returned to being a farming village once the Main Gate opened.

In the 1960s, this area was sparcely populated with farm houses. To the right of the main gate as you entered the base was the village of Chicol-ni. It extended until the Namsan-ni village area and consisted of mudwattle farm houses scattered along the hillside. The Haesong Dance Hall — the first large building to the left as one exited the base — was located in this area in 1957.

In the Chicol-ni area along the hill below the perimeter was mud-wattle houses. Slowly these choga-chip farmer houses were torn down and converted to more modern houses for the military personnel who lived off-base and for housing for the influx of people moving to the area to seek employment on base. In the 1960s, the low lying areas were still rice fields, but soon the rice fields were filled in and new houses were built. By the 1970s, the housing spread now from the Chicol-ni side outside the gate to the Mokcheon-ni side near the railroad tracks.

Namsan Village Choga-chip (1968) (Bill Bayless) (NOTE: This house is to the middle right in the 1968 photo below. This photo taken from top of hill with a telephoto lens. This is the same house as in the 1953 photo by Robert Spiwak.)

Namsan Village (1968) (Bill Bayless)

In the 1968 photo above, the mudwattle houses (choga-chip) in the center area are those from the 1950s. Notice that the older houses are grayish in color, while the newer stucco houses are lighter in tone. In the 1953 photo the house on the left with a wall when seen from the rear is located on the right. By 1968, it was still there, but some new houses to the area. The area had returned to being purely agricultural. By 2005, the mudwattle houses were gone and the place they were at was now an open field. However, the two houses at the bottom of the photo still remained occupied by the original residents. The house to the right cares for a small farm patch planted where the original homes once stood.

In the mid-1970s during the major reconstruction in Shinjang, a road was built to the Namsan Village area. From the Main Gate it proceeded straight until the base of Hill 170 but did not extend up the hill whose paths still remained dirt covered. In the mid-1980s (between 1980-1983), the road and rail overpass to the Doolittle gate was built and the back gate opened. In conjunction with this construction, a new road (Mokcheon Village Road) was cut from the new access road to the Namsan village road. This road passed the Bravo Gate and then proceeded to a Y-intersection where one turned left to the Main Gate.

In the late 1990s, the small road up the hill in the Namsan Village area was paved with concrete. In the 2000s, this road was expanded and new apartments built on the hill. By the mid-2000s, other apartment complexes were being added in anticipation of the influx of personnel when the Yongsan Garrison was scheduled to close.

Top R: Daycare Center Top of Hill 170. In the 1968 photo above, the paths converge at the top of the hill just below the hilltop — this is the present location of this building.; Top L: Road looking up towards Daycare Center. In the 1968 photo, the path leading down from the top on the left is this stretch of road.; Middle R: Apartments under construction. These apartments are at the base of the path.; Middle L: Last two houses from 1960s. These houses are seen in the 1968 photo at base of hill. Bottom R: Rooftop of 1960s house (Note the transite roof and construction of mudbrick covered with stucco used in the area houses in the 1960s when concrete and wood were scarce commodities. The mud bricks were made in an open air “factory” in the Songbuk dong area.) Bottom L: The second 1960s house but note that additions were made over the years. (2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan)

View Train Track from Namsan Village (1965) (Harry Tezlaf)

Namsan Village outside gate (1968) (Bill Bayless)

The 1965 picture taken from base perimeter and shows the top tier of houses on the slope. As one looks out, there appears to be a path going from left to right. This is the rail spur and small road from the Shinjang area leading to the “freight gate” at the tip of Bomb Dump Hill. The next line up with the telephone poles along it is the Kyongbu Railway with the Mokcheon village near the tracks to the left. There is another faint line further up the photo near the tracks. This is Route 1 (MSR-1). The houses on the top right are in Ojwa-dong as one enters Songtan from Jinwi-myeon. There is a faint white line at the tip of the hill near Ojwa-gaol (hamlet). This is the Jinwi River that flows past the north of the base.

Notice that the pictures in 1968 showed the houses laid out in tiers. The same pattern was followed in the construction closest to the base. The low apartments and houses built in the 1960s were constructed on upper tiers near the perimeter wall. In the building boom of the 1970s and 1980s were built on the lower two tiers. At the base of the first tier of houses was a dirt path that ran in front of the houses. This would develop into the Namsan Village Road. The fields are fallow indicating the winter season. There are two paths in the rice fields. The one closest to the bottom would be the Mokcheon path at the base of Hobak hill — where the Shinjang House Office is and where this photo was probably taken from. There is what appears to be another wider path. This is actually the rail spur and adjacent road coming from the Shinjang area headed to the freight gate at the tip of the Bomb Dump Hill. The rice fields would be reclaimed in the 1970s and became part of the construction boom in the 1980s and 1990s with houses along the Namsan Village Road.

In the 2005 photos, there is one of a deserted 1960s house. This house was on the upper tier to the left of the 1968 photo. There is a drop off in the hill and just beyond to the right is the “dimple” area of Hill 170 near the Bravo Gate.

(L) Namsan Village near Hill 170 (2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan) (R) Namsan Village looking toward Bomb Dump Hill (2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan)

(L) Namsan Village looking towards Songtan Catholic Church (2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan) (R) Namsan Village Yongwasa Buddhist temple with Rental Village under construction above it (2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan)

(L) Perimeter Wall near Main Gate (2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan) (R) 1960s house on slope before dimple area of Hill 170 near Bravo Gate (2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan)

(L) Deserted 1960s house overgrown near perimeter (2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan) (R) Deserted house 1970s house on hill overlooking Shinjang area (2005) (Kalani O’Sullivan)

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347th Tactical Fighter Wing

“BLACK PANTHERS”
35th TFS

“FLYING FIENDS”
36th TFS

“HEADHUNTERS”
80th TFS

Nuclear Alert with Det 1, 347th TFW After Nov 66, the 6441st TFW departed Yokota AB for Tahkli RTAFB, Thailand taking some of the F-105s of the old 8th TFW with it. The nuclear commitment was then switched back to the 41st Air Division again in Nov 66 with the F-105s of the 35th, 36th and 80th TFS. The 35th and 36th TFS converted to F-4Cs in 1967, but the 80th did not convert until 1968 after it was assigned to the 347th TFW.

The 347th Tactical Fighter Wing was activated on 21 Dec 1967 and organized on 15 Jan 1968. The 34th, 35th, 36th and 80th were transferred to the 41st Air Division on 15 Nov 1966 and transitioned to the F-4C. (NOTE: The 34th TFS was assigned to the 41st Air Division at the same time as the other squadrons on 15 May 1966 but was attached to 388th Tactical Fighter Wing in Korat RTAFB, Thailand flying F-105s. When the units switched to the 347th TFW in 1968, it also switched but remained attached to the 388th TFW still with F-105s.)

The 35th and 36th had transitioned to the F-4C in 1967. The 80th were still flying the F-105s and did not transition to the F-4C until after it was assigned to the 347th TFW. All three squadrons pulled the nuclear alerts at Osan.

The 347th TFW aircraft were standing alert at Osan when the Pueblo Incident occurred on 23 Jan 1968, but were ineffective to respond simply because they were standing a nuclear alert and their aircraft were configured for this mission. At USS Pueblo Veterans Association site, Edward A. Lewis of Salem, New Hampshire was assigned to the 6314th Support Wing at Osan in Jan 1968. He stated, “In January, there were about a half dozen aircraft each at Osan and Kunsan. They were TDY from Japan and were “specially configured.” It would have taken too long for them to be reconfigured in time to aid the Pueblo. As it was, they were downloaded and uploaded several times over the next day or so until other aircraft could be flown in from Japan.”

The 36th TFS as part of the Det 1, 347th TFW operations pulled nuclear alerts in the Diamond area at Osan AB according to AFHRA records since 1968 (F-105 (1968) and F-4C (1968-1971)) on one-month rotations. The 36th FS history shows rotations to Osan AB for “1 Oct?4 Nov 1968, 18 Feb?4 Mar 1969, 27 May? Jul 1969, 9 Sep?8 Oct 1969, 27 Dec 1969?1 Jan 1970, 10 Apr? May 1970, 20 Jun?1 Jul 1970, 4 Sep? Oct 1970, 27 Nov?6 Dec 1970″ out of Yokota AB, Japan. (Source: 347th Wing and AFHRA: 36th FS.)

The following is excerpted from the 80th TFS Headhunter Site for the sister squadron of the 36th TFS:

“Throughout the 1968 – 1971 time frame the primary mission of the 80th was to deploy on a rotating basis with the 35th and 36th TFS to Osan AB, Korea, providing a nuclear strike alert posture against targets in North Korea, China and the Soviet Union. The squadron maintained several aircraft on fifteen-minute nuclear alert full time, and engaged in a vigorous conventional weapons training program. On several occasions the squadron reacted to provocations by the North Koreans by putting crews and aircraft on heightened states of air defense and conventional weapons alert.

In 1970 all PACAF F-4C Wild Weasel aircrews were transferred to the 80th. At this time the squadron was composed almost exclusively of Wild Weasel aircrews. These crews trained in Wild Weasel tactics while maintaining all weapons qualifications and pulling nuclear alert as a primary commitment.

On 15 February 1971, shortly after its twenty-ninth anniversary, the squadron was deactivated in a general reduction and realignment of US military forces in Japan, Korea and Okinawa. Shortly after this order was issued it was announced that the squadron designation would be reactivated in Korea without equipment and personnel. At the time of deactivation the 80th personnel, including all the Wild Weasel crews, were transferred to the 35 TFS and later in the spring these crews and all the F-4C aircraft deployed to Kadena AB, Okinawa to form the 67 TFS under the 18th TFW. A year or so later, the F-4C Wild Weasels, trained by and formerly in the 80th TFS performed with distinction in combat during Linebacker II.

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Assassination Attempt on Blue HouseIn 1967, infiltration and violent confrontation along the DMZ increased to almost daily incidents. On 7 Jan 1968 ROK President Park Chung-hee presided over an emergency national security council meeting at Wonju to coordinate a “pan-national” anti-communist effort. An advisory body was formed to advise the President.

On 21 Jan 1968, a band of 31 communist agents were intercepted in the northern suburbs of Seoul by the Korean National Police. In the ensuing fire-fight, 5 agents were killed and one captured. Six civilians were killed, five wounded. The suicide team was dispatched on 16 Jan to destroy the Presidential Mansion. A captured agent identified the men as officers from the 2,400 man, 124th Army Unit, 283d NK Army Group, being trained for guerilla operations in the South. In the end, a total of 34 soldiers, policemen and civilians killed by the attack.

The Blue House Raid: The officers on the detachment knew that their mission might well decide the outcome of the Second Korean Conflict. North Korean Lieutenant Kim Shin Jo, a participant captured during the mission, explained that killing the ROK president “would create political problems within the South Korean government and would agitate the South Korean people to fight with arms against their government and the American imperialists.”4 With one stroke, the spearhead group of the 124th Army Unit might push the Republic of Korea into chaos and open the way for reunification from the north.

Late on the evening of 17 January, the team changed into ROK Army uniforms, donned dark coveralls, and penetrated the U.S. 2d Infantry Division sector. They cut several holes through the famous chain-link fence and slipped the entire group through, all within thirty meters of a manned U.S. position. They moved carefully for two days and nights through the American division’s sector. The North Koreans even camped the second night on a forested hillside within a few kilometers of Camp Howze, the U.S. divisional headquarters.

The infiltration went smoothly until the afternoon of 19 January, when the team unexpectedly encountered four South Korean woodcutters. Seizing on an opportunity to impart a bit of indoctrination to these representatives of the ROK’s “oppressed masses,” the special operators harangued the terrified woodcutters about the coming insurrection and the glories of North Korean communism. At the same time, they apparently gave some inference as to the nature of their impending raid. After a few hours, the KPA officers released the woodsmen unharmed with a stern warning not to go to the police. The special forces leaders calculated that their assassination mission was within hours of completion and that the civilians would probably not go to the police immediately, nor would the authorities believe such a wild tale.

This proved to be a fatal mistake on their part. The South Koreans went to the police that very night. The local police chief believed them and notified his chain of command, which reacted promptly in accord with Presidential Instruction #18. By morning, the ROK’s new counterguerrilla structure commenced operations. Unfortunately, the ROK leadership did not know the exact mission of the 124th Army Unit, so the police and the military tried to guard all important sites and at the same time search the approaches to Seoul. Even with massive resources employed, however, the ROKs could not cover everything. The stealthy raiders entered the city in two- and three-man cells on 20 January. They quickly became aware of the frenzied atmosphere in the capital. Eavesdropping on busy police and ROK Army radio nets, the KPA team’s leaders plotted the identities and movements of their foes. Obviously, the original plan had to be abandoned. The 124th Army Unit would have to improvise. The North Koreans were well trained, and their commander saw a possible way to make use of the heightened alert. Maybe they could still complete their mission.

Upon rendezvous that night, the men removed their coveralls. This revealed their ROK Army uniforms, complete with the correct unit insignia of the local ROK 26th Infantry Division. The team then formed up and prepared to march the last mile to the Blue House, the ROK presidential residence, posing as ROK Army soldiers returning from a counterguerrilla patrol.

The platoon marched smartly toward the Blue House, passing several National Police and ROK Army units en route. A scant 800 meters from the Blue House, a police contingent finally halted the platoon and began to ask questions that exceeded anything the raiders had rehearsed. The nervous North Koreans fumbled their replies. One suspicious policeman drew his pistol; a commando shot him. A melee then ensued in which two 124th men died. The rest of the North Koreans scattered and began racing for the DMZ.

ROK soldiers, police, and American troops cooperated in the massive manhunt that followed over the next few days. Several sharp encounters flared as the desperate North Koreans clawed their way toward home. Three more operatives were pursued and killed in the Seoul area. Subsequently, aroused I Corps (Group) units-to include both U.S. divisions-participated in successful sweeps that killed twenty-three and captured one of the North Koreans. Only two of the thirty-one northerners could not be accounted for-and they were presumed dead.

The liquidation of the Blue House assault team, however, came at a horrendous price. Three Americans died and three fell wounded in attempts to block the escaping infiltrators. ROK casualties totaled sixty-eight killed and sixty-six wounded-mainly army and police but also about two dozen hapless civilians. This cost hardly served as a ringing endorsement for all the security improvements developed and instituted throughout 1967.

Much had gone very wrong. The 124th cut right through the heart of the most developed segment of the DMZ barrier system. The embarrassing inattentiveness of the U.S. 2d Infantry Division said little for American military performance and strained U.S.-ROK relations. Indeed, the key event in the whole process revolved around a chance meeting with unarmed timbermen-random players not really part of the United Nations Command’s anti-infiltration scheme. Fortunately for President Park, the loyal civilians notified the police, and the local authorities acted with alacrity. Had the KPA killed the woodcutters, the infiltrators might well have killed Park too. Even in the teeth of an alerted Seoul, the enemy nevertheless closed to within 800 meters of Park’s residence, stopped more by luck and individual initiative than by a grand design.

Much had also gone right. The citizenry responded, the police foiled the raid, and a hasty but thorough amalgam of quick-reaction forces relentlessly pursued the North Koreans. The 124th Army Unit had gotten in, but they could not get back out-a tribute to the DMZ enhancements. In terms of anti-infiltration methodology, the delay and neutralization efforts had gone pretty well. Detection, however, still relied too much on the thin crust of regular forces along the DMZ. Most of the casualties occurred during attempts to track down the intruders. The allies were still finding too many of their prey only while being ambushed. Nobody had much of a chance to reflect on lessons learned. U.S. and ROK soldiers were still tracking down the remnants of the Blue House raiding detachment when, as Bonesteel recalled, “the damned Pueblo occurred two days later and that really put the fat in the fire.”

(Source: Scenes from an Unfinished War: Low-Intensity Conflict in Korea, 1966-1968 by Major Daniel P. Bolger)
In 1968, 1071 infiltrators attempted entry into the ROK, an increase of 371 over 1967. 83 percent came overland while the remaining 17 percent came by sea routes.
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Pueblo Incident: The following was excerpted from the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) site: Military Analysis Network site.

Operation Red Fox
23 Jan 1968 – 05 Feb 1969

On 23 January 1968 North Korean patrol boats seized the USS Pueblo, a US Navy intelligence-gathering vessel, in the international waters of the East Sea off Wonsan. One USS Pueblo crewmember was killed in the boarding and 82 were taken POW and held captive. The seizure, which took place a mere two days after a commando intrusion into Seoul, shocked the whole world, and there arose strong public demand in the United States for firm retaliatory action against North Korea. North Korea made the utmost use of the Pueblo incident in its crafty propaganda, believing that the United States, deeply involved in the Vietnam War then, would not be able to use the force of arms on the Korean Peninsula.

Crew of the USS Pueblo
(Click on photo to enlarge)
Between 26-31 January 1968 several 9th Air Force active units deployed to the Pacific in response to North Korea’s seizure of USS Pueblo: the 4TFW sent 72 F-4Ds, the 354TFW sent 18 F-100s, and the 363TRW sent six RB-66s. In addition, several 9AF-gained ARC units were recalled to active duty: the 113TFW and 107th, 113th, 121st and 177TFGs. The 334th and 335th Fighter Squadrons, equipped with F-4 Phantom II fighters, rushed to Korea to support operations during the Pueblo incident. The squadrons returned to Seymour Johnson in June 1968. F-106 fighters were briefly deployed to Osan AFB in Korea in March of 1968 to provide air defense during the Pueblo incident.

The 347th Tactical Fighter Wing was activated at Yokota Air Base, Japan on 15 January 1968 . The mission was to provide air defense for the islands of Japan. Units assigned were the 34th, the 35th, and the 36th Tactical Fighter Squadrons (TFS); and the 556th and the 6091st Reconnaissance Squadrons. Aircraft assigned were the F-105 Thunderchief, the F-4C Phantom II, the EB-57 Canberra, and the C-130 Hercules. Between 23 Ocobert 1968 and 05 February 1969 all of the 347th Tactical Fighter Wing’s F-4Cs were deployed to bases in South Korea to participate in the US response to North Korea’s abduction of the USS Pueblo.

Six Air Force Reserve units were mobilized in the wake of the Pueblo Incident. The 120th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Colorado Air National Guard was ordered into active Federal service as a result of the Pueblo incident, along with three other F-100 tactical fighter squadrons: 136th Tactical Fighter Squadron, New York, 174th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Iowa, 188th Tactical Fighter Squadron, New Mexico. The 120th Tactical Fighter Squadron entered combat in Vietnam on 5 May 1968, two days after its arrival, and completed its 1,000th mission 51 days later. During the Air National Guard’s eleven months of service in Vietnam, the four F-100 squadrons flew 24,124 combat sorties and accumulated 38,614 combat flying hours.

The 445th Military Airlift Wing was activated after the Pueblo was seized, on January 26, 1968. The activation of the 445th found many support personnel stationed at eight different stateside bases and aircrews flying more missions to Europe, the Caribbean, South America, and Southeast Asia. The Wing remained activated in support of the Pueblo incident for seventeen months until released from active military service on June 2, 1969. For superior performance and dedication during the Pueblo incident, the 445th Military Airlift Wing received its first Air Force Outstanding Unit Award.

On 22 Mar 1968 the 318th Fighter Interceptor Squadron deployed to Osan AB from McChord AFB, WA. This marked the first time in history that Aerospace Defense Command F-106 fighter interceptors had flown to a critical overseas area, using in-flight refueling along with tactical air units.

318th FIS

318th FIS on Alert (1968) (USAF Photo)

318th FIS on Alert (1968) (USAF Photo)

318th FIS a/c 59-0059 on alert (Winter 67-68) (Don Ward)

The following is from USS Pueblo Site: My name is Harry Larrabee Sr, TSgt, USAF(Ret) and I was stationed with the 6922 Security Wing (United States Air Force Security Service) at Clark Air Base. About 1.5 hours after the ship was taken over by the North Koreans another Air Force Sgt and myself boarded an Air Force C-124 with two I Vans (intercept vans with R390A recievers and PT-6 recorders) and two S-141 Shelters (something like a COMSEC Van equipped to monitor LF, HF, VHF and UHF) tool boxes over stuffed with parts to repair R-390s and PT-6s for Osan Air Base in the Republic of Korea.

Upon our arrival sometime after midnight we set up the two S-141 shelters and the I Vans were set up the next day inside the compound on Hill 179 which housed the 6922 SW Det 2. For the next 60 days we upgraded the existing operations by rebuilding the receivers, recorders and TTY machines while some of the operations was moved to the I Vans. Each van was made up from 30(?) foot trailers which had both antenna and power inputs. While this was going on the other Sgt and I also pulled 24 a day stand-by on the S-141 shelters is ensure thier operation.

I do remember about 3 days after our arrival at Osan a North Korean Mig-21 flew from the DMZ to Osan Air Base and buzzed the base runway twice before heading back north. I myself was in one of the S-141 Shelters at the time talking with the operator at the time, this operator was listening to the Mig talking back to its base. We didn’t realize at the time the aircraft was so close untill we could hear a jet that didn’t sound like the F-105s that was stationed at Osan. When we exited the van this when we watched the Mig buzz the base. At this time neither the U S Forces; meaning Air Force, Army, or Navy; or the ROKs had anthing that could defend against the Mig. If memory serves me correctly about three days latter the Air Force had 9 F-106 all weather fighter/intercepters assigned to the base.

We stayed with the 6922 Det 2 for 10 months supporting the mission for NSA and USAFSS. When I got on the operations floor for the first time I did notice a “X” off the East side of North Korea showing the position of the U S S Pueblo at the time of boarding, this “X” was 15 miles from the coast. Our total mission the whole time was to support “Electronic Intelligence” for NSA, USAFSS, USA, and the USN regarding the Pueblo and the North Korean activity at the time. Since it took so long for the crew members to be released I really don’t know how much our intelligence effort helped.

While at Osan Air Base there was also a EC-121 that used to land there every so offten. This is the same EC-121 that was shot down in the Yellow Sea in April 1969, the same one that had holes in the tail section when it was flown into Osan while I was there. Unfortunately Viet Nam was in full gear so I don’t really feel that the United States was in a good position to do anything with North Korea. In fact I also feel that had the North Koreans crossed the 38th Parallel I would be eating rice now and not the nice home cooked meals that I’m used too.

The following is from Scenes from an Unfinished War: Low-Intensity Conflict in Korea, 1966-1968 by Major Daniel P. Bolger:

The air power arrived under the operation code-named Combat Fox. Spurred by Lieutenant General Seth J. McKee of Fifth Air Force, several air units arrived in Korea before 1 February 1968. Along with forces from Okinawa, these included the three, potent F-4D Phantom II squadrons of Colonel Charles E. (“Chuck”) Yeager’s 4th Tactical Fighter Wing. Yeager’s “suitcase air force” flew in from North Carolina within seventy-two hours of notification, a truly remarkable performance. Altogether, almost 200 combat aircraft deployed.

At sea, the Seventh Fleet marshaled some thirty-five major surface combatants. Six aircraft carriers led the procession of naval might that comprised Operation Formation Star. Navy air furnished another 400 or so frontline combat jets.

The buildup looked impressive, but appearances could be deceiving. Bonesteel had asked for this show of strength, but he did not really command it. Narrowly defined command relationships strictly limited these contingency forces to a deterrent role. Thanks to his personal influence, Bonesteel received some help from the Fifth Air Force in prosecuting the Second Korean Conflict; the Seventh Fleet did not cooperate at all.

The Fifth Air Force’s Advance Echelon took charge of the U.S. Air Force’s (USAF) contribution. Senior USAF officers made it clear that these air units “[were] neither assigned nor attached to the command of General Bonesteel as Commander, US Forces Korea.” In the event of an overt invasion, the Fifth Air Farce (sic) would come under UN authority. But until then, it responded to distant U.S. Pacific Air Forces and through them to U.S. Pacific Command.

Fortunately, Generals McKee and Bonesteel worked out practical arrangements to make use of the new air units in the ongoing low-intensity conflict. Combat Fox aircraft aided the ROKs in sea-approach coverage and provided strip-alert quick-reaction flights. Both American infantry divisions received and exercised new forward air controller teams and procedures, although no actual air strikes occurred. Squadrons and wings rotated to Korea at regular intervals, allowing some training for them from the commitment. Once the imminent danger subsided, the USAF component gradually pared back to its precrisis strength. In all, Combat Fox lasted sixteen months.

The U.S. Navy went its own way, with the Seventh Fleet anxious to reduce the task groups and speed ships to Vietnamese waters. None of the warships responded to General Bonesteel in any capacity, although he would gain some air sorties in the event of a major war. For Seventh Fleet, the Korean circuit mainly constituted a waste of time. According to one participating admiral, these activities “usually involved some rather innocuous air operations for a couple of days, using one of our aircraft carriers.” By summer, the Seventh Fleet had moved on.

Although not fully orchestrated for maximum support of General Bonesteel’s UNC, the contingency buildup worked. This tremendous show of force brought in ten times the amount of aircraft normally operated by the 314th Air Division. The 600 or so USAF and U.S. Navy (USN) jets completely negated the only real conventional edge the DPRK possessed their air arm. Any northern blitzkrieg would have to proceed under American-dominated skies. North Korea did not try anything. Even unconventional operations dwindled in the face of the U.S. air and sea armadas.

Thus, the contingency deployments did their job and guaranteed some breathing space for the Americans and South Koreans to settle their disputes. Apprised of the ROK intransigence and war fever, President Johnson wisely deferred to General Bonesteel and Ambassador Porter and sent an envoy immediately. Cyrus R. Vance arrived in Seoul on 10 February.

Vance possessed topflight credentials. A former secretary of the Army and deputy secretary of defense, Vance had spoken for Johnson and the United States in several delicate situations: Panama in January 1965; the Dominican Republic (that same year); in Detroit during the riots of June 1967; and on strife-torn Cyprus that autumn. He would speak softly enough to the Koreans, but his words would be blunt.

As usual, Vance traveled light. Only John E. Walsh, ambassador to Kuwait, and translator Daniel A. O’Donoghue accompanied the troubleshooter. Bonesteel and Porter met the trio at the airport, and they took off immediately for the secure confines of U.S. Eighth Army headquarters. Walsh experienced a frigid flight in a bubble-topped, little OH-23 while perched unceremoniously on Bonesteel’s lap. With the Blue House raiders just run to ground, even the commanding general could not afford to borrow one of the few enclosed UH-1 Hueys. The cold flight said a lot about the resource situation in United Nations Command. Bonesteel might have done it intentionally, to make a point.

Vance wanted to meet immediately with President Park, but ROK Blue House staffers rebuffed his request with uncharacteristic rudeness. The officials told Vance that Park was meeting with his military planners and not to be disturbed. Unable to arrange a meeting, and looking ahead to a banquet that evening sponsored by the ROK Army, Vance and his men huddled with Bonesteel and Porter. The fivesome went over some hundred discrete issues, ensuring a unified front. Vance would do all the talking for the next few days.

At the ROK Army dinner that night, the Americans stuck to light conversation and banal, obvious toasts. Their excited counterparts talked with conviction about the mighty things to come as the allies avenged the Blue House and Pueblo incidents. The southerners seemed to think that Vance’s arrival presaged the great march north. One boozy ROK general cornered Ambassador Walsh and confided in him: “We’re blood brothers…. When you are hurt, we are hurt.”, If Vance and his partners had any doubts about ROK belligerence, the banquet demonstrated just how wild things had gotten in Seoul.

When Vance met Park the next day, the South Korean president proved quite obstinate. But Vance did not compromise. Johnson’s spokesman laid out his position frankly. First, there would be no wider war in Koreaperiod; the U.S. already had its hands full in Vietnam. Any ROK military action against the north would be cleared with General Bonesteel, and he was not empowered to allow South Korean cross-border reprisals without President Johnson’s approval. Vance made it clear that he could foresee no circumstances-short of a full-scale North Korean invasion-that could garner such approval.

Second, with a military attack ruled out, the United States would negotiate as necessary in order to gain freedom for the Pueblo sailors. Vance reminded Park that America had a tradition of talking with groups and states it did not recognize, including such thorns as the Barbary pirates, the Filipino insurgents, and Pancho Villa. This matter was between the United States and North Korea.

Finally, Vance offered some sweetener with the bitter gruel. He promised Park $100 million in immediate military aid, to include F-4 series Phantom fighter jets for the ROK Air Force; additional assistance would follow. To get this equipment, Park had to vow not to go north.

For four days, Park equivocated. But he really had no choice. Without the United States, South Korea could never hope to defeat the DPRK at any acceptable cost. The ROK leader finally consented to reign in his generals. Vance left, his mission accomplished. Presidents Johnson and Park met in Honolulu in April to seal the deal. So the great crisis abated. A midintensity war had been averted. The low-intensity war, however, remained to be won. (Source: Scenes from an Unfinished War: Low-Intensity Conflict in Korea, 1966-1968 by Major Daniel P. Bolger)

Operation Combat Fox (USAF Involvement):
Fifth Air Force Advance Echelon to Osan AB (from Fuchu AS. Japan)
4th Tactical Fighter Wing to Kunsan AB (72 F-4Ds from Seymour Johnson AFB, North Carolina)
18th Tactical Fighter Wing I-) to Osan AB, Kwangju ROKAFB (36 F-105Ds from Kadena AS, Okinawa)
12th Tactical Fighter Squadron (-) to Osan AB (12 F-105Ds from Kadena AB, Okinawa)
334th Tactical Fighter Squadron to Kwangju ROKAFB (24 F-105-Ds from Kadena AB, Okinawa)
64th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron to Kimpo AB (24 F-102As from Naha AB, Okinawa)
82d Fighter-Interceptor Squadron to Suwon ROKAFB (24 F-102As from Naha AS, Okinawa)
318th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron to Osan AB (24 F-106As from McChord AFB, Washington)
Eleven months after the seizure North Korea repatriated 82 Pueblo crewmen and one set of remains to the United States through P’anmunjom on 23 Dec 1968. Upon signature of the US admitting to espionage in the coastal waters of the Sea of Japan, the 82 POWs were freed. Upon their return on 28 December 1968, the crew was treated poorly by the public and the military and only in 1990 did they receive the POW ribbons to which they were entitled. The ship remains in Wonson Harbor, North Korea.

USS Pueblo (AGER2): War Trophy in Wonson Harbor
(Click on photo to enlarge)
The following is a guestbook entry from USS Pueblo Veterans Association by Edward A. Lewis of Salem, New Hampshire. He was assigned to the 6314th Support Wing at Osan in Jan 1968. He stated:

“…I’m glad the memory of the Pueblo and your heroic sacrifices is being kept alive. I was a US Air Force officer stationed at Osan Air Base at the time of the capture, having arrived there in November, 1967 (I was on the way home on the day you were released). In January, 1968, I was a First Lieutenant and Personnel Officer assigned to the 6314th Support Wing, 14th Air Division. For the next six months, I headed up the Personnel Readiness Center, which handled all the Air Force TDY staffing in-country.

A couple of weeks ago, while exploring Pueblo related websites, I came across a 1999 e-mail from Stu Russell in which he asks for any knowledge of the US Air Force blocking the runways to prevent ROKAF from taking off. Here are some thoughts if you are still interested in that subject: ROKAF was charged with air defense in Korea, so it may have been thought appropriate for them to do something. Of course, they were still plenty upset at the North Koreans for the Blue House incident a few days before.

I was very friendly with a number of air controllers and feel I would have heard about us blocking the runways, but I know I definitely did not hear of any such thing happening. Nor, conversely, was there ever any word of them scrambling from any air base. Our thinking (among my friends) was that if the ROKAF had scrambled, they surely would have blown the North Koreans out of the water. Our basis for that was about a month before, a NK gunboat was harassing a ROK fishing boat (may have been spying, nothing really said, who knows) up near Cheju-do. ROKAF scrambled and did blow them out of the water.

The USAF was responsible for all offensive air operations. In January, there were about a half dozen aircraft each at Osan and Kunsan. They were TDY from Japan and were “specially configured.” It would have taken too long for them to be reconfigured in time to aid the Pueblo. (SITE NOTE: The “half dozen aircraft” at Kunsan and Osan on nuclear alert cannot be verified. He is referring to the aircraft of the Det 1, 347th TFW of Osan with nuclear weapons and the Det 1, 475th TFW at Kunsan. His numbers would indicate 3 aircraft — 2 “hot” and one spare. However, the SIOP info from Nautilus.org for the time stated four “hot” with two spares.) As it was, they were downloaded and uploaded several times over the next day or so until other aircraft could be flown in from Japan.

Also, I recall it did not take too long (seems now like only a day or two, but I could be wrong on that point) for a carrier to be nearby. (SITE NOTE: The USS Enterprise took one day to reach the area, but reports state that when it did arrive, there were what appeared to be 75 ships stretching across the horizon. All Navy personnel thought they were going to war. However, after three days of steaming up and down the North Korean coast, they were told to withdraw.)

Here is the most interesting and telling part. Between 1:00 and 1:30 local time, I was meeting with the Deputy Director of Operations, Lt Col (later Col) Paul Taylor, in his office. At about 1:15, the Director of Operation, Col Fishell (as I recall) came into the office and said, “Paul, I understand there’s a Navy ship in trouble off the coast.” Col Taylor responded, “We’ve heard that, too, and have been in touch with the Navy. They say thay can handle it.” Those were the exact words (or 99%), especially that last sentence.

In view of all that happened immediately subsequent, I will never forget them. A very short discussion, less than five minutes, took place in which they agreed we (USAF Korea) would do nothing, nor was there any indication of anything being done or to be done by ROKAF. These were the two officers who would have been the most involved with any USAF action to be taken and would have also been the most knowledgeable of any ROKAF action. I was in Col Taylor’s office for another ten minutes or so after that. Again, it’s been 34 years, but that conversation is one I will never forget. …”
The following is a short chronology of the Pueblo incident:

The 12th TFS from the 18th TFW at Kadena immediately deploys to Osan AB on 23 Jan. The 475th TFW is hastily formed of the 67th TFS (from Kadena); 356th TFS (from Myrtle Beach); and 558th TFS (changed to 391st TFS) were immediately sent to Kunsan to hold down the fort until the 4th TFW from Seymour Johnson, NC arrived.

The 4th TFW arrived with its THREE squadrons (334th; 335th and 336th TFS) at Kunsan AB on 31 Jan 1968 — though the 336th TFS is only shown at Kwangju ROKAFB from Jun-Jul 68). 18th Tactical Fighter Wing F-105s was split between Osan AB and Kwangju ROKAFB.

The 15th TRS from Kadena with its RF-4Cs deploy to Osan AB from 26 Jan-12 Feb 1968. UNC announces loss of a USAF RF-4C photo reconnaissance plane over Taegu on 10 Feb. Operating from Itazuke AB, Japan with a detachment operated at Osan AB, South Korea, 13 Feb-c. 25 Jul 1968.

On 14 Feb, a USAF F-4D out of Kunsan AB crashed near the village of Yongan-myon, Ilssan-gun, Chollabukto killing three villagers and injuring another. The pilot and nav ejected safely.

On 22 Mar, the deployment to Osan AB of the 314th Fighter Interceptor Squadron, 325th Fighter Interceptor Wing from Air Defense Command (ADC) first time the F-106 flown to critical areas outside the continental US using inflight refueling. Rotated stateside in June. (NOTE: The 325th Wing source states: “From 9 February to 1 July 1968, the 325th Fighter Interceptor Wing (ADC) kept a large detachment of F-106A aircraft at Osan Air Base, Republic of Korea to provide air defense.” (On July 1, 1968, the Air Force inactivated the 325th FIW.))

The “paper wing” of the 354th TFW was formed to provide the cover wing for the ANG units that were deployed to Kunsan to replace the 4th TFW in July. The 354th TFW consisted of the 127th TFS: 5 Jul 1968-10 Jun 1969. (Kansas ANG: F-100); 166th TFS: 5 Jul 1968-10 Jun 1969. (Ohio ANG: F-100);

(NOTE: The 8th US Army Chronology 1 July 1968-31 December 1968 on 1 August has a confusing notation. It stated, on 3 Aug, “The 12th Tactical Fighter Squadron, headquartered in Kadena AFB, Okinawa, arrives in Korea to replace the 334th Tactical Fighter Squadron which rotated to CONUS. The 300-pilot 12th Tactical Fighter Squadron flies F-105 Thunderchiefs.” The 334th and 335th TFS of the 4th TFW of Seymour Johnson AFB, VA was scheduled to return on Jul 1968. However, the 12th TFS from Kadena does not have 300 “pilots.” Most likely they meant “300-man squadron.” AFHRA shows the 12th TFS deployed to Osan AB, South Korea, 23 Jan?3 Jun 1968 for the Pueblo Crisis.)
On 17 Dec, the 71st FIS (ADC) with F-106 aircraft from Malstrom AFB, Montana arrive at Osan AB replacing the 48th FIS (ADC) returning to Langley AFB, VA. The 71st FIS from Malmstrom AFB, MT deployed at Osan AB, South Korea from about 22 Dec 1968 ?about 9 Jun 1969. (We are uncertain about the location of these interceptors as some records indicate that the Interceptors were at Suwon during the Pueblo Crisis.)

18th Tactical Fighter Wing
Kadena AB, Okinawa

12th TFS

The following is from Tango Way relating Bill Bayless’ experiences during the Pueblo Incident while deployed to Osan. He was an Engine Mechanic of the 18th TFW at Kadena and was part of the contingent that immediately deployed with their F-105s to Osan AB on 23 Jan. He stated, “We lived in barracks on the alert pad. The nuclear weapons bunker was across the street. The barracks consisted of four bays with a central shower and latrine. We put ninety-six men in a barracks designed for thirty-two. I set my alarm for 0300 so that I might have some hot water for a shower.” In this, he is talking of staying in the Diamond area of the base where the nuclear alerts were staged. But he was lucky, the advance elements of the 4th TFW had to put up their own twelve-man tents without any prior experience — in the middle of winter. The folks at Kunsan who came up from Cam Rahn Bay had only light jungle fatigues and no thermal underwear. Bill was lucky — he had a shower.

Barracks
Bill continued, “… Osan was a mess. Most of the vehicles on the base were not operating. Vehicle parts and supplies had been shipped to Vietnam to support the war effort and the Osan vehicle fleet had deteriorated. It took a few days to get everything we needed from Kadena.” This was the standard situation in Korea, but at least at Osan they were at the head of the supply chain so things were better than Kunsan where the 4th TFW showed up. Because Osan was close to the DMZ, it was felt that staging of the aircraft further south was recommended. Try to imagine the three squadrons of the 4th TFW along with a squadron from Cam Rahn Bay, Vietnam, additional WB-57 aircraft, C-130s hauling in cargo, F-105s from Kadena and Osan seemed to have it a lot easier. In the end, the overcrowding at Kunsan was solved by sending the nuclear alert Det 1, 475th to Taegu and one of the 4th’s squadrons to Kwangju.

Airfield from Hill 170 near End-of-runway
He went on, “… An SR-71 was launched from Kadena to look for the Pueblo and was over the area in about 15 minutes. There was a problem with weather and I don’t know if the mission was successful.” From the recalling of the events, it was not the lack of information about the events that caused the problem, but the “political” solution that evolved — versus the military one. If the US went after the Pueblo full force, it would be starting another “war” while the US was deeply involved in Vietnam. It could NOT support two wars. Though as distasteful as it may seem, the decision was logical. However, years later as the USS Pueblo sits in Wonsan Harbor as a “war prize” of North Korea, one wonders if the decision was a right one. However, in the end, many in the US military lost faith in the military creed to never leave anyone behind — as the US “deserted” the crew of the USS Pueblo in North Korea and attempted to peacefully negotiate their release. Thirty years later, the after-effects of the US decision to NOT react are still being felt.

The high-level behind-the-scenes discussion of 11 Feb 1968 is related in Scenes from an Unfinished War: Low-Intensity Conflict in Korea, 1966-1968 by Major Daniel P. Bolger:

When Vance met Park the next day, the South Korean president proved quite obstinate. But Vance did not compromise. Johnson’s spokesman laid out his position frankly. First, there would be no wider war in Koreaperiod; the U.S. already had its hands full in Vietnam. Any ROK military action against the north would be cleared with General Bonesteel, and he was not empowered to allow South Korean cross-border reprisals without President Johnson’s approval. Vance made it clear that he could foresee no circumstances-short of a full-scale North Korean invasion-that could garner such approval.

Second, with a military attack ruled out, the United States would negotiate as necessary in order to gain freedom for the Pueblo sailors. Vance reminded Park that America had a tradition of talking with groups and states it did not recognize, including such thorns as the Barbary pirates, the Filipino insurgents, and Pancho Villa. This matter was between the United States and North Korea.

Finally, Vance offered some sweetener with the bitter gruel. He promised Park $100 million in immediate military aid, to include F-4 series Phantom fighter jets for the ROK Air Force; additional assistance would follow. To get this equipment, Park had to vow not to go north.

For four days, Park equivocated. But he really had no choice. Without the United States, South Korea could never hope to defeat the DPRK at any acceptable cost. The ROK leader finally consented to reign in his generals. Vance left, his mission accomplished. Presidents Johnson and Park met in Honolulu in April to seal the deal. So the great crisis abated. A midintensity war had been averted. The low-intensity war, however, remained to be won.

Ginko Tree on Hill 180 (now part of Golf Course Landmark)

January 23, 1968

The broken generator was mounted on the front PTO case of the J-79 engine, which put me down the intake of the RF-4C most of the morning.

I came out for air after about an hour and could sense that something was going on. The tempo of the flight line was different. Aircraft were being refueled, people were moving a little faster, and C-130′s were landing at Kadena. I dismissed my reaction and went back to work. About thirty minutes passed, and someone yelled down the intake, “Bayless, come on out, you need to go home and pack.” Ok, this was a mobility exercise, part of a game we played. I had been through this many times. You go home, pack your duffle bag, report to your assigned area, and wait for the all clear. I went home and packed, told my spouse that I would probably be home for dinner, and reported back to the flight line. An hour later I was on a C-130 bound for South Korea.

Earlier that day, the USS Pueblo was at work 13 miles from the coast of North Korea when four North Korean patrol boats surrounded the craft. The Pueblo’s skipper, Comdr. Lloyd Bucher, protested that the ship was in international waters, beyond the 12- mile limit. The Pueblo, armed with two machine guns, offered no resistance to the North Korean crewmen as they scrambled aboard the Pueblo. Bucher ordered secret documents burned and equipment destroyed. The North Koreans opened fire and three US crewmen were wounded and one, Duane Hodges, from Creswell, Oregon, was killed by a 57mm shell. Ten bags of highly sensitive documents were seized by the North Koreans, along with most of the ships highly classified equipment.

There was no help available to the Pueblo, once the attack was under way. Yokota Air Base had three aircraft on alert at Osan Air Base, South Korea, but two were out of commission and waiting for parts and the other was armed nuclear. All the F-105s on alert at Kadena were armed with nuclear weapons. I don’t know why the navy didn’t respond.

As we arrived at Osan Air Base, the 83 crewmen from the Pueblo were being processed into prison at Wonsan. The 18th TFW commander ordered the deployment of all of Kadena’s F-105s to Osan, Korea. Twelve aircraft were launched by sundown. As ground crews arrived at Osan, they went to work to arm each Thud (F-105) with 16 500 lb., armor piercing, bombs. The next morning they were ready, with orders to sink the Pueblo. Orders to launch never arrived from 5th Air Force, but our aircraft and people remained on alert until after the release of the Pueblo crew.

The base exchanged sold out of almost everything within a couple of days. It was two or three weeks before new stocks of essentials like soap, shampoo, deodorant, razor blades, and shaving cream started to arrive. A few of these items were available from local establishments in the town of Osan. When we arrived from Kadena, we were ill equipped for the cold weather. It took a while to get cold weather clothing, so we made due with field jackets without liners.

We worked twelve hour shifts, as I remember, and I choose to work mostly at night. That left the day free to roam about and photograph the village of Osan and the surrounding area. Osan was a poor town, with little to support it other than the base. I think a rather high percentage of the people in town engaged in occupations of dubious repute. In the history of Korea there must have been an influx of Christian missionaries, because the biggest and best buildings in town were the abundant Christian churches of various denominations.

A TRIP ON A BROKEN AIRPLANE

After six weeks, at Osan, I boarded a C-130 from, Naha Air Base, for the trip back to Okinawa. The aircraft crew chief told some of us, before leaving, that they were having problems controlling the prop speed on one of the engines. Even though it was loaded with a J-75 engine on an installation dolly (about 10,000 lbs.) and sixteen or seventeen troops with all of their tools and baggage, the pilot and crew felt it was safe if one of the engines had to be shut down.

A young lieutenant sat beside me and introduced himself as one of the base chaplains. His father was ill and he was headed home on emergency leave. He had never flown in a military aircraft before. When we were airborne the pilot feathered the prop and shut down the problem engine. About 20 minutes out of Osan another engine started to lose oil pressure. The pilot declared an emergency and fire trucks and ambulances met us as we landed at Kunsan Air Base. (That didn’t set well the the young chaplain.) There were, including me, several jet engine mechanics on the plane and none of us had ever turned a wrench on a C-130. Transit Alert mechanics replaced the oil pressure transmitter and we were on our way.

We reached a cruising altitude of about 30,000.feet and everyone was starting to relax, although the prop speed problem had not been cured. Well into the flight, somewhere over the East China Sea, there was a loud “BANG” and the C-130 immediately went into a dive. My chaplain companion had a white knuckle grip on his own thighs and his eyes were closed. When the plane reached an altitude of about 10,000 feet, the pilot leveled the airplane and discontinued the dive. I had been through high altitude chamber training and recognized this as a rapid decompression and the pilot’s actions were “by the book”. The crew chief made everyone aware that the J-75 engine and all baggage and equipment might need to be dumped, but that didn’t happen. We cruised into Naha at 10,000 feet and landed without incident. Everyone was happy to be on solid ground, but none more grateful than the young chaplain.

LT. TOM UTTS

Our maintenance officer, Lt. Tom Utts, wrote a novel, Korea Blue, loosely based on his experiences in Korea. Tom currently resides in California. He has a great sense of humor and had an interesting Air Force Career. Take some time to visit his websites: ZCAPS LAIR and CLARK AIR BASE SCRAPBOOK

F-105s at Osan AB (Jan 1968) (Tom Utts)

(L) F-105s at Osan AB (R) 12th TFS Ops Bldg (Jan 1968) (Tom Utts)

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Life at Osan and Songtan With the heightened tension, the base set about constructing bomb shelters with sand bags. We are uncertain of organization but the AFCS indicates “Air Force Communications Service” who were permanent party — not TDY personnel. Believe these personnel lived in Jamesway barracks at the base of Hill 180 and worked near the perimeter in what used to be the Ground Power Section for the AFSS on Antenna Hill.) (NOTE: We are seeking the individual who posted these pics to the Osan AB Yahoo Group to credit him properly.)

(L) Sandbaggers Sandbagging it (R) Airman taking break (1968) (Unknown: From Osan AB Yahoo Group Photos)

(L) The Bucket MW Army (?) — Korean War era barracks with snow on ground (R) Inside of Jamesway Barracks of permanent party personnel.

(L) The Turtle Stele appears to be near the perimeter fence — not the location it was in 1976 near present commissary. (1968) (Unknown: From Osan AB Yahoo Group Photos) (NOTE: See Korean History: Chosun Period for Turtle Stele info.) (R) Main Gate to left (1968) (Unknown) (NOTE: Namsan Village Road was not built until the 1980s.)

Off-base, the Chicol-ville area remained a rather bleak area of wooden buildings that lined the Shinjang Mall Road. The photos below were taken during the winter months with its snow and freezing temperatures.

Kid in snow (1968) (Unknown)
Uncertain of Location but buildings of type near MSR (1968) (Unknown)

Pony carts: Appears to be “honey pot” storage. (1968) (Unknown) (NOTE: Pony delivery carts operated by North Korean refugees from Milwal road area.)
Chicol-ni from over the perimeter fence (1968) (Unknown)

MSR-1 Looking North to Osan-ni (1968) (Unknown)
Mokchon Railway Crossing looking north (1968) (Unknown) (Note: Car crossing track appears to be taxi.)

Kyongbu Railway looking north (1968) (Unknown) (NOTE: The children are returning from school as indicated by their school bags.)

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Bob Hope Show (Dec 1968) After the tensions had died down a bit after the Pueblo Incident and units were packing up to go home, the Bob Hope Show came to Osan in December 1968. This dedicated group of troopers came overseas every Christmas with Bob Hope. Because of this Bob Hope is held as an icon whose shows dating back to WWII made him a timeless legend. On this trip, he was accompanied by Ann Margaret — who after years is still a favorite in the eyes of those who served in Vietnam as well. She became the anti-thesis to “Hanoi Jane” (Jane Fonda) who caused a lot of heartburn to GIs by calling them “baby-killers” and openly supported the Viet Cong. Ann Margaret, on the other hand, neither supported nor condemned the Vietnam War, but only supported the “boys.” For this, Vietnam-era vets remember her fondly to this day. Of course, every show had the leggy girls — to remind all of the girls back home and always had a beauty pageant winner — who was Miss World, Penelope Plummer from Australia for this show.

Crowd waiting for the show (1968) (Neil Mishalov)
Crowd waiting for the show(1968) (Neil Mishalov)

Bob Hope with his golf putter (1968) (Neil Mishalov)
Penelope Plummer dazzling the crowd (1968) (Neil Mishalov)

(Source: Photo by Neil Mishalov at www.mishalov.com”>www.mishalov.com.)

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Bob Hope with Penelope Plummer, Miss World of Australia (19 Dec 1968) (Craig Garner)

Bob Hope with Penelope Plummer, Miss World of Australia (19 Dec 1968) (Craig Garner)

Bob Hope and Ann Margaret (19 Dec 1968) (Craig Garner)
Ann Margaret and member of audience (19 Dec 1968) (Craig Garner)

Appreciative audience (19 Dec 1968) (Craig Garner)
(Source: Photo by Craig Garner at Stars and Stripes.)

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557th CESHR Red Horse (1968-1969) Osan, Kunsan, Taegu, Kwangju, Suwon and Kimpo. The 557th Red Horse Squadron assisted in the build up of US Air Forces in South Korea as a result of North Korea’s seizure of the USS Pueblo. Responsible for the construction of many projects throughout Korea such as the “Wonder Arches” (Hardened Aircraft Shelters) and expanding aircraft parking ramp areas. The 557th Red Horse Squadron relocated to Eglin AFB, Florida in 1969. The projects started were handed over to Korean contractors to complete.

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Assault in Wongon-myeon, Songu-ri According to the Pyeongtaek History, on 28 Mar 1968, an American Arpel (?) assaulted Mr. Kim Tong-shik cutting his tongue. Outcome of this incident unknown but it would have fallen under the newly implemented SOFA. However, unless a serious crime case involving murder/rape, the ROK police jurisdiction usually waived after an investigation. (Source: Pyeongtaek City History CD, “Pyeongtaek Si Sa.”)
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Project Black Spot: Alleged Secret Project to Halt Infiltration Between 19 August 1968 – 23 October 1968, there was a secret program called “Project Black Spot” to use NC-123K and AC-123K to attempt to stop the infiltration into the South by the North. They became operational in 1968 and flew 28 operational missions over the two month period in the South Korean Sea, trying to stop infiltration from North into South Korea by sea. Unfortunately, no bad guys were caught. The Black Spot folks supposedly shared some of the facilities of the 314th Air Division Recon. According to Richard J. Latshaw, “They went out on a bunch of night missions but never found anything to speak of. About the same time, we were checking out a new TI ir system and flew one mission over the water. Scared the you know what out of what was probably an NK boat. At least, he took off in a Northerly direction as fast as he could go. Unfortunately, we didn’t have anything to drop on him. (the NK boats used to join in with the fishing fleet and then run ashore to drop off or pick up agents).”

During this time, the North still did not have semi-submersibles nor the small submarines. (Source: Skunk Works.) (See Spies, Infiltrators and Espionage for further historical information on the infiltrators and spy networks in South Korea.)

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1969

Songbuk Elementary School (1969) (Songbuk Elementary School)

On 22 Nov 1969, Taegwang Chongup High School was officially opened as a spin-off of the Taegwang Middle School on the same location. The title of the high school would be changed on 16 Dec 1972 to Taegwang High School due to a change in regulations.
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LIfe at Osan AB Gregory Terlecki of Alexandria, VA wrote in Nov 2005, “I was the Law Enforcement Desk Sergeant for the 6314th SP Sqdn, C Flight, from about June 1969 – Feb 1970. I did pull security before that and can still vividly remember walking perimeter behind those F-106s & the F-4s.” (SITE NOTE: The F-106s Delta Darts were from the 71st FIS, of Malstrom AFB, MT were for air defense and the F-4Cs came from Det 1 347th TFW at Osan AB that came into existence in 1968 stood nuclear alerts on one month rotations.)

6314th Security Police Squadron

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First Man on the Moon Rivets Korea to TVs On 21 July 1969, the first men walked on the moon. In Korea, everyone is glued to the TV to watch the events on TV as it unfolds. President Nixon proclaims a National Day of Participation so everyone watches as Apollo 11 makes history. Remember that at that time, the TV were not household fixtures but located mostly in coffee shops and other business shops. The TVs were cheap black and white models for the most part.
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EC-121 Shot Down On Monday, April 14, 1969 at 5:00 PM EST (1544Z), a Navy EC-121M reconnaissance aircraft (PR-21/BuNo 135749) of Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron One (VQ-1) with a crew of 31, including nine Naval Security Group (NAVSECGRU) and Marine linguists, took off from Atsugi Naval Air Station, Japan on a routine Beggar Shadow SIGINT collection mission over the Sea of Japan. The EC-121M had been directed to proceed to a point off the Musu Peninsula, where the aircraft was to orbit for several hours along a 120-mile long “track,” then land at Osan Air Base in South Korea. The aircraft commander had been ordered not to come any closer than 50 nautical miles to the North Korean coastline. This particular route had been flown by VQ-1 EC-121Ms for two years without incident, and the mission had been graded as being “minimal risk.” More than 190 similar missions had been previously flow by Navy and Air Force reconnaissance aircraft off North Korea’s east coast during the first three months of 1969, all without incident. Six hours after takeoff, the crew of the EC-121M transmitted a routine radio-teletype activity report at 11:00 PM EST, then disappeared off USAF radar screens at 11:50 PM EST, 90 miles southeast of the North Korean port of Chongjin.

The EC-121M mission had been monitored from the ground by Air Force radar sites in Japan and South Korea, as well as by the USAFSS 6918th Security Squadron at Hakata, Japan and Detachment 1, 6922nd Security Wing at Osan Air Base, Korea (USA-31), which followed the flight by intercepting North Korean air defense radar tracking transmissions. Air Force radars and USAFSS COMINT intercept operators in Korea had detected two NKAF MiGs flying towards the unarmed EC-121 prior the plane’s disappearance. In addition, the intercept operators at the USAFSS listening post at Osan, South Korea, who were copying North Korean voice and morse air defense radio traffic, tracked the flight path of the EC-121 aircraft as well as the intercept course of the North Korean fighters. The NAVSECGRU listening post at Kamiseya in Japan was also intercepting Russian PVO radar tracking of the EC-121M mission, giving NSA two sources of information as to the flight path of the aircraft.

The USAFSS listening post at Osan attempted to warn the aircraft’s commander by transmitting a mission abort signal at 11:46 PM EST. But the MiGs caught up with the slow flying aircraft as it turned for home 90 miles southeast of the North Korean port city of Chongjin, and the MiGs shot the EC-121 down at 11:47 PM EST. All 31 crewmembers were killed, including nine NAVSECGRU cryptologists. The bodies of only two of the crew were ever recovered. The USAFSS listening post at Osan (SIGAD USA-31) issued a CRITIC message on the incident at 5:44 AM GMT on April 15, 1969.

President Nixon order an immediate halt of all aerial reconnaissance missions in the Sea of Japan, but rescinded his order three days later, this time ordering that all peripheral reconnaissance missions off North Korea be accompanied by fighter escorts.

According to one source, an NSA review of COMINT intercepts of North Korean Air Force ground-to-air radio traffic from the USAFSS listening post at Osan showed that the shootdown had resulted from a command and control error between the North Korean ground controller and the fighter pilot. Other NSA intercepts showed that the Soviets were shocked by the North Korean action, so much so that Russian warships were sent to the crash site to help American ships search for survivors.

President Nixon’s revelation that NSA had successfully monitored both the North Korean and Russian air defense tracking nets caused both nations to immediately change all of their radio frequencies, operating procedures and crypto systems in use at the time. It took NSA’s cryptologists months to get back to the point where they were prior to Nixon’s press conference. (Source: KoreanWar.com.)
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F-106 Delta Darts Alert (1969) The alerts for the F-106s continued into 1969. The following photos by Frank Dutcher, 71st FIS, Malstrom, MT during alerts at Osan in 1969 are from F-106 Delta Dart: 71st FIS

F-106s from the 95th Fighter Interceptor Squadron, 21st Air Division (later 20th Air Division) of Dover AFB, Delaware deployed at Osan AB from 15 Nov. 1969 – 1 May 1970. Attached to Fifth Air Force ADVON, 15 Nov. 1969 – 1 May 1970.

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Anti-government Protests over Constitutional Amendment In June-July 1969, 3,800 students from five Seoul universities clashed with police over the amendment to the Constitution that would allow Park Chung-hee to run for the Presidency for a third six-year term. Clashes lasted for eleven straight days.

In Sept 1969, clashes between rock-hurling students and police flared up again over the constitutional issue.

On 18 Oct the national referendum showed that two-thirds favor the third term amendment with 11.1 million voting. President Park had said he would step down if the referendum didn’t pass. However, with the approval he could run for a third term in 1971.

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SOFA Punishment Under the SOFA, the Ministry of Justice exercised jurisdiction on 51 cases — 11 military and 40 civilian. Of this number, 34 are awaiting trial, two on appeal and 15 completed. There were no acquittals and the general level of punishment was “reasonable” according to the 8th Army.

ROK Upgrade under Military Assistance Program On 29 Aug, six F-4Ds arrive, the first of 18 to be given to the ROK under the $100 million 1968 Military Assistance Program (MAP). On 23 Sep President Park Chung-hee activates first ROKAF F-4D squadron at Taegu. The last of the 18 F-4Ds were delivered in Sep to the ROKAF.

In December a number of U-10B aircraft arrive under the MAP. The single-engine prop aircraft equipped with communications, search light and loudspeakers intended for counter-intelligence work.
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ROK Developments President Park Chung-hee on 29 Sep 1969 opens the Osan-Chon leg of the 270-mile Seoul-Pusan Expressway. This highway, which will form the backbone of a nationwide mass transit network and improve military supply lines, was scheduled to be completed by mid-1970.

The RO annouced a devaluation of its currency as the open market exchange rate jumps from 290 to 305 won to one US dollar.
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Miracle of the Han During the 1960′s, South Korea made great economic progress. Seoul, the showpiece of this success, became known as the “Miracle on the Han River.” Through its five year plans, the government set out to make Korea into a modern industrial nation. New industry sprang up around Seoul, causing the population to soar to 10.6 million. Rapid growth forced the government to develop plans to ease crowding in Seoul. It chose an area south of the Han River, where relatively few people lived, to build new housing. Soon huge, high-rise apartments pierced the skyline in other outlying areas. Rice growing fields south of the city disappeared to be filled by apartment complexes. The city absorbed these new residential areas into its orbit.

The new housing was unlike traditional Korean homes, which were wide, one-story structures with rows of rooms linked by courtyards and porches. Instead, residents of modern Seoul lived in vast apartment complexes surrounded by playgrounds, department stores, and sports facilities. The old-style homes disappeared from the city landscape. (Source: Korean Society.)

Unfortunately, the “Miracle of the Han” would take a few more years to extend outside of Seoul. Many people in the Cholla Provinces felt neglected by the prosperity of Seoul while their economies remained at the subsistence levels. The term “regionalism” was coined to reflect the feelings of the Cholla provinces of what was referred to the favoritism showed to the the Seoul-Taegu-Pusan connections.
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Infiltrators, Spies and Hijacking In 1969 there were 367 NK infiltrators attempted to infiltrate on 153 separate occasions. This was a dramatic decrease from the 1,142 attempted infiltrations in 1968, but that seaborne infiltrations tripled. Of the 367 infiltrators, 79 were captured and 93 were killed.

On 11 Dec a KAL turboprop YS-11 hijacked enroute from Kangnung to Seoul and diverted to NK airport near Wonsan with 51 passengers. The International Red Cross asked to intervene. This was the second hijacking of a commercial airliner after the C-47 that was hijacked in Feb 1958. Large scale anti-communist protests in ROK over the hijacking were held.

The government took a hardline with Communists after the assassination attempt on the Blue House in 1968. In July 1969, Lee Kun-su, a high-ranking communist who defected through Panmunjon made the headlines in Mar 1967, was hanged in Seoul Prison. He was condemned on 10 May for spying for the North while posing as a defector. Also in July Kim Chong-tae, a leader of a NK spy network called the Unification Revolution Party, was hanged in Seoul Prison. He was sentenced to death in Jan 1969 for espionage activities against the South since Mar 1964. The ROK CIA announced in Sep that they arrested two NK agents and 10 accomplices who attempted to reorganize the Unification Revolution Party that was neutralized in 1968. In Aug 1969 the Supreme Court upholds the convictions of two leaders in the Imja island espionage ring arrested in July 1968 and sentences them to death.

The ROK Security Command and KCIA were active in searching out spy rings — but it appears that many of these rings had existed in Korea for many years before being found. On 19 Aug the ROK Army announced the arrest of six agents belonging to two separate espionage groups which had infiltrated into the south coast and were to spy on military facilities in Pusan, Seoul and Taegu. In Oct the KNP announced the arrest of 10 people in a spy ring in three cities in North Cholla Province after the leader of the group surrendered. The ROK Security Command announced the arrest of nine suspected NK espionage agents in two Kunsan based spy rings. In Oct two NK agents and 17 collaborators were arrested in Seoul after a gun battle that wounded two KCIA agents. In Oct the KNP arrested two subversive agents in Yongdongpo who had infiltrated the ROK on 8 Jul to stir up unrest. In Oct the KNP and KCIA announced the arrest of four spies and three suspected spies in two separate roundups in Seoul and Taegu. On 19 Nov the ROK Army Security Command announced the arrest of a five-man spy ring in Yongdong-po set up by a NK agent in 1961.

The North suspended large scale penetration attempts and instead started infiltrating the South with small teams. The ROK drew up plans to increase the KNP to a strength of 15,000 men to cope with the infiltration problems. (NOTE: It was not until 1970 that the paramilitary Combat Police (later called Riot Police) was proposed.) On 21 Jul infiltrators were repulsed by 2d ID troops on the DMZ. On 12 Aug the ROK Army Security Command announce the arrest of three agents residing is Sochon, South Chunchong Province (22km from Kunsan). Two agents captured attempting to exfiltrate near Munsan. On 24 Aug large firefight on DMZ leaves one infiltrator and three ROK soldiers dead. On 14 Sep three infiltrators killed and one captured on eastern sector of DMZ at a road block. In the firefight that ensued, one ROK army killed and four wounded. In Oct a NK agent and supporter captured attempting to exfiltrate across the Imjin River. In Oct two infiltrators killed and one repelled in central sector of DMZ. On 13 Oct one infiltrator killed in central sector. Two agents who appeared in the I Corps area on 12 Oct are killed by ROK Marines when they attempt to cross the Imjin River on 17 Oct.

Seaborne infiltration were on the increase in 1968. On 12 Jul an infiltrator was captured near Kimpo after infiltrating by sea on 8 Jul. In June, a band of 16 guerillas infiltrated by boat near Pusan. 13 were killed, but 3 escaped. On 25 Jul the three NK agents were tracked down on Taehuksan island near Mokpo and killed. On 25 Jul, three infiltrators and two ROK soldiers killed on the southern half of the DMZ. In Aug Seoul police capture two agents who had landed on the southern coast. On 8 Aug KNP announced the capture of a NK espionage agent in Pusan who was to forment trouble amongst unions and students. He had been infiltrated by highspeed spy boat. On 12 Aug a high-speed NK boat attacks a fishing vessel off the southern islands in Cholla Province killing two men and wounding three others before escaping. On 20 Sep four infiltrators killed and speedboat captured on west coast. On 22 Sep a NK agent is captured by ROK Marines on east coast near Yongil.

On 24 Sep ROK Destroyer Pusan-ham had a running gun battle with a 50-ton spy boat off the southwest coast of South Korea near Imja Island. The spy boat attempted to evade capture by dodging in and out of the fishing boats. In the fire-fight that ensued, six ROK crewmen were seriously injured. Because inclement weather was closing in, it was decided to sink the 50-ton spyboat. Approximately 15 crewmen aboard perished.

On 13 Oct a ROK destroyer Chungmu-ham sank a 75-ton spy boat carrying about 20 agents after a running gun battle off the SW coast.

On 25 July, 45 NK guards attacked UNC guards with fists and clubs. No serious injuries involved.
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DMZ Ambush Ambush along DMZ Four soldiers traveling along the DMZ in a one-and-a half ton truck marked with a white flag and “DMZ Police” were attacked with small arms and grenades by North Korean intruders in a planned ambush. U.S. Army responding to the shooting spotted the four intruders heading north to the DMZ.

The four soldiers from the 7th ID were identified as SSgt James R. Grissinger; SP4 Charles E. Taylor; SP4 Jack L. Morris; and PFC W.E. Grimes. Each were shot through the head by their attackers.
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Nixon Doctrine On July 24, 1969, President Richard Nixon, en route to Guam, told reporters that the United States would seek to reduce its military involvement in Asia and encourage the “Asianization” of conflicts on that continent. Originally called the “Guam Doctrine” and better known as the “Nixon Doctrine,” this change of foreign policy was a result of U.S. public pressures to get out of Vietnam, the war’s drain on the U.S. economy, the new president’s intention to uphold his campaign promise to “withdraw honorably” from Southeast Asia, and the new administration’s aspiration to meet the geopolitical challenges and opportunities generated by the Sino-Soviet split of the late 1960s. Throughout the early 1970s, the Nixon administration developed its strategy for a new relationship with Asian nations, based on the maintenance of U.S. security commitments to and increased burden-sharing by its Asian allies. Simply put, the Nixon Doctrine stated: “We shall be faithful to our treaty commitments, but we shall reduce our involvement and our presence in other nations’ affairs.”

This Doctrine would ultimately lead to the removal of the 7th ID from Korea in 1971…and the coining of the term “Vietnamization.”